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SYRIANS BAROMETER

“A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL
COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE”

SB- 2022

Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN
NOVEMBER 2023

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SerBest Kitaplar

İvedikköy Mah. İvedik Cad. Mercan 2 Plaza, No: 253/A, Kat: 3 06378 Yenimahalle, Ankara
ISBN: 978-625-98070-1-0

Book and Cover Design: Serbest Kitaplar

Press:

Atalay Konfeksiyon Matbaacılık ve Reklam İnş. Tur. Otomotiv San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.
Sertifika No: 47911
Zübeyde Hanım Mah. Süzgün Sk. No:7 Altındağ / Ankara
Tel: 0.312. 3844182

Syrians Barometer books and executive summaries available online in
Turkish, English and Arabic:
www.unhcr.org/tr/yayinlar / www.mmuraterdogan.com

This study was carried out with the support of UNHCR Turkey. The study reflects the personal views of the author and those views express UNHCR is not binding. UNHCR does not use any of the information contained in this document in any way cannot be held responsible for its use.

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to our dear Tülin....

FOREWORD

At the end of 2022, 108.4 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations and events seriously disturbing public order. Among them were 35.3 million refugees, 62.5 million internally displaced persons, 5.4 million asylum seekers and 5.2 million other people in need of international protection.

Ongoing and new conflicts have driven forced displacement across the globe. In the ever-evolving landscape of global displacement, each statistic, each number, represents a life irrevocably altered by the tumult of conflict, persecution, or insecurity.

Against this backdrop, Türkiye continues to stand as a beacon of refuge. The largest portion of this population consists of Syrians under temporary protection, marking the 12th year of the conflict in Syria. This humanitarian endeavor, underpinned by Türkiye's strong legal framework and steadfast solidarity, serves as a testament to the enduring spirit of compassion and cooperation in the face of adversity.

Amidst these efforts, however, lies a distressing reminder of the fragility of displaced communities, as social cohesion between refugee and host communities in Türkiye found itself at a critical juncture. This delicate balance underlines the importance of comprehensive strategies to foster mutual understanding and support. In this respect, the Syrians Barometer continues to provide an insight, offering a nuanced understanding of the prevailing social realities, attitudes and perceptions shaping the coexistence of refugees and host communities in 2022.

Since its inception, the Syrians Barometer has served as a cornerstone of evidence-based action and policy development, thanks to the efforts of Prof. M. Murat Erdogan, the esteemed team and the advisory board members. Through comprehensive surveys and in-depth focus group discussions, they have untangled the complexities and the evolving dynamics of coexistence across Türkiye since UNHCR's inception of support for the Syrians Barometer in 2019.

As we reflect on the findings of the Syrians Barometer 2022 study, we anticipate that the study's outcomes will prove invaluable for contemporary analysis, informing future policy decisions geared towards fostering a society that adeptly caters to the needs of both host community members and the population it responsibly hosts.

Angela Maria Li Rosi
UNHCR Representative in Türkiye

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When the first group of 252 Syrian asylum-seekers arrived in Türkiye on 29 April 2011, nobody had expected the crisis to have continued this long and the number of refugees to have increased this much. No one had probably predicted that this date would become such a significant symbolic turning point for Türkiye's history. In the face of changing dynamics of the process, which had been even more significant than the increasing numbers on strengthening the tendencies of Syrians to remain permanently in Türkiye, I have started conducting studies on various aspects of this issue since 2013, firstly as part of Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center (HUGO) and then of Turkish German University Migration and Integration Research Center (TAGU), of which I am the founding director. When the first product of these studies, which mostly have been based on fieldwork, was published by HUGO in 2014 under the title of "Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration", the number of Syrians in Türkiye was 1.6 million. In a relatively early phase, this study argued that a large part of the Syrians would remain in Türkiye permanently and that serious ground-work was needed for social cohesion, having emphasized the significance of "social acceptance" in this context. This was followed by studies focusing on the impact of Syrians on the business world in 2015, Syrian children living in camps in 2016; and in 2017, Syrians and media, and Syrians and municipalities in process management. In this framework, "Syrians Barometer: a framework for achieving social cohesion" was published in 2017 as the most comprehensive academic research in the field, built upon preparations that had started in 2016. Syrians Barometer developed a model through which social realities and perceptions are encountered to build a peaceful future for the Turkish society as well as the Syrians. This model envisioned to work in a "barometer" mentality whereby regularly repeated studies with a carefully crafted questionnaire could follow the changing attitudes and tendencies in response to major developments.

Syrians Barometer, which aims to provide reliable data to interested researches and policy-makers as well as the general public, has been possible through the cooperation of a large team and sincere support provided by various institutions and individuals. I thank everyone who has contributed to various aspects of this study. First of all, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude and appreciation to the Hacettepe University family for giving me the opportunity to be a proud member of this institution between 1987-2017 and to conduct significant studies through HUGO that I founded in 2010. I would like to thank the faculty members and especially my dear students of the Turkish-German University, where I worked between October 2017 and February 2022, for their support. I am very excited -and proud as an alumnus- to continue my studies at Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences, Mülkiye Center of Migration Research-MÜGAM, where I started working in February 2022. I would like to express my gratitude particularly to the Rector of the University, **Prof. Necdet ÜNÜVAR**, and the Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences, **Prof. Orhan ÇELİK** for their efforts and support.

One of the aspects related to Syrians Barometer studies that makes me the proudest is the "Academic Advisory Board" which includes some of the most esteemed academics in the field in Türkiye and the world. I would like to express my gratitude, starting from **Prof. Dr.**

Nermin ABADAN-UNAT who is one of the founding academics in this field in Türkiye and a former professor of mine at Mülkiye, to all the members of this board for their invaluable contributions in this study: **Prof. Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Dr. Banu ERGÖÇMEN, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali ERYURT, Prof. Dr. Elisabeth FERRIS, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kasım HAN, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İÇDUYGU, Omar KADKOY, Prof. Dr. Neeraj KAUSHAL, Prof. Dr. Ayhan KAYA, Prof. Dr. Fuat KEYMAN, Ümit KIZILTAN, Prof. Dr. Kemal KİRİŞÇİ, Prof. Dr. Nilüfer NARLI, Kathleen NEWLAND, Prof. Dr. Barbara OOMEN, Prof. Dr. Ludger PRIES, Assoc. Dr. Saime ÖZÇÜRÜMEZ, Prof. Dr. H.Halil USLUCAN, Prof. Dr. Nasser YASSİN, and Assoc. Dr. Ayselin YILDIZ.**

SB-2019, SB-2020 and SB-2021 were conducted in cooperation with UNHCR-Türkiye. For their support, but more importantly for their trust and efforts, I should express my appreciation to UNHCR Türkiye Representative **Angela Maria Li ROSI and Neşe KILINÇOĞLU, Alev ÖRSEL KARACA, Selin ÜNAL, Sera ZAFER** and other UNHCR members.

I would like to thank the administrators and employees of the **Presidency of Migration Management**, which was established in 2014 and paid extraordinary effort in a short while to manage the process quite successfully, for their help and support. Especially, I would like to thank PMM President **Atilla TOROS**.

I should express my utmost appreciation to the team at Ankara Social Research Center (ANAR), who conducted the field research component of this study. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to **Funda USLU** and **Ahmet BABAĞLU** for their meticulous work and valuable support. I would like to thank Serbest Kitaplar Publishing House, especially **Selçuk DURGUT** and **Gökhan YÜCESAN**, for their contribution to the design and publication of the study.

And certainly, I offer my limitless and special gratitude to my daughter **Rüya** and my beloved wife **Prof. Dr. Armağan ERDOĞAN**, who remain constantly by my side at all times with unparalleled support, patience, and sacrifice.

Undoubtedly, those who spent the most labor in preparing this study were the members of the SB- 2022 research team. I would like to thank my colleagues, **Assist. Prof. Dr. Nihal EMİNOĞLU (Project Coordinator/ Senior Expert), Tülin Haji MOHAMAD (Project Officer for Syrians/Senior Expert), Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fulya MEMİŞOĞLU (Senior Expert), Deniz AYDINLI (Senior Expert) and Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur UNUTULMAZ (Senior Expert)**, each of whom is a special name in this field, for their hard work, contributions, and patience.

This study is a humble attempt to contribute to building a peaceful future for the Turkish society, who has been the real hero during this challenging process, and an honorable life for everyone in the country. Therefore, my last and most important thanks go to the **Turkish society**, who -despite their doubts and concerns - welcomed over 4 million refugees with extraordinary effort and sacrifice.

M. Murat ERDOĞAN

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ABBREVIATIONS

3RP	: UN Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
AFAD	: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, Turkish Ministry of Interior
CHP	: Republican People's Party
DTM	: Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECHO	: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECHR	: European Court of Human Rights
EU	: European Union
FGD	: Focus Group Discussions
FRIT	: Facility for Refugees in Türkiye
HDP	: Peoples' Democratic Party
HUGO	: Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
LFIP	: Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MEB-MoNE	: Turkish Ministry of National Education
MPM	: Migrants' Presence Monitoring Programme
MÜGAM	: Ankara University Mülkiye Center of Migration Research
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
PMM	: Presidency of Migration Management, Turkish Ministry of Interior
SB	: Syrians Barometer
ŞEY	: Conditional Education Support
SUY/ESSN	: Emergency Social Safety Net
TAGU	: Turkish German University Migration and Integration Research Center
TEC	: Temporary Education Center
TNSA	: Türkiye Population and Health Research, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
TSC	: Temporary Shelter Center (Camps)
TÜİK	: Turkish Statistical Institute
uTP	: under Temporary Protection
UN	: United Nations
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WHO	: World Health Organization



SYRIANS
BAROMETER
SB- 2022
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION¹

As the anti-administration demonstrations that started in March 2011 spiraled out of control and turned into a civil war encompassing all of Syria, the tragedy surrounding the plight of Syrians who had to escape from their countries to save their lives and sought asylum in neighboring countries has been continuing for 12 years. The number of people who were forcefully displaced in Syria, which had a national population of 22.5 million in 2011, has surpassed 13.5 million according to the data released in UNHCR 2021 Global Trends. Of this figure, 6.8 million escaped the country while 6.7 million became internally displaced persons within Syria.² More than 80% of Syrian refugees live in neighboring countries particularly including Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan. Around 15% of Syrian refugees live in European countries, particularly including Germany and Sweden. It is very difficult to be able to predict how the situation in Syria will unfold with any degree of certainty. However, significant changes can be observed in Syrians' possibility, motivation, and tendency to return, both due to the current conditions in Syria and the fact that they have been establishing new lives for themselves in their countries of residence. This, in turn, demonstrates the necessity of undertaking serious planning and adopting large-scale policies in social, economic, political and security-related fields for the countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees, particularly including Türkiye.

The High Commissioner for Refugees, Flippo Grandi, describes what has been happening in Syria as *"the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time"*.³ Sharing 911 km of land borders with Syria, one of the most significantly affected actors from this immense crisis is Türkiye. The first mass movement of Syrians into Türkiye took place with the arrival of a group of 252 individuals through the Cilvegözü border gate in Hatay, following which the mass movement of Syrian refugees into the country has continued until 2017.⁴

1 The "Introduction" and "Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Türkiye" parts in this study were taken from the SB-2019 report, only with the update of developments that took place in 2020-2022.

2 UNHCR-Global Trends in Forced Displacement – 2021 <https://www.unhcr.org/60b638e37/unhcr-global-trends-2021>, p.7 (Access: 06.09.2022) and IOM-World Migration Report 2020, p.43 (https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) (Access: 06.09.2022)

3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> (Access: 06.09.2022)

4 Even though Türkiye is party to both 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 New York Protocol Relating to Legal Status of Refugees, it retains the geographical limitation in the Convention. The national legislation has also been produced in this context and therefore Türkiye only grants refugee status to individuals coming from Europe (interpreted as Council of Europe member countries) and carrying the conditions of a "refugee" described in the 1951 Convention. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which entered into force in 2013, also adopted this approach while regulating the statuses of "refugee", "conditional refugee", and "subsidiary protection". The asylum-seekers arriving from Syria, on the other hand, were granted another protective status, namely "Temporary Protection". In the current legal framework, asylum-seekers arriving from outside of Europe are granted the "conditional refugee" status, upon assessment of their application and if they fulfill the criteria set by the 1951 Convention. This study, being fully aware of this legal context and its official definition of a refugee, prefers to use the concepts of "Syrians" or "asylum-seekers" to refer to the displaced Syrians arriving in Türkiye since 2011. It also occasionally uses the concept of "refugee" to refer to Syrians due to the sociological context and the common use of the concept. (For the use of the concept of refugee by public institutions in Türkiye in the sociological context see: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/138450/-our-country-has-been-home-to-the-highest-number-of-refugees-for-the-past-7-years->, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-slams-west-over-refugee-policy-174721>)

According to the official figures provided by the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) of the Ministry of Interior, the number of Syrians “under temporary protection” (uTP) is 3.535.898 as of 31 December 2022.⁵ This figure, which corresponds to 3,98% of Türkiye’s national population underscores a decrease from the previous year for the first time since 2011. While the same figure was 3.737.369 as of 31 December 2021, it dropped to 3.535.898 with a decrease of 201.471 individuals. Five important issues are stated among the reasons for this decline: 1. Voluntary returns, 2. Naturalized Syrians under temporary protection, 3. Deletion of duplicate records in registration updates, 4. Making the records of Syrians who cannot be reached in registration updates “inactive”, and 5. Syrians who have moved from Türkiye to other countries. The number of Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye increased steadily between 2011 and 2017, and then, with Türkiye’s operations in Syria, the implementation of a “safe zone” and increased border security, inflows from Syria decreased to a minimum level. The population increase of Syrians in Türkiye after 2017 was mostly due to new births, which averaged 100 thousand per year. Despite the consistent decrease in 2022 and 2023, at the time of writing this report, the number of Syrians was over 3 million 254 thousand in November 2023.

⁵ SB-2022 takes this figure of 3.535.898 as the reference number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Türkiye, which was released by the PMM as of 31 December 2022. (<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>, Access: 20 January 2023)



**SYRIANS
BAROMETER
SB- 2022**

**SYRIANS UNDER
TEMPORARY
PROTECTION IN
TÜRKİYE**


I. SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TÜRKİYE- DECEMBER 2022

1. Numerical Data Regarding Syrians under Temporary Protection in Türkiye

a. General View

The first migrations from Syria to Türkiye took place on 29 April 2011 when the first group of 252 Syrians arrived in Türkiye. Syrians continued to arrive ever since albeit in gradually smaller numbers over the last few years. The number of Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye was 14 thousand in 2012, 224 thousand in 2013, 1 million 519 thousand in 2014, 2.5 million in 2015, 2.8 million in 2016, 3.4 million in 2017, 3.6 million in 2018, 3.5 million in 2019, 3.641.370 as of 31 December 2020, 3.737.369 as of 31 December 2021, and 3.535.898 as of 31 December 2022.⁶ This number corresponds to 4.14% of Türkiye's population of 85.2 million in 2021, according to TUIK data.

SB-2022-FIGURE 1: NUMERICAL AND PROPORTIONAL CHANGE OF SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TÜRKİYE, 2011-2022




YEAR	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYRIANS	14.237	224.655	1.519.286	2.503.549	2.824.441	3.426.786	3.623.192	3.576.370	3.641.370	3.737.369	3.535.898
NET NUMBER OF SYRIANS EACH YEAR	14.237	210.418	1.294.631	984.263	330.892	592.345	196.406	-46.822	65.000	95.999	-201.471
POPULATION OF TÜRKİYE (IN MILLIONS)	73.7	74.7	75.6	76.6	77.7	78.7	80.8	82.0	83.1	82.2	85.2

Although more than 93% of Syrians living in Türkiye are under temporary protection, 100 thousand Syrians are living in the country with a residence permit as of December 31, 2022. In addition, at an accelerating pace in the last four years, some Syrians uTP have been granted

⁶ PMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 05.01.2023)

Turkish citizenship. The number of Syrians who received citizenship was announced by the then Minister of Interior as 230 thousand 998, of whom 130 thousand 914 are of legal age, on April 15, 2023.⁷ The Temporary Protection Regulation, which determines the status of Syrians in Türkiye, clearly states that living in the country with this status does not give rise to the right to apply for citizenship.⁸ In this context, naturalization of Syrians in Türkiye takes place through “exceptional citizenship”.

SB-2022-FIGURE 2: SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE AND THEIR STATUSES⁹ (31 ARALIK 2022)



Sources: PMM (<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>) , <https://www.goc.gov.tr/ikamet-izinleri> , (Access: 04.01.2023), NTV: “Minister of Interior Süleyman Soyly announced the numbers of foreigners granted citizenship” (Access: 15.04.2023). (https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/kac-yabanciya-vatandaslik-verildi-icisleri-bakani-suleyman-soyly-acikladi,aHo7eEl_xEmS9OgBdmKWSw) (Access: 07.10.2023)

7 NTV: “Minister of Interior Süleyman Soyly announced the numbers of foreigners granted citizenship” (15.04.2023). (https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/kac-yabanciya-vatandaslik-verildi-icisleri-bakani-suleyman-soyly-acikladi,aHo7eEl_xEmS9OgBdmKWSw) (Access: 07.10.2023)

8 Temporary Protection Regulation: ARTICLE 25- (1) “Temporary protection identification document shall grant the right to stay in Türkiye. However, this document shall not be deemed to be equivalent to a residence permit or documents, which substitute residence permits, as regulated by the Law, shall not grant the right for transition to long term residence permit, its duration shall not be taken into consideration when calculating the total term of residence permit durations and shall not entitle its holder to apply for Turkish citizenship.”

9 Bu tabloda “Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler”in içinde “vatandaşlığa alınanlar”ın da yer alması, sosyal uyum bağlamında değerlendirme yapmak için tercih edilmiştir. Ayrıca vatandaşlığa alınan Suriyelilerin istisnalar dışında Suriye Arap Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlıklarını da korudukları da bilinmektedir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye’deki “Suriyeli toplumu” 4 milyonun biraz üzerinde görünmektedir.

b. Distribution of Syrians uTP in Türkiye by Cities

The distribution of Syrians in Türkiye by cities is known through their registration data. However, the number of registered Syrians in a city and the number of Syrians who actually live in that city might differ. This situation is observed especially in terms of those living in areas close to the Syrian border and Syrians living in western provinces and especially in metropolitan areas.¹⁰ In the DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) and FMS (Flow Monitoring Surveys) surveys conducted between 2017-2019 in cooperation with the PMM and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), important data were obtained regarding the Syrians living outside the provinces where they are registered, especially in Istanbul.¹¹ In this respect, the Press Statement of Istanbul Governorship on “Combating Irregular Migration”¹² on 22 July 2019 and a similar announcement that was made on 29 July 2023 can be considered as important milestones. In the announcement also made by the Governorship of Istanbul on July 29 and within the scope of “fighting against irregular migration”, it was stated that “Syrian nationals under temporary protection who are registered outside the province of Istanbul but currently residing there must return to the provinces where they are registered by September 24, 2023.” In all of Türkiye, especially in Istanbul, registration/number determinations have started to be made directly by the PMM and process of sending those unregistered individuals to their provinces of registration has been accelerated.

According to the registration-based data as of 31 December 2022, the city hosting the largest number of Syrians, which is 543.973, is Istanbul. The number of registered Syrian residents accounts for 3.32% of Istanbul’s population. In terms of absolute numbers, Istanbul is followed by Gaziantep where 461 thousand Syrians live (17,79% of its population), Şanlıurfa with 370 thousand registered Syrians (20,29% of its population), and Hatay with 356 thousand Syrian residents (14,75% of its population). In terms of the percentage of population, Kilis is the city with the largest Syrian community. With a local population of 145 thousand, Kilis is home to 87 thousand Syrians. In other words, the number of Syrians in Kilis corresponds to 37% of this city’s population. The number of Turkish cities with more than 100 thousand registered Syrians is 9. Considering the fact that many of these cities already had various structural problems, arrival of large numbers of Syrians has led to an increase in poverty as well as some problems regarding access to public services.

The distribution table of Syrians under Temporary Protection in Türkiye according to the provinces they are registered reveals important differences between provinces. The number of provinces that are above the Türkiye average of 4.14% is 12. Ranking in terms of density in proportion to provincial populations is as follows: Kilis (37,55%), Şanlıurfa (20,29%), Gaziantep (17,79%), Hatay (14,75%), Mersin (11,19%), Adana (10,02%), Mardin (9,16%), Kahramanmaraş (7,64%), Osmaniye (6,53%), Bursa (5,52%), Kayseri (5,51%), and Konya (5,12%).

10 Former Interior Minister S. Soylu gave an important example to this situation in his statement on 16.06.2022. Stating that the population of Kilis is 145 thousand, Soylu said there are a total of 109 thousand 687 Syrian records here, while they have determined that 18 thousand 504 of them have not been in Kilis for 2 years, and thus the Syrian population in Kilis is 91 thousand 183. AHABER (16.06.2022) (<https://www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2022/06/16/son-dakika-turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi-ne-kadar-icisleri-bakani-suleyman-soylu-acikladi>) (Access: 07.07.2022)

11 IOM-Türkiye: https://displacement.iom.int/sites/default/files/public/reports/T%C3%BCrkiye_Compilation_06_June_22.pdf; IOM-Türkiye: <https://Türkiye.iom.int/migrant-presence-monitoring> (Access: 12.04.2022)

12 Istanbul Governorate (22.07.2019) “Press Release on Combating Irregular Migration” (“Düzensiz Göç İle Mücadele Konusunda Basın Açıklaması”), (<http://www.istanbul.gov.tr/duzensiz-gocle-mucadele-ile-ilgili-basin-aciklamasi>) (Access: 07.07.2022)

CHANGE IN THE WAY REGISTERED SYRIANS' RATIO IN THE PROVINCIAL POPULATION IS CALCULATED

In the province-based statistics provided by the Presidency of Migration Management, the number of Syrians in each province was being given as the proportion obtained by dividing the Syrian population in that province by the total population of the province, and it was being presented as the density of the Syrian population in the province. This calculation method was leading to relatively higher values proportionally. For example, according to the data of 21.04.2021, while the population of Kilis was 141.454, and the Syrian population in Kilis was 105.816, the share of the population was 74.81%; the population of Gaziantep was 2.085.795, and the Syrian population in Gaziantep was 449.014, and the share in the population was 21.53%; the population of Hatay was 1.654.907, and the Syrian population in Hatay was 435.953, and the share in the population was 26.34%; the population of Şanlıurfa was 2.108.013, and the Syrian population in Şanlıurfa was 423.523, and the share in the population was 20.09%. However, in 2022, this calculation system was changed, and the ratio of the registered Syrian population in the province started to be determined by being divided by the sum of population of the province and the Syrian population. As a result of this system, which is statistically more accurate, significant changes toward a decrease in density ratios have emerged. Although there was also a decrease in the Syrian population in some provinces, the main reason for the change was the calculation system. In this context, in 2021, the ratio in Kilis, which was 74.81%, was determined as 37.55% in 2022; the ratio in Gaziantep, which was 21.53% in 2021, was determined as 17.79% in 2022; the ratio in Hatay, which was 26.34% in 2021, was determined as 17.58% in 2022, and the ratio in Şanlıurfa, which was 20.09% in 2021, was determined as 14.75% in 2022.

SB-2022-TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIANS UTP IN TÜRKİYE BY CITIES

No	Province	Registered	Population	Total Number of People Living in the City	Rate of the Number Registered Syrians to the total Number of People Living in the city	No	Province	Registered	Population	Total Number of People Living in the City	Rate of the Number Registered Syrians to the total Number of People Living in the city
1	ADANA	252.080	2.263.373	2.515.453	10,02%	42	K.MARAŞ	96.856	1.171.298	1.268.154	7,64%
2	ADİYAMAN	22.252	632.148	654.400	3,40%	43	KARABÜK	1.492	249.287	250.779	0,59%
3	AFYONKHSR	11.080	744.179	755.259	1,47%	44	KARAMAN	834	258.838	259.672	0,32%
4	AĞRI	1.126	524.644	525.770	0,21%	45	KARS	167	281.077	281.244	0,06%
5	AKSARAY	3.853	429.069	432.922	0,89%	46	KASTAMONU	1.883	375.592	377.475	0,50%
6	AMASYA	1.230	333.331	336.561	0,37%	47	KAYSERİ	80.490	1.434.357	1.514.847	5,31%
7	ANKARA	97.004	5.747.325	5.844.329	1,66%	48	KIRIKKALE	1.691	275.968	277.659	0,61%
8	ANTALYA	4.495	2.619.832	2.624.327	0,17%	49	KIRKLARELİ	764	366.363	367.127	0,21%
9	ARDAHAN	112	94.932	95.044	0,12%	50	KİRŞEHİR	1.871	242.944	244.815	0,76%
10	ARTVİN	67	169.543	169.610	0,04%	51	KİLİS	87.686	145.826	233.512	37,55%
11	AYDIN	8.215	1.134.031	1.142.246	0,72%	52	KOCAELİ	53.076	2.033.441	2.086.517	2,54%
12	BALIKESİR	4.406	1.250.610	1.255.016	0,35%	53	KONYA	122.986	2.277.017	2.400.003	5,12%
13	BARTIN	446	201.711	202.157	0,22%	54	KÜTAHYA	1.599	578.640	580.239	0,28%
14	BATMAN	12.219	626.319	638.538	1,91%	55	MALATYA	31.376	808.692	840.068	3,73%
15	BAYBURT	132	85.042	85.174	0,15%	56	MANİSA	12.577	1.456.626	1.469.203	0,86%
16	BİLECİK	622	228.334	228.956	0,27%	57	MARDİN	86.948	862.757	949.705	9,16%
17	BİNGÖL	1.189	283.112	284.301	0,42%	58	MERSİN	238.213	1.891.145	2.129.358	11,19%
18	BİTLİS	1.059	352.277	353.336	0,30%	59	MUĞLA	10.236	1.021.141	1.031.377	0,99%
19	BOLU	4.044	320.014	324.058	1,25%	60	MUŞ	1.572	405.228	406.800	0,39%
20	BURDUR	8.676	273.716	282.392	3,07%	61	NEVŞEHİR	12.680	308.003	320.683	3,95%
21	BURSA	183.749	3.147.818	3.331.567	5,52%	62	NİĞDE	6.522	363.725	370.247	1,76%
22	ÇANAKKALE	4.235	557.276	561.511	0,75%	63	ORDU	1.059	760.872	761.931	0,14%
23	ÇANKIRI	704	196.515	197.219	0,36%	64	OSMANIYE	38.661	553.012	591.673	6,53%
24	ÇORUM	3.127	526.282	529.409	0,59%	65	RİZE	1.264	345.662	346.926	0,36%
25	DENİZLİ	13.271	1.051.056	1.064.327	1,25%	66	SAKARYA	14.961	1.060.876	1.075.837	1,39%
26	DİYARBAKIR	21.670	1.791.373	1.813.043	1,20%	67	SAMSUN	9.203	1.371.274	1.380.477	0,67%
27	DÜZCE	1.475	400.976	402.451	0,37%	68	SİİRT	4.071	331.980	336.051	1,21%
28	EDİRNE	617	412.115	412.732	0,15%	69	SİNOP	198	218.408	218.606	0,09%
29	ELAZİĞ	12.230	588.088	600.318	2,04%	70	SİVAS	3.311	636.121	639.432	0,52%
30	ERZİNCAN	162	237.351	237.513	0,07%	71	ŞURFA	370.793	2.143.020	2.513.813	14,75%
31	ERZURUM	987	756.893	757.880	0,13%	72	ŞIRNAK	11.545	546.589	558.134	2,07%
32	ESKİŞEHİR	6.636	898.369	905.005	0,73%	73	TEKİRDAĞ	11.669	1.113.400	1.125.069	1,04%
33	GAZİANTEP	461.149	2.130.432	2.591.581	17,79%	74	TOKAT	1.168	602.567	603.735	0,19%
34	GİRESUN	359	450.154	450.513	0,08%	75	TRABZON	3.393	816.684	820.077	0,41%
35	GÜMÜŞHANE	144	150.119	150.263	0,10%	76	TUNCELİ	38	83.645	83.683	0,05%
36	HAKKARİ	1.626	278.218	279.844	0,58%	77	UŞAK	2.822	373.183	376.005	0,75%
37	HATAY	356.361	1.670.712	2.027.073	17,58%	78	VAN	1.682	1.141.015	1.142.697	0,15%
38	İĞDIR	70	203.159	203.229	0,03%	79	YALOVA	3.553	291.001	294.554	1,21%
39	İSPARTA	7.040	445.678	452.718	1,56%	80	YOZGAT	5.155	418.500	423.655	1,22%
40	İSTANBUL	543.973	15.840.900	16.384.873	3,32%	81	ZONGULDAK	639	589.684	590.323	0,11%
41	İZMİR	145.302	4.425.789	4.571.091	3,18%						


PMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma> (Access: 05.01.2023)

SB-2022-TABLE 2: THE NUMERICAL AND PROPORTIONAL SIZES OF 16 PROVINCES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF SYRIANS UTP IN TÜRKİYE (31.12.2022)


Top 16 Provinces with the largest number of Syrians uTP	Province	Population	Number of Syrians uTP	Share in Population as %*	Rank Among Provinces with the Largest Share of Syrians uTP
	Türkiye	85.279.553	3.535.898	4,14	
1	İstanbul	15.840.900	543.973	3,32	12
2	Gaziantep	2.130.432	461.149	17,79	3
3	Hatay	1.670.712	356.361	14,75	4
4	Şanlıurfa	2.143.020	370.793	20,29	2
5	Adana	2.263.373	252.080	10,02	6
6	Mersin	1.891.145	238.213	11,19	5
7	Bursa	3.147.818	183.749	5,52	10
8	İzmir	4.425.789	145.302	3,18	13
9	Konya	2.277.017	122.986	5,12	12
10	Kilis	145.826	87.686	37,55	1
11	Ankara	5.747.325	97.004	1,66	16
12	Kahramanmaraş	1.171.298	96.856	7,64	8
13	Mardin	862.757	86.948	9,16	7
14	Kayseri	1.434.357	80.490	5,51	11
15	Kocaeli	2.033.441	53.076	2,54	15
16	Osmaniye	553.012	38.661	6,63	9

* The calculation was made by dividing the number of Syrians under temporary protection registered in the relevant city by the sum of the population of the city and the registered Syrian uTPs in that city according to the ADKNS system.

SB-2022-FIGURE 3: RATIO OF SYRIANS UTP POPULATION TO POPULATIONS OF PROVINCES IN TÜRKİYE (31.12.2022 - TOP 16 PROVINCES WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF SYRIANS UTP) (38 THOUSAND+)



SB-2022-FIGURE 4: TOP PROVINCES IN TÜRKİYE WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF SYRIANS UTP (31.12.2022) (38 THOUSAND+)



As of December 31, 2022, 3.127.729 of the total 3.535.898 Syrians uTP are registered in the 16 cities with 38,000 or more Syrian uTB residents shown in this list, accounting for more than 88% of the whole Syrian uTP population. The remaining 12% is registered in the other 65 provinces. 1 million 275 thousand, i.e. 34%, of Syrians in Türkiye live in five border cities (Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Mardin). The number of Syrians living in three major metropolitan cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) is 787 thousand accounting for the 21% of the total Syrian uTP population in Türkiye.

c. “Urban Refugees”

One of the most significant characteristics of Syrians in Türkiye is that they have turned into “urban refugees”, especially since 2013. As of 31 December 2022, only 1.34% (47,525) of the total number of 3,535,898 Syrians in Türkiye live in the 7 temporary shelter centers (camps) located in the following 5 cities: Hatay (3), Kilis (1), Adana (1), Kahramanmaraş (1), and Osmaniye (1). The decrease in the number of people living in the camps continues. In other words, Syrians live outside the camps as urban refugees, spread almost all over Türkiye.

**SB-2022-TABLE 3: NUMBER OF SYRIANS UTP IN TEMPORARY SHELTER CENTERS
(31 DECEMBER 2022)**

Province	NAME OF TEMPORARY SHELTER CENTER	TOTAL IN THE CENTER	TOTAL IN THE PROVINCE
Adana (1)	Sarıçam	15,856	15,856
Hatay (3)	Altınözü	3,983	7,131
	Yayladağı	3,146	
	Apaydın	2	
Kahramanmaraş (1)	Merkez	9,629	9,629
Kilis (1)	Elbeyli	7,423	7,423
Osmaniye (1)	Cevdetiye	7,486	7,486
Total			47,525
NUMBER OF SYRIANS uTP LOCATED OUTSIDE THE TEMPORARY SHELTER CENTERS			3,488,373
PMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (Access: 05.01.2023)			



SYRIANS
BAROMETER
SB- 2022
JUSTIFICATION
AND RESEARCH
INFORMATION

II. SYRIANS BAROMETER-2022 JUSTIFICATION AND RESEARCH INFORMATION

SYRIANS BAROMETER (SB) research is conceived of as a regularly held study to be simultaneously conducted on Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye and the Turkish society. The most comprehensive study in its field, SB is based on survey research conducted on large representative samples, which is further complemented with focus group discussions (FGDs). The present study is structured as a continuation of five previous studies, “Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration” published in 2014 and four “Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Türkiye” studies published in 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2021. SB aims at drawing attention to the social realities in the field, deliberately trying to stay away from the contentious politicized debates, while striving to analyze the mutual social perceptions and, crucially, the changes and developments in these perceptions. In this context, the study also endeavors to reveal and discuss the existing experiences and relationships in the field, future projections and concerns, and prospects for social cohesion.

It is obvious, of course, that the findings of this study’s survey and focus groups cannot be directly generalized to the entire populations. In other words, what is presented here as the views of the “Turkish society” or “Syrians in Türkiye” are obviously the views of the participants of this research and can only be related to the wider populations in a limited manner, as neither community is homogenous and static. This study strives to present the most accurate picture that is possible in a social scientific context with the most diligent application of research, data collection, and analysis methods. Even so, however, the final product is ultimately derived from fieldwork and will inevitably have certain limitations.

SB studies endeavor to understand and explain the effects of the unprecedented and new context created by Syrians in Türkiye on both the Turkish society and the Syrian community. It is very difficult to make clear predictions on this process, particularly regarding the future of the situation in Syria. However, the more than 12 years that have passed indicate that the concerns of the Turkish society, alongside their demand for Syrians to leave, either to go back to Syria or somewhere else, are growing, and the continuation of the chaotic situation in Syria, as well as the strengthening tendency among Syrians toward permanent stay. Examples from around the world and the situation in the region indicate that some Syrians will be permanent in Türkiye. It is necessary, in this context, to be sensitive to the question of how social cohesion will be created and to develop policies accordingly. The trade-off between the costs of implementing integration policies, which could be avoided with the concern that they might “incentivize permanent settlement”, and the costs of potential problems that might arise in the future because of the failure to implement them at the right time might vary according to country contexts. However, social cohesion efforts in Türkiye, as elsewhere in the world, should be based not only on harmonizing and making contributions to the “newcomers” (Syrians in the Turkish context), but also on how the newcomers can contribute to peace and security of Turkish society and how both communities can live in harmony. In this context, it is clear that a “preventive” or even a “soft-security” approach is an integral part of social cohesion efforts.

Mass migration movements, particularly when they occur in an irregular-uncontrolled manner, create concerns among receiving societies. Among these concerns the most prominent ones appear to be “losing one’s job or reduction of income due to cheap labor”, “increase in crime and violence”, “additional economic and financial burden”, “reduction in or deterioration of public services”, and “corruption of identity / demographic transformation”. Moreover, these concerns appear to be stronger in cases of mass asylum movements. This is because while regular migration is considered to be a development tool and a process in which all parties involved (migrants, country of destination, country of origin) generally win, asylum indicates an imposition that cannot be planned and where

states or societies have no choice. This is reflected in the fact that while developed and high-income countries host a very large part of international migrants, these same countries are much more reluctant in accepting refugees.¹³ The fact that only 17% of refugees are able to arrive in such developed, high-income countries is another indicator of this.¹⁴ This figure was around 14% before the crisis in Ukraine. This significant difference concerning migrants and refugees is also visible in the context of social cohesion policies, which prove to be more complicated and challenging in the case of refugees than that of migrants. It should be noted that social cohesion discussions as well as initiatives are increasingly becoming commonplace in Türkiye and that what is at issue in the Turkish context is almost exclusively “refugees” and not “migrants”. In most examples around the world and especially in European countries, integration studies are generally discussed regarding migrants. In Türkiye, however, it is necessary to address the issue within a framework of war-induced asylum and a parallel inflow of irregular migrants, rather than a pre-planned and organized migration process. The process, which has been dominated from the outset by a perception of ‘temporariness’ and emergency management, makes it difficult for the actors managing processes to make decisions and for both Turkish society and Syrians to support social cohesion efforts.

The SB studies, whose main purpose is to provide “a framework for achieving social cohesion” and which is repeated every year with a similar concept, is expected to provide sound and regular data to public institutions, researchers, academics, non-governmental organizations, international institutions and other interested parties, and to be a source for data-based policies. In this study, the data from the research conducted by M. M. Erdoğan in 2013 and published in 2014 (“Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration”) are reminded as a partial reference for the past. Thus, researchers interested in the subject are provided with the opportunity to compare data. In SB-2022, the findings of the SB-2017, SB-2019, SB-2020, and SB-2021 studies, which were applied on the same model, are presented in a comparative way.¹⁵ The research questions were formed by the research team, which is composed of migration experts, and project advisors, while the analysis of the findings and the preparation of the report was conducted by the same research team.¹⁶

1. SB-2022 Research Model

Due to the earthquake disaster that occurred on February 6, the survey with Syrians that was scheduled to take place in February could only be conducted with 89 people and no FGDs with Syrians could be held. Therefore, SB-2022 had to consist of a study to determine the perceptions of Turkish citizens towards Syrians and to measure the change/development in these perceptions. On the other hand, only 89 household surveys completed with Syrians in the period leading up to the earthquake were not used in this study as they were not representative.

13 The top 10 countries hosting most migrants are: USA (50.7 million), Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, France, Canada, Australia, and Italy- World Migration Report IOM-World Migration Report-2022, p.25 and p.75. (<https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022>) (Access: 5.02.2024)

The top 10 countries hosting most refugees are: Türkiye, Colombia, Uganda, Pakistan, Germany, Sudan, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Ethiopia, and Iran - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: <https://www.unhcr.org/media/global-trends-report-2021> (Access: 15.01.2024)

14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2021/03/10-Facts-About-Refugees_2021_TR.pdf (Access: 15.07.2022)

15 To access SB studies online in Turkish, English and Arabic see UNHCR Türkiye website, also see SB-2019: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/09/SB2019-TR-04092020.pdf>, SB-2020: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2022/03/SB-2020-turkce-son.pdf>, SB-2021: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2023/01/SB-2021-Ingilizce-19-Ocak-2023.pdf>

16 Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan, who has developed the SB research as well as been managing the research processes and writing research reports, together with his team, carried out the “Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration” (2013-2014), the predecessor study of the Syrians Barometer study, and then the SB-2017 studies at Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center-HU- GO, of which he was the director. He carried out SB-2019 and SB-2020 studies at the Turkish-German University Migration and Integration Research Center-TAGU, of which he was also the director. Prof. Erdogan transferred to Ankara University in February 2022, where he was appointed as the Director of the Mulkiye Center for Migration Studies-MUGAM. Therefore, SB-2021 and SB-2022 studies were carried out at MUGAM.

