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Mobility and durable solutions: a case study of Afghan and Somali refugees

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Introduction

Refugee situations are traditionally met with three durable solutions (local integration, resettlement and repatriation) in the long-run, or self-settlement and encampment in the interim.[1] In recent years, however, some academics, institutions and policy makers have increasingly highlighted the viability of refugee mobility to refugee situations, and particularly to protracted situations where conventional responses remain elusive or ineffective.

For example, Monsutti advocates multi-directional and transnational mobility as part of a more comprehensive and relevant "Afghan" solution (2004; 2006; 2008). Long highlights the viability of labour migration in reasserting refugees' rights and socioeconomic security, and in promoting durable solutions in the long run (2009; 2010). Horst (2004; 2006a; 2006b) and Van Hear (2003; 2006) stress the significance of transnational mobility respectively for the survival of camp refugees, and as "an enduring if not a durable solution to refugees" (Van Hear, 2006, p. 9). Other academics including Lindley, Stigter, Scalettaris, Jacobsen, Hansen and Adepoju, among others, have also advocated mobile responses and shall be analysed in further detail throughout this paper.

Drawing on their arguments and the growing recognition of refugee mobility in theory and in practice, this paper will ask to what extent mobility truly represents a viable response to refugee situations. It will define mobility as migratory and transnational. Migratory mobility incorporates asylum, labour, educational or marital migration at a national, regional or international level. It involves physical movement between or from camps, from rural to urban settings, or onwards from a country of first asylum, and can be circular, permanent or temporary (Crisp, 2008, p. 23).

Mobility is also "a centrepiece of transnationalism", defined as the process by which 'transmigrants' build cross-border "familial, economic, social, organisational, religious and political" activities and networks through "sustained contacts and travel across national borders (Mahler, 1998, p. 76; Glick Schiller et al, 1992, pp. 1-2; Ahmed et al, 2003, p. 3). Consequently, transnational mobility incorporates both refugees who migrate and those who do not, but who are nonetheless implicated within transnational networks.

In this way, mobility is not simply physical movement per se; rather, it is a wider process that incorporates physical migration and transnationalism, together with the related social, cultural, economic and political processes, such as livelihoods, socioeconomic status, social networks, and remittances.

Through an analysis of Somali refugees in Kenya, and Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, this paper will argue that while mobility can represent a viable response, the extent to which it does so is ultimately limited to certain individuals, contexts and over time. In this sense, it would be inaccurate to either celebrate or negate altogether the viability of mobility. Moving away from some of the more celebratory arguments

[1] The term "refugee" shall refer to persons who meet the 1951 Refugee Convention definition, irrespective of official recognition of their refugee status.

for refugee mobility, this paper will maintain that the viability of mobility is best conceptualised as a nuanced and individually, contextually and historically specific process that remains therefore highly variable. This variability will be elaborated throughout the paper, which will also seek to identify trends and patterns that determine for whom, when, where, for what and why mobility represents a viable response to refugee situations.

This paper will consider to what extent mobility represents a "relevant", "constructive" and "workable" response in order to determine the overall viability of mobility.[2] Whilst enabling a more comprehensive examination of the term 'viable', these headings also incorporate a range of actors, arguments, perspectives and themes from which to develop a comprehensive theoretical and practical basis.

The first section will examine the relevance of mobility through a theoretical analysis that incorporates refugees' familiarity with mobility, socioeconomic status, gender and duration in exile. The second section will explore mobility's constructive extent by analysing both its tangible and conceptual implications for refugees' survival, local development and legal status. The third and final section will consider the 'workability' of mobility through an analysis of key stakeholders and the social, cultural, economic and political obstacles that obstruct the viability of mobility.

How relevant is mobility?

Defining "relevant" as pertinent, appropriate and applicable, it is clear that any response must be relevant in order to be viable. To date, social science has been largely 'a-mobile', and consequently mainstream approaches tend to prioritise sedentary rather than mobile responses for refugee situations (Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 208; Long & Crisp, 2010, p. 56; Huttunen, 2010, p. 44).[3] Adopting a refugee perspective, this paper will argue that mobility can be a relevant response to some refugees, but that this relevance is not uniform and will vary according to individual agency, structure and over time.

This argument shall be explored in relation to Afghan and Somali refugees' familiarity with mobility, socioeconomic status, gender, and duration in exile. In order to establish the extent of mobility's relevance, this paper will draw on Massey's 'politics of mobility' – similarly expressed by Hyndman (2000) and Ahmed et al (2003) – which argues that different social groups and individuals have distinct power relationships with mobility in terms of both their levels of engagement and control of movement (Massey, 1993, p. 61).[4] In this sense, not everyone will be able to access or benefit from mobility, and its relevance will therefore be varied and limited.

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[2] These adjectives are derived from a definition of viable as, "capable of working successfully; feasible" and "workable; practicable" (Pearsall & Hanks, 1998, p. 2058; Simpson & Weiner, 1989, p. 588).

[3] Encampment and third country policies seek to fix or sedentarise refugees 'in place' until a durable solution can be found. The three durable solutions are also linked to physical locations (repatriation to a country of origin, local integration to a country of asylum, and resettlement to a third country) and the assumption therefore that solutions occur when mobility ceases (Monsutti, 2008, p. 59).

[4] Accordingly "some are more in charge of [mobility] than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it" (Massey, 1993, p. 61).

Familiarity with mobility

Migratory and transnational mobility have historically constituted a key livelihood strategy and, more generally, a way of life for both Somalis and Afghans for generations (Horst, 2006c, p. 12; Monsutti, 2008, p. 58). Mobility is "part of the social and cultural landscape" of Afghans, and has formed a "quintessential part of life" for Somalis over the centuries (Monsutti, 2008, p. 60; Kleist, 2004, p. 2).[5] To what extent, however, is this familiarity and relevance of mobility prior to flight maintained by refugees when in exile? "Refugees do not appear out of a historical vacuum lacking in social networks, skills and experiences", and the mobile strategies developed in the past can remain, and in many cases already are, valuable in refugee situations (Horst, 2006c, p. 11).

'Camp to urban' and secondary migration are common among both refugee groups, as indicated by the 'matutus' that shuttle between Dadaab and Nairobi, and the presence of sizeable Afghan and Somali diasporas (Campbell, 2006, p. 407; Van Hear et al, 2009, p. 17; Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 212). Transnational mobility is also widespread as Afghans engage in "deep-rooted transnational activities" including multi-directional, cross-border movements and enduring transnational networks (Collective for Social Science Research, 2006, p. 2; Monsutti, 2007, p. 169).

As well as a continuation of mobile practices, evidence suggests that the relevance of mobility can even intensify in exile (Scalettaris, 2009, p. 58; Horst, 2004, p. 3). For example, transnational remittances have been central to the Somali economy for decades, but have become even more relevant in recent years due to the increase in Somalis living abroad and technological improvements in telecommunications (Horst, 2004, p. 5).[6] In these ways, mobility constitutes an important, common and therefore relevant strategy for many Afghan and Somali refugees.

This being said, refugees exhibit great diversity in adapting to exile, and outcomes will vary according to individual agency and refugees' social, economic, cultural and political context (Horst, 2006c, p. 10). Consequently, while many may engage in mobile strategies, mobility can be less relevant for the many others who either choose or are coerced into more sedentary strategies. For example, migratory (if not transnational) mobility may be less relevant for the approximate 210,000 refugees who remain in Kakuma and Dadaab camps, and for the estimated five million Afghans who have repatriated to Afghanistan (Crisp, 2000, p. 602).