SB-2022 TABLE 4: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

	Turkish Citizens
Sample Size	2.267 persons 2.267 individuals selected according to a quota to be representative of Turkish society in 26 cities which are determined based on their populations on NUTS-2 level
Universe of the research	The average size of Turkish households is taken to be 3,17 in accordance with TUIK 2022 data.* The number of households was calculated by dividing the population by this average: 85,279,553 (TUIK-ADNKS 2022) / 3,17 = 26.902.067.** The sample size, in turn, was calculated on the basis of these figures on a 95% confidence level and $\pm 2,06$ confidence interval to be 2.267.
Mode of Survey Application	Person Based / (CAPI – Computer-Assisted Personal Interview method)
Time of Survey Application	24 December 2022-4 January 2023
Confidence Level	%95
Confidence Interval	$\pm 2,06$
Method of De-termining and Applying the Quota (the surveys were carried out at the homes of respondents within the framework of a province-district-neighborhood-based selection)	The survey questionnaires for Turkish citizens were administered in the city centers of 26 cities in NUTS-2 level, with individuals of 18 years of age or older who have the capacity to understand and answer the questions. Only one person in each household was surveyed. In the selection of individual respondents, simple random sampling was used and the number of surveys to be conducted in each city was determined according to their respective populations by taking into account the population at the NUTS-2 level. The selection of households to conduct surveys was done applying the random walk rule by the city field managers. Maximum effort has been paid to ensure proportional representation of different sex, age, educational attainment, and occupational groups since the study aimed to include these as potentially relevant categories for analysis. In the analysis and presentation of the responses to some specific questions, particularly when responses are collected on a "Likert" scale for more advanced comparison, a special system of point-based assessment is also used. ¹⁷
Field Survey Implementation	The field implementation of the surveys was conducted by An-kara Centre for Social Research (ANAR), one of the most experienced institutions in this sector. ¹⁸ [http://www.anararastirma.com.tr] Focus Group Discussions (FGD) for the SB are conducted and analyzed by the SB research team.
Reporting	Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan

17 5'li Likert ölçeği kullanılarak sorulan ve çok sayıda hücrenin yer aldığı tablolardan oluşan sorularda anlaşılmayı ve değişkenlerin birbiriyle mukayeselerini kolaylaştırmak için yüzdeler değeri puanla dönüştürülmüştür. Puanlama için kullanılan yöntem şu şekildedir:

İlgili ölçeklerde her madde için cevaplar;

1 = Hiç yeterli değil/hiç katılmıyorum/çok sorun yaşıyoruz/hiçbirine uygun değil/hiç kaygılı değilim,

2 = Yeterli değil/katılmıyorum/sorun yaşıyoruz/çok azına uygun/kaygılı değilim,

3 = Ne yeterli ne yetersiz/ne katılıyor, ne katılmıyorum/bazen sorun yaşıyoruz, bazen yaşamıyoruz/ yarısı için uygun, yarısı için değil/ne kaygılı ne de kaygısızım,

4 = Yeterli/katılıyorum/sorun yaşamıyoruz/çoğunluğuna uygun/kaygılıyım,

5 = Çok yeterli/çok katılıyorum/hiç sorun yaşamıyoruz/tamamına uygun/çok kaygılıyım,

6 = Fikrim yok/bilmiyorum,

7 = Cevap yok, şeklindedir.

Puan hesaplarına geçilmeden önce, kodlar 1"1, 2"2, 3"3, 4"4, 5"5, 6"0, 7"0 olacak şekilde kodlanmıştır.

1 = Tamamına uygun

2 = Çoğunluğuna uygun

3 = Yarısı için uygun, yarısı için değil

4 = Çok azına uygun

5 = Hiçbirine uygun değil

6 = Fikrim yok/bilmiyorum,

7 = Cevap yok

şeklinde olan soru için ise, kodlar 1"5, 2"4, 3"3, 4"2, 5"1, 6"0, 7"0 olacak şekilde kodlanmıştır.

Her bir soru için verilen cevapların aritmetik ortalaması alınmıştır. Bu işlemler SPSS programında yapılmıştır.

Kullanılan puan skalası:

a) 0-2,99 puan: 'Yeterli değil'; 'Katılmıyorum'; 'Sorun yaşıyor'; 'Uygun değil'; 'Kaygılı değil'

b) 3,0-5,0 puan: 'Yeterli'; 'Katılıyorum'; 'Sorun yaşamıyor'; 'Uygun'; 'Kaygılı'.

18 ANAR Araştırma: <http://www.anararastirma.com.tr/>

The SB surveys are conducted simultaneously with both Turks and Syrians within a maximum period of 30 days. In general, the Turkish survey is completed first. In the SB-2022 study, immediately after the survey with Turkish sample was completed, the survey with the Syrian sample commenced on February 3, 2023. It was decided to stop the survey due to the earthquakes on February 6, to conduct the SB-2022 study only with Turks, and to compensate for this in SB-2023

2. Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)

As part of the Syrians Barometer (SB) 2022 study, primary data was collected from Turkish citizens through 10 FGDs in addition to the large-scale survey. These FGDs were conducted in 7 cities (Ankara, İstanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, Mersin, Çanakkale, Şanlıurfa) with a total of 57 participants.

The average number of participants in the FGDs is 5.7. Different socio-economic groups (categories) were determined for the FGDs where gender balance is considered to be able to listen to the specific perceptions and concerns that exist within each group. While 7 of the FGDs were conducted with "Mixed" groups, there were 1 "Female", "Students", and "Workers" FGDs each. A significant level of diversity among the participants was aimed so that the data to be obtained in FGDs can provide information about a large part of the society, while not overlooking the different views and experiences of smaller important groups.

Since SB studies aim at understanding social perceptions and views, the quotations in FGDs are important in terms of reflecting the views of the participants. The quotations herein reflect the views of the FGD participants directly and shouldn't be seen as presenting the views of the authors' or institutions', or the "real situation".

SB-2022 TABLE 5: FGDS CONDUCTED WITH TURKISH CITIZENS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SB-2022

CITIES	NUMBER OF FGDS	CATEGORIES	NUMBER OF TOTAL FGD PARTICIPANTS
Ankara	2	2 Mixed	14
İstanbul	2	1 Workers, 1 Female	11
Çanakkale	1	Mixed	6
Mersin	1	Mixed	6
Gaziantep	1	Mixed	5
Hatay	1	Mixed	5
Şanlıurfa	2	1 Students, 1 Mixed	10
TOTAL	10		57 Participants

SB-2022 study has used a mixed research methodology employing a range of data collection and analysis techniques:

- A detailed literature review,
- A review of existing statistical data, including official sources and others,

- Examination of relevant legal texts,
- Review of SB-2017, SB-2019, SB-2020, and SB-2021 data to prepare/update survey questionnaires,
- Conducting the comprehensive SB survey,
- Conducting and reporting the FGDs
- Sharing the research findings with the SB-Academic Advisory Board and receiving their input.

The surveys and focus group discussions of the SB-2022 research were carried out in December 2022 and January 2023. The research findings naturally reflect the situation in the mentioned dates.



SYRIANS
BAROMETER
SB- 2022

**TURKISH SOCIETY
(CITIZENS OF
REPUBLIC OF
TÜRKİYE)**

III. SB-2022: TURKISH SOCIETY (CITIZENS OF REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE)

1. SB-2022: TURKISH SOCIETY

a. SB-2022: TURKISH SOCIETY (Citizens of Republic of Türkiye) RESEARCH PROFILE

i. *Survey Structure and Profile*

The survey in the scope of SB-2022 study aimed to collect data on the views and perceptions of Turkish society regarding Syrians was administered in the city centers of 26 cities in NUTS-2 level, with individuals of 18 years of age or older who have the capacity to understand and answer the questions. Only one person in each household was surveyed. In the selection of individual respondents, simple random sampling was used and the number of surveys to be conducted in each city was determined according to their respective populations in NUTS-2 level. The selection of households to conduct surveys was done applying the random walk rule by the city field managers. Maximum effort has been paid to ensure proportional representation of different sex, age, educational attainment, and occupational groups since the study aimed to include these as potentially relevant categories for analysis. The SB studies, while obtaining data on Türkiye in general through the 26 provinces, also evaluated these provinces in three different categories as “border cities”, “metropolitan cities” and “other cities”.

The research sample for Turkish citizens was formed on a representative basis over 26 provinces based on the Statistical Territorial Units Classification (NUTS)- Level 2 (NUTS-2) determined by TUIK. Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics-NUTS used by EU countries was accepted as a result of studies under the law 2002/4720 in line with Türkiye’s EU accession process. NUTS serves as a guide for the standardization and reliability of research conducted in Türkiye. Depending on the subject and purpose of the study, the relevant level (1,2, or 3) is selected. For the SB study, NUTS-2 (Level-2) covering 26 cities was used within the framework of universal reliability and validity rules.

For the SB-2022 Turkish society survey, a total of 2,267 valid questionnaires were applied. The sample of 26 provinces was calculated not only on the basis of the province where the application took place, but also considering that province and its surroundings as determined by TUIK. Quotas were applied in the research regarding region, socio-economic status, gender, and age of the respondents. The survey was carried using the CAPI - Computer-Assisted Personal Interview method between 24 December 2022 and 4 January 2023. The confidence level of the study was 95% and the confidence interval was ± 2.06 .

SB-2022-TABLE 6: SB-2022 CITY-BASED TURKISH SOCIETY SAMPLE

	Provinces	#	%		Provinces	#	%
1	İstanbul	418	18,4	14	Gaziantep	70	3,1
2	Ankara	158	7,0	15	Kayseri	69	3,1
3	İzmir	126	5,6	16	Konya	66	2,9
4	Bursa	118	5,2	17	Balıkesir	56	2,5
5	Kocaeli	112	4,9	18	Tekirdağ	55	2,4
6	Adana	107	4,7	19	Mardin	52	2,3
7	Manisa	89	3,9	20	Malatya	51	2,2
8	Antalya	89	3,9	21	Van	48	2,1
9	Aydın	88	3,9	22	Kırkkale	47	2,1
10	Şanlıurfa	84	3,7	23	Kastamonu	33	1,5
11	Hatay	82	3,6	24	Ağrı	33	1,5
12	Samsun	80	3,5	25	Erzurum	31	1,4
13	Trabzon	75	3,3	26	Zonguldak	30	1,3
Total						2267	100,0

To be able to provide a more thorough and accentuated analysis, the findings from this representative sample were further broken down into various categories based on sex, age group, region (i.e. border cities / metropolitan cities / other cities), educational attainment, occupation, and ethnic origin. Where relevant and significant, cross-tabulations are presented to show differences in data according to these categories.

SB-2022-TABLE 7: PROFILE AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS IN SB-2022 SURVEY ON TURKISH SOCIETY (IN TOTAL 2.267 INDIVIDUALS)

	#	%		#	%
Sex			Region		
Female	1126	49,7	Border cities	395	17,4
Male	1141	50,3	Metropolitan cities	702	31,0
			Non-metropolitan cities	1170	51,6
Age Groups			Other cities*	1872	82,4
18-24	352	15,6	Occupation**		
25-34	488	21,5	Private Sector Employee	545	24,0
35-44	499	22,0	Housewife	507	22,4
45-54	408	18,0	Artisans/Tradesmen	459	20,2
55-64	275	12,1	Retired	291	12,8
65 and above	245	10,8	Student	148	6,5
Educational Attainment			Unemployed	136	6,2
Illiterate	64	2,8	Public Sector Employee	85	3,8
Literate	81	3,6	Self-Employed	58	2,6
Primary School	509	22,5	Businessperson	27	1,2
Middle-school	456	20,1	Farmer	2	0,1
High-school or equivalent	667	29,4	No Answer	5	0,2
University/Graduate degree	490	21,6	TOTAL	2.267	100,0
* "Other Cities" refer to the combination of "metropolitan" and "non-metropolitan" cities.					
**In some of the upcoming data tables on "occupation", answers "Farmer" and "No answer" are not presented due to very low number of these answers.					

The provinces of Adana, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep and Mardin, which are located close to the Syrian border and host a very high proportion of Syrians considering their population, are defined as "border cities", while İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir are grouped into the category of "metropolitan cities". The remaining 18 cities are, in turn, categorized as "other cities" (i.e. non-border and non-metropolitan cities). With this categorization, it is intended to make it possible to compare the social cohesion processes in the regions where the Syrian population is densely concentrated with the regions where it is sparsely concentrated. In SB-2022 17,4% of the surveys were conducted in the border cities while 31% and 51.6% of the surveys were conducted in the metropolitan and other cities, respectively. Under the title "SB-2022 Research Model" as explained, due to the earthquake, the survey for Syrians could not be completed; therefore, the section on Syrians is not included in the SB-2022 analysis.

SB-2022- TABLE 8: SURVEY SAMPLE BY REGIONS

Region	Border Cities	Other Cities			
		Metropolitan Cities	Non-metropolitan (and non-border)		
Cities	Adana	Ankara	Ağrı	Kastamonu	Manisa
	Gaziantep	İstanbul	Antalya	Kayseri	Samsun
	Hatay	İzmir	Aydın	Kırıkkale	Tekirdağ
	Mardin		Balıkesir	Kocaeli	Trabzon
	Şanlıurfa		Bursa	Konya	Van
			Erzurum	Malatya	Zonguldak
Number of Surveys Conducted (Total: 2.267)	395	702	1.170		
%	%17,4	%31,0	%51,6		
	%17,4	%82,6			

ii. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

In SB-2022, 10 FGDs were conducted with Turkish participants in 7 cities. A total of 57 Turkish citizens participated in these FGDs. As it was done in SB-2020 and SB-2021, FGDs were conducted online in SB-2022.

SB-2022-TABLE 9: FGDS CONDUCTED IN SB-2022

CITIES	REGION	NUMBER OF FGDS	CATEGORY	NUMBER OF TOTAL FGD PARTICIPANTS
Ankara	Metropolitan Cities	2	2 Mixed (7+7)	14
İstanbul		2	1 Workers (5), 1 Female (6)	11
Çanakkale	Other Cities	1	Mixed (6)	6
Mersin		1	Mixed (6)	6
Gaziantep	Border Cities	1	Mixed (5)	5
Hatay		1	Mixed (5)	5
Şanlıurfa			1 Students (5), 1 Mixed (5)	10
TOTAL		10		57 Participants

Average number of participants at the FGDs was 5.7

In the present SB-2022 study, data and findings from both the survey and the FGDs were used in conjunction with one another. The empirical base of the study was provided by the survey findings while FGD data was instrumental in interpreting various findings and reaching a deeper understanding.

SB-2022 FGDS WITH TURKISH CITIZENS: GENERAL EVALUATION AND FINDINGS

In SB-2022, as in previous studies, one general finding is that the views of the Turkish society in the surveys and the views in the FGDs overlap to a great extent. However, although Syrians were not studied in SB-2022, it is generally observed that the relatively more “optimistic-positive” opinions obtained in the surveys conducted with Syrians in SB studies have changed significantly in FGDs, and the problems experienced are expressed more. An important problem encountered in SB-2022 Turkish FGDs has also provided us with some clues about social cohesion. As is known, during the period between December 2022 and January 2023, when the SB-2022 FGDs were held, Türkiye entered into an election process and one of the most important issues of the elections was Syrians/refugees. The general negative sentiment about refugees in Türkiye, and Syrians in particular, coupled with the popularization of the issue of Syrians which increasingly became the subject of populist politics, created serious difficulties in finding Turkish FGD participants for the SB study. Aside from the pessimism and negativity of the attitude of the Turks who did participate in the FGDs, the willingness to participate in the FGDs has also decreased significantly, and the invitations and requests of the SB team to participate in the FGDs have been harshly rejected. These reactions were also observed in the FGDs, both in the reactions towards the SB team that implemented the FGDs and in the harshness of the answers given to the questions asked. More than a technical issue encountered by the SB Team, observing such strong reactions in society has revealed important clues in terms of social cohesion.

It is seen that the results of 10 FGDs held in 7 provinces with the participation of Turkish citizens are largely similar to the results of the previous SB studies, but concerns about Syrians have increased significantly, the belief in peaceful coexistence has greatly decreased, and security concerns about Syrians are more frequently expressed. On some issues - again, as seen in previous studies - the reflexes of participants in border cities appear to be harsher than the reactions of participants in metropolitan cities. This situation seems to be related to the awareness arising from the politicization of the process and the recent irregular migration mobility. However, except for the experts in the field, Turkish society in general cannot be expected to distinguish the differences between the concepts of “regular migration”, “irregular migration”, “asylum”, and so forth. For this reason, Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis, and even those living in Türkiye with residence permits are all seen by Turkish society as a problem and even a threat, and the label “Syrian” is often used to include all other groups. Serious concerns and expectations of society have also led the relevant public institutions to identify irregular migration and irregular migrants as a higher priority area in the management of migration processes. However, this situation causes the public to evaluate the issue of Syrians almost entirely within the framework of irregular migration debates.

2. SB-2022 FGD GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

- Compared to previous experiences, there were serious difficulties in finding Turkish FGD participants in the SB-2022. Increasing concerns and the politicization of the issue during the election process are thought to have played an important role in this.
- Many findings in the SB-2022 FGDs with Turkish citizens are similar to the previous SB study FGDs. In this context, there were not many different and surprising findings that had not been brought up before. However, it has been observed that rejection and anger have become significantly stronger. There is an extraordinary increase in participants’ concerns about the presence of Syrians, including border cities, metropolitan cities and Çanakkale, where the number of Syrians is low.

- It was observed that a significant portion of the participants emphasized **nationalism** more frequently. It has been frequently stated that, unlike previous years, the presence of Syrians creates a security concern.
- The majority of participants believe that **Syrians are given privileges** in many areas and state that policies include **positive discrimination towards Syrians**. This situation is met with extraordinary reaction and it is often underlined that Syrians should not receive different and **preferential treatment** after 12 years.
- **Almost none of the participants believe that Syrians will return to their country after the war ends.** The majority also believe that the safe zone policy will not work. The reason is that the conditions and opportunities for Syrians in Türkiye are much better than in Syria and the safe zone.
- **Turkish FGD participants were very vocal that Syrians should somehow be sent out of the country. It is clear that the level of tolerance towards Syrians has decreased considerably.**
- A significant number of participants often expressed that they feel like **a minority in their own country**. They stated that some neighborhoods are like **"little Syria"** and emphasized that this is worrying.
- **Almost none of the government's policies towards Syrians are known by the participants.** It is seen that the participants only have estimates on many issues, especially the number of citizenship, and these are far from reality.
- **Some participants stated that the issue of Syrians has been turned into political material and this has increased especially during the election process. It has been stated that this situation has increased polarization in society, and it has been underlined that political discourses have a major role in increasing marginalization and discrimination.**
- **The fact that Syrians do not speak Turkish is highly criticized.** After 12 years, it is clear that Turkish society does not find this situation understandable or acceptable.
- **There are strong reactions to the naturalization of Syrians.** The announced number of Syrians who have been naturalized (which was around 200,000 at the time of the research) is considered unrealistic by the Turkish society. These figures are not trusted by the participants and it is believed that a much higher number of Syrians have been granted citizenship. There is also a strong perception that citizenship is sold for money, which is very harshly criticized.
- **The belief in peaceful coexistence with Syrians has decreased even more compared to previous years. The risk of social tension and conflict was mentioned more often than in previous years.**
- **While there is not much reaction to Syrians working and opening businesses, it has often been emphasized that they should be registered, pay their taxes, be subject to strict controls, and that there should be no favoritism.**
- **The participants' reaction to the Arabic signs was expressed very clearly.**
- It was noted that the requirements of travel permit and residence in the province of registration for Syrians were not well known by the participants, but when they were told about it, they stated that it was a correct practice that should continue.

SB-2022- TURKISH SOCIETY RESEARCH FINDINGS


1. Turkish Society's Spatial Proximity with and Awareness of Syrians

SB research, which aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of the field and then to provide a conceptual vision for social cohesion, started with a question on how much Turkish society and Syrians shared their physical living spaces. As already mentioned, only 1.5% of Syrians in Türkiye live in camps while the vast majority of the rest live in urban areas.¹⁹ However, there is a remarkable degree of variation in the population density of Syrians between different regions, cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. For this reason, the survey began with the question, "Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood/district?" This question is doubly important, both as an awareness question and as a potential variable whose influence on later questions is significant. In all five SB surveys, the total percentage of respondents who answered "yes, there are a few" and "yes, there are many" was about 80%. In SB-2022, this figure was highest at 84.2%. This high percentage is, in fact, a significant indicator of the fact that more than 90% of Syrians live in urban spaces together with the Turkish society. Sharing physical spaces with Syrians is not peculiar to border cities, but it is observed in other big cities as well.

SB-2022-TABLE 10 (+FIGURE): ARE THERE SYRIANS LIVING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD/DISTRICT/REGION?

	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022
	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	1715	82,1	1890*	83,2*	1772*	78,4*	*1814	*80,5	1909*
No	297	14,2	311	13,7	422	18,7	333	14,8	305
No idea/No response	77	3,7	70	3,1	65	2,9	106	4,7	53
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267

SB-2022: Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood/district/region?



*"Yes" category presents the sum of "Yes, there are many" and "Yes, there are a few" responses.

Note: While in previous studies, the question was "Are there Syrians in the neighborhood/district/region", it was changed to "Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood /district?" in SB-2021 and SB-2022.

¹⁹ After the February 6, 2023 earthquakes, the number of Syrians living in camps (Temporary Accommodation Centers) increased, and as the overall number living in the country decreased, the rate in camps increased to 2.3%.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

Looking at the responses to the questions “Are there Syrians in your neighborhood/set/region? & Where do you encounter Syrians in your daily life?” in the FGDs, most of the participants interviewed in border provinces stated that there are Syrians in their neighborhoods (some even in their apartments or housing complexes) and that they encounter Syrians a lot in their daily lives. Some of the participants stated that the neighborhood they live in is composed of residents with a relatively middle or high economic level and that the Syrians living there are at a similar level, generally as a “*negative situation*”.

- ◆ “I currently live in Şanlıurfa’s Yenişehir Region. My home is here so I am constantly in dialogue with them. I run a haberdashery. We are used to living together, but we always see chaos and fights in the neighborhood. It is as if the places belong to Syrians. (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female)

On the other hand, almost all of the FGD participants, while responding to this question, stated that they did not know whether the foreigner they encountered was Syrian or not, that they only guessed and that they could be from another Arab country. This can be interpreted as the fact that all foreigners are perceived as Syrians to a large extent, that a prototype of “Syrian” has been formed in the society, but that the host community has started to realize and express, albeit relatively, that this may be misleading.

- ◆ “When I don’t go to work by shuttle, I encounter them in public transportation. But I have difficulty distinguishing whether they are Syrian or Afghan.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Man-Worker)
- ◆ “I meet a lot of Arabs, especially in Istiklal Street, but I am not sure if they are Syrians or not. Some of them may be Syrians, but I prefer not to interact with them” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Female-Worker)
- ◆ “I don’t think there are any Syrians in my neighborhood either, but there must be. I think we are not aware of them, but they definitely exist even if they do not attract attention” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Man-Worker)

Participants living in or passing through neighborhoods with a high concentration of Syrians frequently expressed that **they felt like “foreigners”**. It was also quite common for them to **compare such neighborhoods to Arab countries** and to express that they see themselves as a “**minority**” in these neighborhoods.

- ◆ “**I feel like a foreigner in some neighborhoods**, for example, I was in Balat for a while and I felt this a lot there. The signs in foreign language make me feel foreign.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Female-Worker)
- ◆ “I lived in Konya for 2 years in a neighborhood where Syrians lived and there were 15-20 people living in a single house. They didn’t seem friendly to us, they excluded us a bit. **They were in control. It was as if the neighborhood was theirs and we were the minority** (...) There is a neighborhood in Konya, it is like Mecca-Medina. They don’t let anyone else trade except themselves.” (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara- Male-Student)
- ◆ “There are a lot of foreigners where I live. Africans, Arabs, there are also some I think are Syrians. **When I go to some shopping malls, I feel extremely foreign**. The people, the music everything is completely foreign, I feel as if I went to another country (...) Most of the people I meet here are rich people.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Female-Worker)

2. How does the Turkish Society See the Syrians?

It is important to look at how various communities see or define each other in order to understand their social encounters and interactions. Therefore, the SB research includes this question of definition. In this context, the respondents were given a list of 10 concepts and asked which concepts best reflected their view of Syrians. They were given the chance to provide multiple responses. While in SB-2017 the top response to this question was *"They are victims who escaped persecution/war"* with 57,8%²⁰, since SB-2019 onwards, with the exception of SB-2020, this relatively "positive" description that includes the perception of "victimhood" falls to fourth place. It should also be emphasized that the findings in SB-2020 are generally more positive with the effect of the pandemic. However, it was observed that perceptions of threat, "otherization" and definitions indicating widespread concerns in defining Syrians are increasingly prominent in the SB studies. In SB-2022, the top response was *"They are burdens on us"* with 51,6%, followed by *"They are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future"* (38,7%) and *"They are people who did not protect their homeland"* (33,4%). The response *"They are victims who escaped persecution/war"* is at the fourth rank with 30,2% in SB-2022. The perception of Syrians as *"They are people exploited as cheap labor"* in Turkish society is reported between 12,8% and 17,7% in the five SB studies. In SB-2022, this figure is 15,8%.


When evaluated in the context of demographic groups, it is observed that the view that *"They are burdens on us"* in SB-2022 is more prevalent among young men, students, those living in metropolitan cities, and those with high school degrees and above. Among those who define Syrians in Türkiye as *"They are victims who escaped persecution/war"*, women, young people, those who have not attended school, those living in border cities, and business people are more prominently represented. The response *"They are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future"* is more popular among men, 18-24 age group, university and higher education holders, and those who live in metropolitan cities.

²⁰ In the first study entitled "Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014" this question was asked with a single response option and the top response was "they are people fleeing from persecution" (41.1%), followed by "they are guests in our country" (% 20.8), "they are brothers and sisters with the same religion" (12.1%). The response "they are burdens on us" received 20.1% support.

SB-2022- TABLE 11 (+FIGURE): PLEASE STATE WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS YOU FIND MOST APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE SYRIANS (MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

Rank		SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	They are burdens on us	899	43,0	896	39,5	755	33,4	859	38,1	1169	51,6
2	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of trouble in the future/*They are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future	814	39,0	954	42,0	518	22,9	917	40,7	878	38,7
3	They are people who did not protect their homeland	-	-	940	41,4	559	24,7	846	37,5	757	33,4
4	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	1208	57,8	794	35,0	863	38,2	758	33,6	684	30,2
5	They are people exploited as cheap labor	298	14,3	308	13,6	290	12,8	399	17,7	359	15,8
6	They are different from and strangers to us	376	18,0	448	19,7	206	9,1	373	16,6	340	15,0
7	They are guests in our country	424	20,3	495	21,8	512	22,7	409	18,2	288	12,7
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	509	24,4	343	15,1	257	11,4	216	9,6	230	10,1
9	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	433	20,7	446	19,6	366	16,2	270	12,0	222	9,8
10	They are harmless people	306	14,6	158	7,0	165	7,3	197	8,7	139	6,1
11	Other	15	0,7	42	1,8	14	0,6	21	0,9	21	0,9
	No idea/ No response	32	1,5	20	0,9	33	1,5	27	1,2	28	1,2

SB-2022: Please state which of the following statements you find most appropriate to describe Syrians (Multiple Responses) (Top 4 responses) (%)



"The statement "They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of trouble in the future" was updated as "They are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future" in SB-2021 and SB-2022.

SB-2022-TABLE 12: PLEASE STATE WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS YOU FIND MOST APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE SYRIANS (MULTIPLE RESPONSES - %)

	They are burdens on us	They are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future	They are people who did not protect their homeland	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	They are people exploited as cheap labor	They are different from and strangers to us	They are guests in our country	They are beggars/ people who entirely rely on assistance	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	They are harmless people	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex												
Female	50,7	36,6	32,5	31,4	15,7	16,0	12,0	10,2	9,1	7,5	0,5	1,2
Male	52,4	40,8	34,3	28,9	16,0	14,0	13,4	10,1	10,5	4,7	1,3	1,3
Age Group												
18-24	56,5	45,5	40,6	27,6	15,9	11,9	9,1	11,1	8,2	3,7	0,3	1,7
25-34	49,8	39,3	34,2	31,8	14,1	15,0	13,5	6,1	9,2	8,0	1,0	1,6
35-44	54,1	35,9	31,5	30,1	15,8	15,8	13,4	9,6	9,4	4,8	0,4	1,2
45-54	49,3	39,2	30,4	31,6	15,4	14,5	15,4	10,8	12,3	7,1	1,0	0,5
55-64	49,1	37,8	29,1	30,2	19,6	13,1	11,6	14,5	10,5	8,4	2,5	-
65 +	49,4	33,9	35,1	28,6	15,5	20,8	11,4	11,8	9,0	4,5	0,8	2,4
Educational Attainment												
Illiterate	43,8	37,5	29,7	31,3	10,9	10,9	12,5	10,9	12,5	4,7	-	3,1
Literate	45,7	37,0	29,6	28,4	21,0	16,0	12,3	9,9	13,6	12,3	-	-
Primary School	49,9	35,0	29,1	30,6	13,4	13,2	14,3	12,0	11,6	7,3	0,8	1,2
Middle-School	52,9	34,4	30,7	30,3	13,8	16,4	12,9	10,5	11,2	7,0	0,9	1,8
High-School or equivalent	53,5	42,1	37,5	30,1	16,8	14,5	10,3	9,6	7,6	4,8	1,6	1,0
University/ Graduate Degree	51,4	42,4	35,9	29,8	18,8	16,5	14,1	8,6	8,6	5,1	0,4	1,0
Region												
Border cities	53,2	10,6	5,6	41,3	9,9	2,5	12,7	3,3	11,4	4,6	0,8	1,5
Other cities*	51,2	44,7	39,3	27,8	17,1	17,6	12,7	11,6	9,5	6,5	1,0	1,2
Metropolitan cities	63,0	66,2	54,7	24,2	14,5	15,8	13,8	7,5	9,8	7,0	0,6	0,6
Non-metropolitan cities	44,2	31,7	30,0	30,0	18,6	18,7	12,1	14,0	9,2	6,2	1,2	1,5
Occupations												
Private sector employee	54,7	45,1	36,9	30,6	16,7	14,9	10,1	12,3	5,3	7,3	0,4	1,5
Housewife	47,5	28,6	28,4	35,3	12,8	14,6	14,0	9,7	12,4	8,1	0,2	1,4
Artisan/ Tradesman	48,8	37,7	32,5	29,4	15,5	15,7	12,6	8,9	12,6	6,5	2,4	1,3
Retired	50,9	38,1	32,0	25,8	19,6	18,6	12,0	13,4	7,2	3,8	2,1	1,4
Student	60,8	51,4	48,6	23,0	13,5	13,5	8,8	6,1	8,1	1,4	-	0,7
Unemployed	55,9	46,2	32,4	27,6	13,1	12,4	14,5	11,7	9,0	4,1	0,7	-
Public sector employee	47,1	25,9	24,7	37,6	24,7	9,4	23,5	3,5	15,3	5,9	-	-
Self-employed	60,3	46,6	31,0	17,2	13,8	22,4	15,5	8,6	12,1	5,2	-	1,7
Business person**	40,7	40,7	44,4	40,7	25,9	-	22,2	-	22,2	3,7	-	-
General	51,6	38,7	33,4	30,2	15,8	15,0	12,7	10,1	9,8	6,1	0,9	1,2

In the top four definitions, the groups with the highest rates of saying "we are not alike" in the demographic categories are colored.

* Other cities include both metropolitan cities and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

When the findings of all 5 SB studies are considered together, it is possible to observe that the sentiments of social conscience and solidarity are mentioned simultaneously with those of discomfort and anxieties regarding the future. However, the SB-2021 and SB-2022 data show that for the first time, the first three of the four definitions include concern and negativity, and the response “They are victims who escaped persecution/war” was ranked fourth, falling to the lowest level (SB-2021: 33.6%, SB-2022: 30.2%).

SB-2022-TABLE 13: : STATEMENTS FOUND MOST APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE SYRIANS (MULTIPLE RESPONSES - %) / ARE THERE SYRIANS LIVING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD /DISTRICT?

Rank	Please state which of the following statements you find most appropriate to describe Syrians (Multiple Re-sponses)	Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood / district? (%)				
		Yes, there are many	Yes, there are a few	No	No idea / No response	General
1	They are burdens on us	57,6	44,5	43,6	37,7	51,6
2	They are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future	41,6	36,5	32,5	34,0	38,7
3	They are people who did not protect their homeland	35,5	31,4	30,2	24,5	33,4
4	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	25,6	35,5	35,1	47,2	30,2
5	They are people exploited as cheap labor	14,1	18,6	16,1	22,6	15,8
6	They are different from and strangers to us	14,9	16,5	13,1	9,4	15,0
7	They are guests in our country	10,2	15,6	16,4	17,0	12,7
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	10,8	9,3	9,8	7,5	10,1
9	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	8,2	11,2	12,8	13,2	9,8
10	They are harmless people	5,0	8,6	4,9	9,4	6,1
11	Other	0,9	1,1	1,0	-	0,9
	Fikrim yok/cevap yok	0,9	1,6	2,3	-	1,2

When the responses to this question are considered in conjunction with whether or not the respondents report living in close proximity to Syrians, it would be possible to detect some trends. In the table above, it is decided that it would be more meaningful to analyze only the “yes, there are many” and “no” options for evaluation. This is because the sum of the “yes, there are many” and “yes, there are a few” options in SB-2022 was 84.2%, making it very difficult to analyze.

Accordingly, similar to the findings of SB-2020 and SB-2021, those who reported that there are not any Syrians living in their region/city/neighborhood appear to more strongly support the perception that “they are victims who escaped persecution/war”, ranking this option second. However, those living in places with Syrians appear to give the responses that “they are burdens on us”, “they are people who did not protect their homeland”, and “they are people who will cause social and economic problems in our country in the future” more frequently. This shows that the feeling of compassion is higher among those who do not live together and are distant, while negative perceptions are more common among those who live with Syrians. In this context, it should be kept in mind that the “if you get to know them, you will love them” approach emphasized in some social cohesion studies does not always reflect the truth, and sometimes getting to know the other has the risk of further strengthening segregation.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

In order to measure the perceptions towards Syrians, participants in FGDs were asked what comes to their mind when they hear the word “Syrian”. In other words, they were asked what concepts they use to describe Syrians.

In all the FGDs, it was observed that **a very large proportion of the participants defined Syrians in negative terms. Among these, the frequently mentioned ones are “misfit”, “disorganized”, “crowded”, “indifferent”, “chaos”, “fighting”, “too many children”, and “not a preferred group”.** On the other hand, some participants, albeit a small number, described Syrians in terms of “hardship”, “poverty” and “being in limbo”.

In all FGD cities, it is observed that mostly negative descriptions were used, and only a few participants used a few positive adjectives (emphasizing victimhood). However, almost all **Hatay** participants used terms such as **“people who came to the country because of the war”** and **“people who need support and help”** instead of negative terms.

When the responses to this question are compared with the FGDs of previous years’ SB studies, it is clear that negative statements have gained more weight. However, it should be noted that after 12 years, the participants frequently stated that their tolerance towards Syrians has decreased, that while in previous years they saw them as more victims, they no longer see them as such, and that their stay has been too prolonged. It should also be noted that not only in the answers given to this question, but also in all the questions asked throughout the interview, very negative and negative expressions were used when talking about Syrians, anger increased and tolerance decreased. It should also be noted, not only in the answers given to this question, but also in all the questions asked throughout the FGD discussions, **that very negative expressions were used when talking about Syrians, that anger appears to be growing, and that tolerance is in decline.**

- ◆ “Beggars, people collecting paper. And many children. Emotionally, I feel sorry for children and women, I don’t feel sorry for men, I actually feel anger.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Female-Student)
- ◆ “When I say Syrian, I think of a **large** family. Children and children, but **only one man and a lot of women.** I feel anger towards the men, and sometimes I feel anger towards the women for not fighting against this. When we say Syrian, I think of **patriarchal society.**” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Female-Worker)
- ◆ “When they first came, yes, maybe they were in need of help, but now it has been more than 10 years, I think they have established their own lives during this time and they don’t need that much help anymore. **I don’t think they can adapt, either.** Maybe they needed help when they arrived, but as far as I can see now, they don’t.” (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Male-Worker)
- ◆ “They are indifferent, very careless, don’t care about anything” (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female)
- ◆ “They are a nation very much into fun and we are experiencing their pain more, I think this is the general opinion in Urfa. It is as if we came out of the war, not them. Our people are more frugal and think about the future, both men and women are the same, we are trying to build our future, but they are a careless nation and they are fond of enjoying themselves.” (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female)
- ◆ “For me, Syrians are people who came to the country because of the war, therefore they are people who need support and help” (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male)

3. The Definitions / Labels that Fit Syrians According to the Turkish Society

When we look at the attitude of the Turkish society in defining Syrians, we observe that negative characterizations, distance and prejudices have become stronger over time. As can be seen in the table below, the most negative attitude of Turkish society towards Syrians in the SB study is realized in SB-2022, despite the fact that the options are structured only around positive concepts.²¹

SB-2022-TABLE 14: TO WHAT EXTENT OF SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE DO THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS FIT? (SCORED)

	SB-2017	SB-2019	SB-2020	SB-2021	SB-2022
Hard-working	2,0	2,0	2,1	2,3	2,0
Nice	1,9	1,7	1,9	2,0	1,5
Kind	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,8	1,5
Reliable	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,7	1,4
Average Score	1,8	1,7	1,8	2,0	1,6
Judgement/Perception Scores	0-2,99 (Weak-Low)		3,0-5,0 (Strong-High)		

The demographic analysis also shows very minimal differences. In other words, it is clear that there is a general consensus in Turkish society on these issues. In the border region, however, a slightly above-average positive attitude is noticeable. The second striking point is that the most positive characterization of Syrians is “hardworking”, as can be seen in the table below.

²¹ In SB-2022, in contrast to previous SB studies, it was attempted to present only positive statements in the table, since it was felt that a “one-way” questioning of the qualifications would be more meaningful, both in terms of testing technique and concerns over “leading”, as well as in terms of analysis. This is because it is already obvious that those who stay away from positive characterizations are in a negative place.