While repatriation can involve initial mobility to another country it is, in theory, intended to be uni-directional with an emphasis on containing or reversing movement. In this way, while mobility may be relevant for those already familiar with mobile strategies, it is by no means uniformly or automatically so, even in the Somali and Afghan cases where it should arguably be at its most applicable given common histories of mobility.

[5] Both Somalis and Afghans have migrated for nomadic pastoralism, religion, trade, and more recently for educational and labour purposes for centuries (Horst, 2004, p. 3; Monsutti, 2008, p. 60)

[6] The number of Somalis abroad has multiplied by ten since the outbreak of war in 1991 (Gundel, 2003, p. 12).

While mobility may therefore be variably yet significantly relevant for many Afghan and Somali refugees already familiar with mobility, to what extent is it relevant and therefore viable for more historically sedentary or agricultural communities? Prior to displacement, farming was the primary occupation of many Sudanese refugees living in Ugandan settlements, and many subsequently preferred to remain in sedentary agricultural settlements whilst in exile.

At the same time, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that significant numbers of Sudanese also chose to self-settle outside the settlement system (Kaiser, Hovil, & Lomo, 2005, p. 10). While self-settlement does not necessarily entail mobility, many Sudanese self-settled refugees subsequently engaged in regular physical movement to and from settlements and within the area generally, as well as regular visits to Sudan in order to purchase market resources, visit their land, attend burials and assess the security situation there (Kaiser, 2006, p. 610; Hovil, 2002, p. 15).

In these ways, the relevance of mobility conforms to both continuity and adaptation, so that while mobility may be more relevant to already mobile refugees, it can become increasingly relevant for some agriculturalist refugees who adapt to their refugee situation. Moreover, Somali, Afghan and Sudanese refugees evade strict categorisations; as indicated above, all three groups engage in both sedentary and mobile strategies. In addition, Sudanese refugees express both negative and positive feelings to leaving the settlements (Kaiser, 2006, p. 606).

In this sense, far-reaching assumptions remain problematic, particularly as the relevance of mobility may vary significantly according to structural context and individual agency. For example, for Sudanese agriculturalists, the decision to remain in camps may reflect limited assistance, restricted access to land outside the settlements or the inability to move, as opposed to a natural preference for a more sedentary lifestyle.[7] Likewise, the decision to engage in more mobile strategies may reflect general insecurity or failings of the self-reliance strategy (SRS) rather than an affinity with more mobile strategies.[8] In these examples, the extent to which mobility is relevant is clearly more limited when it is coerced or reactive as opposed to chosen or proactive.

Socio-economic status

Socioeconomic status, attributed to refugees' differing levels of social and financial capital, can also determine the extent to which mobility represents a relevant response. In the context of restrictive policies, migration is an increasingly expensive option. Afghan refugees must pay smugglers and guides, bribe officials, buy identification papers, meet the costs of transport, finance prison releases, and so on (Monsutti, 2007, pp. 173-175).

[7] For example, psychosocial and economic dependency on the settlement structure left many powerless to move as indicated by one female interviewee, "I want to go, but there is no means for me to go" (Hovil, 2002, pp. 12-13).

[8] Soil infertility, limited inputs, small plots and isolation from markets has meant that many remain reliant on food aid (Kaiser, 2006).

This creates a hierarchy of mobility similar to Massey's 'politics of mobility', whereby certain mobile strategies and destinations are more accessible and therefore relevant for certain groups of refugees. For example, asylum migration to the West in particular is often a more relevant and viable strategy for those who can mobilise significant resources (Van Hear, 2003, p. 11). Alternatively, labour migration to the Middle East is more accessible and therefore relevant for poorer Somali refugee households as it requires fewer resources (Lindley, 2007b, p. 11; Long, 2009). In this way, while low financial capital may hinder certain forms of migration it does not, however, necessarily rule out the relevance of mobility altogether.

Social capital can also determine the relevance of mobility by providing the information, financial resources and logistical support central to engaging in mobile strategies (Crisp, 1999, p. 7). Transnational social networks are "by no means a universal phenomenon", however, and one's ability to maintain them (through potentially expensive visits, long-distance phone calls and the sending or receipt of remittances) may rely on some prior level of financial resources (Dorai, 2002, p. 92). In this way, the relevance of mobility will vary according to complex combinations of social and economic capital.

While refugees with greater wealth are more likely to engage in mobile strategies, so too are those with significant social support. For example, Goldsmith determines three categories of Somali refugees; those with economic capital who reside in upscale areas of Nairobi, those with clan or lineage connection to Kenyan Somalis who live in the Eastleigh area, and those with both poor social and economic capital who remain sedentary in camps (Goldsmith, 1997, p. 470).

Although poorer refugees with social capital may thus be able to engage in cheaper or shorter forms of migration, the very poorest may therefore be excluded altogether. Consequently, and similarly to Massey's theory, mobility is only relevant for those who can access it and it may be less and even irrelevant for those lacking the social and/or economic capital required to participate.

Gender

In accordance with Massey's 'politics of mobility', gendered constructs also determine both who controls and who engages in mobility; with significant implications therefore for the relevance of mobility.[9] For example, Hazara men are significantly more mobile than women due to long-held gendered constructs that limit women to domestic responsibilities within the domestic unit (Monsutti, 2007, p. 182). In the case of Somalis, men tend to be more mobile than women given women's often lower skill level, limited resources and responsibility for child care (Hyndman, 2000, p. 160).

Mobile responses may also be less relevant for young children and the elderly associated with vulnerability and immobility; for example, older generations are generally less mobile and tend to remain behind in camps and countries of asylum

[9] Gender is a relational process that constructs socially acceptable roles, responsibilities, identities and hierarchies between men, women, children and the elderly (Crawley, 2000, p. 17; El-Bushra, 2000, p. 4).

(UNHCR, 2000). The relevance of mobility, and particularly labour migration, is also linked to gendered assumptions in the labour market that certain groups, whether women, children or the elderly, are less able or suitable for certain jobs.

Nevertheless, the extent to which mobility is relevant will vary. Able-bodied and physically strong Afghan men in their teens, twenties, thirties and forties are more likely to migrate than weaker or older male counterparts, indicating that mobility isn't automatically and uniformly relevant for men (Stigter & Monsutti, 2005, p. 5).

Furthermore, mobility is less relevant for an only child or son who is unlikely to be allowed to migrate (ibid). The experiences of women are also varied; while Hazara women may remain sedentary, others groups engage actively in various forms of migration; certain Somali women move around neighbouring countries as nomadic traders, and others travel to Nairobi to open roadside stalls or work as domestic servants (Kleist, 2004, p. 4; Campbell, 2006, pp. 404-405). In these cases, labour market constructs can also favour women over men in relation to female-associated forms of employment.

In addition, the relevance of mobility is not determined by refugees' direct engagement in migration alone, as women, children and the elderly may actively engage in transnational networks that do not require physical movement per se. Transnational remittances go beyond those who migrate to migrants' families and communities, and often directly to the wife where the remitter is married (Stigter & Monsutti, 2005, p. 10). Furthermore, mobility can challenge traditional gendered responsibilities, thereby again increasing the relevance of mobility for those who stay behind.