SB-2022-TABLE 15: TO WHAT EXTENT OF SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE DO THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS FIT? (%)

	Fits to None of them	Fits to a Minority of them	Minority + None	Fits to Half of them	Fits to a Majority of them	Fits to All of them	Majority + All	No idea/ No response
Border cities								
Hard-working	38,8	11,1	49,9	13,4	25,3	6,8	32,1	4,6
Kind	54,7	16,2	70,9	14,2	5,8	2,5	8,3	6,6
Reliable	58,7	15,7	74,4	12,4	4,6	2,3	6,9	6,3
Nice	52,4	16,0	68,4	16,7	7,3	1,8	9,1	5,8
Other cities*								
Hard-working	49,7	14,6	64,3	15,4	13,7	2,0	15,7	4,6
Kind	66,0	13,2	79,2	10,8	3,9	0,5	4,4	5,6
Reliable	68,5	12,1	80,6	8,8	2,9	0,4	3,3	7,3
Nice	60,6	14,2	74,8	12,9	4,2	0,6	4,8	7,5
Metropolitan cities								
Hard-working	52,8	15,1	67,9	16,5	11,7	1,0	12,7	2,9
Kind	71,8	11,8	83,6	10,1	2,1	0,6	2,7	3,6
Reliable	74,8	11,1	85,9	7,5	2,7	0,3	3,0	3,6
Nice	66,7	15,2	81,9	9,9	2,8	0,3	3,1	5,1
Non-Metropolitan cities								
Hard-working	47,8	14,3	62,1	14,7	14,9	2,6	17,5	5,7
Kind	62,6	14,0	76,6	11,3	4,9	0,5	5,4	6,7
Reliable	64,7	12,7	77,4	9,5	3,1	0,4	3,5	9,6
Nice	56,9	13,7	70,6	14,8	4,9	0,8	5,7	8,9
* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.								

SB-2022-TABLE 16: TO WHAT EXTENT OF SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE DO THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS FIT? (SCORED) DEMOGRAPHICS

	Hard-working	Nice	Kind	Reliable	Average score
Sex					
Female	1,9	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5
Male	2,1	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,6
Age Group					
18-24	1,8	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,4
25-34	2,1	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,6
35-44	2,0	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,6
45-54	2,0	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
55-64	2,1	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
65 +	2,0	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	1,9	1,5	1,5	1,5	1,6
Literate	2,3	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,7
Primary School	2,2	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,7
Middle-School	2,1	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
High-School or equivalent	1,8	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5
University/ Graduate Degree	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,5
Region					
Border cities	2,4	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,8
Other cities*	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	1,8	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5
<i>Non-Metropolitan cities</i>	1,9	1,5	1,5	1,3	1,6
Occupations					
Private sector employee	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5
Housewife	1,9	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
Artisan/ Tradesman	2,2	1,6	1,6	1,4	1,7
Retired	2,0	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,6
Student	1,7	1,3	1,3	1,2	1,4
Unemployed	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,5
Public sector employee	2,1	1,8	1,7	1,6	1,8
Self-employed	2,1	1,8	1,6	1,6	1,8
Business person**	2,4	1,9	1,8	1,7	2,0
General	2,0	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
Judgement/Perception Scores	0-2,99 (Weak-Low)		3,0-5,0 (Strong-High)		
* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.					
** Results belong to 27 business people.					
Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.					

4. Perception of Cultural Similarity

The role of cultural similarity between a host community and newcomers (migrants or refugees), both at the time of arrival and later in the years of cohabitation, has been an important topic in the migration studies literature. Despite a significant shared history and 911 kilometers of land border, as well as a common religion that is predominantly observed by both societies, SB research has consistently found that Turkish society maintains a significant social distance between themselves and Syrians. While the political discourse makes frequent references to “*ensar*” (solidarity with refugees as a tradition of Islam), “religious fellowship”, “neighborhood”, and “common history”, it appears that these are not fully embraced by the society. When asked the question “*To what extent do you think Syrians in Türkiye are culturally similar to us?*”, the combined share of those replied with “they are not similar at all” and “they are not similar” is 84,3% in SB-2022. The rate of those who stated that we have cultural similarities with Syrians (similar + very similar) was 5.5% in SB-2022, which peaked at 8.8% in SB-2020 in the last three studies. Another noteworthy point here is the increase in the weight of those who say “They are not culturally similar at all” in the total. While the rate of those who preferred this option was 40.8% in SB-2017, 50.5% in SB-2019, 52.1% in SB-2020, and 54.1% in SB-2021; this rate increased to 61.7% in SB-2022. In the “Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration” survey conducted in 2014, the total number of respondents who believed Syrians were culturally similar was 17.2% and the total number of respondents that suggested the opposite was 70.6%.²² In fact, it is understood that Turkish society has had a very clear perception on this issue from the very beginning and does not see Syrians as culturally “their own”, and that this perception has been getting stronger every year.

When the responses to this question of “cultural similarity” in SB-2022 is analyzed within the framework of demographic and socio-economic categories, it is observed that the perception of “we are not similar” is more prevalent among women, young people, private sector employees and those living outside the border provinces. However, the interesting result for this question emerges for Turkish citizens living in “border cities”. Although this group, which consists of cities that have a border with Syria or are connected to the border region, actually have quite similar characteristics with Syrians in terms of language, religion, ethnicity, traditions, culture, and so forth, the rate of those who stated that “we are not culturally similar to Syrians” in SB-2022 was 78.5% in border cities, while the overall average in Türkiye was 84.3%. This surprising situation was also observed in the Şanlıurfa Barometer study conducted in 2018.²³ The fact that the values are very close to each other between the Türkiye average and the border provinces are actually surprising in itself. However, the fact that from time to time those in the border region think that “they are not similar” even more strongly than the Türkiye’s average, shows that making migration and social cohesion policies based on the assumed cultural similarity is not always enough to get the desired results. However, it is known that discourses based on commonalities such as cultural similarity, kinship, having the same faith, and so forth play a significant and positive role in the beginning stages of mass human movements. “Helping out brothers and sisters in a difficult situation” does work as strong motivator. As the duration of stay is prolonged and the numbers grow, that may unsettle the host community, however, this perception of cultural similarity and its positive contribution both grow dimmer.


22 In the 2014 study, “Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration”, the rate of those who “completely disagreed” with the statement “I believe we are culturally similar with Syrians” was 45,3%, while 25,3% “disagreed” with this statement (in total 70,6%). The total share of those who “agreed” and “completely agreed” with the statement was 17,2%. By region, those who disagreed was 75,6% at the border cities and 69,6% at the other cities. See: pp.139

23 Şanlıurfa Barometer study was conducted by Şanlıurfa Governorship in 2018, in cooperation with the GAP Administration, UN-HCR and the Turkish-German University Migration and Integration Research Center-TAGU in 2018 under the direction of Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan.

SB-2022-TABLE 17 (+FIGURE): TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE ARE CULTURALLY SIMILAR TO US?

	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Not similar at all	853	40,8	1147	50,5	1177	52,1	1219	54,1	1399	61,7
Not similar	823	39,4	712	31,4	575	25,5	607	26,9	513	22,6
Neither similar, nor not similar	185	8,9	196	8,6	253	11,2	211	9,4	191	8,4
Similar	152	7,3	153	6,7	192	8,5	179	8,0	119	5,2
Very similar	10	0,5	7	0,3	7	0,3	7	0,3	6	0,3
No idea/ No response	66	3,1	56	2,5	55	2,4	30	1,3	39	1,8
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: To what extent do you think Syrians in Türkiye are culturally similar to us? %



SB-2022-TABLE 18: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE ARE CULTURALLY SIMILAR TO US? (%)

	Not similar at all	Not similar	Combined not similar	Neither similar, nor not similar	Similar	Very similar	Combined similar	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	63,4	21,8	85,2	7,9	4,6	0,3	4,9	2,0
Male	60,0	23,5	83,5	8,9	5,9	0,3	6,2	1,4
Age Group								
18-24	67,9	19,0	86,9	6,0	6,0	0,3	6,3	0,8
25-34	65,0	19,1	84,1	8,8	5,3	-	5,3	1,8
35-44	61,7	23,9	85,6	8,2	4,0	-	4,0	2,2
45-54	62,0	20,1	82,1	10,3	4,9	0,5	5,4	2,2
55-64	56,0	26,2	82,2	8,7	6,6	0,7	7,3	1,8
65 +	52,2	32,7	84,9	8,2	5,7	0,4	6,1	0,8
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	57,8	21,9	79,7	10,9	6,3	-	6,3	3,1
Literate	56,8	24,7	81,5	7,4	6,2	2,4	8,6	2,5
Primary School	54,2	26,3	80,5	10,8	5,9	0,2	6,1	2,6
Middle-School	62,9	24,4	87,3	5,9	5,5	0,2	5,7	1,1
High-School or equivalent	66,3	20,4	86,7	7,6	3,7	0,2	3,9	1,8
University/ Graduate Degree	63,5	20,0	83,5	9,2	6,1	0,2	6,3	1,0
Region								
Border cities	55,7	22,8	78,5	9,1	7,9	1,0	8,9	3,5
Other cities*	63,0	22,6	85,6	8,3	4,7	0,1	4,8	1,3
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	63,7	21,9	85,6	8,9	4,7	0,1	4,8	0,7
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	62,6	23,0	85,6	7,9	4,7	0,1	4,8	1,7
Occupation								
Private sector employee	66,6	22,0	88,6	6,1	4,2	0,2	4,4	0,9
Housewife	59,3	23,5	82,8	8,7	4,9	0,4	5,3	3,2
Artisan/ Tradesman	60,8	22,9	83,7	10,0	5,0	0,2	5,2	1,1
Retired	54,6	29,6	84,2	8,6	5,8	0,3	6,1	1,1
Student	72,3	12,8	85,1	6,8	7,4	-	7,4	0,7
Unemployed	66,2	18,6	84,8	4,8	6,9	0,7	7,6	2,8
Public sector employee	55,3	22,4	77,7	18,8	2,4	-	2,4	1,1
Self-employed	51,7	22,4	74,1	10,3	10,3	-	10,3	5,3
Business person**	59,3	14,8	74,1	14,8	7,4	-	7,4	3,7
General	61,7	22,6	84,3	8,4	5,2	0,3	5,5	1,8

The demographic groups with the highest rate of "not similar" are colored in the leftmost column.


* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

The course of the perception of cultural similarity on the Syrians' side is more striking. Although Syrians were not included in the SB-2022 study due to the earthquake disaster, it is observed in previous studies that the initial high perception of cultural similarity of Syrians declined very rapidly. As can be seen in the figure below, the rate of Syrians who believe that they have a similar culture to Turks has steadily decreased over time, while the perception that "we are not similar" has increased. In fact, in the SB-2021 survey, the rate of those who said "we are not similar" (29.9%) exceeded the rate of those who said "we are similar" (24.7%).²⁴

SB-2022- FIGURE 5: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE ARE CULTURALLY SIMILAR TO TURKS?



²⁴ SB-2021- p: 226

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

In the FGDs, different questions were used to elicit opinions on cultural similarity and socio-cultural change. When asked the question *"How have Syrians in Türkiye positively/negatively affected the socio-cultural structure of the society?"*, it was observed that almost all of the participants in FGDs started sentences with **"They have had a negative impact because..."**. Only a few respondents in Şanlıurfa and Hatay stated that they could not talk about much change due to the fact that their cultural structures with Syrians (in the provinces of that region) are very similar. On the contrary, these participants stated positively that their food culture was enriched and that Syrian and local women were even inspired by each other in the way they wore headscarves. On the other hand, the issue of head scarves was also raised during the FGDs in previous years, but unlike this year, some participants stated that **"our women started to tie scarves like them, in other words, they started to look like them" as a negative impact on the social and cultural structure.**

With regard to the impact on cultural life, it can be observed that "negative" effects are generally mentioned. However, it should be noted that the participants had different interpretations of the definition of "culture" and many participants even started the sentence by saying *"we do not have a homogeneous culture, but..."* and therefore the participants themselves stated that the evaluations related to the question may differ between border cities and other cities.

- ◆ **"While we were trying to talk about and minimize the conflict between the countryside and the center before they came, I think that this cultural difference has widened even more with this migration to our country."** (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Female-Worker)
- ◆ *"I find the Southeastern culture and the culture of Syrians to be intersectional. If these people settle in Izmir, for example, when there is no integration, it is very normal for there to be chaos. In regions like Izmir, they would experience cultural conflict (...) But for example, Urfa is the place with the least cultural problems and they have a common language, which is a great advantage."* (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Female-Worker)

It is noteworthy that a small number of participants in the Hatay group emphasized the negative impact on the socio-cultural structure. Statements suggesting while both communities have commonalities, some customs are **"starting to resemble the customs of Syrians"** (in a negative and critical sense) is noteworthy.

- ◆ *"In terms of society and culture, Hatay is a mixed place, it hosts many cultures. But after the excessive migration, a fracture started to occur here. **Groupings started. Residents of Hatay started practicing the customs of Syrians, they were reminded of certain things.**"* (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male-Worker)
- ◆ *"The society has a historical connection in terms of culture. But what has changed is that I see that **the number of multiple marriages has increased**, we are witnessing individuals from Hatay having religious marriages with Syrians. Maybe this has been remembered again and there has been a degeneration in this context."* (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male-Worker)

Instead of providing a definition of "culture" and talking about the points that either corrupt it "or enrich it in a positive way, FGD participants preferred to say that there are negative impacts on culture in general and sometimes supported this with examples. Among these examples, it was frequently mentioned, especially in metropolitan provinces and Çanakkale, that child marriage, polygamy and disregard for girls are common among Syrians and it was emphasized that this situation is incompatible with Turkish culture and disturbing. It is also important to note that the answers to this question are often met with the view that **the two communities cannot "harmonize"**. In other words, with the exception of some participants in border provinces, FGD participants in general stated that they are culturally quite different from Syrians and that this cannot make it possible for the two communities to live together. Although social cohesion and coexistence were discussed as a separate question within the scope of the FGDs, it is noteworthy that the participants emphasized these two issues in their answers to other questions and expressed negative and hopeless views. It should be noted that the findings in this area are largely in line with the findings of previous years.

5. Interactions / Communication with Syrians

As of December 31, 2022, Syrians uTP reached 4.14% of Türkiye's population²⁵ of **85,279,553**, while the camp population in the total Syrian population dropped to 1.34%. It is also known that there are significant differences between regions, cities, districts, and neighborhoods. The numerical sizes of various communities within districts or neighborhoods is one of the most important factors in the structuring of social relations.

SB-2022- TABLE 19: PLEASE STATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE EVER ESTABLISHED THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIANS²⁶ (%)

Rank		SB-2017			SB-2019			SB-2020			SB-2021			SB-2022		
		Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response
1	To have a conversation	46,1	53,0	0,9	38,0	61,5	0,5	48,4	50,6	1,0	47,7	52,2	0,1	40,6	59,0	0,4
2	To shop (from a Syrian)	26,5	72,7	0,8	19,6	79,9	0,5	27,4	71,3	1,3	23,8	75,7	0,5	22,9	76,4	0,7
3	Support/ Solidarity	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,5	67,9	1,6	26,5	73,0	0,5	22,3	76,4	1,3
4	To establish a business relationship	15,6	82,8	1,6	12,2	87,3	0,5	19,6	79,0	1,4	14,8	84,9	0,3	15,9	83,2	0,9
5	To be friends	14,2	84,0	1,8	12,1	87,5	0,4	21,3	77,5	1,2	15,1	84,4	0,5	13,1	86,0	0,9
6	To have a problem*	10,6	87,2	2,2	12,9	86,7	0,4	19,7	79,0	1,3	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	To fight*				7,7	91,9	0,4	13,2	85,7	1,1	11,2	88,5	0,3	12,3	86,7	1,0
8	To flirt/romantic relationship	3,4	94,9	1,7	0,6	99,0	0,4	4,9	93,8	1,3	2,0	97,6	0,4	2,4	96,1	1,5
9	To get married	2,9	95,6	1,5	0,4	99,2	0,4	4,9	93,9	1,2	1,9	97,7	0,4	-	-	-

Spatial concentration is considered to be important in SB studies to analyze social cohesion processes and to develop more effective policies. The findings of the SB studies reveal that Turkish society's social relations with Syrians have decreased in almost all areas. It is noteworthy that even the rate of the response "to have a conversation", which is one of the most basic forms of social relations, decreased from 46.1% in SB-2017 to 40.6% in SB-2022 in 6 years. Despite the fact that Syrians share more spaces with Turks, speak Turkish, albeit to a limited extent, send their children to Turkish public schools and participate in business life, the fact that social relations remain so limited and even diminish points to the problems to be experienced in terms of social cohesion processes.

25 TÜİK: Address-based Population Registration System, 2022 <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=49685>

26 "Sorun yaşamak" ve "Kavga etmek" maddeleri SB-2017 döneminde tek madde şeklinde verilmiştir.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

In the FGDs, in response to the question *“What kind of relationship/communication do you have with Syrians? Can you share your experiences?”*, it is seen that the most interaction was expressed in the FGDs held in border cities. Especially in the FGDs conducted in Şanlıurfa and Hatay, it is understood that neighborly relations come to the forefront. **In the border cities where Syrians live in large numbers, it has been observed that the examples of “communication/experience” are more “neutral”; they have even emerged in the form of cooperation between neighbors and even cohesion is emerging over the years.**

- ◆ **“There are a lot of Syrians in the neighborhood where I live, I can even say around 70%. We also have Syrian tenants. My relations with Syrians are normal, there has been a normalization. Integration has been achieved with the people in the region.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male-Worker)
- ◆ **“There are also many Syrians in my neighborhood. Since I also work in the health sector, we come across them all the time. We try to guide and help them as much as we can. Cohesion has now been formed; years have passed.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Female-Worker)
- ◆ **“In Hatay, there is already a connection from the past, there is a historical bond. For this reason, there are no excessive reactions, but it can happen from time to time in some places. I have not experienced any negativity.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male-Worker)
- ◆ **“There are many Syrians in our neighborhood. I realized that we were very prejudiced when they first arrived. I had thought that we would have more problems, that we would not be able to communicate. I had thought we would have problems especially because they are close to the culture of Antakya but our lifestyles are different, but in the following years I saw that it was the opposite. We also have neighbors; we communicate very well. We often meet at the supermarket, at the hairdresser. Our children have Syrian friends at school. We do not have any problems.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Female-Worker)
- ◆ **“We work very closely together because of our work, and there are also Syrians with whom we shop. There are socio-cultural differences among them, as there are among us. They also have problems that they criticize seriously within themselves. Just as we criticize cultural problems from time to time, they are going through similar processes (...) Hatay as a province has an advantage in terms of language since many people here speak Arabic. I think the problems are minimal. There are problems in the Turkish society as well. Compared to other provinces, Hatay is actually a city that overcomes problems a little more easily.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male-Worker)
- ◆ **“I live in a detached house and our immediate neighbors are Syrian. The Syrian population is very dense here. Our neighborly relations are quite developed and we live without any problems. We shop with each other; we communicate in this way.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male-Student)

6. Social Distance

Measuring the “social distance” between the Turkish society and Syrians uTP whose number, as of the end of 2022, has surpassed 3,5 million and more than 98% of whom live outside of camps was determined as one of the key objectives of Syrian Barometer research. The concept of “social distance”, developed by Emory S. Bogardus in 1925, provides a very useful tool for discussing the terms of social cohesion.²⁷ The scales applied regularly by the Syrian Barometer research to measure social distance are important to uncover dynamics of living together. In calculating a social distance measure with Syrians, Cluster and Discriminant analyses were used. In this framework, scoring was conducted by assigning “1” to those who said “I agree”, “0” to those who said “I partly agree”, and “-1” to those who said “I disagree”. Next, the average score for each question was calculated to reach the overall social distance score. In this calculation, considering the distribution of the data, the “Cluster analysis” was used to form 5 groups. The appropriateness of these groups was confirmed by the “Discriminant analysis”. A strong correlation of 98,5% was found between the scoring and these 5 groups.²⁸

27 Emory S. Bogardus (1925) “Social Distance and Its Origins.” *Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (1925): 216-226.


28 For more details on Cluster and Discriminant Analysis See: C. Fraley and A. E. Raftery (1999) *Software for Model-Based Cluster and Discriminant Analysis* (<https://www.stat.cmu.edu/~brian/724/week14/mclust-old.pdf>) (Access: 10.09.2022)

The findings on "social distance", which were tried to be understood with the question "Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements in terms of reflecting your feelings about Syrians" on ten statements, show us that the very high level of social distance of the Turkish society towards Syrians has reached its highest level in SB-2022. Although Turkish society has been living together with Syrians, especially after 2013, social distance reached its highest level (-0.56) in SB-2022.

SB-2022-TABLE 20 (+FIGURE): SOCIAL DISTANCE GROUPS

#	SB-2017			SB-2019			SB-2020			SB-2021			SB-2022		
	%	Social Dis- tance Score	#	%	Social Dis- tance Score	#	%	Social Dis- tance Score	#	%	Social Dis- tance Score	#	%	Social Dis- tance Score	#
Very distant	748	36,1	-0,95	1157	51,0	-0,97	792	35,2	-0,99	932	41,4	-0,95	1102	48,8	-0,99
Distant	555	26,8	-0,51	347	15,3	-0,55	589	26,2	-0,62	552	24,6	-0,52	459	20,3	-0,68
Neither distant, nor close	363	17,5	-0,02	383	16,9	-0,10	428	19,1	-0,11	396	17,6	-0,01	341	15,1	-0,22
Close	220	10,6	0,44	244	10,8	0,36	282	12,6	0,38	192	8,5	0,45	220	9,7	0,34
Very close	186	9,0	0,88	135	6,0	0,87	156	6,9	0,86	178	7,9	0,90	138	6,1	0,90
General	2072	100,0	-0,36	2266	100,0	-0,51	2247	100,0	-0,42	2250	100,0	-0,42	2260	100,0	-0,56
	Scores bt - 1,00; -0,90 Very Distant			Scores bt - - 0,89 - - 0,50 Distant			Scores bt - 0,49; - 0,09 Neither Distant, Nor Cloee			Scores bt 010; 069 Close			Scores bt 0,70; 1,00 Very Close		

SB-2022: SOCIAL DISTANCE



Not-1: SB-2022'de Suriyeliler ile çalışma yapılamadığından sosyal mesafe ölçeği verilememektedir.

Not-2: SB-2017 döneminde 17 kişi, SB-2019 döneminde 5 kişi, SB-2020 döneminde 12 kişi, SB-2021 döneminde 3 kişi, SB-2022 döneminde 7 kişi sosyal mesafe ifadelerine (10 madde) cevap vermediğinden gruplamaya dâhil edilmemiştir.

The findings on the “social distance” issue, which is attempted to be understood with the question “*Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements in terms of reflecting your feelings about Syrians;*” and with ten different propositions, show us that the significantly high level of social distance exhibited by the Turkish community towards Syrians has increased even further in SB-2022.

As mentioned, although Turkish society has been living together with Syrians, especially after 2013, the distance has been increasing. Even though the results are not known on the Syrians side since the SB-2022 study did not include Syrians, it should be reminded that there has been a significant decline in the “very close” distance of Syrians to Turkish society in the recent period. The value, which was +0.71 in SB-2017, decreased to +0.55 in SB-2021.

The social distance scale shows that Turkish society has a very significant social distance towards Syrians. It is observed that those who live in the border region with a high concentration of Syrians distance themselves to a lesser extent than those living in other cities. It should be emphasized, however, that this situation changes frequently. In SB-2021, it was found that the relative cultural proximity of the population in the border provinces to the Syrians did not reduce social distance, but rather increased it. In SB-2022, the social distance of Turks in the border cities was found to be lower than in other regions. These data also reveal that periodic factors are effective in provinces with high numbers of Syrians.

When SB-2022, SB-2021, SB-2020, SB-2019, and SB-2017 findings are considered together, the social distance towards Syrians displayed by the Turkish society falls in the category of “distant” in all five studies. However, it is noteworthy that while the respondents in the “very distant” group constituted 36,1% of all respondents in SB-2017, it increased to 51% in SB-2019, decreased again to 35,2% in SB-2020, increased again to 41,4% in SB-2021, and reached its highest in SB-2022 with 48.8%. The combined share of the “very close” and “close” groups was 19,6% in SB-2017, 16,8% in SB-2019, 19,5% in SB-2020, 16,4% in SB-2021, and 15,8% in SB-2022. The significant divergence since 2020 is striking.

When the details of the social distance findings are examined, it is understood that the statement regarding being together in the education/school environment (“*It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children*”) is accepted at the highest level in both SB-2021 and SB-2022. However, this acceptance decreased radically from 41.3% in SB-2021 to 24.5% in SB-2022. This is followed by “working in the same workplace” with a Syrian, albeit in a decreasing trend. However, when SB-2021 and SB-2022 figures are compared, it is observed that the distance has increased in all data.

SB-2022-TABLE 21: SB-2022 SOCIAL DISTANCE GROUPS (%)

	Very distant	Distant	Neither Distant, Nor Close	Close	Very Close
Sex					
Female	49,7	20,6	14,7	9,1	5,9
Male	47,8	20,1	15,5	10,4	6,2
Age Group					
18-24	53,3	19,4	16,5	6,8	4,0
25-34	47,8	18,5	15,6	11,5	6,6
35-44	45,7	21,4	15,7	10,1	7,1
45-54	47,8	19,4	17,1	11,3	4,4
55-64	47,3	22,2	13,1	9,8	7,6
65 +	53,9	22,4	9,4	6,9	7,4
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	51,6	10,9	10,9	15,6	11,0
Literate	60,5	22,2	6,2	6,2	4,9
Primary School	46,0	23,0	13,5	9,6	7,9
Middle-School	52,2	21,3	13,1	8,1	5,3
High-School or equivalent	51,0	18,6	16,5	9,2	4,7
University/ Graduate Degree	43,0	19,9	18,6	11,9	6,6
Region					
Border cities	42,5	15,5	16,0	14,8	11,2
Other cities*	50,1	21,3	14,9	8,7	5,0
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	54,0	19,7	12,8	8,0	5,5
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	47,7	22,3	16,2	9,1	4,7
Occupation					
Private sector employee	53,2	18,8	15,7	8,1	4,2
Housewife	47,8	19,2	16,4	10,3	6,3
Artisan/ Tradesman	42,8	22,7	18,8	10,5	5,2
Retired	50,3	25,5	9,0	7,6	7,6
Student	54,1	16,2	16,2	8,1	5,4
Unemployed	51,7	21,4	11,0	6,2	9,7
Public sector employee	35,3	17,6	18,8	21,2	7,1
Self-employed	58,6	13,8	1,7	15,5	10,4
Business person**	40,8	14,8	14,8	18,5	11,1
General	48,8	20,3	15,1	9,7	6,1

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note1: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

Note2: 7 people were not included in the grouping as they did not respond to the social distance statements (10 items).

SB-2022-TABLE 22: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN TERMS OF REFLECT-ING YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT SYRIANS? (%)

Rank		I Disagree	I Partially Agree	I Agree	No idea/ No response
1	It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children	62,0	10,3	24,5	3,2
2	It wouldn't disturb me to work with a Syrian in the same work place	62,0	12,1	22,6	3,3
3	I can be friends with a Syrian	62,8	14,1	20,5	2,6
4	It wouldn't disturb me to live with a Syrian in the same building	65,5	11,3	20,2	3,0
5	It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families would settle down in the neighborhood that I live	65,6	12,6	19,8	2,0
6	It wouldn't disturb me to settle down in a neighborhood where the majority of residents are Syrian	76,1	8,6	13,3	2,0
7	It wouldn't disturb me if my brother/sister married a Syrian	80,4	5,6	10,7	3,3
8	I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	79,1	7,8	10,3	2,8
9	I would allow my child to get married with a Syrian	81,9	5,2	9,2	3,7
10	I can get married to a Syrian	85,1	4,2	7,5	3,2

SB-2022-TABLE 23: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN TERMS OF REFLECTING YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT SYRIANS? (%)

		I Disagree	I Partially Agree	I Agree	No idea/ No response
It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children	2022	62,0	10,3	24,5	3,2
	2021	41,9	13,6	41,3	3,2
	2020	43,7	16,3	37,0	3,0
	2019	52,0	13,2	32,3	2,5
It wouldn't disturb me to work with a Syrian in the same work place	2022	62,0	12,1	22,6	3,3
	2021	48,2	15,7	32,5	3,6
	2020	48,1	17,1	32,4	2,4
	2019	56,3	12,6	28,2	2,9
It wouldn't disturb me to live with a Syrian in the same building	2022	65,5	11,3	20,2	3,0
	2021	55,9	14,6	27,4	2,1
	2020	53,4	17,9	26,5	2,2
	2019	60,4	14,8	23,3	1,5
It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families would settle down in the neighborhood that I live	2022	65,6	12,6	19,8	2,0
	2021	51,1	16,4	30,7	1,8
	2020	53,0	18,2	26,3	2,5
	2019	59,4	14,2	24,7	1,7
I can be friends with a Syrian	2022	62,8	14,1	20,5	2,6
	2021	55,7	15,9	26,8	1,6
	2020	54,7	17,8	25,6	1,9
	2019	61,1	15,4	21,8	1,7
It wouldn't disturb me to settle down in a neighborhood where the majority of residents are Syrian	2022	76,1	8,6	13,3	2,0
	2021	64,8	12,3	21,1	1,8
	2020	62,3	14,5	20,9	2,3
	2019	70,5	11,3	16,7	1,5
I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	2022	79,1	7,8	10,3	2,8
	2021	76,8	7,9	11,9	3,4
	2020	72,7	12,1	11,9	3,3
	2019	75,3	10,2	12,1	2,4
It wouldn't disturb me if my brother/sister married a Syrian	2022	80,4	5,6	10,7	3,3
	2021	78,3	7,2	11,3	3,2
	2020	77,4	9,5	10,4	2,7
	2019	81,3	8,5	8,2	2,0
I would allow my child to get married with a Syrian	2022	81,9	5,2	9,2	3,7
	2021	79,0	7,0	11,1	2,9
	2020	78,7	9,4	9,3	2,6
	2019	81,5	8,5	7,6	2,4
I can get married to a Syrian	2022	85,1	4,2	7,5	3,2
	2021	85,0	4,8	7,9	2,3
	2020	84,7	6,1	6,6	2,6
	2019	86,9	6,6	5,0	1,5

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

Social distance statements were also posed to participants in the FGDs as independent questions. The responses of the participants from the FGD cities to the hypothetical questions that were essential for the social distance scale study are compiled below.

In terms of being friends, almost all participants in the Gaziantep, Hatay, and Şanlıurfa FGDs stated that they already have more than one Syrian friend. It is understood that the participants, especially university students, have many Syrian friends at their schools. On the other hand, participants in Mersin - one of the cities that showed the biggest distance towards Syrians in all FGDs - distanced themselves from all types of social relations and stated that they would not want to be friends as they thought they would not be culturally compatible. Similarly, another FGD group that opposed almost all types of relationships was Çanakkale participants who reported having almost no daily encounters with Syrians. **These findings suggest that where there is less interaction, prejudices are greater, and therefore social distance increases and motivation to come together is significantly lower.**

In terms of being neighbors, participants from border provinces stated that they already have Syrian neighbors and that this would not be a problem. These participants stated that they did not want to generalize "Syrians", that they would want their neighbors to be people who obey the rules, with the idea that every nation has good and bad, polite and rude, clean and dirty people, and therefore they would not have a nationalist perspective on this issue. Again, the Mersin and Çanakkale FGD participants were the groups most distant from this form of relationship.

Business partnership is the second form of social relationship after "marriage", which a significant number of respondents are most distant from. It is observed that a significant portion of the participants stated that they would not form a business partnership with Syrians with the prejudice and expression that they are "unreliable". It was found that, as in the case of marriage, respondents from border cities had a more favorable view of business partnerships than respondents from other provinces.

Regarding the issue of their children being educated in the same class with a Syrian child, the participants stated that their answers may differ depending on how many Syrian students are in the class. Participants stated that they would not accept a high number of Syrian students in the class, mostly due to concerns about the quality of education. While in border cities there is no distance on this issue, participants in metropolitan cities and Çanakkale responded negatively to a great extent.

- ◆ *"Last year, I read on a news page on Twitter. The majority of the class was Syrian and they did not want to recite the Turkish National Anthem. I would not want to send my child to crowded schools where such things can happen."* (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Male-Worker)

When asked about their views on **marriage** with Syrians, which has a special place in terms of social relations, it is seen that a significant portion of the participants put the most important distance among all forms of social relations. More precisely, the majority of the participants - as in previous SB studies - stated that "I would not marry a Syrian". When asked about the reasons for this, they stated that they thought they would not be able to adapt culturally and that even if they would get along with their Syrian spouse-to-be, their families would not. When the respondents who said "I would not marry a Syrian" were asked about their views on marrying someone from another nationality (e.g. from Europe), some of them said that it would be possible, while others said that they had a "nationalist" approach to this issue, meaning that they would prefer to marry only Turks. Almost all of the respondents in border provinces emphasized cultural affinity and stated that it would not be a problem for them to marry a Syrian. It is noteworthy that some of the participants in the Istanbul and Ankara FGDs stated that they would not be distant from marrying a Syrian "if their styles are similar, if they get along and have things in common". **In other words, these participants do not make definite statements such as "I will never get married" just because he/she is "Syrian", they care about the matching of ideas for marriage, and once they achieve this, they do not care what nationality the prospective spouse is.** It should be underlined that the respondents who hold this view are predominantly young participants.


7. Livelihood Sources: How Syrians in Türkiye earn their living

It is observed in many studies on social cohesion that a significant part of the complaints by the host communities against newcomers stems from the actual or perceived “financial burdens” created by them. The support provided to asylum seekers or migrants through the host community’s taxes and public institutions can become a matter of both criticism and negative perception. SB studies have uncovered that despite years of living together with Syrians, Turkish society has insufficient information regarding the livelihoods of Syrians, which is mostly based on prejudices and misinformation. When the Turkish respondents were asked the question “*How are Syrians in Türkiye making their living?*” with the chance of producing multiple responses, more than 80% of the respondents included “through assistance of the Turkish state” in their responses in all five SB surveys (SB-2017: 86,2%; SB-2019: 84,5%; SB-2020: 80,6%; SB-2021: 82,5%, SB-2022: 81,5%). In other words, more than 80% of Turkish society believes that Syrians are living with the support of the Turkish state, either in cash or in kind. It is possible that some statements of politicians from time to time play an important role in this. However, as can be seen in the analysis of the data on Syrians included in the previous SB-2017, SB-2019, SB-2020 and SB-2021 studies, the proportion of Syrians who receive support from the state or other institutions, particularly Social Cohesion Assistance (ESSN), is around 40%. Although the SB studies and various field studies, especially those conducted by the International Labor Organization (ILO), reveal that Syrians basically make a living by working, the perception in the society is evidently quite different. In fact, it is seen in the SB studies that one of the most important concerns of the Turkish society regarding Syrians is that they harm the country’s economy (see Table 31). However, it is observed that the perception that Syrians make a living by working has also strengthened in the Turkish society and has risen to the second place. In SB-2021, the rate of those who said “by working” rose to second place for the first time with 64.2%, and in SB-2022, although the perception on this issue decreased slightly, it maintained its second position with 52.6%. It is surprising that the “by begging” option, although it has fallen from second to third place in the last two SB surveys, is still so strong on the list with 48.7%.

SB-2022-TABLE 24 (+FIGURE): HOW ARE SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE MAKING THEIR LIVING? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

Sıra No.		SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Through assistance from the Turkish state	1801	86,2	1918	84,5	1820	80,6	1858	82,5	1847	81,5
2	By working	1040	49,8	1155	50,9	1123	49,7	1447	64,2	1193	52,6
3	By begging	1359	65,1	1231	54,2	1199	53,1	1113	49,4	1103	48,7
4	Through support from charitable people	666	31,9	478	21,0	478	21,2	623	27,7	350	15,4
5	Through support from international organizations / foreign states	101	4,8	181	8,0	152	6,7	384	17,0	377	16,6
6	Through NGO (associations/ foundations etc.) support	170	8,1	218	9,6	201	8,9	339	15,0	199	8,8
7	Other	-	-	22	1,0	41	1,8	163	7,2	153	6,8
	No idea/No response	19	0,9	31	1,4	41	1,8	20	0,9	30	1,3

SB-2022: How are Syrians in Türkiye making their living? (Multiple Responses)



**SB-2022-TABLE 25: HOW ARE SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE MAKING THEIR LIVING?
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES %)**

	Through assistance from the Turkish state	By working	By begging	Through support from international organizations/ foreign states	Through support from charitable people	Through NGO (associations/ foundation etc.) support	Through the support of Syrians in Türkiye	Through the support that come from relatives/ acquaintances living abroad	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex										
Female	83,7	49,6	48,4	16,6	16,3	7,8	2,9	1,7	0,6	1,3
Male	79,2	55,7	48,9	16,7	14,6	9,7	4,8	2,3	1,1	1,3
Age Group										
18-24	83,0	44,3	58,2	13,4	12,5	7,7	5,1	1,4	0,6	0,6
25-34	80,3	52,9	49,0	18,2	14,8	11,9	4,1	2,0	0,6	1,8
35-44	82,8	57,7	43,7	18,2	16,4	8,4	4,4	1,6	1,0	0,8
45-54	81,1	53,4	44,9	15,4	15,9	7,8	3,2	2,2	1,2	1,7
55-64	78,9	53,8	46,9	18,2	17,5	7,6	2,5	3,6	1,1	1,5
65 +	82,4	51,0	52,7	15,1	15,9	7,8	3,3	1,2	0,8	1,6
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate	81,3	48,4	50,0	12,5	14,1	7,8	3,1	4,7	1,6	1,6
Literate	84,0	48,1	40,7	22,2	16,0	2,5	1,2	1,2	-	2,5
Primary School	78,8	53,8	45,4	16,9	14,9	8,6	2,0	2,0	0,8	1,2
Middle-School	82,5	54,4	48,0	16,7	14,7	5,9	3,5	1,5	1,3	1,5
High-School or equivalent	81,3	49,9	50,2	16,0	15,4	10,6	5,2	1,5	0,9	1,2
University/ Graduate Degree	83,3	54,7	51,6	16,7	16,7	10,2	4,9	2,9	0,6	1,2
Region										
Border cities	74,9	53,2	29,1	5,8	7,8	6,8	2,5	1,8	1,0	2,3
Other cities*	82,9	52,5	52,8	18,9	17,0	9,2	4,2	2,0	0,9	1,1
Metropolitan cities	88,7	57,5	56,1	28,5	21,2	13,0	4,3	3,0	1,0	1,0
Non-metropolitan cities	79,3	49,5	50,8	13,2	14,5	6,9	4,1	1,5	0,8	1,2
Occupation										
Private sector employee	84,6	53,2	51,9	18,9	15,4	8,8	4,0	2,8	0,4	0,9
Housewife	82,2	48,5	41,6	15,4	15,8	5,9	2,0	1,8	1,0	1,6
Artisan/ Tradesman	78,2	59,3	46,6	15,5	16,8	11,5	5,0	1,3	1,3	1,1
Retired	80,4	54,3	49,1	15,1	14,1	5,8	3,8	2,1	1,0	2,4
Student	83,1	43,2	62,2	15,5	8,8	6,8	5,4	0,7	-	-
Unemployed	76,6	45,5	55,9	20,0	13,1	11,0	2,1	2,1	2,8	2,8
Public sector employee	85,9	60,0	43,5	18,8	29,4	15,3	10,6	3,5	-	-
Self-employed	81,0	50,0	46,6	13,8	13,8	12,1	3,4	3,4	-	-
Business person**	77,8	59,3	55,6	18,5	11,1	18,5	-	-	-	-
General	81,5	52,6	48,7	16,6	15,4	8,8	3,9	2,0	0,9	1,3

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

8. Looking at the Society from Outside

SB studies aimed to understand the attitude of the Turkish society towards Syrians through 6 propositions, 3 of which are positive and 3 of which are negative. The response *"Our society are very tolerant towards Syrians"*, which was added to the options of the question *"Which of the following statements best reflects how our society treats Syrians?"* in SB-2021, received the highest level of support in both SB-2021 and SB-2022 respectively with 28.5% and 39.2%. In the three SB studies that did not include this option, the statement *"Our society has embraced Syrians"* was the strongest response in SB-2017 (32.9%) and SB-2020 (35.8%), and the second strongest response in SB-2019 (29.1%).²⁹ In the SB studies, the option *"Our society is doing everything it can for Syrians"* was always in the top 3 among the 6 options. The option *"Our society is exploiting Syrians as cheap labor" / "Syrians are being used as cheap labor"*, in turn, always ranked third. However, the rate of this answer, which received 25.1% support in SB-2020, decreased significantly in SB-2021 (16.5%) and SB-2022 (12.5%). The support for the statements *"Our society looks down on Syrians"* and *"Our society treats Syrians badly"* was below 9% in all SB studies.

SB-2022-TABLE 26: WHICH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BEST REFLECTS HOW OUR SOCIETY TREATS SYRI-ANS?³⁰

Sıra No.		SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Our society is very tolerant towards Syrians	-	-	-	-	-	-	641	28,5	889	39,2
2	Our society is doing everything it can for Syrians	681	32,6	699	30,8	428	18,9	635	28,2	577	25,4
3	Syrians are being used as cheap labor	391	18,7	410	18,0	568	25,1	372	16,5	284	12,5
4	Our society has embraced Syrians	687	32,9	660	29,1	809	35,8	229	10,2	235	10,4
5	Our society treats Syrians badly	121	5,8	131	5,8	167	7,4	154	6,8	104	4,6
6	Our society looks down on Syrians	144	6,9	137	6,0	200	8,9	104	4,6	91	4,0
7	Other	-	-	-	-	23	1,1	37	1,6	22	1,0
	No idea/No response	65	3,1	234	10,3	64	2,8	81	3,6	65	2,9
Total		2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

²⁹ Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
"Turkish society has embraced Syrians": Agree: 78%, Disagree: 9,8%

³⁰ The previously used option *"Our society is exploiting Syrians as cheap labor"* has been updated to *"Syrians are being used as cheap labor"* in SB-2021 and SB-2022.

9. Anxieties: Security, Serenity and Social Acceptance

It is observed that the Turkish society both shows “acceptance” and “solidarity” and has serious concerns about the Syrians who started arriving in Türkiye on 29 April 2011 and have been living outside camps and mostly in urban areas since 2013. As also expressed in SB-2017 and SB-2019, “*high level yet fragile support*” appears to be turning into a form of “*toleration*” and then “*rejection*” due to these concerns and anxieties. As the process, which was expected to last a very short time when it began in 2011, has been prolonged and the numbers have exceeded millions in a short time, feelings of solidarity have been eroded and concerns have increased. The problems in the economy, the increase in unemployment and, more importantly, the further politicization of the process leading up to the 2023 elections seem to have played an important role in the negative perceptions of Syrians in Turkish society. SB research sought to uncover the reasons, nature and extent of the support and anxieties that Turkish society has about Syrians. In the anxiety/concern questions, the four main concerns that arise in mass humanitarian mobilizations, i.e., “*loss of jobs,*” “*increase in crime rates,*” “*deterioration of public services,*” and “*corruption of identities,*” were specifically addressed to Turkish society. On the other hand, aside from the concerns in the society, the views of those who have different views on living with Syrians is also questioned with a positive statement (“*We live together with Syrians in peace*”).

a. Anxieties

SB studies show a steady increase in anxieties about Syrians in Turkish society. While the overall level of anxiety was calculated to be 3.2 (out of 5)³¹ in SB-2017, it increased to 3.6 in SB-2019, declined to 3.5 in both SB-2020 and SB-2021, and reached its highest score of 3.8 in SB-2022. These scores indicate a quite high and increasing level of anxiety that should not be ignored. All the data also reveal that the concerns of Turkish society have not been given a necessary and adequate response. This situation is also effective in the politicization of the process. The concerns and reactions of society, which are not taken seriously enough, seem to have opened up a very useful political space.


In SB-2022, just like in SB-2020, the most serious concern/anxiety in the Turkish society about Syrians is “*Syrians becoming citizens*” with 84% (score equivalent 4.1).³² The statement that has been at the top or second place in the SB studies since the beginning is the proposition that “*they will harm our country’s economy*”. In SB-2022, the support for this is 76.8% and the score value is 3.9. The statement “*I think that Syrians will harm Türkiye’s social-cultural structure*” ranks third with 76.3% and the score of 3.8. The concern about “*demographic change and identity deterioration*” (“*I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society’s identity*”), which has been on the agenda frequently in the last two years in Türkiye, is also represented at a high rate of 76.1% (score: 3.8). The statement “*I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians*” ranks

31 While SB-2017 included 6 statements on anxieties over Syrians in different areas, SB-2019 and SB-2020 included 9, and SB-2022 included 8+1.

32 The statement on “*citizenship*”, which was included in the list of concerns for the first time in SB-2019, was included in the question list in SB-2019 and SB-2020 but was not included in 2021 due to a technical error.

fifth with 75.2%, followed by “I think that Syrians disrupt social peace by engaging in crimes such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution” with 74.1% (score: 3.8). The other two concerns that fell below the general anxiety score of 3.8 are “I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs” (Score: 3.6) and “I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children” (Score: 3.4). Based on these findings, it can be said that Turkish society’s anxieties about Syrians are essentially related to identity concerns. In other words, Turkish society has more abstract concerns than concrete and actual or imminent ones like “job losses” or “increased crime rates”. This is evidenced by the fact that concerns over “job losses” or “committed crimes or caused harm”, which are expected to result from concrete negative experiences, are at the end of all concerns. It is believed that economic problems and the politicization of the issue during the election process have a high contribution in bringing these concerns to the agenda.

SB-2022- TABLE 27: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REGARDING SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (SCORED)

Rank		2017	2019	2020	2021	2022
1	I am worried about Syrians becoming citizens*	-	3,5	3,8	-	4,1
2	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	3,4	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,9
3	I think that Syrians will harm Türkiye's socio-cultural structure	3,3	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,8
4	I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	-	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,8
5	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	-	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,8
6	I think that Syrians disturb social peace by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution**	3,4	3,7	3,5	3,5	3,8
7	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	3,1	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,6
 Average Score		3,2	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,8
8	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	2,9	3,4	3,0	3,2	3,4

* The statement “I think they will become citizens and play a role on deciding Türkiye's destiny and future” in SB-2019 was updated as “I am worried about them becoming citizens” in SB-2020 and as “I am worried about Syrians becoming citizens” in SB-2022.

** The statement “I think that Syrians will disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution” in previous SB studies was revised in SB-2021 and updated as “I think that Syrians disturb social peace by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution”.

SB-2022- TABLE 28: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REGARDING SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (SCORED)

Rank		Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined agree	No idea/ No response
1	I am worried about Syrians becoming citizens	4,8	4,9	9,7	4,9	43,6	40,4	84,0	1,4
2	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	6,4	6,3	12,7	9,3	43,5	33,3	76,8	1,2
3	I think that Syrians will harm Türkiye's socio-cultural structure	7,1	7,9	15,0	7,0	45,2	31,1	76,3	1,7
4	I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	7,8	8,6	16,4	5,9	44,4	31,7	76,1	1,6
5	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	7,4	7,9	15,3	7,1	44,5	30,7	75,2	2,4
6	I think that Syrians disturb social peace by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	6,2	7,0	13,2	9,4	43,8	30,3	74,1	3,3
7	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	9,4	11,3	20,7	8,6	43,6	25,8	69,4	1,3
8	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	11,2	14,6	25,8	10,8	39,9	21,7	61,6	1,8

SB-2022- TABLE 29: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REGARDING SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (SCORED)

	I am worried about Syrians becoming citizens	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	I think that Syrians will harm Türkiye's socio-cultural structure	I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	I think that Syrians disturb social peace by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	Average Score
Sex									
Female	4,1	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,4	3,8
Male	4,1	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,8	3,5	3,4	3,7
Age Group									
18-24	4,2	4,1	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0	3,8	3,7	4,0
25-34	4,0	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,6	3,4	3,8
35-44	4,1	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,3	3,7
45-54	4,0	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,7	3,6	3,4	3,7
55-64	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,7	3,5	3,4	3,7
65 +	4,1	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,7
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	3,8	3,6	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,4	3,1	3,2	3,3
Literate	4,1	4,2	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,6	3,9
Primary School	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,4	3,7
Middle-School	4,1	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,8	3,7	3,4	3,8
High-School or equivalent	4,1	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,9	3,7	3,5	3,8
University/ Graduate Degree	4,1	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,9	3,7	3,5	3,4	3,8
Region									
Border cities	3,7	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,5	3,4	2,9	3,4
Other cities*	4,1	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,5	3,8
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	4,3	4,2	4,1	4,1	4,0	4,0	3,9	3,7	4,0
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	4,1	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,5	3,4	3,7
Occupation									
Private sector employee	4,2	4,0	4,0	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,5	3,9
Housewife	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,7	3,6	3,3	3,6
Artisan/ Tradesman	4,0	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,8	3,4	3,4	3,7
Retired	4,1	3,9	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,5	3,3	3,7
Student	4,3	4,1	4,1	4,1	4,1	4,1	3,9	3,7	4,0
Unemployed	4,0	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,9	3,7	3,7	3,5	3,8
Public sector employee	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,1	3,5
Self-employed	4,0	3,8	3,7	3,8	3,6	3,7	3,6	3,3	3,7
Business person**	3,8	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,6	3,3	3,6
General	4,1	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,6	3,4	3,8

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

Although there is a high level of concern about Syrians in all areas, a striking change is observed in the demographic analysis of the SB data. Until SB-2021, it was observed that those living with a large Syrian population in areas bordering Syria were highly anxious in all areas, much higher than the Türkiye average. For example, while the average anxiety score was 3.5 in SB-2021, the score in border regions was 3.7. However, the SB-2022 survey shows that in parallel with the politicization of the process, the level of anxiety has increased all across the country in general and among those living in metropolitan areas in particular. In addition to those living in metropolitan areas, high levels of anxiety are also observed among students and those in the 18-24 age group.

b. “Living Together in Peace”?

While trying to analyze the concerns of the Turkish society about Syrians, a positive statement (*We live together with Syrians in peace*) was also included for testing purposes. This statement, which was included in the anxiety propositions until SB-2021, was evaluated independently in SB-2022. With an average score of 1.7, this proposition received the least support in all studies since 2017. To read it the other way around, it is another sign that Turkish society has no expectation or even desire to live together in peace with Syrians.

SB-2022- TABLE 30: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REGARDING SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (SCORED)

	2017	2019	2020	2021	2022
We live together with Syrians in peace	1,9	1,5	1,7	1,7	1,7

In SB-2022 data, the rate of combined disagreement with the statement “*We live together with Syrians in peace*” is 76.8% in total, of which 54.1% is “strongly disagree”, while the rate of combined agreement is 8.9% in total, of which 1.3% is “strongly agree”. Those who responded slightly more positively to the statement “*We live together with Syrians in peace*” are those living in border cities with 14.2%. This reveals that the perceptions about Syrians find more place in identity politics and that those living in metropolitan areas show a higher level of interest in this.

SB-2022- TABLE 31: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REGARDING SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined agree	No idea/ No response
GENERAL	54,1	22,7	76,8	12,3	7,6	1,3	8,9	2,0
Border cities	47,6	18,7	66,3	15,2	11,7	2,5	14,2	4,3
Other cities	55,5	23,6	79,1	11,6	6,8	1,0	7,8	1,5
Metropolitan cities	57,4	23,4	80,8	10,4	6,5	0,9	7,4	1,4
Non-Metropolitan cities	54,4	23,7	78,1	12,4	6,9	1,0	7,9	1,6

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

A large majority of the participants who answered the question “Do you think that the Syrians who will stay in Türkiye in the future and Turkish society will be able to live together in peace?” stated that they **do not believe that peaceful cohabitation will be possible**. Compared to previous years, there is both an increase in the number of those who express hopeless and negative views on this issue and a more negative and distant attitude in the way they convey this hopelessness.

- ◆ “We cannot live in peace within ourselves, so how can we live with others?” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)
- ◆ “Only with a solid and strong legal system can people live together in peace. However, these issues are problematic in our country right now.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)
- ◆ “Economically, tensions are high in Türkiye right now. The situation is no different for Syrians, so I don’t think it is possible to live together in peace under the current conditions.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul- Male, Worker)

In previous years, participants from the border cities responded more positively to this question, in other words, they stated that they were already living together in some way and that this could continue in the future. Whereas in this study, it is seen that although the Turkish community living in those regions still wishes to live together peacefully, their belief has decreased and their concerns have increased. Some participants emphasized that the political process has not been well managed, which has polarized and marginalized the society and will have a negative impact on the serenity of the society in the foreseeable future.

10. Experiencing “personal harm” from Syrians and things “heard”


a. Experiencing Actual Harm

In general, concerns about Syrians in the society are based either on experiences or on perceptions. In this context, the actual existence of being harmed was questioned based on the high rates of those who stated “*I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children*”, which was 57.4% in SB-2017, 61.1% in SB-2019, 45.8% in SB-2020, 33.5% in SB-2021, and 61.6% in SB-2022. The question, which was tried to be concretized by determining the time and action, was posed as “*Have you experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years?*” and it was tried to be understood whether the participants themselves, their families or people around them had been harmed.

SB-2022- TABLE 32 (+FIGURE): HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED ANY HARM FROM A SYRIAN IN THE LAST 5 YEARS? (%)

	SB-2017			SB-2019			SB-2020			SB-2021			SB-2022		
	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
Personal harm	9,4	90,4	0,2	13,7	86,0	0,3	11,4	87,8	0,8	11,7	88,0	0,3	13,8	85,6	0,6
Harm to someone in your family	7,7	92,0	0,3	8,0	91,1	0,9	6,8	92,4	0,8	7,1	92,3	0,6	10,0	88,7	1,3
Harm to someone in your personal environment	38,0	57,4	4,6	34,7	63,5	1,8	30,8	67,3	1,9	32,2	65,5	2,3	37,4	60,2	2,4

SB-2022: Have YOU/YOUR FAMILY/SOMEONE AROUND YOU experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years? (%) "YES"



Personal harm

Harm to someone in your family

Harm to someone in your personal environment

In the SB-2022 survey, the rate of those who stated that they had been personally harmed by Syrians in the last 5 years was 13.8%. This rate was 9.4% in SB-2017, 13.7% in SB-2019, 11.4% in SB-2020, and 11.7% in SB-2021. While the rate of those who stated that their “family members has experienced harm” was 7.7% in SB-2017, 8% in SB-2019, 6.8% in SB-2020, 7.1% in SB-2021, this rate was 10% in SB-2022. The question “Have any people in your personal environment experienced harm?”, which is mostly based on things heard from others, was responded positively by 38% in SB-2017, 34.7% in SB-2019, 30.8% in SB-2020, 32.2% in SB-2021, and 37.4% in SB-2022.

In the demographic analysis on questions about being harmed by Syrians, it is observed that all values are higher for all questions in the border region where the Syrian population is densely populated. The rate of experience of personal harm was 14.7%, while that of harm to family members was 9.9% and harm to someone around respondents was 31.6%. Interestingly, among those who claim having experienced personal harm, metropolitan cities ranked first with 18.7%.

SB-2022- TABLE 33: HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED ANY HARM FROM A SYRIAN IN THE LAST 5 YEARS? (%) REGIONAL ANALYSIS

		Personal harm	Harm to someone in your family	Harm to someone in your personal environment
Region				
Border cities	Yes	14,7	9,9	31,6
	No	83,8	88,6	64,6
	Don't remember/ No response	1,5	1,5	3,8
Other cities*	Yes	13,6	10,1	38,6
	No	85,9	88,7	59,2
	Don't remember/ No response	0,5	1,2	2,2
Metropolitan cities	Yes	18,7	13,4	49,3
	No	81,0	85,0	48,1
	Don't remember/ No response	0,3	1,6	2,6
Non-Metropolitan cities	Yes	10,5	8,1	32,1
	No	88,9	90,9	65,9
	Don't remember/ No response	0,6	1,0	2,0

b. Types of Harm Experienced


To better understand the anxieties, an additional question was added since SB-2019 regarding the type of harm that was reported. Those who stated that they had suffered harm from Syrians, in person or in their family, were asked an additional question with 8 options and the chance to

provide multiple answers as “What kind of harm have you/they experienced?”. The top five “areas of harm” experienced by themselves, their families or their personal environment from Syrians are listed as follows in SB-2022: “bullying/harassment” (SB-2019: 40.5%; SB-2020: 45.4%; SB-2021: 48.5%; SB-2022: 61%), “unrest/noise” (SB- 2019: 38%; SB-2020: 36.7%; SB-2021: 42%; SB-2022: 43.4%), “theft” (SB-2019: 43.5%; SB-2020: 47.9%; SB-2021:44.6%; SB-2022: 43%), “violence” (SB-2019: 38.2%; SB-2020: 40.7%; SB-2021: 46.1%; SB-2022: 39.6%), and “occupation of property” (SB-2019: 9.8%; SB-2020: 14.8%; SB-2021: 10.9%; SB-2022: 12.1%).

SB-2022-TABLE 34 (+FIGURE): WHAT KIND OF HARM HAVE YOU/THEY EXPERIENCED? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES)*

Sira No.		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Bullying/Harassment	360	40,5	365	45,4	384	48,5	570	61,0
2	Unrest/Noise	337	38,0	295	36,7	333	42,0	405	43,4
3	Theft	386	43,5	385	47,9	353	44,6	402	43,0
4	Violence	339	38,2	327	40,7	365	46,1	370	39,6
5	Occupation of property	87	9,8	119	14,8	86	10,9	113	12,1
6	Loss of a job	57	6,4	45	5,6	28	3,5	30	3,2
7	Disruption of family order due to affair/marriage	45	5,1	22	2,7	33	4,2	27	2,9
8	Financial/ economic damage/ fraud	17	1,9	9	1,1	10	1,3	7	0,7
9	Other	48	5,4	12	1,5	23	2,9	12	1,3
	No idea/ No response	8	0,9	8	1,0	3	0,4	9	1,0

* Data from the respondents who said that they or someone from their family / personal environment experienced harm from Syrians in the last 5 years.



The data presented here is based on a survey investigating perceptions. Therefore, these rates should not be read as facts. The limited official data available shows that the rate of Syrians' involvement in crime is below average.³³ However, in the SB study, on average, one in ten people reported having experienced "personal harm". In SB-2022 as in SB-2021, the most common areas of experiencing harm reported by a total of up to 50% of respondents who stated that they, their family members or people around them had been harmed by Syrians in the last five years were "bullying/harassment", "violence", "theft" and "unrest/noise". Here, the fact that respondents were given the chance to provide "multiple responses" due to the possibility of a person experiencing more than one harm/problem within the last five years makes it difficult to fully understand the real situation. It is noteworthy that the option "I lost my job" ranked only seventh in SB-2019 (6.4%), sixth in SB-2020 (5.6%), seventh in SB-2021 (3.5%) and sixth in SB-2022 with 3.2%.

33 For the statement of former Interior Minister S. Soylu on this issue, see: Onedio.com.tr (23.03.2022) Minister of Interior S. Soylu, "The crime rate of our own citizens in Türkiye is 2.2%, while that of Syrians is 1.3%, almost half the rate." (<https://onedio.com/haber/suleyman-soylu-nun-suriyeli-ve-turk-vatandaslarinin-suc-oranini-karsilastirmasi-tepkilerin-odaginda-1056050>). For an important academic study on the subject, see: Aysegul Yılmaz Kayaoglu (2022) Do refugees cause crime? <https://avesis.itu.edu.tr/publication/details/48a8e872-517a-45ef-9845-049f71e236a4/do-refugees-cause-crime> (Do refugees cause crime: "In doing so, the paper employs instrumental variables, difference-in-differences (DiD), and staggered DiD methods to explain if the conflict-fleeing Syrians have pushed Türkiye's crime rates higher in the short and the long run. It also controls for a multitude of time-varying provincial characteristics and presents a battery of robustness checks against various identification threats. As a result, DiD estimates show that refugees do not have any causal effect on the crime rates in Türkiye. More strikingly, its IV estimates provide evidence for a rather negative effect on the crime rates per capita whilst finding a null effect on the crime rates per native resident in particular.")

SB-2022-TABLE 35: WHAT KIND OF HARM HAVE YOU/THEY EXPERIENCED? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES %)

	Bullying/ Harassment	Unrest/ Noise	Theft	Violence	Occupation of property	Loss of a job	Disruption of family order due to affair/ marriage	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex									
Female	64,7	45,1	39,5	36,2	11,4	2,8	2,8	1,2	0,9
Male	57,9	41,9	46,0	42,5	12,6	3,6	3,0	2,8	1,0
Age Group									
18-24	66,7	43,3	40,6	42,2	10,6	3,3	3,3	1,1	-
25-34	64,2	45,6	40,7	40,7	7,4	2,9	2,9	2,0	2,9
35-44	59,2	47,1	42,2	41,7	13,1	4,9	3,4	1,5	1,0
45-54	56,4	41,2	47,9	33,9	18,2	3,0	2,4	3,0	-
55-64	57,1	41,0	39,0	38,1	11,4	1,9	2,9	1,0	-
65 +	59,5	35,1	52,7	39,2	13,5	1,4	1,4	5,4	1,4
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	66,7	57,1	33,3	52,4	9,5	4,8	4,8	4,8	-
Literate	65,7	45,7	57,1	37,1	5,7	-	2,9	2,9	2,9
Primary School	58,0	40,0	45,5	37,5	13,5	3,5	1,5	2,5	0,5
Middle-School	62,6	39,5	44,6	38,5	11,8	2,6	1,0	1,0	0,5
High-School or equivalent	61,4	46,2	40,7	43,1	11,4	3,1	4,5	2,4	0,7
University/ Graduate Degree	60,6	44,6	40,9	36,8	13,5	4,1	3,6	1,6	2,1
Region									
Border cities	39,5	27,9	51,7	32,0	11,6	8,2	6,1	0,7	2,0
Other cities*	65,1	46,3	41,4	41,0	12,2	2,3	2,3	2,3	0,8
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	79,8	63,3	45,9	51,1	13,0	2,8	1,9	1,9	0,3
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	52,5	31,8	37,6	32,5	11,5	1,9	2,6	2,6	1,2
Occupation									
Private sector employee	64,6	46,4	44,5	42,6	12,9	3,4	1,5	1,9	0,8
Housewife	63,1	50,0	38,1	37,5	9,7	1,7	2,3	1,1	1,1
Artisan/ Tradesman	54,0	39,9	45,5	36,9	13,6	4,5	4,5	2,0	0,5
Retired	54,2	33,3	42,7	31,3	10,4	-	3,1	5,2	-
Student	75,3	39,7	41,1	47,9	8,2	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4
Unemployed	69,7	31,8	45,5	43,9	18,2	9,1	4,5	3,0	1,5
Public sector employee	41,9	45,2	35,5	41,9	9,7	6,5	9,7	-	6,5
Self-employed**	52,2	69,6	47,8	39,1	8,7	-	-	-	-
Business person**	50,0	50,0	62,5	37,5	25,0	-	-	-	-
General	61,0	43,4	43,0	39,6	12,1	3,2	2,9	2,0	1,0

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 23 self-employed and 8 business people

Note: Data from the respondents who said that they or someone from their family / personal environment experienced harm from Syrians in the last 5 years.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

In order to assess the impact of Syrians in Türkiye on social life, the issue of “harm” was specifically addressed in the FGDs. In this regard, it was stated that participants in the SB-2022 FGDs, regardless of whether they are small or large scale, can report any situation that they would “define as harm”. Almost none of the FGD participants responded positively to the question “Have you or someone close to you experienced any harm from a Syrian?” However, this does not mean that there are no reactions against Syrians or no encounters that were deemed disturbing by the participants. The majority of the participants expressed a high level of concern and reaction towards Syrians in response to different questions.

In the FGDs held in Mersin, almost all participants strongly emphasized that they had encountered “disturbing situations” when sharing their experiences and interactions with Syrians, although they did not characterize them as “direct harm”. The **most prominent complaints are that Syrians are “rule-breakers” and “disrespectful”, that they walk around in groups late at night, that women in particular feel uncomfortable and insecure when Syrian men walk around together, that some streets (which were not so before the settlement of Syrians) are now “inaccessible” and that they warn their children and young girls not to enter those neighborhoods**, and that they feel that they are in the **minority**, especially in some neighborhoods and even in shopping malls. In this context, it is understood that “being harmed” is more related to perceived harms and threats to lifestyle than experiences of physical violence or similar issues.

- ◆ *“I usually take the train from the center to Tarsus around 9-9.30 in the evening and in the past **I could walk alone without hesitation, now I cannot**. I ask my brother to pick me up **because there is always a group of 5-6 Syrian men in front of me and we hear a lot of news about harassment. This makes people uneasy**. Our parents used to tell us to be home on time, don’t dress too short (...) now I say the same to my nieces, because I am very scared of Syrians and the things we hear around us are not good.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*
- ◆ *“I live in Mezitli, where there is a Syrian group with a higher economic status and the only thing I see is disrespect. In traffic, in the supermarket, everywhere. I was not like this in the past, I used to support them, but now I ask myself why they should be here. (...) They occupy my living spaces with their disrespect. They make jokes among themselves by shouting ‘This is Damascus street, this is Aleppo street’ and this irritates me a lot. These disgusting jokes trigger my hatred.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*
- ◆ *“Syrians go out at night, I think because of their culture, and they really flock to the parks, it happens around 2-3 am at night. They wake up everyone living around. **After 11 pm, there is no one out other than Syrians, the night belongs entirely to them and we can only sleep with the air conditioner on and the doors and windows closed because there is noise.**” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*
- ◆ *“Especially Syrian men, no matter how old you are, they act to put women in their place, they push and shove us, they don’t know any such thing as queuing, they drive over us and never pull over in traffic...” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*
- ◆ *“I live in a very big housing complex and we are the minority. We have access to all these facilities by paying a certain monthly fee, but sincerely, I can’t use the pool or the garden (...) I can’t even use the elevator, they are rude, there are heavy food smells and our culture never matches.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*
- ◆ *“Where I live is a site where Syrians with good economic status live. They play games in groups and act in racist ways against Turkish children, they always group together.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*
- ◆ *“When you ask for help from any law enforcement officer, if the person you have a problem with is Syrian, he/she is right. Because of them, I have evolved from a very humanitarian point to a point where I cannot recognize myself, all because of them.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)*

11. Right to Work and Anxiety over Loss of Jobs

During mass migration inflows, anxiety over loss of jobs in the face of newly arrived cheap labor emerges in all receiving societies. This plays a significant role in the reactions against and concerns about the newcomers. While this had been a widespread concern among Turkish society in the early years, it appears that it increasingly tends to become less of a priority. In other words, even though Syrians predominantly live and work in urban centers, according to SB findings, the fear of losing jobs doesn't seem to be among the major anxieties. Naturally, such effects on the local population are felt more intensely in the border cities that are more densely populated by Syrians, compared to the overall average.

SB studies reveal that around 1 million Syrians in Türkiye are in active labor force. According to the data obtained from the answers to the question *"Do you work in an income-generating job?"* asked to Syrians in the household surveys in the SB surveys, the rate of working in the age category of 12 and above was 37.9% in SB-2019, 29.4% in SB-2020 and 33.6% in SB-2021. Similar numbers are reported in the studies of various organizations, notably the ILO.³⁴ However, concern about job loss ranks very low in the list of anxieties about Syrians in Turkish society. As it was discussed in detail in the section entitled *"Anxieties: Security, Serenity and Social Acceptance"* above, Turkish society's concern that *"Syrians will strip us of our jobs"* ranked 5th out of 6 concern statements in SB-2017 (score 3.2), 8th out of 9 in SB-2019 and SB-2020 (score 2019: 3.6, 2020: 3.5), 6th out of 7 in SB-2021 and 7th out of 9 in SB-2022. Despite this, however, when Turkish society is asked the question *"What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Türkiye?"*, it is seen that the rate of those who said *"Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits"* was 54.6% in SB-2017, 56.8% in 2019, 49% in SB-2020, 43% in SB-2021, and 51.6% in SB-2022.³⁵ The rate of those in favor of granting *"temporary work permits to work only in specific jobs"* was 29.8% in SB-2017, 21.4% in SB-2019, 24.4% in SB-2020, 14% in SB-2021, and 12.9% in SB-2022. The rate of those who are in favor of Syrians receiving *"permanent" work permits for all kinds of jobs* is 5.5% in SB-2017, 3.8% in SB-2019, 7.4% in SB-2020, 8.4% in SB-2021 and 4.9% in SB-2022.

To summarize, Turkish society's concerns about issuing work permits to Syrians are still very high, with 51.6% of the society opposed to the issuance of such permits. The widespread belief in Turkish society that *"Syrians are living off the support by Turkish state"* implies that Syrians are seen as a burden on the Turkish state and therefore on taxpayers. However, it is striking that the same people who believe this also express significant degree of discomfort regarding issuing work permits to Syrians, which seems contradictory.


34 ILO Türkiye (2021) https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_738602.pdf

35 Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: Working Rights: Under no circumstance they should be allowed to work (47,4%), They should be given temporary work permits to work only in specific jobs (29,5%), They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job (13,2%), They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job (5,4%), they should be given permanent work permits to work only in specific jobs (4,5%).

SB-2022-TABLE 36 (+FIGURE): WHAT KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE CONCERNING THE WORKING OF SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE?³⁶

#	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#
Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits	1141	54,6	1290	56,8	1107	49,0	968	43,0	1169	51,6
They can work in any job with a temporary (fixed-term) work permit*	169	8,1	336	14,8	363	16,1	732	32,5	656	28,9
They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs**	621	29,8	487	21,4	552	24,4	316	14,0	293	12,9
They can work in any job with a permanent (indefinite) work permit***	115	5,5	85	3,8	168	7,4	189	8,4	110	4,9
Other	-	-	-	-	13	0,6	11	0,5	2	0,1
No idea/ No response	43	2,0	73	3,2	56	2,5	37	1,6	37	1,6
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2023: What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Türkiye?



Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits

They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job*
They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs**

36 *Daha önce "Her türlü işte çalışmalarına geçici çalışma izni verilmelidir" cevap seçeneği, SB-2021 ve SB-2022 döneminde "Geçici (sürelili) çalışma izni ile her türlü işte çalışabilirler" şeklinde güncellenmiştir.

** SB-2019 döneminde "Sadece belirli işlerde çalışmalarını için çalışma izni verilmelidir" ifadesinin SB-2017 yılındaki cevapların "Belli işler için geçici çalışma izni verilmelidir" ve "Belli işlerde kalıcı çalışma izni verilmelidir" ifadelerinin birleşmesi ile elde edilmiştir.

*** Daha önce "Her türlü işte çalışmalarında kalıcı çalışma izni verilmelidir" cevap seçeneği, SB-2021 ve SB-2022 döneminde "Kalıcı (süresiz) çalışma izni ile her türlü işte çalışabilirler" şeklinde güncellenmiştir.

SB-2022-TABLE 37: WHAT KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE CONCERNING THE WORKING OF SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (%)

	Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/ given work permits	They can work in any job with a permanent (indefinite) work permit	They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs	They can work in any job with a permanent (indefinite) work permit	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	50,3	30,3	12,5	5,0	0,1	1,8
Male	52,9	27,6	13,3	4,7	0,1	1,4
Age Group						
18-24	57,1	28,4	9,4	4,0	-	1,1
25-34	43,4	32,0	16,6	5,7	-	2,3
35-44	50,1	30,1	13,2	5,2	-	1,4
45-54	54,4	27,2	12,7	4,2	0,5	1,0
55-64	54,2	28,7	10,5	5,5	-	1,1
65 +	55,1	24,5	13,1	4,1	-	3,2
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	45,3	23,5	15,6	4,7	-	10,9
Literate	58,0	29,6	7,4	3,7	-	1,3
Primary School	53,0	24,2	13,6	7,8	-	1,4
Middle-School	52,9	28,5	13,2	3,9	0,2	1,3
High-School or equivalent	52,9	28,9	13,5	3,5	0,1	1,1
University/ Graduate Degree	46,7	34,9	11,8	4,7	-	1,9
Region						
Border cities	51,9	17,2	17,7	8,6	-	4,6
Other cities*	51,5	31,4	11,9	4,1	0,1	1,0
Metropolitan cities	49,6	34,2	12,7	2,4	0,1	1,0
Non-metropolitan cities	52,7	29,7	11,5	5,0	0,1	1,0
Occupation						
Private sector employee	52,3	28,8	14,3	3,5	0,2	0,9
Housewife	50,7	27,4	12,8	6,3	-	2,8
Artisan/ Tradesman	50,8	29,8	12,9	4,8	0,2	1,5
Retired	55,7	27,8	11,7	3,1	-	1,7
Student	49,3	34,4	12,2	3,4	-	0,7
Unemployed	60,7	23,4	8,3	5,5	-	2,1
Public sector employee	35,3	37,6	21,2	5,9	-	-
Self-employed	51,7	25,9	8,6	12,1	-	1,7
Business person**	37,0	37,0	14,8	11,2	-	-
General	51,6	28,9	12,9	4,9	0,1	1,6

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Not: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

A closer inspection of those who replied with *“Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits”* suggests that the most concerned groups include women, those over the age of 35, and those who are illiterate or primary school graduates. However, it is observed that the biggest reaction came from the border region with a rate of 47.3%, which is about 4.3% higher than the average of 43%. It is clear that job loss due to Syrians is more widespread in this region and this is reflected in preferences.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

The answers to the question *“What kind of a policy should be followed regarding the working of Syrians in Türkiye?”* reveal, in contrast to the survey data, that **the participants do not oppose Syrians working or even opening a workplace. However, almost all participants stated that they are against informal employment and cheap labor, both to ensure competition with the host community on equal and balanced terms and to enable Syrians to work under fair and decent conditions.** The views expressed in this framework are largely in line with the FGD findings of the previous SB studies.

Although participants do not oppose the working of or opening workplaces by Syrians, the demand that Syrians should be registered and audited more strictly is frequently voiced. It was stated that some Syrian businesses - especially those in the service sector - do business at below-market prices, which harms Turkish businesses serving in the same area on the same street and in the same neighborhood. Likewise, **it is important to note that almost all participants stated that they were disturbed by the Arabic signboards of Syrian businesses. In addition, participants stated that Syrian employers do not pay taxes and that inspections are lacking in this regard. In short, there was a widespread view that the situation would be acceptable if both working conditions and the conditions for opening and operating workplaces were more strictly regulated without any positive discrimination and favoritism towards Syrians.** On the other hand, it appears that the fact that Syrians must obtain a work permit is not well known among the participants. It should be noted that while this issue was not mentioned by the participants, when the FGD facilitator asked *“how do you evaluate the issue of Syrians obtaining work permits?”*, most of the participants thought at that moment that it was a good practice for Syrians to “work with permits”.

Participants provided **a wide range of answers to the question of how Syrians in Türkiye affect the national economy. As a positive impact on the economy,** some participants stated that Syrians work well in agriculture and animal husbandry and meet the need for labor in these fields. In addition, it is mentioned that Syrians make a positive contribution to closing the labor shortages of particularly intermediate staff in certain sectors (such as textile, construction and factory work) that emerge because locals do not prefer to work in them.

- ◆ **“Especially in Gaziantep region, they work cheaply in the textile sector and I think they are the reasons why the economic crisis has been postponed. We could have felt this crisis more because there is no intersection cluster.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara- Male-Worker)
- ◆ **“The standard of Turkish people is now higher than Syrians’. They prefer jobs that require strength such as shepherding and portering. I could not find any Turkish employees in Çanakkale. There employees demand wages above the minimum wage, and those who initially agree later leave. I would prefer to employ Syrians if they were here.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Male-Artisan)
- ◆ **“People with money contribute a lot to the economy. If we invite Arab capital and Gulf capital from outside, Syrian people can also invest, which is a plus. The important thing is that the appropriate people operate in the appropriate place.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Male- Employer)
- ◆ **“The painter’s salary is 1000 TL a day right now, the reason for this is Syrians. If it would normally be 5 thousand TL per day, Syrians are the reason why it is cheaper. Currently, the labor force in the construction sector is made up of Syrians. If the expensiveness is not reflected 2-3 times more on us, it is thanks to Syrians.”** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male-Worker)

Participants who stated that **Syrians have a negative impact on the economy**, on the other hand, see them as **responsible for rent increases, think that local people are losing their jobs due to the fact that Syrians work cheaply, and that there is competition between local people and Syrians for this reason**. It was noted that almost all FGD participants agreed that Syrians work cheaper and unregistered, and even started the “impact on the economy” question with this observation; however, while some considered this to be a positive impact, others interpreted it as a negative situation. **While the perception of positive and negative impact on the economy is evenly distributed among the participants, there are no significant differences between the comments of the participants from border cities, metropolitan cities and Çanakkale, where the number of Syrians is quite low.**

It should also be noted that the assessments in this area are broadly in line with the previous year’s FGD findings.

- ◆ ***“In hospitals, especially since everything is very expensive, our citizens cannot access medicine, those citizens get a Syrian to have their medicine prescribed and buy it that way, we have become pariahs in our own homeland.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male, Worker)
- ◆ ***“Although they make a positive contribution to the economy in the short term, this effect will turn negative in the long term”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)
- ◆ ***“They provide cheap labor. They work without insurance. I think this situation has a negative impact on the country’s economy.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)
- ◆ ***“Unfortunately, Syrian workers are employed in many places and they work cheaply. For this reason, I think that many people cannot find a job, they become unemployed. In this respect, it had a negative impact.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Female-Worker)
- ◆ ***“They are in all sectors and I think this has negatively affected the economy. Our share of GDP per capita has decreased. I even attribute current economic troubles to them.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female, Unemployed)
- ◆ ***“There are many people working in agriculture in our region. When they first arrived, Syrians demanded low wages and Turkish agricultural workers from the villages left and Syrians replaced them. After a certain point, they started organizing among themselves and started to say ‘we won’t come if you don’t give us this salary’. First they removed the Turks and then they became a monopoly.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female, Worker)
- ◆ ***“Especially in the last 3-4 years, when the rents skyrocketed, we realized that we could not make it in Istanbul and we migrated here. I think migrants have an impact on this.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Female, Worker)

Almost all participants in one of the Şanlıurfa FGDs were university students. These qualified young people studying in departments such as engineering and sociology were asked an additional question: “Do you see Syrians as your competitors in terms of labor force?” The responses are quite remarkable. Since most of the Syrians in Türkiye are unqualified/unskilled and have low levels of education, there is a prevailing view that they only work in unskilled jobs and therefore compete with similarly low-skilled Turks and perhaps make them lose their jobs. Unlike in previous studies, however, it was mentioned in this FGD that educated Turkish youth started to have similar concerns regarding qualified Syrian students studying at universities. It was stated that Syrian university students stand out in some jobs due to the fact that they generally speak Arabic, English and Turkish, and that they can be preferred more among young people looking for jobs, especially in border cities, for many reasons, and that this has started to create an element of competition.