While emancipation is by no means an automatic corollary of mobility, some Afghan women have adjusted hierarchies in relation to the modernising example of Iran and take on greater responsibility and decision making in the absence of men (Monsutti, 2007, p. 184). While gendered constructs are clearly significant in determining the relevance of migration for men, women, children and the elderly, their varied experiences and access to transnational networks indicate that the extent to which mobility is relevant will vary according to the individual, context and over time.

Duration in exile

Protracted exile can also determine the relevance of mobility over time. At the beginning of an emergency, humanitarian assistance is often the most crucial response for the survival of refugees (Bakewell, 1999, p. 2). Many fleeing refugees are separated from family members, social networks, assets, possessions and livelihoods, and arrive in critical emotional and physical conditions. Mobile strategies are often risky and carry significant physical and emotional costs associated with family separation, deportation, illness and injury (Stigter & Monsutti, 2005, p. 7).

Consequently many refugees may prefer to remain in camps which can represent a much needed "safety net and a protective environment" and provide at least some, if not all, of their basic needs (Kaiser, Hovil, & Lomo, 2005, p. 14). The extent to which mobility represents a relevant and indeed preferred response to refugees during earlier

stages will ultimately depend upon their individual agency and structure, limiting the possibility of exhaustive conclusions or hypotheses. Broadly speaking, however, mobility may become more relevant over time as refugees' needs and preferences change. Priorities frequently shift over time from immediate survival to education, employment, training, health care and access to credit, which may be better met by more mobile strategies that expand livelihoods and opportunities (Cheng & Chudoba, 2003, p. 2).

In any case, assistance in protracted situations declines sharply over time as donors prioritise new emergencies (Jacobsen, 2006, p. 14). Consequently, migratory and transnational mobility may also become increasingly relevant to those who must now find alternative means of meeting their ongoing survival needs. Furthermore, protracted refugee situations (PRS) have increased in duration and number over the past two decades and affect an estimated 5.5 million refugees around the world, indicating therefore that the relevance of mobility may be expanding (UNHCR, 2006, p. 109).[10]

While mobility may arguably become more relevant to refugees in protracted exile, there has, however, been much debate surrounding the durability of transnational mobility and networks in the long run, and particularly among second generations (see Levitt & Jaworksy (2007); Bryceson & Vuorela (2002), Vertovec (2009)). Transnational mobility is perhaps best conceptualised as a fluid and evolving process rather than an automatic state of being, whose relevance therefore is not guaranteed at all times or indefinitely (Ali-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001, p. 594). For example, Somali refugee remitters often associate remittances with temporality, suggesting that they do not plan to maintain financial transnational linkages indefinitely (Horst, 2006b, p. 19).

This paper has argued that mobility can be relevant, but that the extent to which this is so will vary. Exhaustive or far-reaching conclusions and assumptions do not reflect the lived experiences of Afghan and Somali refugees who conform to varying extents to both sedentary and mobile strategies. In this sense, mobility can be both normal and abnormal, significant and inappropriate, destabilising and liberating, pervasive and limited, and therefore relevant and irrelevant depending on the refugee in question, and when, where and why they engage in mobility.

For example, the relevance of mobility may vary depending on whether refugees are direct participants or indirect recipients, and on whether they proactively choose to engage or are reactively coerced by their situation. In addition, certain forms of mobility may be more or less relevant to some than others, or may become so over time. In these ways, agency, structure and era are central to the relevance of mobility, and ensure the extent of mobility's relevance and therefore viability is limited to certain refugees, contexts and times. Consequently, and in answer to this section's title, while mobility may be more relevant than traditionally assumed, it is not greatly, uniformly or consistently so as it is ultimately constricted by its variability and changeability.

While far-reaching conclusions regarding the relevance and therefore viability of mobility remain elusive, this paper has nonetheless attempted to more thoroughly

[10] PRS rose from nine to seventeen years between 1993 and 2003 (UNHCR, 2006, p. 109).

determine the relevance of mobility by hypothesising for whom, when and where mobility is relevant in the albeit narrow context of certain Afghan and Somali refugees in Pakistan, Iran and Kenya.

Taking Massey's argument that "different groups of people have distinct relationships to mobility", this paper has sought to isolate some general, though by no means universal or all-purpose patterns (Massey, 1993, p. 61). Firstly, the relevance of mobility entails both continuation and adaptation. Consequently, while mobility may be more common among previously mobile groups and male refugees, it can also become relevant for previously sedentary agriculturalists and for certain groups of women (although the extent will vary significantly).

Secondly, mobility conforms to a hierarchy, whereby long-distance and more secure forms of mobility are more accessible to refugees with greater combined social and economic capital, while more 'irregular' mobility or even immobility hold greater relevance for those with fewer resources and contacts. As has been argued throughout, however, these trends are by no means static and unambiguous.

Thirdly, mobility may become more relevant and therefore viable for refugees over time; as exile becomes protracted, their needs and preferences shift, circumstances change and funding is reduced. Ultimately, however, refugees' familiarity with mobility, socioeconomic status, gender and duration in exile combine with other factors including structure, agency and era to ensure significant variations in the relevance of mobility.

How constructive is mobility?

If a viable response is defined as one that is one that is "capable of working successfully", it must arguably therefore be constructive (Pearsall & Hanks, 1998, p. 2058). Defined as practical, beneficial and productive, a constructive response is viable in that it positively benefits those involved, promoting practical and productive outcomes. To what extent, however, is mobility a constructive and therefore viable response?

This paper will consider the constructive and destructive implications of mobility in relation to survival, socioeconomic development and legal status, asking to what extent mobility is constructive for each. It will also use as a basis of analysis the migratory and transnational mobility employed by Somali refugees who move from camps to urban areas to expand and diversify their livelihood opportunities, send remittances and pursue further migration.

While the implications of mobility are by no means limited to survival, socioeconomic development and legal status, these themes usefully incorporate a mix of social, economic, political and legal perspectives, as well as a range of different actors; camp refugees, mobile refugees, stayees, host communities, donors and UNHCR. In this sense, these three areas also provide a useful starting point for answering three questions, which shall be posed throughout this section; constructive for whom, when and under what context? It shall be argued that mobility can incur both constructive and destructive' repercussions depending on individual agency,

structural context and time. While the constructive extent of mobility remains therefore varied and context specific, it shall nonetheless be broadly maintained that mobility's greater constructive potential for survival and local development can be undermined by its more destructive' implications for legal status.

Survival

Camp refugees in Kenya face a range of significant economic, physical and psychosocial insecurities that threaten their daily survival (Horst, 2006a, pp. 19, 77; Horst & Van Hear, 2002, p. 33; Omaar & de Waal, 1993). Violence, in the form of cross-border attacks, inter-clan rivalry and sexual abuse, is common (Crisp, 2000; Omaar & de Waal, 1993). Malnutrition is widespread as inadequate rations of 1,900 K-cals are provided for just two years (Verdirame, 1999, pp. 67-68).[11]

Educational opportunities are also limited, with low primary school attendance and scarce secondary schooling opportunities (Moret et al, 2006, p. 39). Agricultural or market-based livelihood opportunities are inadequate given the aridity and isolation of camps, leaving most refugees dependent on low profit petty trade or limited and low paid employment opportunities with aid agencies (Verdirame, 1999, p. 62; Horst & Van Hear, 2002, p. 33).

In this context, migratory and transnational mobility can be constructive and even "essential for [the] daily survival" of camp refugees (Horst, 2006a; Shandy, 2003; Koser & Van Hear, 2003).[12] Typically identified as places of immobility and control, camps can also be sites of connection and link, as indicated by the telecommunication centres near or within them (Van Hear, 2003, p. 3).

In this context, transnational mobility can transfer essential economic, social, emotional and informational resources, which can directly supplement inadequate rations and ensure survival during times of contingency when the refugee regime provides no additional assistance. While only ten to fifteen per cent of Dadaab refugees receive direct financial support, transnational mobility may also promote the survival of indirect recipients. In both Somali and Afghan contexts, rremittances are shared with relatives and neighbours, and create a source of credit and demand for labour and goods (Horst, 2006a; Jazayery, 2002, p. 242; Savage & Harvey, 2007, p. 35).

In addition to transnational transfers, migratory and transnational mobility also ensure refugees' survival by enabling them to diversify their livelihood strategies and consequently to spread and manage risk. While elderly and younger family members may remain in camps to take advantage of health and education services, others may engage in return migration to countries of origin to maintain assets, still others may pursue livelihoods through circular migration to cities or seasonal agricultural work, while other family members may migrate further abroad in the hope of more secure

[11] During 1990s, malnutrition in Dadaab camps reached 54%, with mortality rates were at five times the average (UNHCR, 2006, p. 122).

[12] To clarify, in the context of migration and remittances between camps and urban areas, transnational mobility can take on a more localised or internalised nature when it occurs within rather than across national borders.

asylum and higher incomes (Van Hear, 2006, p. 12). These diversification strategies can represent a more secure, sustainable and therefore constructive response than other common survival strategies, such as prostitution, irregular farming, theft and premature repatriation (Crisp, 2003, pp. 19-23).[13] In addition, the transnational nature of these strategies ensures that the constructive potential of mobility extends beyond camp refugees to include urban refugees in Kenya, Pakistan and Iran, as well as 'stayees' and returnees in Somalia and Afghanistan (Jazayery, 2002, p. 242; Savage & Harvey, 2007, p. 11; Monsutti, 2004, p. 221).

While mobility may be highly constructive and therefore viable in the aforementioned examples, its benefits do not accrue uniformly, straightforwardly or automatically among refugees and over time. For example, transnational remittances are frequently associated with inequality (de Haas, 2005, p. 1278; Skeldon, 2007, p. 14), and around ten to fifteen percent of Dadaab refugees receive no advantage whatsoever, thus remaining totally reliant on aid agencies for their survival (Horst, 2006a, p. 157).

In this sense, and in spite of the shortfalls associated with humanitarian assistance, the constructive potential of mobility may be limited to its ability to supplement rather than replace humanitarian assistance in camps. Moreover, mobility is a relational process with knock-on effects for others. Consequently, while mobility may be essential for the survival of many camp refugees, it can be significantly less so for refugee remitters who may be "enforced" or "pressured" into maintaining transnational links and sending remittances (Ali-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001, p. 596; Lindley, 2007b, p. 16).

Facing socioeconomic pressures of their own, transnational mobility can thus exacerbate their poverty and restrict their own educational, career, marital and familial prospects (Horst, 2006b, p. 18; Lindley, 2007b, pp. 19-22).[14] The constructive extent of mobility is clearly limited if it promotes the survival of some by exacerbating the situation of others.

The constructive extent of mobility will also vary according to context and over time, as mobility will arguably be at its most constructive when refugees' basic physical needs are not already being met. For example, economic downturn and domestic political pressure during the 1990s saw Iran revoke education and health subsidies and limit UNHCR assistance, so that migratory and transnational mobility became arguably more constructive to survival than they had once been when these albeit basic services were still provided (Abbassi-Shavazi et al, 2005).

Pakistan evokes a similar picture as whereas refugees once had access to "an extensive international aid apparatus…with generous external funding", the provision of food rations and other assistance ceased after 1995, obliging many refugees to engage in increasingly constructive transnational strategies and urban migration in order to meet their needs (Harpviken, 2009, p. 79). Overall therefore, while transnational and migratory mobility are constructive for the survival of some

[13] That said, there is no guarantee that mobile strategies won't lead to further exploitation and insecurity elsewhere, as shall be explored in the Nairobi context below.

[14] As indicated by remitting refugees' endorsement of self-sustaining investments, such as the education or migration of younger relatives who can then take over their remittance responsibilities (Lindley, 2007b, p. 25).

(whether directly or indirectly) they may be less so for others, and will depend on the context over time.

Local development

In addition to daily survival, mobility can also constructively and therefore viably promote longer-term socioeconomic development. A significant number of Somali refugees migrate temporarily from Kenyan camps to Nairobi's Eastleigh district, and in doing so can both directly and indirectly "remake place" with often positive but also negative results (Hyndman, 2000, p. 151). As active consumers and a cheap supply of labour, urban refugees "boost economic production, fill gaps in the labour market and creat[e] new business opportunities", consequently helping transform Eastleigh from a "residential community to the commercial centre of the Eastlands" (UNHCR, 2007, p. 13; Campbell, 2006, p. 402).

In contrast to the rural-bound traffic of Kenyan remittances, Somali remittances are largely spent in the city economy constituting a source of hard currency and creating substantial demand (Lindley, 2007a, p. 13). Consequently, Eastleigh now attracts investments and consumers from throughout the city, offers the cheapest goods and services in Nairobi and has created employment opportunities for both local Kenyans as well as refugees (Campbell, 2006, pp. 403-408).

The constructive impact of mobility can also extend to countries of origin. Somali and Afghan transnational mobility in the form of social and financial remittances, investments, political lobbying and regular return visits has supported reconstruction and development efforts in Somalia and Afghanistan (Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006, p. 15; Oeppen & Schlenkoff, 2010, pp. 151-152). For whom, however, is this constructive; for refugees in the diaspora who may already be struggling to meet transnational responsibilities or for donors looking to reduce budgets? In any case, diasporas can be highly constructive for development, as indicated by Somali diasporic organisations that invest in hospitals, schools, universities and other health and educational facilities (Hansen, 2004).

In addition to the above-mentioned material benefits, migratory and transnational mobility may also be constructive in dispelling common conceptual assumptions (shared by many academics, policy makers and aid agencies) that refugees are an economic burden best confined to camps, and that mobility sits in opposition to development.[15] Indeed, over the last decade there has been a major conceptual shift among the international community, and migration is increasingly identified as an opportunity and a positive force for development (Black & Skeldon, 2009, p. 2).

This shift has, however, been largely limited to migrants, and greater recognition of the development potential of more mobile *refugees* could feasibly help to moderate the increasingly restrictive policies exhibited by Pakistan, Iran and Kenya. It could also promote a reappraisal of dominant camp relief programmes (which tend to bypass local communities through parallel refugee systems) by encouraging greater

[15] Unilinear development models and modernisation theories see "a settled existence [as] far superior to a mobile one" in terms of both individual development and national-level economic contributions (Chatty, 2010, p. 29).

integration of refugee and host community services (Harrell-Bond, 2000, p. 11), as has occurred with some success elsewhere (see Van Damme, 1995).