- ◆ ***“I see them as competitors and I think I need to improve myself more because they speak 3 languages. I am in the Faculty of Theology and Syrians are fluent in Arabic and that is their native language. I even have difficulties in the department now because when there are Syrians studying theology, the professors make the exams very difficult.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female-University Student)
- ◆ ***“In terms of work, they can work in international organizations because they know English and Arabic very well.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female-University Student)
- ◆ ***“All the employees of a software company were Syrians and there were only 2 Turks. The reason for this is that they speak a lot of languages and they accept to work cheaply.”*** (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male-University Student)


12. Opening Workplaces / Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship plays an important role for Syrians' self-reliance and economic integration. Entrepreneurship means creating employment first for oneself and then for others. Such enterprises could range from employing only one person to employing hundreds and even thousands of people. It needs to be noted, however, that there is a strong societal opposition to Syrians' opening their own businesses / workplaces. Among the responses for the question "Under which conditions should Syrians be able to open workplaces?", the answer "they definitely shouldn't" received support from 54.6% in SB-2017, 67.2% in SB-2019, 55.5% in SB-2020, 54.2% in SB-2021, and 70.5% in SB-2022. This is much stronger than their refusal to grant working rights. It can be said that the economic problems and the politicization of the process play an important role in the background here, as well as the "rejection of permanence".

SB-2022-TABLE 38 (+FIGURE): UNDER WHICH CONDITIONS SHOULD SYRIANS BE ABLE TO OPEN WORKPLACES?

	SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%		
They definitely shouldn't	1526	67,2	1253	55,5	1221	54,2	1599	70,5
Only if they pay their taxes	469	20,6	564	25,0	716	31,8	410	18,1
Only for specific work fields	193	8,5	257	11,4	196	8,7	128	5,7
They should be able to open any type of workplace in any work field	-	-	60	2,6	62	2,7	46	2,0
Only if they will open large workplaces where Turkish citizens will also work	38	1,7	79	3,5	29	1,3	41	1,8
Other	-	-	2	0,1	2	0,1	3	0,1
No idea/ No response	45	2	44	1,9	27	1,2	40	1,8
Total	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: Under which conditions should Syrians be able to open workplaces?



SB-2022-TABLE 39: UNDER WHICH CONDITIONS SHOULD SYRIANS BE ABLE TO OPEN WORKPLACES? (%)

	They definitely shouldn't	Only if they pay their taxes	Only for specific work fields	They should be able to open any type of workplace in any work field	Only if they will open large workplaces where Turkish citizens will also work	Only for a temporary duration	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	72,9	16,8	5,0	1,9	1,5	-	1,9
Male	68,2	19,4	6,3	2,2	2,1	0,2	1,6
Age Group							
18-24	75,0	14,5	5,4	2,0	1,4	-	1,7
25-34	64,6	21,3	8,4	1,6	1,2	-	2,9
35-44	72,6	18,0	4,6	3,0	1,0	-	0,8
45-54	72,3	17,7	5,6	2,0	1,5	0,2	0,7
55-64	68,7	18,5	3,3	2,9	4,4	0,7	1,5
65 +	71,0	17,1	5,3	-	2,9	-	3,7
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	67,2	21,9	0,0	3,1	-	-	7,8
Literate	81,5	7,4	3,7	1,2	2,5	-	3,7
Primary School	72,5	15,7	4,7	3,3	2,2	0,2	1,4
Middle-School	72,4	17,8	4,8	1,8	1,8	-	1,4
High-School or equivalent	71,5	17,6	6,5	1,2	1,3	0,3	1,6
University/ Graduate Degree	64,1	22,9	7,4	2,0	2,2	-	1,4
Region							
Border cities	61,0	19,5	9,9	4,5	1,3	-	3,8
Other cities*	72,5	17,8	4,8	1,5	1,9	0,2	1,3
Metropolitan cities	72,8	19,0	4,4	0,6	2,0	0,1	1,1
Non-metropolitan cities	72,4	17,1	4,9	2,0	1,9	0,2	1,5
Occupation							
Private sector employee	74,1	16,0	5,7	1,8	0,9	0,2	1,3
Housewife	71,8	18,1	4,9	1,2	1,4	-	2,6
Artisan/ Tradesman	68,2	21,1	5,7	1,7	1,7	0,2	1,4
Retired	70,1	17,2	5,2	1,0	3,5	0,3	2,7
Student	74,3	13,5	7,4	2,7	1,4	-	0,7
Unemployed	73,1	13,1	5,5	4,8	1,4	-	2,1
Public sector employee	50,6	30,6	10,6	2,3	5,9	-	-
Self-employed	72,5	15,5	1,7	6,9	1,7	-	1,7
Business person**	44,5	37,0	7,4	7,4	3,7	-	-
Genel	70,5	18,1	5,7	2,0	1,8	0,1	1,8

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Not: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

When we relate the issue with demographic characteristics, it is observed that the highest degree of refusal for Syrians to open a business, at a level higher than the national average of 70.5%, is coming from women, young people, and people living in metropolitan areas in SB-2022. Interestingly, in SB-2021, the reaction was stronger in border cities.

13. "Will Syrians Return?"

It is observed that as the perception that Syrians will be permanent in Türkiye grows stronger, concerns, pessimism and objections also grow in the attitude of Turkish society towards them. In 2014, when there were just 1.6 million Syrians in Türkiye, the survey found that 45,1% of Turkish respondents reported believing that all Syrians in the country will return.³⁷ However, after 2017, it is observed that the perception in the society has changed drastically. When the responses given to the question *"Do you believe that Syrians in Türkiye will return to their country when the war is over?"* are considered, the combined share of "none of them will return" and "even if some of them return, majority of them will stay" was 70.5% in SB-2017, 78.4% in SB-2019, 80.3% in SB-2020, 79.1% in SB-2021, and 83.5% in SB-2022. In other words, since 2020, more than 80% of the Turkish society thinks that all or most of the Syrians will stay in Türkiye. The total share of people in the Turkish society who believe that all or most of the Syrians will return was 6.7% in SB-2017, 4.6% in SB-2019, 2.3% in SB-2020, 2.4% in SB-2021, and 2.9% in SB-2022. Considering the options "Half of them will return, half of them will stay in Türkiye" and "Most of them will return, less than half of them will stay in Türkiye" - it is observed that 90% of the Turkish society believes that at least half of Syrians will stay in Türkiye even if the war ends. In other words, although objections to the permanence of Syrians have increased in Turkish society in the period since their arrival, the hope and belief that they will go back has decreased.


³⁷ Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:

"There are over 1,5 million Syrian asylum-seekers in Türkiye at the moment. Which of the following statements best describes your opinion on the return of Syrians after the war is over?":

- I expect all of them to return (45,1%)
- I expect less than half of them to stay in Türkiye (9,4%)
- I expect all of them to stay (12,1%)
- I expect more than half of them to stay in Türkiye (15,7%)
- I expect at least half of them to stay (%17,6).

SB-2022-TABLE 40 (+FIGURE): DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE WILL RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY WHEN THE WAR IS OVER?

Rank		SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	None of them will return	793	38,0	1106	48,7	1070	47,4	950	42,2	1164	51,3
2	Even if some of them return, majority of them will stay	679	32,5	674	29,7	744	32,9	831	36,9	729	32,2
3	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	238	11,4	203	8,9	247	10,9	231	10,2	156	6,9
4	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	189	9,0	145	6,4	103	4,6	132	5,9	114	5,0
5	All of them will return	-	-	42	1,8	53	2,3	55	2,4	65	2,9
6	Almost all of them will return, only few will stay	141	6,7	63	2,8	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	Other	-	-	-	-	1	0,1	-	-	3	0,1
	No idea/ No response	49	2,4	38	1,7	41	1,8	54	2,4	36	1,6
Total		2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: Do you believe that Syrians in Türkiye will return to their country when the war is over?

It is observed that those who answered “none of them would return” regarding the Syrians in Türkiye are mostly women, young people, those with higher education, those living in border cities, and those who work as self-employed.

SB-2022-TABLE 41: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE WILL RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY WHEN THE WAR IS OVER? (%)

	None of them will return	Even if some of them return, majority of them will stay	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	All of them will return	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	54,4	31,9	6,5	3,8	2,0	0,1	1,3
Male	48,4	32,4	7,3	6,2	3,7	0,2	1,8
Age Group							
18-24	61,4	29,3	4,3	2,5	2,5	-	-
25-34	56,8	25,8	7,6	4,5	2,4	0,2	2,7
35-44	52,9	30,5	5,6	4,8	4,4	-	1,8
45-54	48,8	33,8	9,1	4,4	2,5	0,2	1,2
55-64	39,6	40,0	7,3	9,1	1,4	0,4	2,2
65 +	40,4	40,8	7,8	6,5	3,3	-	1,2
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	53,1	29,7	3,1	6,2	1,6	-	6,3
Literate	42,0	40,7	7,4	2,5	3,7	-	3,7
Primary School	46,6	34,2	9,0	4,9	3,9	0,2	1,2
Middle-School	48,7	34,2	7,9	4,8	2,6	0,2	1,6
High-School or equivalent	54,1	30,3	5,6	5,2	3,3	0,1	1,4
University/ Graduate Degree	56,3	29,6	6,0	5,3	1,4	-	1,4
Region							
Border cities	58,7	24,6	6,6	3,0	3,5	-	3,6
Other cities*	49,8	33,8	6,9	5,4	2,7	0,2	1,2
Metropolitan cities	49,6	36,8	6,1	4,8	1,0	0,3	1,4
Non-metropolitan cities	49,9	32,0	7,4	5,8	3,8	0,1	1,0
Occupation							
Private sector employee	53,9	32,7	5,7	4,0	2,2	0,2	1,3
Housewife	52,4	31,2	7,9	4,1	2,0	0,2	2,2
Artisan/ Tradesman	53,1	30,5	5,7	5,9	3,9	-	0,9
Retired	35,4	42,6	9,3	7,2	3,4	0,3	1,8
Student	60,1	27,0	6,1	3,4	3,4	-	-
Unemployed	59,3	22,8	6,9	4,1	2,8	-	4,1
Public sector employee	45,9	34,1	11,8	4,7	2,3	-	1,2
Self-employed	60,3	25,9	5,2	6,9	-	-	1,7
Business person**	25,9	44,5	-	14,8	14,8	-	-
General	51,3	32,2	6,9	5,0	2,9	0,1	1,6

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

Respondents' views on the return prospects of Syrians in Türkiye are broadly similar and reiterate the strong expectation found in the survey that "they will not go". In response to the question "will Syrians in Türkiye return to their countries when the war is over?", **almost all of the participants answered, "they will not" or "they would not"**. When further asked "Why wouldn't they return?", it is seen that the answers given are explained with reasons such as they are comfortable in Türkiye, they have many opportunities, and many of their children were born here. These responses are largely in line with the findings of the previous years' SB FGDs.

- ◆ ***"I don't think they will go, so we have to get used to it because we must (...) If they leave, it would be good for the welfare of our society, but I don't think so."*** (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Male, Worker)
- ◆ ***"You can have guests, but not for a year, not for 10 years. You do it for 5-10 days. We should not expel them, we should provide a suitable environment and send them back"***. (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Male, Worker)
- ◆ *"I think they will be forcibly sent back. This country is not suitable for their uncontrolled reproduction. They will be forcibly sent back no matter what the conditions are, because they themselves will not want to go."* (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Male, Worker)
- ◆ *"The vast majority of them feel like they are from here. That is why they would not return."* (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Female, Worker)

A significant number of FGD participants stated that Syrians would not want to return to safe zones either. They think that Syrians do not know how safe those places will be and that they will not want to return because they are not sure of this, so the establishment of safe zones will not work in this sense.

- ◆ *"Under these conditions, they will not return especially to an environment of uncertainty, they do not know what they will find where they go."* (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Female)
- ◆ *"If I were a Syrian woman, why would I leave a country with sea shores and return to arid, barren, war-torn lands? For example, I know what kind of a perspective the men there have on me, I am more comfortable here, so why should I go back as a woman."* (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Female, Worker)
- ◆ *"I can say for sure, no. Even if Syria recovers, they will not go to Syria."* (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male, Teacher)

14. “Where Should Syrians Live?”: “Are We Ready for Living Together?”

Turkish society appears to believe that prospects of Syrians’ long-term presence in the country are growing. Almost 90% of the society seems convinced that at least half of Syrians will stay in Türkiye. It should be noted that, however, despite this acknowledgement of permanent stay, the will and desire for living together is extremely weak. In other words, there appears to be a case of “involuntary acceptance” in Turkish society regarding Syrians. When asked the question “where should Syrians live?”, it is observed that two demands are strongly emerging: “sending them back” and “isolation”. In a context where more than 98% of Syrians are already living with the Turkish society all across the country, the statement “*they should live with Turkish society wherever they want*” was only supported by the 7.9% (SB-2017), 5.3% (SB-2019), 6.8% (SB-2020), 7.5% (SB-2021), and 2.7% (SB-2022) of the respondents over the years. In addition to this, 2.4% of the respondents in SB-2022 (together with 7.7% in SB-2017, 5.5% in SB-2019, 6.1% in SB-2020, and 4.8% SB-2021) suggested that “*Syrians should be distributed around Türkiye in a balanced way*”. These two responses, which could be seen as indications of the will for living together, make up on 5.1% of the respondents in SB-2022. This means that, while 90% of Turkish society believes that Syrians will permanently remain in the country, 88.5%, according to SB-2022 data, suggest that Syrians should be sent in some way.³⁸ Support for definitely sending Syrians back, or transferring them to safe zones to be established in Syria, has been steadily increasing in the last five SB studies. What is more striking is that the option “they should be sent to safe zones”, which was the primary demand of the Turkish society in SB-2017 and SB-2019, has fallen to second place since SB-2020 (SB-2017: 37.4%, SB-2019: 44.8%, SB-2020: 32.5%; SB-2021: 32.3%, SB-2022: 30%) and the option “they should definitely be sent back” has increased phenomenally (2017: 11.5%, 2019: 25%, SB-2020: 48%, SB-2021: 49.7%, SB-2022: 58.5%). These are followed by isolationist demands, namely “*they should only live in camps*” or “*special cities should be established for them*”. The findings of the SB studies seem to be suggesting that Turkish society is not ready and willing to live together with Syrians.

Although it is difficult to find significant differences in the demographic analysis of the responses to this question, such an analysis reveals that women, those aged 65 and over, those with high school education, those living in metropolitan cities and the unemployed people are more likely to support repatriation of Syrians.

³⁸ Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:


“Asylum-seekers should only reside at the camps in Türkiye”: Agreed: 73.3% / Disagreed: 19%

“Asylum-seeker should reside at the camps that will be established within the buffer zone to be established in Syrian territories near border” Agreed: 68.8% / Disagreed: 18.1%

SB-2022-TABLE 42 (+FIGURE): WHERE SHOULD SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE LIVE?

Rank	#	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#
1	They should definitely be sent back	240	11,5	568	25,0	1083	48,0	1121	49,7	1327	58,5
2	They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there	781	37,4	1017	44,8	735	32,5	727	32,3	679	30,0
1+2	"THEY SHOULD BE SENT BACK"		48,9		69,8		80,5		82		88,5
3	They should be able to live in any city they want	166	7,9	120	5,3	153	6,8	169	7,5	60	2,7
4	They should be distributed around Türkiye in a balanced way	161	7,7	126	5,5	138	6,1	108	4,8	55	2,4
3+4	"THEY MAY STAY"		15,6		10,8		12,9		12,3		5,1
5	They should only live in camps	587	28,1	341	15,0	70	3,1	62	2,8	88	3,9
6	Special cities should be established for them in Türkiye	100	4,8	54	2,4	24	1,1	23	1,0	18	0,8
7	Other	-	-	-	-	12	0,5	-	-	3	0,1
	No idea/ No response	54	2,6	45	2,0	44	1,9	43	1,9	37	1,6
Total		2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: Where should Syrians in Türkiye live? %



SB-2022-TABLE 43: WHERE SHOULD SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE LIVE? (%)

	They should definitely be sent back	They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there	They should only live in camps	They should be able to live in any city they want	They should be distributed around Türkiye in a balanced way	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	60,1	30,0	3,0	2,4	1,7	1,0	1,8
Male	57,0	29,9	4,7	2,9	3,1	0,9	1,5
Age Group							
18-24	61,4	27,8	5,4	0,6	1,7	1,4	1,7
25-34	58,4	29,3	2,7	4,1	2,9	1,2	1,4
35-44	58,3	30,7	3,8	2,6	2,2	1,0	1,4
45-54	53,0	33,8	5,1	3,0	2,7	0,7	1,7
55-64	58,6	30,5	2,5	4,0	2,5	0,4	1,5
65 +	64,5	25,7	3,7	0,8	2,4	0,5	2,4
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	62,5	20,3	6,3	-	3,0	1,6	6,3
Literate	60,5	19,8	7,4	6,2	1,2	-	4,9
Primary School	59,1	28,3	3,9	3,3	2,0	1,6	1,8
Middle-School	60,5	28,5	4,0	2,0	2,4	1,1	1,5
High-School or equivalent	58,6	32,1	3,5	2,3	1,9	0,4	1,2
University/ Graduate Degree	55,1	33,1	3,5	2,8	3,7	0,8	1,0
Region							
Border cities	70,4	13,4	3,8	3,5	3,8	1,6	3,5
Other cities*	56,0	33,5	3,9	2,5	2,1	0,8	1,2
Metropolitan cities	50,7	39,0	4,4	2,6	2,3	0,6	0,4
Non-metropolitan cities	59,2	30,1	3,6	2,4	2,1	0,9	1,7
Occupation							
Private sector employee	57,6	30,8	4,9	2,6	1,7	0,9	1,5
Housewife	59,6	30,2	2,8	2,2	1,5	1,5	2,2
Artisan/ Tradesman	59,9	28,3	3,5	3,7	2,0	0,6	2,0
Retired	60,5	29,9	3,1	2,4	2,1	0,3	1,7
Student	60,8	27,7	4,7	0,7	3,4	2,0	0,7
Unemployed	64,8	26,9	1,4	4,1	1,4	0,7	0,7
Public sector employee	42,3	42,4	4,7	1,2	8,2	-	1,2
Self-employed	41,4	32,8	13,8	1,7	10,3	-	-
Business person**	55,6	22,2	3,7	7,4	11,1	-	-
General	58,5	30,0	3,9	2,7	2,4	0,9	1,6

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.


15. Support to Syrians

It is obvious that there was a considerable degree of social solidarity and support towards Syrians by the Turkish society since the arrival of first Syrian groups in 2011. Independently from the support services provided by Turkish public institutions, national and international civil society organizations, and international institutions, this solidarity and support has become more visible particularly with Syrians living outside of the camps and in urban places. To better understand the quality of and changing trends in the attitudes towards Syrians, it is important to collect data on the support “in cash or in kind”. The survey respondents, thus, were asked “*Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?*”³⁹. While 34.1% answered “yes” to this question in SB-2019, this rate reached 40.5% in SB-2020, and decreased slightly to 39.6% in SB-2021 and more significantly in SB-2022 to 33.9%.⁴⁰ When demographic characteristics of those who provide in-kind or cash support to Syrians are analyzed, it is observed that there are no significant and meaningful differences. Perhaps most importantly, in SB-2022, people living in the border region report a much higher level of providing support (48.2%) than the Turkish average (33.9%), as was the case in SB-2021. This shows that solidarity in the border region is stronger than in Türkiye as a whole.

SB-2022-TABLE 44 (+FIGURE): HAVE YOU EVER PROVIDED IN CASH OR IN-KIND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIANS?

	SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes, I have	774	34,1	914	40,5	893	39,6	768	33,9
No, I have not	1446	63,7	1237	54,7	1313	58,3	1460	64,4
Don't remember/ No idea/ No response	51	2,2	108	4,8	47	2,1	39	1,7
Total	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians? %



³⁹ In this question, the phrase “except for giving money to beggars” used to be included in order to eliminate the effect of “begging”, which was very common, especially in the early periods.

⁴⁰ In the 2014 study “Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration”, those who stated that they have provided assistance to Syrians, either directly or through an organization/institution was around 30%. See: p.129.

SB-2022-TABLE 45: HAVE YOU EVER PROVIDED IN CASH OR IN-KIND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIANS? (%)

	Yes, I have	No, I have not	Don't know/ Don't remember	No response
Sex				
Female	31,1	67,5	1,2	0,2
Male	36,6	61,4	1,3	0,7
Age Group				
18-24	22,7	75,3	1,4	0,6
25-34	36,1	61,9	1,6	0,4
35-44	37,5	60,1	2,0	0,4
45-54	37,5	61,3	0,7	0,5
55-64	34,9	63,7	0,7	0,7
65 +	31,0	68,6	0,4	-
Educational Attainment				
Illiterate	35,9	64,1	-	-
Literate	34,6	65,4	-	-
Primary School	34,0	64,8	0,8	0,4
Middle-School	30,9	67,8	0,9	0,4
High-School or equivalent	32,5	65,7	1,3	0,5
University/ Graduate Degree	38,0	59,0	2,4	0,6
Region				
Border cities	44,8	52,9	1,5	0,8
Other cities*	31,6	66,8	1,2	0,4
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	29,4	69,4	1,1	0,1
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	32,9	65,3	1,3	0,5
Occupation				
Private sector employee	30,7	68,4	0,9	-
Housewife	32,9	65,7	1,4	-
Artisan/ Tradesman	42,9	53,8	2,0	1,3
Retired	29,2	69,8	0,3	0,7
Student	18,9	80,4	0,7	-
Unemployed	30,3	66,2	2,8	0,7
Public sector employee	48,2	50,6	1,2	-
Self-employed	43,1	55,2	1,7	-
Business person**	48,1	51,9	-	-
General	33,9	64,4	1,3	0,4

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

In order to understand the recent situation of support and solidarity for Syrians, those who stated that they provided in-kind or cash aid to Syrians (which is 768 respondents in SB-2022) were asked to what extent they provided aid in the last year. When asked the question "Have you provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians in the last 1 year?", it was observed that 79.7% in SB-2020, 79% in SB-2021 and 66.8% in SB-2022 responded affirmatively. The "sharp decline" over the last year is noteworthy. It is similarly observed that the support reported in the border region decreased from 79.9% in SB-2021 to 72.3% in SB-2022. The decline in support for Syrians seems to be linked to both the general economic problems in Türkiye and the politicization of the process.

SB-2022-TABLE 46: HAVE YOU EVER PROVIDED IN CASH OR IN-KIND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIANS IN THE LAST 1 YEAR?

	SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes, I have	728	79,7	705	79,0	513	66,8
No, I have not	174	19,0	168	18,8	239	31,1
Don't remember/ No idea/ No response	12	1,3	20	2,2	16	2,1
Total	914	100,0	893	100,0	768	100,0


Note: "Results from those respondents who said "Yes" to the question "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians?".

A second follow-up question was asked to those who did not provide in-kind or cash assistance to Syrians to understand their reasons. In the answers to the question "Why haven't you provided any support to Syrians?", for the first time in the last three SB studies, the answer "I didn't want to give support" ranked first with 32.5%. This was followed by "I have preferred to prefer to provide support to our own citizens that are in need" and "I don't believe that they need support". This shows both a decrease in the level of solidarity and a conscious refusal to provide support to Syrians in Turkish society. Among all the demographic categories, the strongest attitude of "I didn't want to give support" was displayed by the respondents in the border cities with 57.3%.

B-2022-TABLE 47 (+FIGURE): WHY HAVEN'T YOU PROVIDED ANY SUPPORT TO SYRIANS? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES))

Sıra No.		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	I didn't want to give support	595	42,2	413	27,9	552	32,5
2	I have preferred to provide support to our own citizens that are in need	332	23,5	428	28,9	500	29,4
3	I don't believe that they need support	261	18,5	329	22,2	404	23,8
4	I don't have sufficient financial resources to give support	204	14,5	427	28,8	317	18,7
5	They are already receiving support from many institutions	217	15,4	393	26,5	268	15,8
6	I couldn't find a way/ an opportunity to help	172	12,2	109	7,4	96	5,7
7	Providing support to them would make them lazy, I wouldn't want them to get used to it	43	3,0	52	3,5	75	4,4
8	Other	7	0,5	9	0,6	4	0,2
	No idea/ No response	33	2,3	11	0,7	17	1,0

SB-2022: Why haven't you provided any support to Syrians? (Multiple Responses)



Note: Results from the respondents who said "No" to the questions "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians?" and "Have you provided in cash or in-kind support to Syrians in the last 1 year?"

**SB-2022-TABLE 48: WHY HAVEN'T YOU PROVIDED ANY SUPPORT TO SYRIANS?
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES %)**

	I didn't want to give support	I have preferred to provide support to our own citizens that are in need	I don't believe that they need support	I don't have sufficient financial resources to give support	They are already receiving support from many institutions	I couldn't find a way/ an opportunity to help	Providing support to them would make them lazy, I wouldn't want them to get used to it	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex									
Female	33,3	27,5	21,9	20,7	15,0	6,2	3,3	0,2	0,9
Male	31,6	31,5	25,8	16,5	16,6	5,1	5,6	0,2	1,1
Age Group									
18-24	37,0	26,0	24,6	12,8	14,9	4,2	4,2	-	1,4
25-34	31,7	29,5	23,3	17,1	12,4	5,6	4,5	-	1,4
35-44	31,5	29,9	23,9	20,3	18,9	5,9	4,8	0,3	0,8
45-54	29,5	31,2	24,4	19,3	15,3	6,1	2,7	0,3	0,7
55-64	35,1	30,2	22,3	17,3	16,3	6,9	5,9	1,0	1,0
65 +	30,7	30,2	23,8	27,2	17,8	5,4	5,0	-	0,5
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	32,7	18,4	18,4	42,9	10,2	-	-	-	-
Literate	25,4	23,8	17,5	33,3	12,7	4,8	-	1,6	1,6
Primary School	26,7	28,8	23,0	24,9	17,5	5,5	5,2	0,8	0,5
Middle-School	34,5	28,4	26,5	16,7	18,1	5,8	5,3	-	-
High-School or equivalent	36,8	30,0	24,9	14,3	15,1	4,0	4,2	-	1,6
University/ Graduate Degree	31,8	32,9	22,2	14,0	13,7	9,0	4,4	-	1,7
Region									
Border cities	57,3	5,1	9,4	29,4	3,5	3,9	0,4	0,4	1,2
Other cities*	28,1	33,7	26,3	16,8	17,9	6,0	5,1	0,2	1,0
Metropolitan cities	26,7	37,3	26,0	16,0	15,6	5,4	7,8	-	0,5
Non-metropolitan cities	29,0	31,3	26,5	17,3	19,5	6,3	3,3	0,3	1,3
Occupation									
Private sector employee	28,3	29,0	27,6	14,5	16,4	5,2	3,8	0,2	1,0
Housewife	33,0	25,3	16,4	26,1	14,1	6,9	3,8	0,5	1,0
Artisan/ Tradesman	34,1	36,1	28,5	12,6	15,2	3,6	5,3	-	1,0
Retired	30,5	32,2	25,5	22,6	22,2	8,4	5,4	0,4	0,8
Student	39,4	27,6	20,5	14,2	9,4	3,9	3,1	-	-
Unemployed	42,0	18,8	22,3	25,9	18,8	2,7	5,4	-	1,8
Public sector employee	32,7	32,7	12,7	14,5	5,5	12,7	5,5	-	3,6
Self-employed	35,1	29,7	40,5	18,9	16,2	-	2,7	-	-
Business person**	-	53,3	26,7	-	20,0	6,7	6,7	-	-
General	32,5	29,4	23,8	18,7	15,8	5,7	4,4	0,2	1,0

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 15 business people

Not1: "No Response" regarding the employment status is not included due to small numbers.

Not2: Results from the 1699 respondents who said "No" to the questions "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians?" and "Have you provided in cash or in-kind support to Syrians in the last 1 year?"

16. Social Cohesion and Syrians in Turkish Society

Syrians Barometer, at its heart, is a study that aims to uncover the existing context in terms of harmonization and social cohesion. Both harmonization and social cohesion are extremely complicated sociological concepts that bring together subjective and objective elements. In this context, social reactions and perceptions are as, if not much more, important as the decisions and policies of the state. Therefore, it is very difficult to measure the existence or level of social cohesion among different social groups that ended up living together. However, social cohesion refers more to social space than public regulations. The SB study considered the concept of “social acceptance,”⁴¹ which was first introduced to the literature in 2013, as the most important basis of this process in the context of social cohesion debates in host communities. In order to understand the extent of social acceptance, another set of questions, similar to the “social distance scales”, asked how the society evaluated the social cohesion of Syrians.

It is known that the concept of social cohesion is interpreted differently by the host community and the newcomers. Therefore, even though the collected data does give us some hints, it is not sufficient to measure the level and quality of social cohesion. The responses provided for the question “*To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/ Türkiye?*” show that the Turkish society is quite dissatisfied with the issue of Syrians’ social cohesion/harmonization. In SB-2022, 2.1% of the Turkish society stated that Syrians have “completely” integrated into Turkish society, 10.1% stated that Syrians have integrated into Turkish society “to a large extent”, while 17.9% stated that Syrians have integrated into Turkish society “to a small extent” and 59.3% stated that Syrians have “not integrated at all” into the Turkish society. In other words, while a combined rate of 12.2% of the respondents believe that Syrians have “completely or to a large extent integrated” into Turkish society, the rate of those who suggest that they integrated into Turkish society “only to a little extent or none at all” is 77.1%. Remarkably, Turkish society finds the Syrians’ social cohesion processes less and less “successful” every year. In other words, although the duration of living together extends, Turkish society’s perception that Syrians are not being integrated into Turkish society gets stronger. Although a survey on Syrians was not conducted in SB-2022, it appears that Syrians are also pessimistic about harmonization.⁴²


41 The concept of “social acceptance” was first used by M.Murat Erdoğan in a 2013 study: See M. Murat Erdoğan (2013), Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Cohesion, Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center Report.

42 See: SB-2021-TABLE-106, p.252

SB-2022-TABLE 49 (+FIGURE): TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE SYRIANS INTEGRATED INTO TURKISH SOCIETY/TÜRKIYE?

	SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
None at all	1050	46,2	1081	47,9	1103	48,9	1344	59,3
To a little extent	413	18,2	497	22,0	567	25,2	406	17,9
None at all + To a little extent	1463	64,4	1578	69,9	1670	74,1	1750	77,2
Neither they have, nor they haven't	452	19,9	248	11,0	236	10,5	216	9,5
To a large extent	248	10,9	300	13,3	264	11,7	229	10,1
Completely	52	2,3	69	3,1	40	1,8	47	2,1
To a large extent + Completely	300	13,2	369	16,4	304	13,5	276	12,2
No idea/ No response	56	2,5	64	2,7	43	1,9	25	1,1
Total	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

* The "partially" option in SB-2019 has been updated to "neither provided nor did it provide" in SB-2020, SB-2021 and SB-2022.



Looking at the social cohesion processes within the framework of demographic data, it is observed that the majority of those who stated that the Syrians "have not integrated" into Turkish society in the SB-2022 are mostly those in the 18-24 age group and people who live in metropolitan cities. However, it was observed in FGDs that those living in border provinces were more pessimistic about the harmonization of Syrians.

SB-2022-TABLE 50: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE SYRIANS INTEGRATED INTO TURKISH SOCIETY/ TÜRKIYE? (%)

	None at all	To a little extent	Neither they have, nor the haven't	To a large extent	Completely	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	59,0	17,3	10,0	10,3	1,8	1,6
Male	59,6	18,5	9,0	9,9	2,4	0,6
Age Group						
18-24	63,6	17,3	8,8	7,7	2,3	0,3
25-34	63,1	14,3	9,2	10,3	2,5	0,6
35-44	56,7	18,2	10,2	12,2	1,6	1,1
45-54	58,6	18,6	9,1	10,3	2,0	1,4
55-64	56,3	17,1	10,2	12,0	3,3	1,1
65 +	55,1	24,9	9,8	6,5	0,8	2,9
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	46,9	17,2	7,8	15,6	3,1	9,4
Literate	63,0	22,2	2,5	11,1	-	1,2
Primary School	55,8	18,7	9,8	11,6	2,1	2,0
Middle-School	59,2	19,1	8,1	10,3	2,4	0,9
High-School or equivalent	63,0	15,9	9,4	9,3	2,0	0,4
University/ Graduate Degree	59,0	18,2	12,0	8,6	2,0	0,2
Region						
Border cities	49,9	15,7	12,1	15,7	5,3	1,3
Other cities	61,3	18,4	8,9	8,9	1,4	1,1
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	68,1	15,5	8,9	6,0	0,9	0,6
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	57,2	20,1	8,9	10,7	1,7	1,4
Occupation						
Private sector employee	65,1	16,5	10,1	6,4	1,9	-
Housewife	55,0	18,5	9,1	12,6	2,2	2,6
Artisan/ Tradesman	61,4	16,3	8,3	11,5	1,8	0,7
Retired	56,4	20,3	10,3	9,6	1,7	1,7
Student	64,2	17,6	7,4	8,8	1,3	0,7
Unemployed	61,4	17,3	5,5	10,3	4,1	1,4
Public sector employee	44,7	24,7	20,0	8,2	1,2	1,2
Self-employed	46,5	20,7	13,8	13,8	5,2	-
Business person**	51,9	14,8	11,1	18,5	3,7	-
General	59,3	17,9	9,5	10,1	2,1	1,1

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities. / ** Results belong to 27 busi-ness people

Participants who were dissatisfied regarding social cohesion and stated that Syrians have not integrated into Turkish society were also asked a follow-up question in SB-2021 and SB-2022: “Should harmonization policies be made for Syrians in Türkiye?” It is seen that the Turkish society is not willing in this regard either, and that this reluctance increased from 54.2% in SB-2021 to 69% in SB-2022. In a similar trend, the rate of those who said “harmonization policies should be made” decreased from 30.4% to 20.3% in one year.

SB-2022-TABLE 51: SHOULD HARMONIZATION POLICIES BE MADE FOR SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE?

	SB-2021			SB-2022		
	#	%		#	%	
Absolutely no	658	29,2	54,2	857	37,8	69,0
No	564	25,0		707	31,2	
Neither yes, nor no	155	6,9	6,9	127	5,6	5,6
Yes	491	21,8	30,4	401	17,7	20,3
Absolutely yes	194	8,6		58	2,6	
No idea/ Don't know	173	7,7	8,5	107	4,7	5,1
No response	18	0,8		10	0,4	
Total	2253	100,0		2267	100,0	

In the demographic analysis, it is observed that men, middle-aged people, high school graduates, those living in metropolitan cities and the unemployed have a more negative attitude. To a limited extent, those with a positive attitude towards harmonization efforts are those living in border cities, those with higher education and those working in the public sector.

SB-2022-TABLE 52: SHOULD HARMONIZATION POLICIES BE MADE FOR SYRIANS IN TÜRKIYE? (%)

	Absolutely no	No	Combined No	Neither yes, nor no	Yes	Absolutely yes	Combined yes	No idea/ no response
Sex								
Female	37,1	31,1	68,2	6,0	16,9	2,1	19,0	6,8
Male	38,5	31,3	69,8	5,2	18,5	3,0	21,5	3,5
Age Group								
18-24	42,0	30,4	72,4	5,1	16,5	2,0	18,5	4,0
25-34	39,6	26,6	66,2	5,3	19,9	4,3	24,2	4,3
35-44	32,9	33,5	66,4	7,2	18,2	2,4	20,6	5,8
45-54	41,2	32,1	73,3	5,2	15,9	1,7	17,6	3,9
55-64	38,2	29,1	67,3	4,7	19,3	2,9	22,2	5,8
65 +	32,2	37,6	69,8	5,3	15,1	1,2	16,3	8,6
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	31,3	28,1	59,4	4,7	15,6	1,6	17,2	18,7
Literate	45,7	23,5	69,2	4,9	13,6	1,2	14,8	11,1
Primary School	34,4	34,8	69,2	7,6	16,7	0,8	17,5	5,7
Middle-School	34,9	33,5	68,4	5,9	17,8	2,6	20,4	5,3
High-School or equivalent	39,7	31,1	70,8	5,1	17,2	2,4	19,6	4,5
University/ Graduate Degree	41,0	27,1	68,1	4,1	20,2	4,9	25,1	2,7
Region								
Border cities	30,6	30,9	61,5	6,3	22,3	2,8	25,1	7,1
Other cities*	39,3	31,3	70,6	5,4	16,7	2,5	19,2	4,8
Metropolitan cities	42,4	30,8	73,2	6,4	14,1	1,3	15,4	5,0
Non-metropolitan cities	37,4	31,6	69,0	4,9	18,3	3,2	21,5	4,6
Occupation								
Private sector employee	42,4	29,2	71,6	6,2	15,8	2,9	18,7	3,5
Housewife	32,9	33,2	66,1	5,5	18,7	1,0	19,7	8,7
Artisan/ Tradesman	37,9	31,2	69,1	5,9	17,6	3,5	21,1	3,9
Retired	38,1	35,7	73,8	3,8	15,5	2,4	17,9	4,5
Student	46,0	24,3	70,3	4,7	16,2	4,1	20,3	4,7
Unemployed	40,7	34,5	75,2	3,4	14,5	2,1	16,6	4,8
Public sector employee	20,0	31,8	51,8	3,5	36,5	5,9	42,4	2,3
Self-employed	31,0	27,6	58,6	13,8	20,7	-	20,7	6,9
Business person**	44,5	14,8	59,3	14,8	22,2	-	22,2	3,7
General	37,8	31,2	69,0	5,6	17,7	2,6	20,3	5,1

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

Within the scope of the FGDs, it was tried to understand what the participants understood by the words “harmonization/social cohesion”, and within this framework, their opinions on whether Syrians have integrated into Türkiye and Turkish society. Accordingly, the following questions were posed to the participants.

What do we understand from social cohesion/harmonization?

The question of whether social cohesion has been created regarding Syrians in Türkiye depends, first of all, on how the participants interpret the concept of “social cohesion”. In order to fully analyze this, the facilitators did not provide any “social cohesion” definition during the interview, on the contrary, they directly asked the participants what they understood from social cohesion. **It is noteworthy that almost half of the FGD participants could not provide a definition of social cohesion.** Even though it was stated by the FGD facilitator that there was no obligation for them to make a definition on an academic-intellectual level, and even though the participants were told that they could explain this even through examples, the participants tended to **comment directly on whether Syrians have integrated into the country rather than defining “harmonization/social cohesion”.**

Among the FGD participants who defined “harmonization”, language was the most frequently mentioned issue. Almost all of the participants stated that it is very important for Syrians to know the Turkish language in order to establish healthy and real communication.

- ◆ “If s/he refuses to learn Turkish, he refuses to harmonize.” (Çanakkale-FGD-Female-University Student)

Almost all participants agreed that language learning is a fundamental condition for social cohesion. On the other hand, it was also observed that participants from border cities did not emphasize learning Turkish as much as participants from other regions. The main reason for this is that the people living in that region speak Arabic and Kurdish widely and therefore communication with Syrians can be more easily carried out through these languages. **It is also important that a limited number of participants who did provide a definition of social cohesion emphasized “mutuality” and included expressions such as “mutual learning from each other” and “living together in peace”.** Although the definition of “social cohesion” is more moderate and includes elements that are binding for both sides, the answers to the complementary questions “Have Syrians integrated into Türkiye?” and “Does Türkiye have a policy of social cohesion? If not, what should it be like?”, it is understood that a more negative perspective towards Syrians is dominant and expectations and hopes for harmonization are weak.