In these ways, migratory and transnational mobility can be highly constructive, both materially and conceptually, for local development in countries of asylum and origin. Nonetheless, the extent to which this represents a constructive response to refugee situations remains highly variable and dependent on a number of factors. Firstly, the constructive potential of mobility is not automatic and can be undermined by hostile state policies, language barriers, irregular status and xenophobia.

In contrast to the transformation of Eastleigh, the restrictive policies of the Iranian government have prevented Afghan refugees from establishing larger collectives or economic niches, thus undermining their developmental potential in their host country (Harpviken, 2009, p. 96). In the context of home countries, mobility's constructive potential may also be undermined by displacement, physical insecurity and the resultant absence of financial institutions, investment opportunities and functioning governments; features of both Somalia and Afghanistan (Sriskandarajah, 2002, p. 297).

Secondly, the constructive extent of mobility is neither uniform nor consistent. While the migration of Somali refugees to Eastleigh promoted investment and employment opportunities, the influx of refugees has also been associated with rising accommodation costs, overcrowding, struggling public infrastructure and crime (Lindley, 2007a, p. 5). In other scenarios, more mobile refugees have also been blamed (accurately or not) for deforestation, soil erosion, land and resource shortages, and the spread of disease.

Thirdly, the extent to which mobility is constructive can vary from person to person depending on their socioeconomic status, gender, age, class and location (Whitaker, 2002, p. 339). For example, the benefits to local hosts often accrue unevenly to wealthier members of society as they may be in a stronger position to profit from the upsurge in cheap labour, trade and business created by an influx of refugees. Indeed, poorer residents may become worse off due to increased competition for jobs, lower wages, rising accomodation costs and general inflation (Whitaker, 2002, p. 247). In these ways, while mobility can promote local development, the extent to which this is constructive is not automatic, uniform or consistent, but highly variable.

Legal status

While mobility can potentially, yet variably, be constructive in promoting survival and socioeconomic development, it can have serious implications for refugees' legal status. As Somali refugees in Kenya are officially prohibited from leaving the camps, mobile refugees occupy a legal limbo and are consequently associated with irregular migrants in the eyes of the authorities.

In this way, mobility can undermine Somali refugees' legal status with destructive implications for their access to humanitarian assistance, protection and rights.[16] This is most clearly indicated by the vulnerability of urban Somali refugees who are exposed to xenophobia, discrimination and a range of protection issues. These include arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation, physical and sexual abuse, and exploitation from employers and landlords (UNHCR, 2005, p. 181).

In addition, refugees' officially recognised rights to earn a wage, employment, housing, and public relief and assistance are also destructively undermined by mobility to urban areas. For example, Somali urban refugees often live in squalid housing conditions, struggle to obtain food and other material and medical assistance, and are restricted to irregular, unreliable and insecure work opportunities (Parker, 2002, pp. 27-35).

Perhaps for these reasons, forty per cent of Nairobi interviewees stated that their situation had not improved significantly and that they were consequently hoping to pursue further movements (Moret et al, 2006, p. 40). Indeed, many mobile Somali refugees are obliged to return to refugee camps or attempt secondary migration to another country (Campbell, 2006, p. 409; Moret et al, 2006, pp. 10-11). If, as defined above, a constructive response is one that positively benefits those involved, promoting practical and productive outcomes, mobility in these cases can be destructive for refugees whose legal status has been undermined.

This being said, the extent to which mobility undermines legal status is ultimately determined by a number of factors, including firstly levels of protection, rights and humanitarian assistance prior to movement. For example, camp refugees (who abide by Kenya's encampment policy) also experience extreme physical and economic insecurity characterised by the aforementioned malnutrition, marginalisation and violence (Lomo, 2000, p. 271).

Consequently, the destructive extent of mobility for refugees' legal status is arguably lessened by the fact that insecurity and hardship are features of both camp and urban contexts, and may therefore be the result of the political and legal backdrop rather than mobility per se. In this context, mobility may even constructively promote refugees' otherwise absent rights, given that the freedom of movement is often a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other economic, political and social rights (Kaiser, 2006, p. 604).

Secondly, the destructive extent of mobility will be lessened in situations where official refugee status exists only partially, temporarily or not at all, and where movement is permitted. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report found that "both Iran and Pakistan have been inconsistent, even negligent, in their recognition of the legal status of Afghan refugees" (2002). They regard refugee protection as a religious or humanitarian as opposed to a legal duty, and recognise refugees as involuntary migrants or mohajerin (people seeking asylum for religious reasons) rather than Convention refugees (Abbassi-Shavazi et al, 2005, pp. 20-21).

[16] Protection is provided by an international legal framework that, in theory, safeguards a range of refugees' civil, political, social and economic and cultural rights (Newland, Patrick, & Zard, 2003; Newland, 2001, p. 518). In this context, protection is a legal issue, and can be withheld from those who do not adhere to the status quo.

In this sense, Afghan refugees' legal status is less susceptible to being undermined by mobility as it never fully existed. In any case, refugee mobility is permitted in both Iran and Pakistan, albeit to differing extents, so that their legal status is not undermined by camp to urban migration in the same way as it is for Somalis. In these ways, while mobility is unlikely to be constructive for legal status, it is perhaps less destructive for many Afghan refugees, given both their comparative freedom to move and their limited legal status.

Through an analysis of survival, local development and legal status, this paper has argued that mobility can represent a constructive and therefore viable response to refugee situations, but that the extent to which it is able to do so is mixed. Mobility can have both constructive and destructive implications for different individuals depending on their shifting roles and responsibilities, socioeconomic status, and desire and ability to engage in mobility. Likewise, its constructive capacity is significantly determined by host country policies towards refugees and their mobility.

For these reasons, while mobility is essential for the survival of some, it is less constructive for those lacking the socioeconomic capital to directly or indirectly participate in transnational mobility or livelihood diversification schemes, and for those obliged to send remittances they cannot afford. Furthermore, while mobility can be highly constructive for local development of countries of asylum and origin and for challenging negative conceptualisations around refugees and mobility, its benefits do not accrue automatically, uniformly or consistently.

Finally, while mobility may destructively undermine legal status, it can ultimately, though by no means necessarily, prove less destructive when refugees' legal status, protection and rights are already undermined. In these ways, the extent to which mobility represents a constructive response is mixed and therefore limited as it incurs both constructive and destructive implications.

As a consequence, far-reaching or universal conclusions remain subtle and shifting. Broadly speaking, however, and with significant exceptions, mobility may ultimately prove more constructive for Afghan and particularly Somali refugees' survival and local development than for their legal status. Survival, development and legal status are not disconnected, however, and the implications of one are likely to have knock-on effects for the others.[17]

In this light, the constructive extent of mobility as a whole is perhaps best determined by balancing the more constructive elements of survival and development against the less constructive aspects for legal status. According to this method and not in relation to the Somali or Afghan cases, Long appears to emphasise the overall constructive extent of mobility by maintaining that the protection risks associated with legal status are "not sufficiently grave to outweigh the potential benefits" of labour migration (2009, p. 20).

[17] For example, refugees with uncertain legal status resist activities that may further jeopardise their status, and are therefore less likely to engage in transnational mobility and the transferral of social and financial remittances so crucial for refugees' survival and local development (Ali-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001, pp. 582-583)

Conversely, Kibreab lays the emphasis on legal status and thereby downgrades the constructive extent of mobility as a whole. He argues that a "socially and economically fulfilling life" is best provided by repatriation (as opposed to mobility) due to refugees' lack of rights and membership (or legal status) in countries of asylum (Kibreab, 1995, p. 385). This paper has taken a more contextualised approach, arguing that mobility's constructive extent depends ultimately on the individual, the context and the era, as indicated by the differing experiences both between and among Afghan and Somali refugees.

How workable is mobility?

Defining "workable" as feasible, practicable and functional, any response must logically be workable in order to be viable. Thus far, this paper has explored the relevant and constructive extent of mobility by drawing on examples of informal mobile strategies already employed by Somali and Afghan refugees. If, as argued in the previous chapter, the constructive extent of mobility is limited by subsequent irregular legal status, a workable response must surely sit legitimately with national and international agendas.

Consequently, this paper will now consider the extent to which mobility is workable in relation to regularised and officially recognised mobile 'solutions'. It will argue that there is some scope for a workable mobile 'solution'; indeed, mobility is already enshrined in internationally recognised and widely ratified agreements, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Nevertheless, the extent to which mobility constitutes a workable response is ultimately undermined by shifting social, cultural, economic and political obstacles from refugees, local communities, UNHCR and states.

Divided into three sections, the remainder of this paper will now elaborate these arguments according to micro, meso and macro-level perspectives by asking for what, when, for whom, why and under what contexts are mobile solutions workable and therefore viable? Firstly, however, it will outline four mobile 'solutions' that have been advocated and sometimes implemented by academics and policy makers over the past decade.

Mobile 'solutions'

Regularised labour migration is advocated by Long (2009; 2010), Saito (2009), and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNHCR (2008) as a "feasible, desirable and necessary" response that would provide refugees with legal 'labour migrant' status, and improve their rights and socioeconomic status (Long, 2009, p. 24).[18] Transnationalism is a second mobile 'solution' that has been sponsored by Van Hear (2003; 2006), Hansen (2006), Black & Gent (2006) and Horst (2006c), among others, as a means of sustaining refugees, strengthening livelihood opportunities and promoting sustainable durable solutions.

[18] As recognised and regularised migrants, refugees could access labour markets more securely and safely, and move more freely than they currently do due to their limited status, rights and freedoms.

Regional free movement agreements constitute a third mobile 'solution' encouraged by Adepoju, Boulton & Levin (2002; 2007), Long & Crisp (2010), Stigter (2005) and Monsutti (2004; 2006; 2008) as a potential means of extending residence and work rights and enabling post-repatriation mobility. Drawing on Somali refugees' 'camp to city' migration elaborated in the previous chapter, this chapter will also examine the 'workability' of internal asylum migration as an officially sanctioned response.

A micro-level analysis: refugees and local communities

This paper maintains that mobile 'solutions' are unworkable without the engagement of key stakeholders, including refugees and local communities at the micro level. Given the considerable variability of these micro-level perspectives, this paper will not provide a clear case for or against the 'workability' of mobility, rather it will contextualise how and why refugees and host communities engage in mobile 'solutions'. Consequently, while there is certainly scope for engagement, it is not automatic and will vary according to the individual, the context, particular events and over time.

To what extent are refugees both willing and able to engage in mobile 'solutions'? As indicated in previous chapters, many refugees already engage in a range of informal mobile strategies, and may therefore participate in similar regularised 'solutions'.[19] On the one hand, transnationalism, regional free movements and regularised labour migration could prove particularly workable for second generation Afghan refugees keen to return for regular visits, but open to re-migrating in the context of poor employment opportunities in Afghanistan (Saito, 2009, p. 47). On the other hand, these may be less appealing for others who prefer to maintain their refugee status in the hope of acquiring resettlement (Adepoju, Boulton, & Levin, 2007, pp. 18-19).[20]

This is particularly true for the many Somalis who have the condition known as *buufis*; the term used to denote an almost medical longing for resettlement (Horst, 2006b, p. 6). In any case, those wanting to engage in mobile 'solutions' may be unable to participate in the first place. Regularised labour migration may apply more readily to men than women due to gendered constructs and to the fact that existing labour opportunities for refugees in Iran and Pakistan are often restricted to manual labour (Harpviken, 2009, p. 89). In these ways, while mobile 'solutions' can be workable, the extent to which they are will vary, and depend on refugees' individual preferences and ability to participate.

A workable and therefore viable 'solution' also depends on the acquiescence of local communities and their tolerance of refugees more generally; while discontented hosts are more likely to actively obstruct refugees' movements, an engaged and accommodating host community can contribute to the employment opportunities, sanctuary and progressive policies required for successful mobile 'solutions'. As indicated by the Eastleigh example, refugees created significant socioeconomic benefits for local Kenyan communities, in the form of supply and demand, cheap

[19] As the relevance of mobility has already been analysed in detail from a refugee perspective, this paper will now provide a comparatively brief analysis in relation to refugees.

[20] Regularised labour migration and regional free movement agreements often involve the transferral of refugee to migrant status. This point shall be explored in further detail below in relation to protection.

labour, business opportunities, employment creation and local development (Goldsmith, 1997, pp. 469-470).

In addition, some Afghan refugees and Pakistani hosts are connected by kinship, ethnic, religious and political networks, which promote greater solidarity and moral obligation between refugees and local communities (Collective for Social Science Research, 2006, p. 3). While reasons for positive engagement therefore exist, local hostility to refugees remains significant, indicating that the 'workability' of mobile 'solutions' is ultimately limited to some extent.

For example, in a 2004 survey ninety six per cent of Kenyan interviewees in Eastleigh believed that refugees should remain in camps or be repatriated, in spite of their contributions to local development (Campbell, 2006, pp. 401-402). Furthermore, in a context of high unemployment, many Iranians view the presence of refugees as more of a burden than a benefit. (Strand, Suhrke, & Harpviken, 2004, p. 3).

This mixed picture suggests that mobile 'solutions' may be more workable among some groups than others, namely employers, entrepreneurs or others who stand to benefit from business and employment opportunities, as well as those who feel morally obliged by ethnic and other ties. Secondly, the 'workability' of mobile 'solutions' may also depend on the era and type of refugee situation; local Pakistani engagement waned due to the protracted and large-scale nature of Afghan exile as locals increasingly feared permanent integration and demographic, ethnic and sectarian disequilibrium (Azhar, 1990).

In this sense, the factors promoting refugee and host participation may be at odds; while mobility may become more relevant for refugees in protracted exile (as argued above), it may become less workable among local communities over time, thus undermining the viability of mobile 'solutions' as a whole.

A meso-level analysis: the refugee regime

In addition to refugee and local community engagement, a workable mobile 'solution' requires the backing of the UNHCR and should be compatible with two central tenets of the refugee regime: durable solutions and refugee protection. Indeed, UNHCR has significant leverage over host states' refugee policies, and can provide important political, technical, logistical and financial impetus necessary for the practical application of mobile 'solutions' (Voutira & Harrell-Bond, 1995, p. 214; Long, 2009, p. 24).