Have Syrians integrated into Turkish society / Türkiye?

A very large majority of FGD participants think that Syrians have not integrated to Türkiye. The fact that those participants who thought differently suggested that only a limited number of Syrians, especially those with higher educational levels have integrated into Turkish society, means that they, too, believe that a large majority of Syrians haven’t integrated into Türkiye. **It should also be noted that a significant proportion of respondents from border cities such as Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa stated that Syrians have integrated into Turkish society / Türkiye.** In their statements, these participants suggested that the fact that the host community members in the border cities have a lot in common with Syrians in terms of culture and language facilitates harmonization. **Nevertheless, it should be noted that the respondents who commented that “they have integrated” did not make very strong statements, but rather gave an impression of “partial harmonization”.**

- ◆ **“We could not establish the system and infrastructure to ensure social cohesion. We could not ensure that children go to school, men and women go to work or somehow be included in the society. They could not become integrated because of this situation.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)**
- ◆ *“Harmonization is more difficult in places like the Aegean and Black Sea regions. Because the cultural differences are much greater. The harmonization of the educated becomes easier. But in general, I don’t think there is harmonization.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)*
- ◆ *“They mostly spend time among themselves. I think they couldn’t become integrated because of this.” (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Male, Worker)*

- ◆ *"They probably know the society well enough to meet their basic needs. But since what I understand by social cohesion requires more, such as being able to connect and make friends with the people here, I don't think they have integrated enough to live in this country in the long term and be in meaningful communication with the Turks."* (SB-2022-FGD-Istanbul-Female, Worker)
- ◆ *They don't know a word of Turkish, they have been here for more than 10 years and they say, 'there is no need, everyone knows Arabic'. Since the neighborhood they live in is completely Arab, they do not feel foreign in terms of language, even their children do not know Turkish, they speak it in a broken manner."* (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male, Worker)

There were also a few positive opinions on this issue:

- ◆ *"There was no harmonization in all 81 provinces, only in Hatay, Kilis, Urfa, and Antep, because Hatay has an Arab population and we know that Syrians interact with them a lot."* (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male, Worker)
- ◆ *"Since we are mostly university students, we look at it from our own point of view, a mutual harmony has been established to some extent, but not one hundred percent, in fact, very little has been achieved."* (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male, Student)
- ◆ *"Does Türkiye have a Social Cohesion Policy? If not, how should it be?"*
- ◆ Another question posed to the participants was **"Does Türkiye have a social cohesion policy? If not, how should it be?"**. The majority of FGD participants responded to this question by shaking their heads and saying "no". **Since most participants did not provide a definition of "social cohesion/harmonization" in the framework of the previous question, it is not clear what they actually expect when they say that Türkiye has no social cohesion policy and what they mean by "no". Still, however, it is important that the answer to this question is a clear "no".** This reaction has been interesting in terms of seeing how Türkiye's policies on migration management are perceived by the public. In response to this question, a significant portion of the participants brought up the issue of the **naturalization** of Syrians and criticized this situation by stating that **"most of the Syrians have been granted citizenship". According to many participants, social assistance and support is provided only to Syrians, thus segregating the two communities. A significant number of participants stated that after 12 years, there is no longer a need for positive discrimination regarding Syrians and that the reaction of the local population will increase if this continues.**
- ◆ **In this context, where the lack of a social cohesion policy is emphasized so clearly and it is understood that the existing policies have a very limited response from the society, when the participants are asked "what kind of a policy should there be?", it is striking that the examples given are not focused on "social cohesion" but on the return of Syrians.** A very small number of participants emphasized that Syrians should have equal rights with the Turkish society, but the vast majority stated that they do not want Syrians in the country instead of expressing a concrete policy. It is noted that there is no clear distinction between border cities and metropolitan areas on this issue, and similar views are expressed.
- ◆ *"In Şanlıurfa, for example, when news break out about a Syrian, local people organize and go to attack the Syrian's shop. "Such incidents show that the policy of mutual harmony has not reached the people."* (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Female-University Student)
- ◆ *"There are also those who have not been integrated, and this may be due to the psychological pressure they feel. You have barely built a life for yourself, you wonder if they will want you, if they look at you like this, if they think badly of you, and there are the problems in your country... All these can affect the process and keep you from harmonization."* (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Female)
- ◆ *"The state did not have a harmonization policy. They looked at them as Ansar and Muhajir and did not produce a long-term policy. If one member of the family works and each member gets a Red Crescent card, they can manage their lives."* (SB-2022-FGD-Şanlıurfa-Male-Worker)
- ◆ *"Only Syrians participate in the activities that we expect the host community to participate in, but the participation from the host community is very limited. So, I think Syrians are making an effort regard harmonization."* (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Female-Student)
- ◆ *"Citizenship should not be given to them, and those who have been given citizenship should forfeit their Turkish citizenship and be sent to their homeland."* (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Male-Real Estate Agent)

17. Syrians' Attitudes towards Turkish society According to Turkish Society


In the SB research, in order to see the concerns and expectations of the Turkish society more clearly, survey respondents were asked to reflect on some positive and negative statements concerning how they think Syrians see and treat Turkish society. The responses given in relation to these statements, four of which can be considered "positive" and three of them "negative", clearly reveals the rejection and negation in the society. In fact, in the last four SB studies in which these statements were posed, support for the 3 negative statements ranked in the first three places, while the positive ones came later and with very low percentages. According to SB-2022 data, as in SB-2019, the statement with which the Turkish society agrees the most (38.4%) is *"Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society"*. The statement *"Syrians do not like Turkish society at all"* ranks second with 27.6%. In third place is the statement *"Syrians are not making an effort to integrate into Turkish society"* (10.5%), an option added in SB-2021. Among the other 4 positive propositions, the one with the highest support is *"Syrians are making efforts to integrate to Turkish society"* with only 7.1%. The table below clearly shows that Turkish society is distant from the "positive" statements and brings the negative ones to the forefront. When the positive and negative statements are evaluated by combining them together, it is observed that the discrepancy between the two widened in each SB study. The difference was 37.1% (26% - 63.1%) in SB-2019 and increased to 59.5% (17% - 76.5%) in SB-2022.

Demographic analysis clearly shows that Turks living in metropolitan areas have more negative views on the behavior of Syrians towards Turkish society.

SB-2022- TABLE 53 (+FIGURE): WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BEST DESCRIBES HOW SYRIANS TREAT TURKISH SOCIETY?

Sıra No.		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	731	32,2	751	33,2	614	27,3	871	38,4
2	Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	702	30,9	769	34,0	719	31,9	625	27,6
3	Syrians are not making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	-	-	-	-	259	11,5	238	10,5
4	Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	302	13,3	180	8,0	186	8,2	161	7,1
5	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	132	5,8	214	9,5	124	5,5	86	3,8
6	Syrians love Turkish society very much	66	2,9	119	5,3	104	4,6	83	3,7
7	Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	90	4,0	70	3,1	77	3,4	54	2,4
8	Other	-	-	17	0,7	6	0,3	12	0,5
	No idea/ No response	248	10,9	139	6,2	164	7,3	137	6,0
Total		2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: Which of the following statements best describes how Syrians treat Turkish society? (%)



Syrians are exploiting Turkish society + Syrians do not like Turkish society at all + Syrians are not making an effort to integrate into Turkish society

Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society + Syrians are grateful to Turkish society + Syrians love Turkish society very much + Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect

SB-2022- TABLE 54: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BEST DESCRIBES HOW SYRIANS TREAT TURKISH SOCIETY? (%)

	Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	Syrians are not making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	Syrians love Turkish society very much	Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex									
Female	39,8	26,4	10,7	5,4	4,2	3,5	2,3	0,4	7,3
Male	37,1	28,7	10,3	8,8	3,4	3,9	2,5	0,6	4,7
Age Group									
18-24	43,8	29,3	8,2	6,3	2,8	2,8	2,0	0,3	4,5
25-34	40,2	25,4	10,1	8,6	2,9	4,1	2,0	0,6	6,1
35-44	36,7	28,3	11,0	7,2	3,8	4,0	1,8	0,4	6,8
45-54	40,2	27,5	9,6	6,1	3,7	3,9	3,2	0,7	5,1
55-64	32,3	26,9	12,4	9,8	5,8	3,3	2,9	0,4	6,2
65 +	34,7	29,0	13,1	3,7	4,9	3,3	2,8	0,8	7,7
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	26,6	31,3	10,9	3,1	4,7	4,7	3,1	-	15,6
Literate	35,8	33,3	12,4	1,2	3,7	3,7	2,5	-	7,4
Primary School	35,8	29,3	9,6	6,3	3,9	4,1	3,3	0,6	7,1
Middle-School	36,0	30,5	10,5	8,3	3,1	3,7	1,5	1,1	5,3
High-School or equivalent	43,3	27,4	8,3	6,6	4,1	3,3	2,1	0,4	4,5
University/ Graduate Degree	38,8	21,8	14,1	9,0	3,9	3,5	2,4	0,2	6,3
Region									
Border cities	18,0	44,3	4,3	9,4	6,1	6,8	3,3	-	7,8
Other cities*	42,7	24,1	11,8	6,6	3,3	3,0	2,2	0,6	5,7
Metropolitan cities	43,7	21,9	16,1	6,8	3,4	1,7	1,7	0,6	4,1
Non-metropolitan cities	42,1	25,3	9,2	6,5	3,2	3,8	2,5	0,7	6,7
Occupation									
Private sector employee	46,8	24,4	9,4	6,2	4,0	3,7	1,1	0,2	4,2
Housewife	33,9	29,2	10,0	6,5	3,7	3,6	2,8	0,6	9,7
Artisan/ Tradesman	34,2	29,8	11,8	9,6	1,7	5,0	2,6	0,7	4,6
Retired	36,5	26,8	12,0	6,5	4,8	2,4	3,1	1,0	6,9
Student	45,3	30,4	10,8	2,0	4,1	2,7	2,7	-	2,0
Unemployed	46,2	26,2	6,2	7,6	4,8	2,1	-	0,7	6,2
Public sector employee	28,2	20,0	16,5	11,8	4,7	4,7	5,9	-	8,2
Self-employed	27,6	36,2	5,2	8,6	3,4	5,2	5,2	1,7	6,9
Business person**	26,0	25,9	18,5	7,4	14,8	3,7	3,7	-	-
General	38,4	27,6	10,5	7,1	3,8	3,7	2,4	0,5	6,0

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

18. How Significant a Problem are Syrians in Türkiye?

As in every society, it is natural for the Turkish society to have problems sometimes constantly and sometimes periodically. It can be said that in recent years, Turkish society has been dealing with problems in many areas such as economy, fight against terrorism, employment, social support, social tension, foreign policy, etc.⁴³ In the SB research, with the question “Among the top 10 problems of Türkiye, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?”, which has been asked since SB-2019, it was tried to explain to what extent the Turkish society sees Syrians as a problem and where they rank them among the problems. In the SB-2019 study, the sum of those who considered Syrians as Türkiye’s “most important”, “second most important” and “third most important” problem exceeded 60%. In the SB-2020 survey, the sum of these three categories decreased to 52.3%. Then, the sum of these three categories increased to 60.4% in SB-2021 and further to 69.6% in SB-2022. The rate of respondents who identified Syrians in the country as the most important problem in Türkiye reached 28.5% in SB-2022. When the overall data is considered, Syrians in Türkiye is ranked in SB-2019 at 3.3rd, in SB-2020 at 3.8th, in SB-2021 at 3.3rd, and in SB-2022 at 2.9th most important problem. In other words, Turkish society states that they see the Syrian issue as one of Turkey’s top three or four problems. In SB-2022, this issue was included in the “top three issues” with 2.9. The rate of those who stated that “Syrians are not a problem/The issue of Syrians wouldn’t be in the top 10” was 5.4% in SB-2019, 5.6% in SB-2020, 3.2% in SB-2021 and 2.9% in SB-2022.


Within the framework of this question, we would like to draw attention to an important “limitation notice”. When fieldwork is carried out on a specific subject in social sciences, the opinions of the interviewee may increase subjectivity and generally, answers may be received showing that interviewee attaches more importance to the topic being discussed at that moment. Since the SB survey was conducted specifically on Syrians in Türkiye, it is clear that there is a similar possibility of mistake. For this reason, “Among the top 10 problems of Türkiye, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?” the answers given to the question should be approached with caution. In another field study conducted throughout Türkiye, the fact that the Syrians/refugees took place in a different order can be explained by this problem in the nature of the survey technique.

43 See: Türkiye Report: <https://turkiyeraporu.com/arastirma/turkiyenin-en-onemli-sorunu-nedir-1-1918/>, (Access: 11.10.2023)
IPSOS: <https://www.ipsos.com/tr-tr/toplumun-84u-icin-en-onemli-sorun-ekonomi> (Access: 11.10.2023)

SB-2022- TABLE 55 (+FIGURE): AMONG THE TOP 10 PROBLEMS OF TÜRKIYE, HOW WOULD YOU RANK THE PRIORITY OF THE ISSUE OF SYRIANS?

	SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1 st rank	617	27,2	418	18,5	572	25,4	647	28,5
2 nd rank	325	14,3	340	15,1	398	17,7	473	20,9
3 rd rank	426	18,8	422	18,7	406	18,0	458	20,2
1+2+3		60,3		52,3		61,1		69,6
4 th rank	196	8,6	212	9,4	209	9,3	235	10,4
5 th rank	191	8,4	278	12,3	215	9,5	147	6,5
6 th rank	64	2,8	106	4,7	73	3,2	33	1,4
7 th rank	61	2,7	80	3,5	56	2,5	24	1,1
8 th rank	44	1,9	61	2,7	62	2,8	20	0,9
9 th rank	17	0,7	37	1,6	23	1,0	22	1,0
10 th rank	115	5,1	116	5,1	102	4,5	79	3,5
Syrians are not a problem/The issue of Syrians wouldn't be in the top 10	123	5,4	126	5,6	73	3,2	67	2,9
No idea/ No response	92	4,1	63	2,8	64	2,9	62	2,7
Total	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0
Average Score	3.3		3.8		3.3		2.9	

SB-2022- Among the top 10 problems of Türkiye, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?



19. Political Right and Citizenship

While the SB surveys indicate that around 90% of Turkish society believe that at least half of Syrians will permanently stay in the country, there are significant objections and anxieties regarding giving Syrians political rights and Turkish citizenship. In fact, as discussed above under the heading “Anxieties: Security-Serenity and Social Acceptance”, one of the main anxieties voiced by Turkish society is the prospects of Syrians obtaining citizenship. SB research also included specified questions on political rights and citizenship to obtain a deeper understanding of the attitudes of Turkish society in this regard. The respondents were asked the question “*What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights?*”. 83,8% of the respondents replied with “*they should not be given any political rights*” in SB-2020. The share of this response was 85,6% in SB-2017 and 87,1% in SB-2019. For this reason, in the SB-2021 study, the question of political rights was abandoned and it was decided to ask only the question about citizenship.

When asked the question “*What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding giving Syrians Turkish citizenship?*” and given the chance to provide multiple responses, 75.9% of the respondents suggested “*none of them should be given citizenship*” in SB-2022 (SB-2017: 75.8%; SB-2019: 76.5%; SB-2020: 71.8%; SB-2021: 67.9%). On the opposite end of the spectrum, only 1% of the respondents said “*all of them should be given citizenship*” (SB-2017: 4%; SB-2019: 1.5%, SB- 2020: 3.6%; SB-2021: 2.2%)⁴⁴. The options that included “conditional support” for granting Syrians citizenship such as “*being educated*”, “*being born in Türkiye*”, “*being an ethnic Turkoman*”, “*speaking Turkish*” or “*being young*” drew support from around 20-30% of the respondents in SB-general. It is understood that there are a significant number of people who advocate the naturalization of only those with certain qualifications, and who call for a review and tightening of these citizenship criteria. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges reveals that Turkish society- across political leanings- has serious concerns about citizenship policy.


In this context, an important technical detail should be mentioned in order to evaluate the results more accurately. In the SB study, this question was posed as “multiple response” question except for SB-2019. Although those who answered “*none of them should be given citizenship*” in SB-2019 are not very likely to also choose the other options, the possibility of transitivity between the other options is high. It does not seem to be a coincidence that the highest level of “*none of them should be given citizenship*” among all SB studies was found in SB-2019 (76.5%). The results should be evaluated taking this technical detail into account.

⁴⁴ Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: “Syrian asylum-seekers should be given Turkish citizenship”: Agreed: 7,7% / Disagreed: 84,5%

SB-2022- TABLE 56 (+FIGURE): WHAT KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING GIVING SYRIANS TURKISH CITIZENSHIP? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

Rank		SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	None of them should be given citizenship	1584	75,8	1737	76,5	1621	71,8	1529	67,9	1720	75,9
2	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	124	5,9	114	5,0	223	9,9	325	14,4	200	8,8
3	Those who have been living in Türkiye for a certain time period should be given citizenship	153	7,3	135	6,0	184	8,1	156	6,9	115	5,1
4	Those who were born in Türkiye should be given citizenship	101	4,8	48	2,1	180	8,0	193	8,6	110	4,9
5	Turkish-origin ones should be given citizenship	63	3,0	53	2,3	91	4,0	147	6,5	102	4,5
6	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	-	-	65	2,9	106	4,7	212	9,4	100	4,4
7	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	47	2,2	9	0,4	55	2,4	73	3,2	49	2,2
8	All of them should be given citizenship	84	4,0	35	1,5	82	3,6	50	2,2	23	1,0
9	Young ones should be given citizenship	11	0,5	-	-	13	0,6	30	1,3	21	0,9
10	Other	-	-	-	-	6	0,2	31	1,4	17	0,8
	No idea/ No response	61	2,9	75	3,3	45	2,0	72	3,2	56	2,5

SB-2022: "None of them should be given citizenship" (%)



Although demographic analysis of the responses on citizenship reveals only minimal differences, it can show some variations within itself. Perhaps the most significant change in the picture is that objections have become more vocal in cities and metropolitan areas where the number of Syrians is relatively small. In fact, this is also observed in other countries where anti-migrant/anti-refugee sentiments are prominent. In Germany, for example, migrant sentiments appear to be stronger in the eastern states, where the migrant population is the smallest. However, when the issue is examined in the context of Syrians in Türkiye, it is thought that this increasing reactivity, which is “based on perception rather than experience”, has a strong connection with the politicization process of the issue. Despite minimal differences, young people, those with secondary education, and students are more likely to express higher objections on this issue.

SB-2022- TABLE 57: WHAT KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING GIVING SYRIANS TURKISH CITIZENSHIP? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES %)

	None of them should be given citizenship	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	Those who have been living in Türkiye for a certain time period should be given citizenship	Those who were born in Türkiye should be given citizenship	Turkish-origin ones should be given citizenship	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	All of them should be given citizenship	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex										
Female	75,8	8,3	5,2	5,1	4,4	5,1	1,7	1,0	0,9	3,3
Male	76,0	9,3	4,9	4,6	4,6	3,8	2,6	1,1	2,5	1,7
Age Group										
18-24	83,0	6,0	2,8	4,0	2,8	4,0	1,4	0,6	1,1	0,6
25-34	73,8	9,6	4,7	5,7	4,3	3,5	1,8	2,0	0,6	3,9
35-44	75,4	10,8	5,8	3,6	3,2	3,8	1,6	0,8	1,8	2,4
45-54	78,2	7,8	5,6	5,6	5,1	4,9	2,9	1,0	2,5	1,7
55-64	73,1	8,4	5,8	6,5	6,9	6,2	2,9	1,1	2,5	1,8
65 +	70,2	9,4	5,7	3,7	6,1	5,3	2,9	-	2,0	4,5
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate	70,3	6,3	6,3	6,3	6,3	7,8	-	-	-	10,9
Literate	75,3	8,6	2,5	3,7	7,4	3,7	-	3,7	-	6,2
Primary School	75,6	7,7	4,7	3,7	3,5	5,5	2,4	1,8	2,6	3,1
Middle-School	77,4	6,8	5,0	5,3	4,2	4,6	1,8	0,4	1,8	1,1
High-School or equivalent	79,3	7,8	4,3	3,7	4,5	3,0	2,8	0,7	1,6	1,3
University/ Graduate Degree	70,8	13,7	6,7	7,1	5,1	4,7	2,0	0,8	1,2	2,9
Region										
Border cities	74,9	4,6	8,4	3,8	1,3	2,0	1,5	1,8	1,3	6,1
Other cities*	76,1	9,7	4,4	5,1	5,2	4,9	2,3	0,9	1,8	1,7
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	75,5	10,5	3,4	3,3	5,1	4,4	2,6	0,9	1,3	1,3
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	76,4	9,2	5,0	6,2	5,2	5,2	2,1	0,9	2,1	2,0
Occupation										
Private sector employee	78,7	8,8	5,3	4,4	3,9	2,0	2,0	0,6	1,3	0,7
Housewife	74,8	7,3	4,9	4,5	3,6	4,3	1,2	1,0	0,6	6,5
Artisan/ Tradesman	76,3	10,5	4,6	4,4	4,6	5,9	2,6	0,7	2,2	1,3
Retired	72,5	9,3	6,5	4,8	6,2	5,2	3,1	1,4	2,7	1,0
Student	82,4	5,4	2,0	4,1	2,7	5,4	0,7	0,7	1,4	0,7
Unemployed	82,1	6,2	3,4	2,1	2,8	6,2	1,4	1,4	1,4	2,8
Public sector employee	60,0	16,5	11,8	12,9	14,1	5,9	3,5	1,2	1,2	2,4
Self-employed	67,2	10,3	5,2	12,1	3,4	3,4	6,9	5,2	6,9	3,4
Business person**	70,4	11,1	-	7,4	7,4	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	-
General	75,9	8,8	5,1	4,9	4,5	4,4	2,2	1,0	1,7	2,5

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small num-bers.

FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

When asked in the FGDs what the citizenship arrangement should look like, the primary response in all cities was that the citizenship policy was not transparent, and this was a point of criticism.

Level of Knowledge:

The majority of the participants stated that they do not know how this policy is implemented, i.e. under what conditions Syrians are granted citizenship, and that this process should be carried out transparently. **A large majority of the respondents estimate the number of Syrians in Türkiye to be around 8-10 million.** Moreover, the majority of the participants stated that “2/3 of Syrians have obtained citizenship”. **Participants are very disturbed about the “number of Syrians that obtained citizenship”, which is based on their own estimate. They argue and criticize that this is a policy of the government to create potential voters for itself. In addition, the view that citizenship is “sold for money” is widespread and heavily criticized.**

How should citizenship be regulated:

In response to the question on what kind of a policy should be followed for obtaining the citizenship, the **number of respondents who believe that “Syrians should never become citizens” is quite low in the FGDs. On the other hand, it was stated that certain criteria should be set and these should be “challenging” criteria and that only those who meet these conditions can be granted citizenship.** When asked what these criteria should be, it is seen that the expectation that the **Turkish language** level should be at a certain level is prominent. In addition, it was stated that “people with a high level of education”, “people who can contribute to society”, “people who are qualified, artists, business people, etc.” should be granted citizenship, while others should not be given citizenship.

Citizenship and Politics

In almost all FGDs, participants stated that the issue of Syrians in Türkiye has been turned into political material, which has had a positive impact on the current government in terms of votes. According to the participants who hold this view, the number of Syrians who have been granted citizenship in Türkiye is over millions, and those Syrians who have become citizens have voted for the current government.

Through this question, it was understood that the participants had no idea about the number of Syrians who obtained citizenship in Türkiye and that they are far from even knowing the current number of Syrians who only had estimations, which were extraordinary numbers. Some participants stated that they believe that the current economic crisis and other problems are somehow being covered up by the “issue of Syrians” that has risen on the political agenda, and therefore, since these problems (which are mostly seen as caused by the government’s policies) are not on the agenda, the government easily wins votes. Although the participants were not asked which political group/party/ideology they support as it was not necessary in the context of the study, it should be noted that the way they interpreted this question, it was expressed as a “negative” situation that the issue of Syrians “benefits the government”. **In addition, a significant number of participants also stated in the FGDs that the instrumentalization of the issue of Syrians triggered polarization in society and increased hate speech. Participants noted the fact that the society is heading towards conflict over “Syrians” as a “negative” impact on politics.**

It is noteworthy that the emphasis on “nationalism” is prominent in the expressions in the FGDs and that very reactive sentences are expressed against Syrians. This is a departure from the FGDs of previous SB studies and is important to see the extent to which the public’s distance from and concerns about Syrians, as well as criticism and anger about the management of the process, have increased.

- ◆ ***“While I used to be inclined to think more globally and openly, now I am pushed to think more nationalist and fascist.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)***
- ◆ ***“It feels like we are alienated and diminished in our land. There are many, many more of them in Mersin and we are like only half of them. Now, when I see so many people coming to these lands, I say ‘we shed blood, we gave martyrs for these lands’ and if I am being ignored, my nationalist feelings swell if these people are coming.” (SB-2022-FGD-Mersin-Female-Worker)***
- ◆ ***“There is a tendency for conflict in bigger cities due to these political discourses, although not yet here. There are groupings in cities like Ankara.” (SB-2022-FGD-Hatay-Male-University Student)***
- ◆ ***“It is not that we should not give it to every Syrian, for example, if he is an engineer, he has a contribution in science and technology, let’s take this man, if he is a businessman, he is one of the leading businessmen in the world, let’s give it to them, we should not be too strict, but we should not give it to everyone.” (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Male-Worker)***
- ◆ ***“It should be given exceptionally, but we need to know why and to whom and how it is given.” (SB-2022-FGD-Ankara-Female-Worker)***

20. The Views on Education Opportunities for Syrian Children

As the prospects of Syrians' permanent stay in Türkiye get stronger, the issue of education become more prominent. As of December 2022, the number of Syrian school-aged children (5 to 17 years of age) is 1 million 112 thousand.⁴⁵ Around 65% of these children have access to school.⁴⁶ It is, however, also a fact that there are lost generations who don't have access to any formal education. The number of Syrian children with no access to schooling in Türkiye is over 400 thousand.

SB research tries to measure the importance and value that Turkish society attaches to Syrian children's education. In general, it can be said that the Turkish society is "sensitive" about the education of Syrian children. The survey respondents were asked the question "*What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children?*" The rate of respondents who suggested "*They should be able to benefit from all kinds of education rights*" was 9.5% in SB-2017, and 6% in SB-2019. Then there was a significant increase in SB-2020, where this rate rose to 29.9% and remained almost same in SB-2021 (29.3%). In SB-2022, it scored a more significant decrease to become 24.7%. While the support for the statement "*they shouldn't be able to receive any education*" in Turkish society was 25.7% in SB-2017, 16.7% in SB-2019, 16.9% in SB-2020, and 14.4% in SB-2021, this proposition rose to the second place in the ranking with 21.7% in SB-2022.

As in the SB-2021 study, the more significant objections and criticisms are voiced especially by the respondents from border provinces where the Syrian population is densely populated. In border cities, the statement "*they shouldn't be able to receive any education*" ranks first in SB-2022. As in border cities, in the age group between 18-24, among those with "literate" education level and among self-employed individuals, the option of "they shouldn't be able to receive any education" received more support than the option of "they should freely receive education at all levels". Similarly, the statement "*Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools*" also received more support in border cities, well above the Türkiye average. It can be suggested that the objections in the border region stem from the experience of disruptions in education, one of the most important public services. In other words, the problem seems to be more related to capacity issues and deterioration in the quality of education. However, it is predicted that the Turkish society's perception is also influenced by concerns that those integrated into formal education system and their families will remain in Türkiye permanently.

This set of questions on the education of Syrian children in the SB studies was also designed to understand the attitude of the Turkish society towards the general harmonization processes in the context of Syrian children's education. The results can be considered as an indicator of the Turkish society's distant attitude towards social cohesion processes.


45 Presidency of Migration Management (31.12.2022) <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_ys_dosyalar/2021_05/21110500_MayYs2021_internet_bulteni_.pdf (Access: 23.05.2021)

46 8,437 registered students, 1.09% of the total, are in YOBİS system, in other words, Temporary Education Centers.

SB-2022- TABLE 58 (+FIGURE): WHAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING THE EDUCATION OF SYRIAN CHILDREN?*⁴⁷

Rank		SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
1	They should be able to benefit from all kinds of education rights**	198	9,5	136	6,0	675	29,9	660	29,3	559	24,7
2	They shouldn't be able to receive any education	537	25,7	380	16,7	381	16,9	325	14,4	493	21,7
3	They should only be taught Turkish language	680	32,6	326	14,4	275	12,2	355	15,8	370	16,3
4	Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools	-	-	355	15,6	155	6,9	319	14,2	277	12,2
5	They should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education	491	23,5	608	26,8	521	23,0	357	15,8	244	10,8
6	They should receive education in Arabic at separate schools apart from Turkish children	-	-	218	9,6	138	6,1	78	3,5	142	6,3
7	They should only be able to receive vocational training***	103	4,9	30	1,3	46	2,0	58	2,6	57	2,5
8	Other	-	-	-	-	11	0,5	8	0,3	10	0,4
	No idea/ No response	80	3,8	218	9,6	57	2,5	93	4,1	115	5,1
	Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: What kind of arrangements should be made regarding the education of Syrian children? %



They should be able to benefit from all kinds of education rights

They shouldn't be able to receive any education

47 Önceki SB'lerde "Suriyeli çocuklara devlet okullarında eğitim verilmesine ilişkin nasıl bir düzenleme yapılmalıdır?" şeklinde olan soru, SB-2021 ve SB-2022'de "Suriyeli çocukların eğitimi konusunda nasıl bir düzenleme yapılmalıdır?" şeklinde güncellenmiştir. / **Önceki SB'lerde "Üniversite eğitimi de dâhil olmak üzere her türlü eğitim imkânından yararlanabilmeliler" cevap seçeneği, SB-2021 ve SB-2022'de "Her türlü eğitim hakkında faydalanabilmeliler" şeklinde güncellenmiştir. / ***Önceki SB'lerde "Okullara gidememeli ama mesleki eğitim alabilmeliler" cevap seçeneği, SB-2021 ve SB-2022'de "Sadece meslek eğitimi alabilmeliler" şeklinde güncellenmiştir.

SB-2022- TABLE 59: WHAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING THE EDUCATION OF SYRIAN CHILDREN (%)

	They should be able to benefit from all kinds of education rights	They shouldn't be able to receive any education	They should only be taught Turkish language	Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools	They should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education	They should receive education in Arabic at separate schools apart from Turkish children	They should only be able to receive vocational training	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex									
Female	22,9	18,7	17,1	15,1	11,1	6,2	2,3	0,4	6,2
Male	26,4	24,8	15,5	9,4	10,4	6,3	2,7	0,5	4,0
Age Group									
18-24	19,0	27,3	16,2	11,1	13,9	6,0	3,4	-	3,1
25-34	28,3	18,0	14,3	13,3	11,3	7,2	2,3	0,6	4,7
35-44	25,1	20,9	15,0	15,6	10,2	6,2	1,4	0,6	5,0
45-54	25,3	21,8	18,9	11,5	9,3	5,6	3,9	0,2	3,5
55-64	24,4	22,5	18,2	10,5	9,5	6,9	1,8	1,1	5,1
65 +	24,1	22,1	16,7	7,8	10,2	5,3	2,4	-	11,4
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	20,3	14,1	15,6	17,2	7,8	9,4	3,1	-	12,5
Literate	16,0	27,2	25,9	6,2	7,4	6,2	2,5	-	8,6
Primary School	24,2	23,0	15,7	13,0	8,0	7,5	2,7	0,2	5,7
Middle-School	23,5	23,0	16,7	16,2	7,7	5,0	2,6	-	5,3
High-School or equivalent	23,1	23,1	16,4	10,6	13,0	6,3	2,1	0,6	4,8
University/ Graduate Degree	30,4	17,5	15,1	10,2	14,3	5,7	2,7	1,0	3,1
Region									
Border cities	22,5	28,6	9,1	19,0	6,6	6,1	2,8	-	5,3
Other cities*	25,1	20,3	17,9	10,8	11,6	6,3	2,5	0,5	5,0
Metropolitan cities	28,7	18,2	19,1	10,8	8,1	7,1	2,4	0,6	5,0
Non-metropolitan cities	23,0	21,5	17,1	10,8	13,8	5,8	2,5	0,5	5,0
Occupation									
Private sector employee	21,8	20,7	20,7	13,8	9,5	5,9	2,0	0,6	5,0
Housewife	22,9	20,5	14,6	14,6	9,5	7,3	3,3	-	7,3
Artisan/ Tradesman	23,3	22,9	16,8	12,8	9,8	6,7	2,4	0,9	4,4
Retired	24,1	21,6	19,9	9,3	10,3	5,2	2,4	0,7	6,5
Student	25,7	23,0	12,1	12,1	16,9	8,1	0,7	-	1,4
Unemployed	28,3	25,5	11,7	8,3	13,8	3,5	4,8	-	4,1
Public sector employee	38,8	12,9	8,2	10,6	20,0	7,1	1,2	1,2	-
Self-employed	37,9	31,0	8,6	1,7	6,9	6,9	3,5	-	3,5
Business person**	48,2	29,6	3,7	3,7	11,1	-	-	-	3,7
General	24,7	21,7	16,3	12,2	10,8	6,3	2,5	0,4	5,1
* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.									
** Results belong to 27 business people.									
Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.									


21. Society's Perspective on the Government's Policy on Syrians

In order to analyze the situation and process management that the Turkish society has faced since 2011, some questions are included in the SB. One of them is "How do you find the policies of the state regarding Syrians? (Syrian policy in general)". While the total rate of those who find the government's policies "right" and "very right" was 18.6% in SB-2017, this figure was 10.7% in SB-2019, 8.4% in SB-2020, 12.2% in SB-2021, and 9% in SB-2022. In turn, while the rate of those who found the government's policies "very wrong" and "wrong" was 62.4% in SB-2017, this was 73% in SB-2019, 70.3% in SB-2020, 69.3% in SB-2021, and 80.2% in SB-2022. This situation reveals that a large part of the society is not satisfied with the policy of the state regarding Syrians and even finds it wrong. In SB-2022, the rate of those who found the government's policies "very wrong" increased to 49.5%. The continuous increase in the rate of those who find it "very wrong" draws attention. There is no doubt that the SB study does not know "what and which policy" is on the minds of the respondents who answer the questionnaires. Accordingly, the answers "I find it right" or "I find it wrong" should be evaluated within the framework of this limitation.

SB-2022- TABLE 60 (+FIGURE): HOW DO YOU FIND THE POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT REGARDING SYRIANS? (SYRIAN POLICY IN GENERAL)

	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020		SB-2021		SB-2022	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Very wrong	505	24,2	823	36,2	761	33,7	874	38,8	1121	49,5
Wrong	799	38,2	836	36,8	827	36,6	687	30,5	697	30,7
Neither right, nor wrong	331	15,8	290	12,8	323	14,3	276	12,2	182	8,0
Right	307	14,7	210	9,3	169	7,5	241	10,7	162	7,1
Very right	81	3,9	32	1,4	21	0,9	33	1,5	42	1,9
No idea/ No response	66	3,2	80	3,5	158	7,0	142	6,2	63	2,8
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0	2253	100,0	2267	100,0

SB-2022: "How do you find the policies of the state regarding Syrians? (Syrian policy in general)"



After this general assessment, an additional question was asked in SB-2021 and SB-2022 to understand how Turkish society views the issue in terms of policy areas. Among the answers to the question of *“To what extent do you think the government’s actions in policy areas (to be read) are right regarding Syrians?”* it is understood that those who responded that the policy is “very wrong” and “wrong” has a general average of 80.2%. Among the government policies, it appears that the one that the Turkish society finds most wrong is the policy on the settlement/distribution of Syrians in Türkiye (80.7%), followed by the “financial support policy” (78.7%). It is observed that the Turkish society finds education (16.8%) and health (15.7%) more right among the policies of the state compared to other areas. In total, 10.3% find the state’s harmonization policies right and 78% find them wrong. However, it should be emphasized that in all areas, the average of those who found the policies right was 9%, while the average of those who found them wrong was 80.2%. The same figures in SB-2021, respectively were 12.2% and 69.3%. Between SB-2021 and SB-2022, those who find the government’s policy on Syrians “wrong” in all areas increased on average by 10%. In addition to the 6 options asked to the Turkish society regarding the policies of the state, in SB-2022, “Repatriation policy to Syria” and “Citizenship policy” were asked as two new questions/policy fields. The strongest reaction to any government policy is observed in the case of “Citizenship policy” with 85.2%. On the other new question, the state’s “Repatriation policy to Syria”, criticism against the state was at the lowest level among all responses with 50.8%.

SB-2022- TABLE 61: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES REGARDING SYRIANS ARE RIGHT? (%)


Rank		Very wrong	Wrong	Com- bined Wrong	Neither right, nor wrong	Right	Very right	Com- bined Right	No idea/ No response
1	Repatriation policy to Syria	35,8	15,0	50,8	6,5	26,5	12,9	39,4	3,3
2	Education policy	41,3	27,2	68,5	9,2	15,3	1,5	16,8	5,5
3	Health policy	49,3	25,1	74,4	7,3	14,0	1,7	15,7	2,6
4	Financial support policy	50,0	28,7	78,7	7,0	9,7	1,6	11,3	3,0
5	Harmonization policies	47,6	30,4	78,0	6,6	8,7	1,6	10,3	5,1
6	Settlement/distribution policy within Türkiye	50,4	30,3	80,7	5,5	8,2	2,0	10,2	3,6
7	Syrians policy in general	49,5	30,7	80,2	8,0	7,1	1,9	9,0	2,8
8	Citizenship policy	58,5	27,2	85,7	4,9	5,2	1,5	6,7	2,7

In the table below, the 2021-20222 comparison is shared as a table and figure. However, “Repatriation policy to Syria” and “Citizenship policy”, which were asked for the first time in SB-2022, are not included in the figure since they were asked in SB-2022 for the first time.

SB-2022- TABLE 62 (+FIGURE): TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES REGARDING SYRIANS ARE RIGHT? (%)

		Very wrong	Wrong	Combined Wrong	Neither right, nor wrong	Right	Very right	Combined Right	No idea/ No response	Fikrim yok/ cevap yok
Repatriation policy to Syria	SB-2022	35,8	15,0	50,8	6,5	26,5	12,9	39,4	3,3	
Health policy	SB-2021	32,2	26,7	58,9	10,8	21,8	2,1	23,9	6,4	
	SB-2022	49,3	25,1	74,4	7,3	14,0	1,7	15,7	2,6	
Education policy	SB-2021	28,6	26,6	55,2	13,7	19,4	1,5	20,9	10,2	
	SB-2022	41,3	27,2	68,5	9,2	15,3	1,5	16,8	5,5	
Financial support policy	SB-2021	42,5	25,5	68,0	9,3	14,8	2,7	17,5	5,2	
	SB-2022	50,0	28,7	78,7	7,0	9,7	1,6	11,3	3,0	
Distribution policy within Türkiye	SB-2021	38,3	30,2	68,5	10,7	12,1	2,0	14,1	6,7	
	SB-2022	50,4	30,3	80,7	5,5	8,2	2,0	10,2	3,6	
Harmonization policies	SB-2021	34,9	31,4	66,3	11,0	12,3	1,4	13,7	9,0	
	SB-2022	47,6	30,4	78,0	6,6	8,7	1,6	10,3	5,1	
Syrians policy in general	SB-2021	38,8	30,5	69,3	12,3	10,7	1,5	12,2	6,2	
	SB-2022	49,5	30,7	80,2	8,0	7,1	1,9	9,0	2,8	
Citizenship policy	SB-2022	58,5	27,2	85,7	4,9	5,2	1,5	6,7	2,7	

SB-2022 - Table 63: To what extent do you think the government's policies regarding Syrians are right? (%)



FGD FINDINGS (SB-2022-T)

In order to understand how Türkiye's policies towards Syrians are perceived and evaluated by the participants, data was also collected from FGDs.