Over the past three years, UNHCR has increasingly promoted mobility as an essential, albeit complimentary, component of any refugee response (Long, 2010, p. 13).[21] While this recent development clearly heightens the 'workability' of mobile 'solutions', UNHCR policy remains nevertheless uneven and cautious. Subsequently, the 'workability' of mobility is limited to certain mobile 'solutions' (namely

[21] This contrasts to its 1990s 'proactive' and 'preventative' approach "based on the notion that refugee movements and population displacements can be contained, controlled or managed" (UNHCR, 1995, p. 43).

regularised labour migration and regional free movement) and certain refugee situations (particularly protracted and mixed migratory refugee flows).

For example, UNHCR's '10 Point Plan of Action on Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration' and its Afghanistan Comprehensive Solutions Unit (ACSU) cite regional free movement and regularised labour migration for residual refugees and mixed migratory flows only, with little attempt to extend these initiatives to other mobile 'solutions' or refugees. Indeed, in the 2006 publication of *the State of the World's Refugees*, labour migration is the only mobile suggestion expressly suggested under the chapter *Rethinking Durable Solutions* (UNHCR, 2006, p. 140).

Moreover, UNHCR's reliance on camp structures for the efficient and transparent provision of humanitarian assistance make it arguably less supportive of other mobile 'solutions', such as internal asylum mobility, that encourage refugees to leave camps (Hyndman, 2000, p. 88; Black, 1998, p. 5). In any case, conventional durable solutions and repatriation in particular remain UNHCR's priority indicating that mobile 'solutions' may ultimately be less workable and therefore less viable than more traditional 'solutions'.[22]

Even so, while mobile 'solutions' may differ conceptually from more sedentary durable solutions, they are not in fact incompatible. In this way, mobility can also be workable in pragmatically promoting evasive durable solutions in protracted and complex refugee situations. For example, in the context of Afghan refugees, Pakistan and Iran remain resistant to local integration, resettlement opportunities are limited, and the notion of a return 'home' is complicated by ongoing insecurity and the fact that many have now been born in exile (Collective for Social Science Research, 2006, p. 2).

Under these circumstances, mobile 'solutions' such as transnationalism, regularised labour migration and regional free movement can constitute highly workable responses. For example, they enable social and financial remittances and ongoing mobility, which can promote reconstruction efforts, support recent returnees and consequently ensure a more sustainable repatriation.

In this way, ongoing mobility is not a failure of the integration or reintegration process, as has been commonly assumed (Long, 2009, p. 1). On the contrary, mobile 'solutions' are a workable and "complimentary avenue for some refugees" as they sustain durable solutions and more accurately capture the reality of refugee strategies (UNHCR, 2007, p. 4). Indeed, given Afghanistan's under-development and the superior economic and labour demands of Iran and Pakistan, mobile 'solutions' are likely to play an inevitable, unavoidable and ongoing strategy for many Afghans (Monsutti, 2008, pp. 71-73).

While mobile 'solutions' can be thus compatible with the durable solutions framework, their impact on refugee protection may be less well-matched. Protection is a fundamental aspect of the refugee regime, to which a workable 'solution' should adhere. Regional free movement and regularised labour migration, however, have

[22] In a recent global appeal UNHCR stated that "returning to their places of origin remains the most desirable durable solution for refugees" (UNHCR, 2009, p. 55).

serious implications for protection thus limiting their 'workability'. For instance, qualification for an Iranian six month work and residency scheme was subject to the compulsory return of the majority of the household and the surrendering of Amayesh documentation and therefore refugee status (Long, 2010, p. 32).[23] This undermined the protection of both those who left and those who stayed. Refugee households were obliged to repatriate prematurely, highlighting that Iran's priority was migration management over protection (Feller, 2006, p. 516).

Furthermore, as 'regularised migrant-nationals abroad', those who remained in Iran were readily associated with irregular and undocumented labourers, and more vulnerable to deportation (Long, 2010, p. 32). Finally, the six month duration of working rights proved problematic for long-term protection as permission to stay and therefore protection from deportation were dependent on renewals (Strand, Suhrke, & Harpviken, 2004, p. 6).

While this example is not necessarily reflective of all mobile 'solutions', it does highlight the protection concerns of even *regularised* mobile 'solutions', particularly when these are managed by states. Overall therefore, while mobile 'solutions' may be particularly workable in relation to promoting durable solutions, their overall 'workability' and viability remain limited due to protection implications and the uneven nature of UNHCR policy.

A macro-level analysis: states

State collaboration is clearly vital for any officially sanctioned mobile 'solution'. Mobile 'solutions' incorporate both positive and negative implications for states, indicating that while there may be scope for workable mobile 'solutions', this may be undermined by the changeable nature of state collaboration. On the one hand, Kenya, Iran and Pakistan all prioritise the repatriation of what they perceive as an 'economically costly and politically volatile refugee burden', thus undermining the 'workability' of mobile 'solutions'. On the other hand, all three also stand to gain from, or may already be reliant on, the cheap labour, supply and demand, remittances and socioeconomic development associated with refugees' mobility, thus boosting the 'workability' of mobile 'solutions'.

This changeability is most clearly indicated by the divergence in state rhetoric and practice. In spite of its ostensibly hostile statements and policy, the Kenyan government has, up to a point, turned a blind eye to the presence of Somali refugees in Eastleigh, as fully enforcing its encampment policy would serve neither its own nor its citizens' interests (Campbell, 2006, pp. 401, 408).[24] While mobile 'solutions' can therefore be more workable than they at first appear, their 'workability' will nonetheless remain politically limited to some extent as long as states' priorities remain migration 'management'.

[23] In accepting passports and residency permits, refugees are "voluntarily re-availing themselves of the protection of their countries of origin and hence ceasing to be refugees" (Long, 2009, p. 10).
[24] As indicated by one commentator, "Eastleigh is 'openly informal', neither hidden from authorities nor entirely consistent with an official, public place of business" (Lindley, 2007a, p. 4).

Furthermore, some 'solutions' may be more or less workable in some contexts than others, depending on both state preference and ability, as indicated by internal asylum mobility. In contrast to Kenya and its policy of encampment, Pakistan permits comparatively, albeit diminishing, free movement of refugees. While this is theoretically also the case in Iran, the Iranian state stipulates that refugees must acquire special permission and documentation in order to travel from one province to another (Harpviken, 2009, p. 15).

Moreover, during the late 1990s, 98,000 Afghans were confined to designated areas and enclosed camps as part of the country's repatriation campaign (Abbassi-Shavazi et al, 2005, p. 31). In this way, regularised internal asylum mobility may be more workable in Iran than Kenya, but most workable in Pakistan, where the authorities are comparatively more tolerant of refugee's internal mobility.

In addition to being less willing, some states may also be less able to engage in certain mobile 'solutions' than others, highlighting again that some 'solutions' may be more workable than others. Regional free movement has been advocated as a workable 'solution' for Afghans that complements their history of cross-border movements (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1; Stigter & Monsutti, 2005, p. 1).

Nevertheless, in the absence of greater burden-sharing and funding, the 'workability' of regional free movement agreements for Afghanistan, and also for the Horn of Africa, may be undermined in the context of weak clusters of states lacking the absorptive capacity and political will to enforce them (Long, 2010, p. 33).

Finally, states' refugee policies may shift over time according to particular priorities, so that what was once less workable may become more so over time, but also the opposite. For example, in light of the growing recognition and amount of remittances being sent, many states, including Afghanistan, now proactively support transnationalism; the current government has established a Ministry of Afghan Diaspora and sponsors conferences and events to attract investments and support from Afghans abroad (Koser & Van Hear, 2003, p. 15).

Nevertheless, state policies to refugees have undeniably hardened over the years in response to asylum fatigue and/or diminishing international funds. In contrast to today, Somalis in Kenya were relatively free to move in search of employment and education opportunities prior to 1991 (Verdirame, 1999, p. 57).[25] Likewise, by the mid 1990s, both Pakistan and Iran had tightened their refugee policy and increasingly saw Afghan refugees as irregular economic migrants rather than 'honourable guests' (Turton & Marsden, 2002, p. 14; Saito, 2009, pp. 3-4).

In these scenarios, more liberal mobile 'solutions' arguably appear less workable today than they would have done several decades ago. Overall, therefore, mobile 'solutions' may be workable and therefore viable, but only up to a point as political obstacles, inconsistencies, priorities, preferences and abilities limit the extent to which they represent a workable response.

[25] This shift in policy resulted from the steep rise in refugees following the outbreak of civil war and state collapse in Somalia in 1991.

This paper has argued that the extent to which mobility represents a workable response depends on a range of often conflicting micro, meso and macro-level factors. In this way, the extent will be determined by levels of engagement from key stakeholders (such as refugees, local communities, UNHCR and states) and compatibility with often shifting concerns (socioeconomic, political, protection, durable solutions and so on).

Consequently, the 'workability' of mobile 'solutions' will vary considerably according to who, for what, where and when they are applied. On the one hand, mobile 'solutions' are already workable for those refugees and local community members willing and able to engage in them, and are compatible with UNHCR's recent interest in finding durable and more comprehensive 'solutions'. On the other hand, they may be less workable for other refugees and host communities who, for cultural, political, social and economic reasons, may choose not to engage, and for the refugee regime and states for which mobile 'solutions' may be less compatible with protection and migration management priorities.

This variable picture indicates that some mobile 'solutions' will be more workable than others, and that mobility will be more workable for some individuals, institutions and states, and in relation to certain priorities, times and contexts than others. A common alignment or consensus is unlikely, and in this sense the extent to which mobile 'solutions' as a whole are workable remains ultimately limited.

For this reason and in contrast to Van Hear and Scalettaris who position mobility in its various forms as a solution in itself, this chapter concludes that mobility is not a workable 'solution' per se (Van Hear, 2006, p. 9; Scalettaris, 2009, p. 58). Rather, it is most workable when conceptualised and implemented as a complimentary adjunct or an interim response in combination with a range of other approaches. Viewed from this perspective, while mobility can be workable and therefore viable, it is restricted by the dominant status quo and is by no means a 'catch all solution' that can be universally applied.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of Afghan and Somali refugees in Iran, Pakistan and Kenya, this paper has argued that mobility can be a relevant, constructive and workable, and therefore viable response to these two refugee situations. Nevertheless, this viability is ultimately limited, firstly by its variability and inconsistency and secondly by its potential for negative as well as positive implications.

The viability of mobility is highly variable and inconsistent and will therefore be more viable for some individuals, contexts and eras than others depending on their social, cultural, economic and political background. While mobility can viably promote the survival of camp refugees, local development in countries of asylum and origin, and durable solutions, its viability will be limited in terms of the individual, context and era.

For example, mobility may be more viable for refugees, stayees and host community members already familiar with mobility, and who possess the right gender, sufficient

socioeconomic capital, or the willingness and ability to participate and benefit (whether directly or indirectly) from the socioeconomic support, cultural adjustments, and business opportunities generated by migratory and transnational mobility.

At the same time, mobility will also be more viable under more favourable political and economic contexts when states, policies, institutions and local communities may be more supportive of mobile refugees. For example, regularised internal asylum mobility may be most viable in Pakistan, where mobility's implications for refugee protection, rights and assistance are less detrimental given the state's failure to grant full status and its greater tolerance of refugee's mobility.

Finally, the viability of mobility will be greater at certain times than others in accordance with shifting priorities and contexts, and may be more viable in protracted refugee situations when refugees' needs have evolved and conventional durable solutions remain elusive. In these ways, while mobility can represent a viable response, it may therefore be limited to certain refugees, contexts and eras.

Secondly, the viability of mobility is also limited by its potentially irrelevant, destructive' and unworkable implications for refugee protection, inequality and poverty. Both unofficial and regularised mobile 'solutions' can undermine refugees' status by either forfeiting their legal status or by converting them into labour migrants. In both cases, refugees' access to their legal rights and official assistance is undermined, leaving them vulnerable to arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation.

Furthermore, mobility can also exacerbate gendered, cultural and socioeconomic inequalities. The ability to engage in migratory and transnational mobility and the associated socioeconomic benefits are unequally distributed and can therefore intensify existing inequalities. Social expectations, labour market constraints and familial responsibilities are likely to limit the mobility of women in relation to adult males. In addition, poorer refugees, stayees and local community members lacking sufficient socioeconomic capital are likely to be excluded from either participating in or benefiting from mobility in comparison to wealthier or better-connected counterparts.

Furthermore, while mobility can improve the situation of some refugees, it can aggravate the circumstances of others, particularly in relation to poverty. For example, the responsibility of remitting can undermine the socioeconomic security and livelihoods of refugees in the diaspora. In addition, the impact of inflation, falling wages, employment competition and strained resources associated with an influx of mobile refugees can adversely affect poverty among local communities.

The potentially negative implications of mobility can also limit the viability of mobility as a whole, as its constituent elements (relevance, 'constructiveness' and 'workability') are not necessarily consistent. In this sense, a relevant (or indeed constructive and workable) mobile strategy is not automatically constructive or workable (or relevant). For example, while regularised labour migration may be relatively workable for both states and UNHCR, it may be destructive in terms of refugees' legal status and protection, and irrelevant for those excluded from labour markets or for those wanting to maintain their refugee status.

In light of both the variability and negative implications of mobility, this paper has attempted to move away from some of the more celebratory arguments in support of mobility; these have interpreted mobility "as a fundamental-capabilities enhancing freedom itself" (de Haas et al, 2009, pp. 1-2), "a central component of any approach to refugee protection, a facilitator of refugees' access to rights" and therefore a "central goal of the international refugee regime" (Long, 2010, p. 13), and "in itself an enduring if not a durable solution to displacement" (Van Hear, 2006, p. 9).

Instead, this paper has taken a more individualised, contextualised and historicised approach in relation to Afghan and Somali refugee situations. It recognises that many refugees already engage in migratory and transnational mobility, and that mobility does constitute a positively, albeit variably, viable response in relation to their survival, to local socioeconomic development, and in promoting durable solutions and revitalising conventional approaches that confine refugees to camps.

Nevertheless, mobility does not constitute an all-encompassing response; its relevance and impact will vary considerably according to structure, agency and era; its implications are not automatically constructive; and significant political, economic, social and cultural obstacles hinder its 'workability'. Consequently it is best conceptualised as one aspect of a wider and more comprehensive approach as opposed to a catch-all 'solution' in itself. In this way, and in answer to this paper's title, mobility can be a viable response to refugee situations, but only to a limited and individually, contextually and temporally determined extent.

ACRONYMS

ACSU	Afghanistan Comprehensive Solutions Unit
ECOWAS	the Economic Community of West African States
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDP	Internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity Convention
OCHCR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PRS	Protracted refugee situation
SRS	Self-reliance strategy
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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