The question of **"Do you think the Turkish government's policies regarding Syrians are right?"** is essentially a general question, and in order to understand what first comes to mind as a policy from the participants, it has been tried to get an answer without mentioning a specific policy, that is, without directing/leading. Other than two exceptions, all participants in FGDs made statements criticizing Türkiye's policies and emphasizing that they found it wrong.

Before asking the question **"How do you evaluate the fact that Syrians in Türkiye cannot live outside the province where they are registered?"**, this practice was explained in detail to the participants by the FGD facilitator. It was explained that if Syrians wanted to leave the province, they would need to obtain a travel permit; that if they wanted to live in another province than their province of residence, they would not be able to benefit from basic rights such as the right to education, health and the right to work, and that they would become unregistered.

First of all, it was understood that almost none of the participants knew about this practice. It is clear that this situation should be considered when addressing the deficiencies in explaining and communicating migration process management and policies to the society.

In addition, it is noteworthy that almost all of the participants (regardless of whether they are from border or metropolitan cities) stated that they found this practice correct and that it should continue. Participants think that Syrians can be monitored and kept under control in this way, which is important for security. On the other hand, it is also important to note that participants believed that if Syrians are allowed to go to any city of their choice, this will negatively affect the population density of cities. In fact, this suggestion was expressed in the same way by participants in border cities where Syrians already live in large numbers. Apart from this, only a few participants stated that they did not find this practice humane and that Syrians should have freedom of movement just like everyone else and underlined that this is a human right.

Settlement Policy

In addition, the facilitator reminded the participants that, when they first arrived in the country, Syrians were dispersed without a settlement policy and asked them **how they would view it if a resettlement and balanced distribution policy were to be implemented today. In response to this question, participants in border cities stated that since the number of Syrians in their cities is already high, distributing this number would take the burden off them and therefore would be a "right" practice, while those in cities like Çanakkale, where there are very few Syrians, stated that they would not favor such a practice due to the fear of a large population that would be directed towards them.**

- ◆ "The people of Çanakkale look with prejudice even at people who came from Istanbul. They say, 'Why did they come?' The arrival of Syrians would be revolutionary for us (...) we are very different culturally, we are like two different extremes. Everyone knows each other here, so they would attract a lot of attention. That's why I wouldn't prefer it." (SB-2022-FGD-Çanakkale-Female-University Student)

22. Social Media and Syrians

It can be said that the general public discussion platform about Syrians in Türkiye is social media. In many areas, especially on Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok, it is frequently seen that both the Turkish reaction to the Syrians and the Syrians' own lives or criticisms are shared. Starting from SB-2021, some questions were asked to understand the views of the Turkish society on social media posts.

Turkish people were asked the question "Regarding the news about refugees on social media, which of the following statements reflects your opinion?". The top response to this was "I believe they are true news" with 34.6%. In SB-2021, the top response was "I think they are provocative" with 20.6%, which was extremely closely followed by "I believe they are true news" with 20.5%. Although in the second rank in SB-2022 is "I think they are exaggerated" (14.5%), there appears to be a striking differentiation between SB-2021 and SB-2022. It is understood that the society generally gives more credence to social media news with negative content about Syrians. The decrease from 20.6% to 10.1% in the rate of those who defined the news on social media channels as "provocative" also points to this. In the demographic data, it is understood that especially young people between the ages of 18-24 characterize the news on social media as "true" with 40%, well above the average. There is no doubt that social media has become an area that shapes societies more and more every day and is almost impossible to control, both in Türkiye and around the world. This is likely to become even more influential as the issue of refugees becomes more politicized, particularly during election periods.

SB-2022- TABLE 63: REGARDING THE NEWS ABOUT REFUGEES ON SOCIAL MEDIA, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REFLECTS YOUR OPINION?

Rank		2021		2022	
		#	%	#	%
1	I believe they are true news	462	20,5	784	34,6
2	I think they are exaggerated	190	8,4	329	14,5
3	I think they are politically-motivated	171	7,6	324	14,3
4	I think they are expressing the dangers Türkiye faces	334	14,8	273	12,0
5	I think they are provocative	464	20,6	228	10,1
6	I think Syrians are treated unfairly	26	1,2	17	0,7
7	Other	6	0,3	2	0,1
	No idea/ Don't know	573	25,4	289	12,8
	No response	27	1,2	21	0,9
Total		2253	100,0	2267	100,0

23. Do your children have problems with their Syrian peers at school or in the neighborhood?

The number of Syrian children receiving education in Turkish public schools has reached over 700,000 in recent years. This number indicates that more than 400,000 out of over 1.1 million school-age children are excluded from compulsory education which is in place for Türkiye for 5-17-year-olds. The participation of 700,000 Syrian children in Turkish public schools after 2016 appears to have created some significant challenges in terms of both capacity and social cohesion. Especially in recent years, both Turks and Syrians have frequently reported

problems with “peer bullying” in schools. For this reason, the question “Do your children have problems with their Syrian peers at school or in the neighborhood?” was asked in SB-2022. Excluding those who stated “I do not have children in school” or “There are no Syrian peers at school or in the neighborhood”, of the 1,165 people (51.4% of the total sample), 34.9% stated that there were no problems, while 16.5% stated that they experienced problems. Those living in border cities where the Syrian population is dense and where there are naturally high numbers of Syrian students in schools express this problem with 21.5%.

Both 16.5% in general and 21.5% in border cities point to an important problem. This situation reveals the risk that peer bullying, especially in middle schools, is based on an ethnic basis, and in this context, it has a profoundly negative impact on social cohesion processes.

SB-2022- TABLE 64: DO YOUR CHILDREN HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THEIR SYRIAN PEERS AT SCHOOL OR IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD?

	#	%
No, they don't	791	34,9
Yes, they do	374	16,5
I don't have children in school	712	31,4
There are no Syrian peers at school or in the neighborhood	323	14,2
No response	67	3,0
Total	2267	100,0

SB-2022- TABLO 65: DO YOUR CHILDREN HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THEIR SYRIAN PEERS AT SCHOOL OR IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD? (%)

	No, they don't	Yes, they do	I don't have children in school	There are no Syrian peers at school or in the neighborhood	No response
Border cities	34,4	21,5	34,4	13,7	2,8
Other cities*	35,0	15,4	35,0	14,4	3,0
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	30,5	20,2	30,5	13,8	2,7
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	37,7	12,5	37,7	14,7	3,2
General	34,9	16,5	34,9	14,2	3,0

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

24. What is your most important concern about Syrians?

In order to better understand the concerns of the Turkish society about Syrians and to evaluate them in the context of social cohesion, a new question was asked in SB-2022: “What is your most important concern about Syrians?” It is seen that the Turks who participated in the SB-2022 study gave the answer “them becoming citizens” with a considerably higher rate (37.9%) than the other options. It was followed by “damage to the economy” (13.6%) and “increase in criminality/criminal activities/gangs” (10.5%).

SB-2022- TABLE 66: WHAT IS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN ABOUT SYRIANS?

Rank		#	%
1	Them becoming citizens	859	37,9
2	Damage to the economy	308	13,6
3	Increase in criminality/criminal activities/gangs	238	10,5
4	Disruption in population balances	143	6,3
5	Corruption of our identity	143	6,3
6	Them not leaving Türkiye	136	6,0
7	Them starting a civil war	102	4,5
8	Damage to social life	54	2,4
9	Them taking our jobs away	51	2,2
10	No problems/ No concern	40	1,7
11	Other	15	0,7
	No idea/ Don't know	124	5,5
	No response	54	2,4
Total		2267	100,0

The highest objections to Syrians' citizenship came from men, people aged 65 and over, high school graduates, retired respondents and respondents from places other than border and metropolitan cities.

SB-2022- TABLE 67: WHAT IS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN ABOUT SYRIANS? (%)

	Them becoming citizens	Damage to the economy	Increase in criminality/criminal activities/gangs	Disruption in population balances	Corruption of our identity	Them not leaving Türkiye	Them starting a civil war	Damage to social life	Them taking our jobs away	No problems/No concern	Other	No idea/Don't know	No response
Sex													
Female	37,2	14,8	10,0	6,7	6,0	6,9	4,5	2,2	2,1	1,6	0,5	5,4	2,1
Male	38,6	12,4	11,0	6,0	6,7	5,1	4,5	2,5	2,4	1,9	0,8	5,5	2,6
Age Group													
18-24	39,5	14,8	11,1	6,0	5,1	6,3	5,4	2,6	2,2	1,1	-	3,7	2,2
25-34	36,7	15,0	10,0	6,8	6,8	4,5	4,5	3,1	1,2	1,8	0,8	6,6	2,2
35-44	35,7	13,4	9,4	6,4	5,8	6,8	5,8	3,0	2,8	1,8	0,6	6,2	2,3
45-54	37,7	15,9	12,0	5,6	7,1	4,7	4,4	1,0	2,5	2,0	0,2	3,9	3,0
55-64	38,2	12,0	9,5	6,9	7,3	8,0	1,8	1,8	2,2	2,2	1,8	5,5	2,8
65 +	42,5	7,4	11,4	6,1	5,7	6,9	3,7	2,5	2,9	1,6	0,8	6,9	1,6
Educational Attainment													
Illiterate	32,8	7,8	7,8	10,9	4,6	14,1	1,6	1,6	-	-	1,6	15,6	1,6
Literate	32,1	13,6	4,9	7,4	6,2	7,4	6,2	2,5	8,6	1,2	-	9,9	-
Primary School	37,1	14,9	11,2	4,3	5,1	6,9	4,3	2,2	2,9	2,6	0,2	6,5	1,8
Middle-School	39,5	15,6	8,8	5,0	5,5	6,1	4,6	1,3	2,0	2,0	1,1	5,4	3,1
High-School or equivalent	39,9	13,2	10,7	7,2	5,6	5,3	4,8	2,5	2,1	1,0	0,3	4,3	3,1
University/ Graduate Degree	36,1	11,6	12,5	7,6	9,6	4,7	4,3	3,5	1,2	2,0	1,2	3,9	1,8
Region													
Border cities	33,2	21,8	2,8	7,6	3,8	2,3	3,3	2,5	3,3	0,5	-	14,4	4,5
Other cities*	38,9	11,9	12,1	6,0	6,8	6,8	4,8	2,4	2,0	2,0	0,8	3,6	1,9
Metropolitan cities	38,5	10,0	11,7	9,3	8,8	6,3	3,1	2,8	0,9	2,6	1,0	2,4	2,6
Non-metropolitan cities	39,1	13,0	12,4	4,1	5,6	7,1	5,7	2,1	2,7	1,7	0,7	4,3	1,5
Occupation													
Private sector employee	40,7	13,2	9,2	7,0	7,7	5,0	4,2	2,9	2,2	2,4	0,7	2,8	2,0
Housewife	34,9	16,4	8,9	6,3	4,7	8,9	3,5	2,2	2,5	1,8	0,6	7,5	1,8
Artisan/ Tradesman	39,4	13,3	12,6	5,5	4,1	4,6	5,7	0,9	1,7	1,3	0,9	5,0	5,0
Retired	43,0	8,9	11,0	5,2	7,6	5,5	3,8	2,7	3,1	2,4	1,0	4,1	1,7
Student	39,2	12,8	8,8	8,1	8,1	5,4	5,4	4,7	1,4	-	-	4,7	1,4
Unemployed	32,4	16,6	11,7	4,8	5,5	6,2	4,1	2,8	3,4	1,4	-	9,0	2,1
Public sector employee	28,2	11,8	15,3	7,0	9,4	5,9	7,0	2,4	2,4	-	1,2	8,2	1,2
Self-employed	34,5	15,5	12,1	5,2	6,9	6,9	3,4	3,5	-	1,7	-	10,3	-
Business person**	18,6	14,8	11,1	18,5	14,8	3,7	7,4	-	-	7,4	-	3,7	-
General	37,9	13,6	10,5	6,3	6,3	6,0	4,5	2,4	2,2	1,7	0,7	5,5	2,4

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small numbers.

25. Türkiye's Activities in Syria and Return

After 2016, following Türkiye's operations in Syria, the established areas that are defined by Türkiye as "safe zones" are also considered as places for Syrians in Türkiye to return to their country. Turkish statements indicate as of September 2023 that the number of Syrians who "voluntarily returned" from Türkiye to these regions after 2016 is 550-600,000.⁴⁸ Turkish state officials state that return will also be encouraged through reconstruction activities in the safe zones.⁴⁹ In this context, the answers from the Turkish society to the question "To what extent do you find it right that Türkiye is building houses and providing services such as education, health and infrastructure in Syria to encourage return?" show that this policy is found "wrong" by 55.2% of the respondents. The rate of those who consider this policy right is 32.9%.

Despite the high demand in Turkish society for Syrians to go back to their country, the reasons for the negative attitude towards Türkiye's construction of housing and provision of services such as education, health and infrastructure in the "safe zones" may include their financial cost, the belief that Syrians will not return even if investments are made in that area, and other reasons. In the end, however, this policy does not seem to have aroused much public enthusiasm for the return of Syrians.

SB-2022- TABLE 68: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FIND IT RIGHT THAT TÜRKİYE IS BUILDING HOUSES AND PROVIDING SERVICES SUCH AS EDUCATION, HEALTH AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN SYRIA TO ENCOURAGE RETURN?

	#	%	
Very right	201	8,9	32,9
Right	543	24,0	
Neither wrong, nor right	202	8,9	8,9
Wrong	656	28,9	55,2
Very wrong	597	26,3	
No idea / Don't know	60	2,6	3,0
No response	8	0,4	
Total	2267	100,0	

In terms of demographic findings, it is noteworthy that respondents who approve of this policy are men, those who are middle-aged, highly educated individuals and public sector employees. The highest support on this issue comes from those living in border provinces with 41.8%.

48 Gazete Pencere (September 10th, 2023) Erdoğan announced the number of Syrians returning to their country: "So far, nearly 600 thousand Syrians have returned to their homeland safely, voluntarily and with human dignity," Tayyip Erdoğan said at the international press conference on the G20 Leaders Summit. As our projects are realized, this number will increase even more." <https://www.gazetepencere.com/erdogan-ulkesine-donen-suriyeli-sayisini-acikladi/> Based on its own information, UNHCR provides the number of voluntary returnees as 153,306 as of October 31, 2022. Of this number, 29 thousand returned in 2022. (https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions) (Access: 10.01.2024)

49 Anadolu Agency (19.05.2023) President Erdoğan: We will enable Syrian refugees to return to their country- President Erdoğan said, "We have prepared projects for the construction of housing in Syria for the return of nearly 1 million refugees to their homeland. We will enable the refugees to return to their countries... The infrastructure investments we are currently making there are in a position to accommodate more than that. We have directed the project in that way, we have taken steps in that way and those people will gladly return to their own lands, to their own countries." <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-suriyeli-multecilerin-ulkelerine-donmesini-saglayacagiz/2901446>

SB-2022- TABLE 69: TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FIND IT RIGHT THAT TÜRKIYE IS BUILDING HOUSES AND PROVIDING SERVICES SUCH AS EDUCATION, HEALTH AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN SYRIA TO EN-COURAGE RETURN? (%)

	Very right	Right	Com- bined Right	Neither wrong, nor right	Wrong	Very wrong	Com- bined Wrong	No idea/ No respon- se
Sex								
Female	6,9	24,2	31,1	10,7	28,7	25,2	53,9	4,3
Male	10,8	23,7	34,5	7,2	29,2	27,4	56,6	1,7
Age Group								
18-24	9,1	19,6	28,7	12,2	25,6	30,9	56,5	2,6
25-34	9,4	23,6	33,0	8,6	26,2	28,1	54,3	4,1
35-44	10,8	27,5	38,3	8,0	29,1	21,4	50,5	3,2
45-54	7,8	24,8	32,6	6,4	29,2	29,4	58,6	2,4
55-64	7,6	26,6	34,2	6,9	30,5	27,3	57,8	1,1
65 +	6,5	19,6	26,1	13,1	36,7	20,0	56,7	4,1
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	4,7	23,4	28,1	12,5	21,9	23,4	45,3	14,1
Literate	6,2	21,0	27,2	8,6	30,9	28,4	59,3	4,9
Primary School	8,4	25,0	33,4	10,6	28,3	24,8	53,1	2,9
Middle-School	8,1	25,4	33,5	9,2	34,0	20,2	54,2	3,1
High-School or equivalent	8,7	23,1	31,8	6,6	27,9	31,8	59,7	1,9
University/ Graduate Degree	11,2	23,3	34,5	9,6	26,9	26,3	53,2	2,7
Region								
Border cities	15,7	26,1	41,8	11,4	16,5	25,3	41,8	5,0
Other cities*	7,4	23,5	30,9	8,4	31,6	26,5	58,1	2,6
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	5,0	22,1	27,1	8,1	28,6	34,0	62,6	2,2
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	8,9	24,4	33,3	8,5	33,3	22,1	55,4	2,8
Occupation								
Private sector employee	6,4	23,3	29,7	10,3	31,4	26,6	58,0	2,0
Housewife	6,9	29,6	36,5	10,3	26,0	21,7	47,7	5,5
Artisan/ Tradesman	11,1	25,3	36,4	4,8	30,5	25,5	56,0	2,8
Retired	8,6	19,6	28,2	10,0	32,6	27,5	60,1	1,7
Student	12,2	14,2	26,4	9,4	20,3	41,2	61,5	2,7
Unemployed	13,1	23,4	36,5	9,7	26,2	24,8	51,0	2,8
Public sector employee	8,2	29,4	37,6	9,4	28,3	23,5	51,8	1,2
Self-employed	12,1	17,2	29,3	8,7	31,0	29,3	60,3	1,7
Business person**	11,1	11,1	22,2	7,4	29,6	40,8	70,4	-
Genel	8,9	24,0	32,9	8,9	28,9	26,3	55,2	3,0

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

** Results belong to 27 business people.

Note: The occupation "farmer" is not included due to small num-bers.

26. Have you ever hired/employed Syrians for renovation, construction, house cleaning, etc.?

In order to understand the nature and intensity of the relations between the Turkish society and Syrians, the question "Have you ever hired/employed Syrians for renovation, construction, house cleaning, etc.?" was asked for the first time in SB-2022 and only 10% of the responses were "yes". In the border region, this rate rises to 16.7% and to 15.4% among male respondents. This data reveals that although there are around 1 million actively working Syrians in Türkiye, the Turkish society does not frequently establish a relationship of service provision from Syrians or prefers not to declare it even if it has such a relationship.

SB-2022- TABLE 70: HAVE YOU EVER HIRED/EMPLOYED SYRIANS FOR RENOVATION, CONSTRUCTION, HOUSE CLEANING, ETC.?

	#	%
Yes	227	10,0
No	2028	89,5
No idea/ No response	12	0,5
Total	2267	100,0

27. What do you think is the most important problem of Syrians in Türkiye?

When the Turkish society is asked the question "What do you think is the most important problem of Syrians in Türkiye?", the answer "they have no problems" comes first- by far- with 31.4%. This is followed by "cultural differences" (20%), "harmonization" (13.3%), and "becoming stateless (10%)". 8.8% of the Turkish respondents, in turn, stated that the most important problem of Syrians is "discrimination/marginalization."

SB-2022- TABLE 71: WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE?

Sıra No.		#	%
1	They have no problems	711	31,4
2	Cultural differences	454	20,0
3	Social Cohesion/harmonization/adaptation	301	13,3
4	Becoming stateless	227	10,0
5	Discrimination/Marginalization	200	8,8
6	Not knowing the language	174	7,7
7	Unemployment	132	5,8
8	Other	3	0,1
	No idea/ Don't know	51	2,3
	No response	14	0,6
	Total	2267	100,0

Although women, middle-aged respondents (35-44), illiterates and housewives come to the forefront in the demographic analysis of those who say, "they have no problems", it is noteworthy that those living in border regions are the most supportive of this view with 45.6%, about 15 points above the average of 31.4%.



SYRIANS
BAROMETER
SB- 2022

RESEARCH FINDINGS
and
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

IV. SB-2022 MAIN FINDING AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SB-2022 RESEARCH FINDINGS

The main findings of SB-2022, which were also evaluated in comparison to SB-2017, SB-2019 and SB-2020 studies where relevant, can be summarized as follows:

SB studies try to take an academic picture of the Syrians in Türkiye, which has been increasingly on the agenda of Turkish society and politics since 2011. The highly dynamic nature of the process, the socio-economic and political changes in Türkiye and even in the region, the limitations of academic studies -even the most comprehensive ones- and complications such as the pandemic, earthquakes, elections and so forth make it imperative to remind that the findings do not belong to the whole, but to the situation at the time. Making assessments on this issue has become even more difficult with the politicization and instrumentalization of the process. However, the second main objective of the SB study, after “making a realistic determination”, with the awareness of the new situation and the challenges of compulsory coexistence, is to put forward policy recommendations for a peaceful and dignified future for Turkish society and Syrians living with them, without causing additional social tensions and even conflicts. When large numbers of different social groups live in the same social environment, either deliberately, as in the case of regular migration, or suddenly and unplanned, as in the case of forced migration, it is vital that the “hosts” and the “newcomers” live together in “harmony”. While the “risk” of social cohesion policies for encouraging the permanence of newcomers is well known, if voluntary or forced coexistence has become inevitable, it is clear that these policies are investments in the peaceful society of the future, or even a soft security approach in this context. SB studies can be characterized as an academic effort to contribute to the efforts on the peaceful, secure, and prosperous future of Turkish society by revealing the real picture.

SB studies include both standard questions to track trends and also try to understand developments in some issues related to the period with questions added from time to time. In this context, systematically conducted SB studies, the present one being the 5th, (if the 2014 study is taken into account 6th) have become an important source for both Turkish society and Syrians to access and evaluate data to analyze where the process is going. The findings emerging from the SB-2022 study should be evaluated as “general” and “specific” findings.

2. General Findings:

The SB-2022 study faced two major obstacles. Due to the earthquakes on February 6, 2023, the fieldwork was conducted only on the data from the survey and FGDs conducted with the Turkish community, as the survey and FGDs with Syrians could not be completed. Therefore, the principle of simultaneous surveys with two communities in SB studies was exceptionally not realized in this study. Despite this, however, the findings obtained are considered to be valuable in terms of understanding the “acceptance level of the host community”, which is the main determinant of the social cohesion processes. The second major obstacle to the SB-2022 study stemmed from the political atmosphere of the Presidential and General Elections in Türkiye. The debate on Syrians in Türkiye, and specifically on “return/repatriation of Syrians”, has become a more popular and political issue than ever before, and this has been prominently reflected in the survey and FGDs conducted with the Turkish society.

The general and data-based findings obtained within the framework of the SB-2022 survey and FGDs conducted with the Turkish society can be summarized as follows:

- Turkish society’s initial high level of social acceptance of Syrians became “fragile” over time and then turned more into “tolerance/endurance” than “acceptance”. The outlook of social acceptance in SB-2022 reveals a process in which even tolerance/endurance is weakening, and rejection is becoming stronger. It is thought that the negative course of this process is due to the decline in Turkish society’s expectations that Syrians will go back, a serious influx of irregular migrants into Türkiye, the emergence of joint but parallel social lives in urban areas, economic problems and the fact that the issue of “refugees” labeled with Syrians has become an important and popular issue in politics.
- Another indicator of the reactions of the Turkish society towards Syrians emerged both in the survey and especially in the FGDs. Participation in an academic study on Syrians was generally rejected by Turks who only said, *“let them go/they should be sent away, there is no need to talk about anything else”*. In this process where it was very difficult to find participants for the FGDs, most of the participants displayed a very categorical-negative attitude towards Syrians. Respondents’ main complaints and concerns were not only about Syrians, but also about administrative processes that were perceived to be poorly managed or not managed at all.
- More strongly than in any other SB study, Turkish society thinks that Syrians will be permanent, believes that they will not return voluntarily, views this with concern, does not show the will to live together and, as a result, tends to reject the vision of a common future to a great extent.
- **In SB-2022, the demand and expectation of the Turkish society is for Syrians to leave/be sent away from Türkiye, with 88.5% which is the highest among all SBs.** The previously observed demand of the Turkish society that “they should be sent to safe zones” is changing to “they should be sent back to Syria”. In other words, Turkish society does not care whether Syrians are sent to “safe zones” or to places outside “safe zones”.
- When the views expressed by the Turkish society in the SB study are tested with demographic variables such as sex, age, education level, and occupation, generally no significant changes are observed. Among all categories, **the most serious distinction is observed between citizens living in the border region and those living in other regions. However, compared to the previous SB studies, the regional balance also differed in SB-2021 and SB-2022, and the reactions of Turks living in metropolitan cities**

towards Syrians became harsher than the reactions in the border region cities with dense Syrian populations. This can be explained by the politicization of the process and the fact that discourses of demographic and cultural transformation have gained more traction in urban metropolitan areas.

- **The process regarding Syrians in Türkiye is rapidly becoming politicized:** The issue of Syrians and other refugees in Türkiye is becoming highly politicized. As with all aspects of society, human mobility, whether in the form of migration or asylum, cannot be considered independent of politics. As is well known, the issue of human mobility, and migration (economic migration) in particular, is perceived as an instrument of economic development policy. Victims of forced migration, i.e., asylum seekers and refugees, in turn, are usually dealt with in connection with security and politics. It is inevitable that this issue, which is becoming increasingly more prominent in the daily life of Turkish society, is also climbing up in its political agenda. In this context, it can even be said that the politicization of the issue came rather late. It has been observed that until the last few years, Turkish society has kept this issue in the background and has not reflected it in its political preferences.
- **The transformation of the process into a political instrument has been particularly evident in the last two to three years.** This can be attributed to the fact that almost all Syrians, numbering over 3.5 million, live together with the Turkish society in urban areas, the strengthening perceptions in the Turkish society that Syrians will not be able to return to their country, the economic problems exacerbated by the pandemic, the 2023 election process in Türkiye and the growing political style that is dominated by populism. It is clear that in the creation of a more serious sensitivity regarding this process in the last two years, the rising numbers of and confidence-breaking scenes including irregular migrants, especially Afghans and Pakistanis, have been effective.
- No effective and credible communication strategy has been developed to address Turkish society's concerns about the very high numbers of refugees and irregular migrants, most of which stem from perceptions rather than experiences. **The concerns and reactions of the society, which are not taken seriously enough, seem to have opened a very useful space especially for populist politicians.** In other words, the issue of Syrians has become one of the most important political debates in Türkiye due to the failure to take the concerns and anxieties of the Turkish society seriously enough and a similar failure to come up with satisfactory policies and especially a credible and convincing communication strategy towards them.
- The period leading up to the Presidential and General Elections held in May 2023 played an important role in further politicization of the issue, which was also reflected in the findings of the SB-2022. The opposition parties' criticism of the government for its general policies and practices on refugees, taking into account the concerns of the society, has received a significant response from the society. It can even be said that these debates have had a certain impact among the supporters of the ruling party. The fact that Turkish society considers Syrians and irregular migrants, who are described as "flooding into Türkiye to invade", among the three most important problems of Türkiye has been effective in the opposition's paying more attention to the issue.
- As is well known, social cohesion processes have three main pillars. The first is the state/public sphere, the second is the Turkish society, and the third is the newcomers, in the Turkish context, Syrians. Although it is the state/public actors that determine and implement the policy, social cohesion cannot take place without a certain level of acceptance from the host

community (Turkish society). For social cohesion process, it is clear that Turkish society is far away from accepting and internalizing a common life with Syrians. Despite the fact that more than 90% of Turkish society says that “more than half of the Syrians will stay”, they approach the vision of living together with Syrians with great concern and even reject it. This will make social cohesion processes more difficult together with the effect of the politicization of the issue. In other words, the Turkish society’s high level of anxiety towards Syrians, their social distance and the politicization of the process limit and complicate the quantitative and qualitative development of relations and the social cohesion processes in general.

- As a result of the politicization of the process and the reactions from the society on both Syrians and irregular migrants, the policy put forward by the administration is basically described as “combating irregular migration”. However, this situation causes the society to see Syrians and other refugees who have been granted temporary protection or international protection by the Turkish State and irregular migrants who entered the country illegally as the same. It should be emphasized that this is a particular challenge for integration process of Syrians in Türkiye.
- The problems caused by the lack of an initial settlement policy for Syrians in Türkiye and the continuation of the process with a chain migration reflex have begun to manifest themselves. The uneven distribution of Syrians across provinces, districts and even neighborhoods has made process management difficult and has led to ghettoization. It is not yet known what impact the “Combating Spatial Concentration (Sparsification) Project” implemented by the Ministry of Interior in February 2022 will have on this issue. However, it is unlikely that this project will yield results that will sufficiently address public concerns.
- **Although there is a high level of concern about Syrians in all areas, a striking change is observed in the demographic analysis of the SB data indicating that concerns are growing to a larger extent among people living in metropolitan cities than among people in border regions.** Until SB-2021, it was observed that those living with a large Syrian population in areas bordering Syria were highly anxious in all areas, much higher than the Türkiye average. In addition to those living in metropolitan areas, high levels of anxiety are also observed among students and those in the 18-24 age group.
- The COVID-19 pandemic, declared by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020, has led to an important experience in terms of both social cohesion and health services. It is observed that the impact of the **pandemic** has “filed down” or “postponed” the concerns and anxieties of the Turkish society towards Syrians to some extent, especially in 2020, but in SB-2021 and especially SB-2022, with the decrease in the impact of the pandemic, economic problems and the politicization of the process, the discomforts are expressed with renewed strength. It is thought that the economic problems in Türkiye during this period were also effective in intensifying the reactions.
- It is understood that the issue in which the Turkish society is most uncomfortable with regarding Syrians is the citizenship policy. Citizenship, which is normally defined as the last and positive stage of the harmonization process, seems to have made Turkish society’s attitude towards Syrians even more negative. The most important reason for this seems to be that the “exceptional citizenship” process granted to Syrians is not transparent and the society is not sufficiently informed about this issue.
- The SB researchs show that the Turkish community’s high level of anxiety is often rooted in perceptions, not experiences. Turkish society needs to be regularly and accurately - albeit this sometimes being an uncomfortable situation - informed about refugees. An accurate, regular and reliable communication strategy is also a serious need for social cohesion policies.

3. SB-2022 Specific Survey and FGD Findings:

Syrians live together with Turkish society, especially in urban areas. The total rate of respondents who answered, “yes there are”, “yes there are a few” or “yes there are a lot” to the question “Are there any Syrians in the neighborhood/district/region where you live?”, which is an “awareness” question, is around 80% in all four SB studies. In SB-2022, this figure reached the highest level of 84.2%.

There have been changes in Turkish society’s perception/definition of Syrians, with concepts that emphasize anxieties and concerns coming to the fore. Turkish society, which for a long-time defined Syrians as “oppressed people, victims, people fleeing from war and persecution”, has in recent years preferred to define Syrians with the expressions of “concern” and “threat”. While in the previous studies the Turkish society defined Syrians primarily as “people fleeing from war and persecution”, a significant transformation was observed in SB-2021 and SB-2022. In SB-2022, while the first preference of the Turkish society when defining Syrians is “people who are burdens on us” with 51.6%, the second preference is “dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future” with 38% and the third preference is “people who did not protect their country” with 33.4%. The definition of “victims who escaped persecution/war” ranks fourth with 30.2% in SB-2022. The perception of Syrians as “people exploited as cheap labor” in Turkish society is also found between 12.8% and 17.7% in the five SB studies. This rate is 15.8% in SB-2022.

Findings on the perception of cultural similarity in social cohesion processes, which is an important part of SB studies, reveal that Turkish society decisively distances itself from Syrians both socially and culturally. Although the political language emphasizes “religious fraternity”, “good neighborliness”, “common history”, and so forth, it is understood that these increasingly do not resonate with the people, who even reactively “reject” them. In SB-2022, the sum of those who answered, “not similar at all” and “not similar” to the question “To what extent do you think Syrians in Türkiye are culturally similar to us?” is 84.3%, which is quite high. In fact, despite the political discourse, it is understood that Turkish society has had a very clear perception on this issue from the very beginning and does not see Syrians as culturally of “their own”, and that this perception has been getting stronger every year. However, an interesting finding regarding this question emerges for Turkish citizens that live in “border cities”. Although this group, which consists of the cities bordering Syria or connected to the border region, actually has very close characteristics to the Syrians in terms of language, religion, ethnic origin, traditions, culture, and so forth, with Arabic being widely spoken in everyday life in some places, the rate of those who say “we are not culturally similar to Syrians” is 78.5% in these provinces (the Türkiye average is 84.3%). It is surprising that the gap is so low (and in some years even above the national average).

It is noteworthy that the tendency of the Turkish society to provide in-kind/cash assistance to Syrians has decreased over the years. In response to the question “Have you ever provided in-kind or cash assistance to Syrians (other than giving money to beggars)?”, which aims to understand whether Turkish society **actively provide support to Syrians**, 34.1% answered “yes” in SB-2019, while this rate reached 40.5% in SB-2020, with a slight decrease to 39.6% in SB-2021, and with a more significant decrease to 33.9% in SB-2022. For the first time in the last three SB surveys, the answer “I did not want to give support” ranked first with 32.5% in the responses to the question “Why haven’t you provided any support to Syrians in the past year?”.

The findings of the SB studies on interactions / communication with Syrians reveal that Turkish society's social relations with Syrians have decreased in almost every field. Despite the fact that Syrians share more common spaces with Turkish society, speak Turkish, albeit to a limited extent, send their children to Turkish public schools and participate in business life, the fact that social relations remain so limited and even diminish points to the problems to be experienced in terms of social cohesion processes.

The findings on "social distance", which was tried to be understood with the question "Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements in terms of reflecting your feelings about Syrians" posing ten different statements, show that the very high level of social distance of the Turkish society towards Syrians reached its highest level (-0.56) in SB-2022, especially among Turks living in metropolitan cities. The social distance score among Syrians, which was +0.71 in SB-2017, decreased to +0.55 in SB-2021. When the details of the social distance findings are examined, it is understood that the issue of coexistence in the education/school environment (*"it wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children"*) is accepted at the highest level in both SB-2021 and SB-2022. However, even this acceptance dropped radically from 41.3% in SB-2021 to 24.5% in SB-2022. This is followed by "working in the same workplace" with a Syrian, albeit with a decreasing trend. Overall, when SB-2021 and SB-2022 rates are compared, it is observed that the distance has increased in all fields.

In studies on social cohesion, it is often recognized that a significant part of the host community's objection to newcomers stems from the "financial burdens" created or believed to be created by the newcomers. In order to determine the perception on the **financial burden of Syrians in Türkiye**, the question "How are the Syrians in Türkiye making their living?" was posed using the "multiple response" technique and the answers show that more than 80% of the society (SB-2017: 86.2%, SB-2019: 84.5%, SB-2020: 80.6%, SB-2021: 82.5%, SB-2022: 81.5%) believe that Syrians live "through the assistance from the Turkish state". However, in SB-2021, the rate of those who said "by working" rose to the second place for the first time with 64.2%, and in SB-2022, although with a slight decrease, it maintained its second rank with 52.6%. According to SB studies, although Turkish society believes that Syrians live with the support of the Turkish state by far, they are also increasingly aware of the fact that Syrians also work.

SB studies show that concerns about Syrians in Turkish society have steadily increased in almost all areas. When average anxiety levels are evaluated out of 5, it was 3.2 in SB-2017, 3.6 in SB-2019, 3.5 in SB-2020, 3.5 in SB-2021, and, at its highest level, 3.8 in SB-2022. All these figures point to an already quite high-level of concern that should not be ignored. This has also been effective in the politicization of the process. The concerns and reactions of the society, which are not taken seriously enough, seem to have opened a very useful political space.

In SB-2022, just like in SB-2020, the most serious concern/anxiety in the Turkish society about Syrians is "Syrians becoming citizens" with 84% (score equivalent 4.1). The statement that has been at the top or second place in the SB studies since the beginning is the proposition that *"they will harm the economy of our country"*. In SB-2022, the support for this is 76.8% and the score value is 3.9. The statement *"I think that Syrians will harm Türkiye's social-cultural structure"* ranks third with 76.3% and the score of 3.8. The concern about "demographic change and identity deterioration" (*"I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish*

society's identity"), which has been on the agenda frequently in the last two years in Türkiye, is also represented at a high rate of 76.1% (score: 3.8). Based on these findings, it can be said that Turkish society's anxieties about Syrians are essentially related to identity concerns. In other words, Turkish society has more abstract concerns than concrete and actual or imminent ones like "job losses" or "increased crime rates".

There is no significant relationship between having actually suffered "personal harm" from Syrians and concerns, and it is understood that perceptions come to the fore rather than personal experiences and concrete problems. In order to observe the relationship between concerns about Syrians and "personal harm", Turkish society is asked whether they, their families or their personal environment have suffered any harm by Syrians. In the SB-2022 survey, the rate of those who stated that they had been personally harmed by Syrians in the last 5 years was 13.8%. This rate was 9.4% in SB-2017, 13.7% in SB-2019, 11.4% in SB-2020, and 11.7% in SB-2021. As in SB-2021, in SB-2022, the responses of those who stated that they, their families or relatives have been harmed by Syrians in the last five years reveal that "bullying/harassment", "violence", "theft" and "unrest/noise" come to the forefront.

The concerns of "losing one's job" or "having to work for lower wages", which are the primary concerns in the host community during mass human mobilities, appear to be much less prioritized by the Turkish society. It can be suggested that this is related to the experience and that the expected negative scenarios in this regard have not been actualized to the extent that would worry the society. The rate of respondents who answered, "Under no circumstances should they be given work permits" to the question "*What kind of regulation should be made regarding the work of Syrians in Türkiye?*", i.e., those who oppose working of Syrians, increased by more than 8 points to 51.6% in SB-2022 compared to SB-2021. *Despite this*, concern about job loss ranks very low in the list of concerns about Syrians in Turkish society. Among the responses for the question "**Under which conditions should Syrians be able to open workplaces?**", the answer "they definitely shouldn't" received support from 54.6% in SB-2017, 67.2% in SB-2019, 55.5% in SB-2020, 54.2% in SB-2021, and 70.5% in SB-2022. This is much stronger than their refusal to grant working rights. It can be said that the economic problems and the politicization of the process play an important role in the background here, as well as the "rejection of permanence".

The response of the Turkish society to the question "where should Syrians live?" as "they should be sent back to their country" has increased to a record high of 88.5% in SB-2022 since the beginning of the SB studies. What is more striking is that the option "they should be sent to safe zones", which was the primary demand of the Turkish society in SB-2017 and SB-2019, has fallen to second place since SB-2020 (SB-2017: 37.4%, SB-2019: 44.8%, SB-2020: 32.5%; SB-2021: 32.3%, SB-2022: 30%) and the option "they should definitely be sent back" has increased phenomenally (2017: 11.5%, 2019: 25%, SB-2020: 48%, SB-2021: 49.7%, SB-2022: 58.5%). The clear finding from the SB studies is that the main desire of the Turkish society is for Syrians to leave Türkiye. In other words, the findings of the SB studies seem to suggest that Turkish society is not ready and willing to live together with Syrians. It cannot be expected for such a high level of demand to not become a political issue. However, due to fundamental human rights, international and national legislation on refugees, the current situation in Syria, the sociological changes that took place and so forth, the expectation of the Turkish society regarding repatriation of Syrians is unlikely to be realized.

Although Turkish society is demanding the return of Syrians to their country, they do not seem to be very hopeful about their return. As the perception that Syrians will become permanent grows stronger, it is observed that concerns, pessimism and objections increase in the attitude of the Turkish society towards Syrians. In 2014, when there were just 1.6 million Syrians in Türkiye, the survey found that 45,1% of Turkish respondents reported believing that all Syrians in the country will return. However, after 2017, it is observed that the perception in the society has changed drastically. In other words, since 2020, more than 80% of the Turkish society thinks that all or most of the Syrians will stay in Türkiye.

The responses provided for the question “To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Türkiye?” show that the Turkish society is quite dissatisfied about the issue of Syrians’ social cohesion/harmonization. In SB-2022, while a combined rate of 12.2% of the respondents believe that Syrians have “completely or to a large extent integrated”, the rate of those who suggest that they integrated “only to a little extent or none at all” is 77.1%. Remarkably, Turkish society finds the Syrians’ social cohesion processes less and less “successful” every year. In other words, although the duration of cohabitation extends, the Turkish society’s perception that Syrians are not integrating gets stronger.

According to Turkish society, Syrians are among the top three most important problems in Türkiye. As in every society, it is natural for the Turkish society to have problems sometimes constantly and sometimes periodically. It can be said that in recent years, Turkish society has been dealing with problems in many areas such as fight against terrorism, economy, employment, social tension, foreign policy, etc. In the SB research, with the question “Among the top 10 problems of Türkiye, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?”, which has been asked since SB-2019, it was tried to explain to what extent the Turkish society sees Syrians as a problem and where they rank them among the problems. In the SB-2019 study, the sum of those who considered Syrians as Türkiye’s “most important”, “second most important” and “third most important” problem exceeded 60%. It is also observed that further politicization of the issue in 2022 turned it into a problem area which is a priority for the Turkish society.

According to the SB studies, Syrians getting citizenship is the most serious concern of the Turkish society about them. While the SB surveys indicate that around 90% of Turkish society believe that at least half of the Syrians will stay in the country permanently, when asked the question “What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding giving Syrians Turkish citizenship?”, the rate of those who say “none of them should be given citizenship” is very high. When asked this question and given the chance to provide multiple responses, 75.9% of the respondents suggested “none of them should be given citizenship” in SB-2022 (SB-2017: 75.8%; SB-2019: 76.5%; SB-2020: 71.8%; SB-2021: 67.9%). In order to better understand the concerns of the Turkish society about Syrians and to evaluate them in the context of social cohesion, a new question was asked in SB-2022: “What is your most important concern about Syrians?” It is seen that the Turks who participated in the SB-2022 study gave the answer “them becoming citizens” with a considerably higher rate (37.9%) than the other options. It was followed by “damage to the economy” (13.6%) and “increase in criminality/criminal activities/gangs” (10.5%).

Independently from whether Syrians will be permanent in Türkiye, access to education for school-age Syrian children under temporary protection should be considered as an important priority. However, in addition to the capacity problems in this regard, the change in the attitude of the Turkish society towards Syrians’ education

is noteworthy. The survey respondents were asked the question *“What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children?”* The rate of respondents who suggested *“They should be able to benefit from all kinds of education rights”* was 9.5% in SB-2017, and 6% in SB-2019. Then there was a significant increase in SB-2020, where this rate rose to 29.9% and remained almost same in SB-2021 (29.3%). In SB-2022, it scored a more significant decrease to become 24.7%. While the support for the statement *“they shouldn’t be able to receive any education”* in Turkish society was 25.7% in SB-2017, 16.7% in SB-2019, 16.9% in SB-2020, and 14.4% in SB-2021, this proposition rose to the second place in the ranking with 21.7% in SB-2022.

Both Turks and Syrians have frequently reported problems with “peer bullying” in schools. For this reason, the question *“Do your children have problems with their Syrian peers at school or in the neighborhood?”* was asked in SB-2022. Among Turks who have Syrian children in the same school with their own children, 16.5% mention that there are problems. Those living in border cities where the Syrian population is dense and where there are naturally high numbers of Syrian students in schools express this problem with 21.5%. This situation reveals the risk that peer bullying, especially in middle schools, is based on an ethnic basis, and in this context, it has a profoundly negative impact on social cohesion processes.

Turkish society is highly critical of the government’s policies regarding Syrians. While the rate of those who found the government’s policies *“very wrong”* and *“wrong”* was 62.4% in SB-2017, this was 73% in SB-2019, 70.3 in SB-2020, 69.3% in SB-2021, and 80.2% in SB-2022. In SB-2022, the rate of those who found the government’s policies *“very wrong”* increased to 49.5%.

The reconstruction activities carried out by Türkiye in the safe zones within the framework of its return policies are not sufficiently supported by the Turkish society. The answers from the Turkish society to the question *“To what extent do you find it right that Türkiye is building houses and providing services such as education, health and infrastructure in Syria to encourage return?”* show that this policy is found *“wrong”* by 55.2% of the respondents. The rate of those who consider this policy right is 32.9%. Turkish state officials state that return will also be encouraged through reconstruction activities in the safe zones.

According to Turkish society, the most important problem of Syrians in Türkiye is that “they have no problems”. This statement, which was suggested by 31.4% of the respondents, was followed by *“cultural differences”* (20%), *“harmonization”* (13.3%), and *“becoming stateless”* (10%). 8.8% of the Turkish respondents, in turn, stated that the most important problem of Syrians is *“discrimination/marginalization”*. The highest support for the view that Syrians *“have no problems”* comes from those living in border provinces with 45.6%.



SYRIANS
BAROMETER
SB- 2022

**POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS**

V. SB-2022: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Syrian Barometer study aims to take a scientific snapshot on Syrian refugees, who caused what can be termed “*a social shock*” in Turkish history due to its development, volume and duration. Based on this snapshot, the team that conducted the study draws policy recommendations based on the research findings, their own knowledge, experience, and insights. The policy recommendations in this study reflect only the views of the SB academic team. It should be noted that the views expressed in this context are not the views of the institutions of the Republic of Türkiye or the UN agencies, in particular the UNHCR, and that these views may even differ from the policies and practices of the aforementioned institutions from time to time.

Since the SB-2022 study had to be conducted only with the Turkish society due to the earthquake disaster, the views on Syrians were based on previous SB studies and other studies conducted by the SB team and other experts.

The future of Syrians in Türkiye is going through an extremely dynamic but at the same time ambiguous process. Although Turkish society believes that the majority of Syrians will remain in Türkiye and does not consider the voluntary return of Syrians to be very realistic, they continue to express their desire/wish for their return in a loud tone. Although this demand is evident, it does not seem meaningful to make very clear predictions about what will happen in the near and medium term regarding the return of Syrians or their departure to other countries. The situation has become even more complicated in Türkiye in recent years with the politicization of the process. However, while Turkish society’s concerns and objections are clear, international migration trends, the situation in Syria, and the fact that Syrians have been sending their children to Turkish public schools and building their lives over the last 11 years suggest that Syrians would not be very interested in “voluntarily returning”. This situation is similar in Lebanon, Jordan and other European countries where Syrians are residing. It is clear that when the harmonization efforts on Syrians in Türkiye is influenced by political discussions such as elections, administrative changes or similar political debates, and when such work is suspended, it is similar to going back to the beginning of the process. For this reason, these periodic ruptures in harmonization efforts, which are basically carried out to prevent damage to social peace, bring risks in themselves. The risk of serious social costs must be kept in mind. Since it is highly likely that, even if their numbers decrease or some of them return, more than a million Syrians will remain in Türkiye, then it is clear that both Turkish society and Syrians need to prepare for this common life.

It can be said that social cohesion efforts have two important objectives. The first is to improve the opportunities for self-development and dignified living for the newcomers, thereby increasing their contribution to themselves and society. The second objective is usually based on the reflex of states to preserve social peace.⁵⁰ In this context, it can be said that the

⁵⁰ The state’s approach to harmonization is set out in Article 96 of the LFIP and the 11th-12th Development Plans as follows:

LFIP Article 96 “...to the extent that Türkiye’s economic and financial capacity deems possible, plan for harmonization activities in order to facilitate mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants and international protection beneficiaries and the society as well as to equip them with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Türkiye or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country. For these purposes, the Directorate General may seek the suggestions and contributions of public institutions and agencies, local governments, non-governmental organisations, universities and international organisations. (2) Foreigners may attend courses where the basics of political structure, language, legal system, culture and history of Türkiye as well as their rights and obligations are explained. (3) The Directorate General shall promote the courses related to access to public and private goods and services, access to education and economic activities, social and cultural communications, and access to primary healthcare services and, awareness and information activities through distant learning and similar means in cooperation with public institutions and agencies and non-governmental organisations. (<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm>)

harmonization efforts structured by the state are planned and implemented not for the “new-comers”, but -with a “soft security” motivation- for the serenity of the host community and to encourage additional contribution of the newcomers to the society.

While the findings of the SB studies reveal, on the one hand, the concerns of the Turkish society and its strong demand for Syrians to leave Türkiye, on the other hand, experiences and the natural course of life give serious indications about the permanence of Syrians in Türkiye. It is imperative to take into account the social shock, widespread concerns and the tension caused by the politicization of the process in a process where the number of refugees, which was 58,000 in 2011, has suddenly reached millions, in addition to which irregular migration movements have intensified. Therefore, the SB studies indicate that the issue of Syrians in Türkiye must be taken seriously and necessary measures must be taken in a timely manner in terms of social cohesion and a peaceful and prosperous future. Otherwise, it predicts that the “social shock” may turn into trauma and become chronic, leading to serious multidimensional risks such as social rupture and tensions and even “parallel social structures”. This academic foresight also makes it necessary to stay away from the “*let them go/let them stay*” debates that dominate populist discourses.

In SB studies, “social cohesion” is used not in a hierarchical and ideologically-biased way, but is meant to refer to “an honorable life together in peace and serenity” that would be established by a rights- and individual-oriented approach. This study in general defines social cohesion as “*the way of life in which different communities, whether those who came together voluntarily or involuntarily, could live in peace and harmony on a common ground of belonging where pluralism is embraced in a framework of mutual acceptance and respect.*”

In SB-2021 and especially in SB-2022, it is understood that Turkish society’s views, concerns and demands regarding Syrians have reached a much higher level than in previous SB studies. The most important reasons for this change can be said to include the politicization of the issue of Syrians in Türkiye and the popularization of the issue during the election process, the irregular migrant influx being frequently on the agenda and the negative developments in the economy. The “anxiety” and “endurance” based approach in Turkish society seems to be the most important factor determining the findings in SB-2022 as in SB-2021.

The policy recommendations below have been developed by evaluating the findings of the SB-2022 studies together with the findings of SB-2017, SB-2019, SB-2020 and SB-2021.

- ***THE HIGH LEVEL OF ANXIETIES/CONCERNS OF THE TURKISH SOCIETY - WHETHER CAUSED BY EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS OR PREDICTIONS - SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND SATISFACTORY EXPLANATIONS AND POLICIES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO ADDRESS THEM:***

Since 2011, Turkish society has been hosting one of the most significant human mobilities

Republic of Türkiye 12th Development Plan, (unofficial translation from p. 204):

Art.816: Harmonization of foreigners in Türkiye into social, economic and cultural life will be supported”, Art.816-1: Non-formal education programs such as Turkish language training will be organized, communication and awareness-raising activities will be carried out to ensure the harmonization of migrants to social and cultural life.” https://onikinciplan.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/On-ikinci-Kalkinma-Plani_2024-2028.pdf.

Republic of Türkiye 11th Development Plan,

“Art. 661.2. The institutional structure of migration management will be strengthened to enhance the integration of foreigners in our country to social and economic life.”, Art. 662.2. “The adaptation of people under temporary and international protection into social life will be improved through Turkish language skills development.” (https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Eleventh_Development_Plan_2019-2023.pdf)

in the history of the world, without any preparation. Over the past 12 years, the Turkish society has shown a high level of solidarity and acceptance, but in recent years there have been increasing levels of concerns. The weakening of the belief that Syrians, who number around 3.5 million, will return, the physical proximity of Syrians living with Turkish society in urban centers, the unsatisfactory communication strategy, the economic difficulties of the country and the perception of “lack of control” and “inability to manage” triggered by irregular migrants play an important role in these concerns. Reasons for public concern may not always be based on factual information. Ultimately, however, the presence in Türkiye of an incomparably higher number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants than in 2011 provides understandable grounds for concern. Failing to take the public’s concerns seriously, downplaying them, and failing to provide satisfactory responses both increases public anxiety and paves the way for populist political formations that instrumentalize the process for short-term political interests.

The issue of Syrian refugees living in Türkiye is not a regulated, foreseen, or planned migration process. Due to the nature of the open-door policy and forced migration, Turkish society had to live together with millions of Syrians in a very short time. This situation, in which process management is also very difficult, has also created concerns in the society such as “losing a job”, “increasing crime rates”, “deterioration of public services” from the very beginning. On the other hand, it is known that those managing the process in Türkiye have tried to respond to public concerns with a “vision” that the process is “temporary” and emotional discourses such as “solidarity of brotherhood”. This approach does not sufficiently address the concerns of the society. The political space opened up by social concerns that are not taken seriously has precisely allowed for a politics based on populist and, more specifically, “send the Syrians back” discourses. Those responsible for process management should take the concerns of the public seriously and provide the public with reliable information on a regular and continuous basis. If the concerns of the public are not taken seriously, and if explanations and policies are not implemented to convince the public, the potential for the issue to be quickly instrumentalized in a populist manner and for tensions to increase is very high.

- ***IT IS NATURAL THAT THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TÜRKİYE BECOMES A POLITICAL ISSUE, ENGAGING ALL POLITICAL PARTIES ON THIS ISSUE CAN REDUCE THE ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES TO RATIONAL DEBATE AND SOLUTIONS CREATED BY POPULIST POLITICAL APPROACHES THAT PRIORITIZE SHORT-TERM INTERESTS.***

At the end of the 12 years that have passed, the issue of Syrians in Türkiye is a matter of political interest, which is understandable and can even be described as belated. Politics is the place for discussing and solving every social issue. In this context, it can even be criticized that the issue of Syrian refugees remained out of the political agenda for a long time. However, the problem here is not the politicization of the issue. Because in a matter that concerns the society so closely, it is inevitable that politics, that is, the institution responsible for a solution, come into play. However, the instrumentalization of the issue through politics creates an extremely uncontrolled populist ground that will bring additional problems. In other words, in Türkiye, it is not the discussion of the issue and solutions that is important, but the nature of the discussion. Recently, it has been observed that the rhetoric of “sending Syrians back to Syria” has found a response in the society, and this has led to expectations that it will be effective in the election process. The main problem here is the discrepancy between the expectations created by populist discourses and sociological and political realities. Political institutions or leaders who govern or aspire to govern the country should consider not only their short-term interests but also the country’s medium and long-term needs, and should offer

realistic solutions to the society instead of emotional rhetoric, whether positive or negative. The social and political cost calculations of this dynamic, multi-dimensional and multi-actor process should be taken into account. Political institutions or leaders need to take into account the risks that their promises, which are mostly short-term in nature, may exacerbate tensions in the society and negatively affect Syrians' feelings towards Turkish society and the state.

- ***ALTHOUGH THE SOCIOLOGICAL REALITY OF SYRIANS AT THE END OF 12 YEARS IS NOT PLEASING FOR THE TURKISH SOCIETY, THE POSSIBILITY OF SYRIANS STAYING IN TÜRKİYE IS STRENGTHENING. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ISSUES OF "PERMANENCE AND LOCAL INTEGRATION", "VOLUNTARY RETURN" AND "RESETTLEMENT" SHOULD BE WORKED ON TOGETHER.***

The process that started with the arrival of asylum-seekers from Syria on April 29, 2011 has been met with the perception of "temporariness" and policies that were mainly based on emotional discourses for a long time. However, it appears that Turkish society's view of Syrian asylum-seekers, Syrians' life practices and their future perspectives about themselves have undergone significant changes in the process. As of the end of 2022, Syrians, numbering more than 3.5 million, live all over Türkiye, mostly in urban areas, and make their presence felt in all areas of life. **The Syrians policy**, which was planned to be built in line with the transformation in Syria since the beginning of the process, **will need to be reconsidered, taking into account both the sociological realities that have developed over the past 12 years and the fact that peace and stability in Syria is very difficult to achieve in the near and medium term.** Considering the time that has passed and the potential conflict environment created by the presence of different power centers in Syria, it can be said that the political changes that will take place in Syria from now on will have less impact on the decisions of Syrians in Türkiye. The Syria of 2022 has evolved into a situation that is beyond the current government in Syria, where there are many different power centers. Although a political solution is the general expectation, in the sociological context, the end of the war and stabilization in Syria and the return of Syrians in Türkiye are two issues that are becoming more and more distant from each other. It is therefore clear that more realistic policies are needed. If policies are based on "**temporariness**" and short-term "**problem solving**", the risk of serious social costs for both Syrians and Turkish society should be taken into account. For all these reasons, all three of UNHCR's durable solutions⁵¹ - voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration - need to be worked together. The simultaneous consideration of "local integration", one of UNHCR's durable solutions, during temporary protection is valuable both in terms of the priorities of countries providing temporary protection and in developing a holistic approach to the needs of persons under temporary protection for all stakeholders involved in social cohesion processes, especially public institutions and organizations. These recommendations are complementary to each other and support the facilitation and prioritization of transitions from social assistance to employment-oriented processes in social cohesion processes.

- ***IN ADDITION TO "TEMPORARY PROTECTION" STATUS, OTHER ALTERNATIVE STATUSES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FOR SYRIANS THAT HAVE A 10-YEAR PAST:***

A re-evaluation of the "**Temporary Protection Status**" of Syrians needs to be discussed

⁵¹ UNHCR: Durable Solutions, The Ultimate Goal: *While UNHCR's primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees, our ultimate goal is to help find durable solutions that will allow them to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace. There are three solutions open to refugees where UNHCR can help: voluntary repatriation; local integration; or resettlement to a third country in situations where it is impossible for a person to go back home or remain in the host country.* (UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/the-ultimate-goal/>.) (Access: 11.08.2022)

as their average duration of stay in Türkiye has exceeded 6.5-7 years, especially because their tendencies to return are decreasing continually and this status has a 10-year past. Although the relevant regulation mentions other status possibilities and opportunities (residence or international protection) when temporary protection ends, the evaluation of alternative statuses to temporary protection, especially in terms of fundamental rights and social cohesion processes, will contribute to the process.

- ***CHANNELS TO CITIZENSHIP, WITH SPECIFIED PROCESSES, SHOULD BE DISCUSSED INSTEAD OF "EXCEPTIONAL CITIZENSHIP"***

SB studies reveal that one of the biggest concerns of Turkish society about Syrians is their possibility of "becoming citizens". For this reason, it is important for the "exceptional citizenship" to actually turn into an "exceptional" implementation in terms of those who will be given citizenship and the sensitivities of the Turkish society. A significant deficiency of the exceptional citizenship process is its lack of transparency. In this context, if citizenship prospects will be made available to Syrians, alternative channels other than exceptional citizenship should be discussed. As it is known, those who live in Türkiye for 5 years with an uninterrupted residence permit have the right to apply for citizenship. However, since the Temporary Protection Regulation does not regulate Syrians' presence in Türkiye as residency and prevents their naturalization process from the very beginning, it is not possible for them to apply for citizenship in a time-bound manner akin to residents. Considering the new situation, it may be considered to provide, for example, those who have been under temporary protection status in Türkiye for 5, 7 or 10 years with the right to apply for "long-term residence" through a legislative amendment, and to open the way for those who have been granted residence status to apply for citizenship at the end of 5 years - just like other foreigners with a residence status - with certain conditions such as knowledge of the Turkish language. Thus, over a period of at least 10-15 years, the right to apply for citizenship is established. Naturally, the Turkish authorities can make the final decision based on certain criteria and needs. However, exceptional citizenship processes are seen as a problem area in terms of not knowing the criteria, being far from transparent and not being able to convince the society on this issue and have a negative impact on the social cohesion processes.

- ***"DEVELOPMENTAL, INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE PROCESS MANAGEMENT" SHOULD BE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE***

A development-based migration and refugee policy has the potential to provide a significant space for peaceful coexistence. This is also in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The emphasis on harmonization in both the 11th and 12th Development Plans of Türkiye is important in this sense. However, it should not be ignored that there is a significant difference between migrants and refugees in terms of the implementation of development-oriented policies, and in this context, the differences that being refugees creates in both refugees and the receiving society should not be forgotten in the implementation of development-oriented migration policy.

- ***THE CONTINUATION OF SUY/ESSN FOR THOSE IN URGENT NEED AND CONDITIONAL EDUCATION SUPPORT IS VALUABLE. BUT RESOURCES NEED TO BE RESTRUCTURED TO PRIORITIZE "DEVELOPMENT" MORE:***

The resources used for the SUY/ESSN should be channeled into education, development/

investment efforts and medium and long-term policies, particularly for those in urgent need and more vulnerable groups. It is crucial that development principles are taken into account in updating the criteria for inclusion in the SUY/ESSN program. However, Syrians should be freed from dependence on social assistance and become self-reliant, and therefore their integration into working life should be encouraged, but with a priority on combating labor exploitation and promoting formal employment.

- ***THE REQUIREMENT FOR SYRIANS TO OBTAIN TRAVEL PERMITS SHOULD BE REVISED:***

Although the part on Syrians could not be conducted in the SB-2022 study, it is believed that it would be useful to make new evaluations on the travel permits applied for Syrians to go to other places from the provinces where they are registered, especially in terms of a development-based migration policy. As is the general practice in the world, the places where those under temporary protection or international protection applicants or international protection status holders will live are determined by the state in Türkiye and the persons concerned are only allowed to leave their province with reasonable justification and permission. However, it is clear that the Syrians are a special case. First of all, as it is known, there was no settlement planning for Syrians, and the rule that Syrians should stay in the province where they were registered was tried to be implemented after the registration process. Although this has created very serious density differences between provinces, districts and even neighborhoods, it has not prevented mobility due to the very large number of Syrians. Around 3.5 million Syrians are developing different networks of relationships every day, for example going elsewhere to work or splitting up families for university education. Aside from the large numbers and the difficulty of control, experience shows that travel permits are not only very difficult to enforce, but has lost its necessity and meaning. It is clear that the travel restrictions for Syrians need to be revised and the reasons for this need to be shared with the Turkish society.

- ***IT SHOULD BE EXPLAINED TO THE SOCIETY THAT "INFORMALITY", WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT AND WIDESPREAD PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY, IS NOT ONLY A PROBLEM CAUSED BY MIGRATION***

While informal economic activities are neither sustainable nor ethically defensible, the prospects of developing a sufficient employment capacity for the Syrians in the short and medium term in Türkiye do not seem realistic. Even though employment in the informal market seems to provide an opportunity for the Syrians to support themselves economically in the short term, this practice is also known to create risks and losses as well as leading to serious exploitation. New arrangements need to be made in this field considering the economic capacity and the needs of Türkiye. However, it should not be forgotten that the informal economy constitutes more than 30% of the Turkish economy and that there are around 10 million Turkish citizens working in the informal economy. Therefore, informal economic activities should not only be seen as a problem of Syrians, and this should be explained to the Turkish society. Although informal economy cannot be accepted and sustained, it does not seem realistic that this issue would be resolved for Syrians in the medium- or even in the long-term period. However, informality cannot be ignored for employees to get paid for their labor and become secure under the principle of "decent job"; also in terms of reducing the other burdens of the state, especially the tax loss, and increasing the contribution to the economy. In this context, the state should be determined to fight against informality and develop short, medium and long-term projects to reduce informality. However, since this process is known to be difficult

and time-consuming, it is valuable to have some temporary regulations and support relevant for the current situation, particularly for the individual security and safety of those in the workforce. The state should make some regulations and spend efforts to meet the financial needs through external funding, particularly through the EU.

- ***THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE ENHANCED:***

The issue of Syrians in Türkiye has created an important opportunity to experience how important a role the civil society can play. While the civil society organizations had to rely on their cooperation with international organizations and the international NGOs in the beginning, the development of a serious capacity has been possible through the passing time. This development of capacity in Türkiye has also led to a development in terms of international cooperation. The cooperation between the public institutions and the NGOs has also developed into an impressive level. New NGO formations of Turks and Syrians should be supported in the process. It is important to work to make NGOs' identities, capacities, areas of expertise, where they work, and so forth more visible, increase their cooperation and contribute to their institutionalization processes. UNHCR's "service mapping" can be considered as an important resource in this regard.⁵² If this system is developed and regularly updated, then mechanisms can be developed to track the impact analysis of NGOs' activities. Service mapping for NGOs can also make valuable contributions in terms of "localization". NGOs whose capacities are strengthened and become more effective in the process should be enabled to play a greater role in international cooperation, particularly in cooperation with the EU.

- ***IT SHOULD BE EXPLAINED TO THE SOCIETY THROUGH AN ACCURATE AND RELIABLE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY THAT SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES ARE NOT FOR NEWCOMERS, BUT MAINLY TO REDUCE THE RISKS TO THE PEACE AND WELL-BEING OF THE HOST COMMUNITY AND TO INCREASE CONTRIBUTION TO THEM:***

As is well known, the issue of social cohesion is extremely complex and although there are principles, it is not possible to talk about a universal model. Although it is difficult to make a common definition of "social cohesion" and a "social cohesion model", it can be stated that what is basically meant by social cohesion policies is that all necessary steps should be taken together and with all stakeholders to ensure that "newcomers", regardless of their status, live a life worthy of human dignity during their stay. An important issue in this context is that integration is not only necessary for "migrants" but also for all foreigners living in the country, regardless of their status. Many actors are involved here. However, "the state" as decision-maker and implementer, "the host community" in terms of acceptance and "the newcomers" are the three most important actors. The perception of temporariness regarding asylum-seekers, persons under temporary protection and irregular migrants - and sometimes also of migrants - is one of the most important handicaps in terms of social cohesion policies. The role of the state in the process is more about ensuring protection based on fundamental rights for all, status determination, strategic decision-making, implementation and process management in the public sphere. However, the state's social cohesion policy alone cannot be expected to succeed without social acceptance and support. The attitude of the host community towards the newcomers is one of the most important elements for a peaceful and dignified coexistence. In

⁵² UNHCR: <https://turkiye.servicesadvisor.net/>

other words, it should not be forgotten that the real process will take place at the society and local level. Neither policies that ignore universal principles of law just to satisfy the society nor practices that refer to universal principles of law but do not receive even minimal support from the society can be expected to be functional.

- ***A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY BASED ON COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED:***

SB studies have shown that a large part of the negative opinions and attitudes concerning Syrians among the Turkish society are based on misleading or incomplete information. It is essential for the Turkish society and Syrians to be regularly informed about the process using accurate and reliable information. An urgent and **comprehensive communication strategy on Syrians can both alleviate a significant portion of public concerns and encourage Syrians' efforts to become part of society. A communication strategy that works and is based on real data will also help to reduce rumors that spread too quickly, often via social media. It is important that the communication strategy also allows for transparency on the issue. Similarly, sharing and explaining legislation and legal processes in a transparent and comprehensible manner with the society is important in terms of contributing to social cohesion. An approach that ignores the concerns of the public and relies on emotionally based rhetoric must be abandoned. If the public's concerns, whether based on facts or perceptions, are not taken seriously and the public does not have access to satisfactory information and explanations on these issues, populist discourses will find very favorable spaces for themselves.**

- ***TÜRKİYE SHOULD DEVELOP ITS SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM SOCIAL COHESION STRATEGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES:***

After 2011, the contributions of international institutions and organizations that have been very influential in the process in Türkiye, especially in terms of protection, capacity and financial resources and cooperation, cannot be overstated. However, one of the most serious problems regarding Syrians in Türkiye is that the projects produced by international organizations and international NGOs are being implemented in the field in an incoherent manner. These projects can only be realized more efficiently if they are part of a comprehensive plan or strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to move from a **period of "short-term solutions dominated by projects" to a period of "projects implemented in areas of need for which Türkiye develops the framework of the strategy". Therefore, Türkiye should develop its own strategy within the framework of its own priorities and capacity and utilize external resources within this strategy. In this way, the confusion of disconnected "projects" will be eliminated, and harmonized projects framed by the overall strategy will both attract more resources and use them more efficiently.**

- ***"LOCAL HARMONIZATION" PROCESSES SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED***

Harmonization processes are community and local centered. This is even more important in the context of Syrians in Türkiye. This is because both the manner of arrival of Syrians and their sheer numbers, as well as the lack of a **settlement policy for Syrians in Türkiye, has led to a very uneven distribution across cities, districts and even neighborhoods, making harmonization at the local level even more imperative. As it is known, there is a placement system**

in Türkiye for international protection beneficiaries that determines where refugees will settle and reside. However, this system has not been implemented for Syrians. This has both positive and negative effects. The passage of time has made a new settlement policy with a balanced distribution of Syrians across regions, provinces and districts almost impossible. Therefore, local harmonization processes in particular need to be promoted through municipalities and the civil society. In this context, local governments should not only be given legal space, but also resources for all foreigners living within their borders.

- **AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE MUNICIPAL LAW AND AUTHORIZATION AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR MUNICIPALITIES TO WORK FOR REFUGEES/MIGRANTS:**

In Türkiye, local governments, especially municipalities, provide services to foreigners within their borders within the framework of the law of fellow citizenship, but they are not given special authority and, more importantly, no additional financial resources for these activities. In order to ensure that local services are not interrupted, local harmonization processes are strengthened, and social cohesion is not disrupted, there is a serious need to transfer financial resources to municipalities, taking into account all foreigners registered within their borders. As is well known, some municipalities host foreigners close to half or all of their population. In this context, the Municipal Law should be amended to give municipalities both the authority to work on this issue and the central funding should be allocated to all those residing within the boundaries of the municipality, not just to the number of Turkish citizens.

- **A FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR MUNICIPALITIES (“BEL-SUY”) SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN COOPERATION WITH THE EU:**

Considering that municipalities do not receive financial support for registered foreigners living within their borders, support from EU resources should be considered. In the short term, some of the resources transferred by the EU to Turkey within the framework of FRIT will be transferred directly to local governments to be used in the services to be provided by the municipalities for Syrians and other international protection applicants. It will be an important contribution to solving the problem. A scheme similar to the current SUY/ESSN model, such as the “Municipal Social Cohesion Assistance” (“BEL-SUY”), could be provided to municipalities on a project basis but directly. For example, €10 per refugee per month could be allocated to municipalities to provide project-based and supervised services to asylum seekers. Such assistance would cost €37 million per month and €450 million per year if only Syrians are taken into account, and €40 million per month and €480 million per year if other asylum seekers are taken into account (i.e., 4 million). This kind of resource transfer is thought to be valuable in terms of meeting the resource needs in local harmonization processes, reducing the complaints such as “the resources we receive are used for asylum seekers, we are victimized”, alleviating the pressure of the issue on politics and contributing to social cohesion processes. However, it should not be forgotten that this will be a short-term and temporary solution.

- **SPECIAL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ENCOURAGE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SHARE MORE BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY:**

The international community’s attitude towards refugees is deeply disappointing. Developed countries, to which only 17% of the current refugees have had access, are increasingly

failing to fulfil their obligations to both resettle refugees and provide financial support and are adamantly pursuing policies of “externalization”. In this regard, the United Kingdom’s agreement with Rwanda has been a striking and worrying practice. It is also known that countries making policies on refugees often act with a reflex of self-protection. Failure to provide support to refugee-hosting countries such as Türkiye, including resettlement and strong financial assistance, means that both the countries implementing open-door policies and refugees are penalized, and that authoritarian regimes that cause refugees are emboldened. In the absence of global responsibility and burden-sharing, the open-door policy has made neighboring countries the victims of the crisis. Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan, which implemented an “open-door policy” to save people’s lives in the wake of the crisis in Syria in 2011, have become the victims of the process, taking on additional burdens and risks in the intervening time. It should not be forgotten that in a world where responsibility-sharing is not effective, there will be fewer countries that will implement an “open-door policy” in crises that will occur, and this will cause refugees to be left alone with practices that violate human dignity and even lead to torture and killing. The avoidance of responsibility by rich/developed countries and the policy of externalization risks making it easier for dictatorial systems to oppress their own people. Türkiye, as the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world, can take a more active role in close cooperation with UN agencies and develop concrete projects to increase the sensitivity of the world public opinion on the issue. “Resettlement” to third countries should be on the agenda as much as “voluntary return” and “local integration”.

- ***SHARING INFORMATION ON FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE EU AND OTHER EXTERNAL SOURCES WITH THE PUBLIC CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING BOTH PRESSURE ON THE STATE AND SOCIAL REACTIONS:***

One of the most frequently mentioned problems of the Turkish society regarding Syrians is that “Syrians are a burden on Turkish society”. The opinion that Syrians live their lives with the help of the Turkish state is above 80%. In this respect, it is important that the financial resources coming to Türkiye from outside, particularly from the EU and UN agencies, are shared with the society. Although it is impossible for external aid to meet the needs and the high costs of millions of refugees are known, sharing this support with the public may reduce public reactions to the management of the process.

- ***INSTITUTIONS AND NGOS IN TÜRKİYE NEED TO TAKE MORE INITIATIVE IN THE USE AND EFFICIENCY OF EU AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FUNDS:***

There is a need for a new structure in which public institutions, local governments and NGOs in Türkiye will play a more active role in the planning and efficiency of international resources allocated to Türkiye for refugees, in particular EU resources. While it is understandable to allocate resources in a project-based and controlled manner, ignoring local initiative and not conducting needs and impact analyses effectively enough to ensure that real needs can be used efficiently also creates a risk of wasting resources. **In this context, Turkish institutions should have a greater say in the planning and implementation of all external resources, in particular financial cooperation agreements with the EU. In the last decade in Türkiye, both public institutions, local administrations and civil society organizations have gained significant experience and built remarkable capacity. It is essential for Türkiye’s institutions to have a greater say in the efficient and appropriate use of resources.**

- ***THE EMOTIONAL APPROACH BASED ON CULTURAL/RELIGIOUS AFFINITY IN PROCESS MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES IS NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS IT WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNIQUE SITUATIONS IN THIS REGARD, THERE IS A NEED FOR RIGHTS-BASED, REALISTIC POLICIES TO BE PRODUCED AND SHARED WITH THE SOCIETY:***

“Cultural closeness” may play a role for solidarity in mass human mobilities in the beginning but as time passes, numerical size becomes the determinant. Although it is a fact that religious and cultural affinity exists between the Turkish society and Syrians, society’s perception on this can change with increasing numbers or negative experiences. Therefore, Turkish society’s characterization of Syrians, particularly those living in border cities, as “a group that is very culturally different from us” can be considered a deliberate reaction. The perception of “cultural foreignness” is observed more among those who are living in border regions and have closeness with Syrians in terms of language, customs, kinship, and so forth. This provides important evidence for producing realistic policies instead of policies based on emotions. What becomes the **determinant factor** here is the numerical size, which is seen to have exceeded the manageable levels. While bringing uneasiness among the host community in multiple ways, growing numbers usually increase the self-confidence of the newcomers in the meantime making it possible for them to live within their social networks without needing the host community. This, in turn, could further increase the distance and contribute to the emergence of “parallel societies”. For these reasons, building social cohesion on cultural closeness may be unrealistic and such emotional statements may not be found to be satisfying for either of them. The trend of Syrians in Türkiye in the SB-2021 to find themselves culturally less similar to Turkish society compared to previous studies can actually be seen as a sign of a new identity formation.⁵³ In other words, there is a growing need for realistic policies that transcend sentimentality not only for Turkish society but also for Syrians.

- ***MORE EFFORT IS REQUIRED IN THE FIELD OF MANDATORY EDUCATION TO PREVENT SYRIAN CHILDREN FROM TURNING INTO “LOST GENERATIONS”:***

Despite Türkiye’s extraordinary efforts and success and schooling of over 700,000 Syrian children, more than 40% of school-aged Syrians do not have access to formal education. Some of the main reasons for this are the differences in the formal education systems in Syria and Türkiye, language barrier, the families’ perception/expectation of “temporariness”, the fact that boys over a certain age are working, some families’ preference of not sending girls to school, and capacity issues at schools. There is obviously a need for a new initiative and a leap concerning the schooling of Syrian school-aged children. However, to prevent this from aggrieving the native people particularly in regions with high Syrian population, there is an urgent need to strengthen the capacity including the number of schools, classrooms, teachers, and other educational equipment. In addition, further precautions need to be taken to tackle peer bullying, prevent drop-outs, and take the necessary steps to recover from the serious negative impact of the pandemic on education, which have particular importance both for the reduction of lost generations and for social cohesion processes. Policies should be developed with the awareness that the problems that have arisen in the school enrollment of Syrian children in recent years, or those who give up going to school due to the negativities experienced even though they are enrolled in school, are a situation that will cause significant problems in the future.

53 SB-2021, P.226 (<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2023/01/SB-2021-1-%CC%87ngilizce-19-Ocak-2023.pdf>)

- ***IT IS NECESSARY TO EMPOWER TEACHERS, INCREASE THEIR RESILIENCE, STRENGTHEN THEIR CAPACITY AND INCREASE THEIR NUMBERS:***

It is plainly obvious that education of Syrians is crucial both for preventing Syrian children from turning into lost generations and for the serenity of the Turkish society and a harmonious cohabitation. It is also known that there is a serious capacity problem in this field. Over 770,000 Syrian children have been placed into Turkish public schools over the past few years. The teachers, who are the bearers of the heaviest burden stemming from this policy of placement of Syrians, need to be supported and strengthened as they work extremely hard in firstly teaching a new language and its alphabet to foreign students, and then trying to give them education.

- ***THE ANXIETIES IN TURKISH SOCIETY, WHICH HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS DUE TO IRREGULAR MIGRATION, MUST BE ALLEVIATED THROUGH TRUSTWORTHY EXCHANGES:***

One of the most important areas of public concern is the perception that the government is not sufficiently in control of the process. This situation further fuels concerns about Syrians. Healthy communication channels should be open to overcome this problem. The massive influx of irregular migrants into Türkiye since 2013 may negatively affect the policies regarding Syrians and their lives in Türkiye. If the society becomes desperate and anxious, any kind of harmonization policy will become more difficult.

- ***IF POLICY MAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS PRIORITIZE THE FIGHT AGAINST IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT PROCESS, THIS MAY HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PERCEPTION REGARDING ALL FOREIGNERS IN SOCIETY, WHICH MAY ALSO HARM SOCIAL COHESION EFFORTS:***

Although the fight against irregular migration is an extremely important and necessary policy for Türkiye's security and social cohesion, the fact that policy makers and practitioners prioritize this issue and include issues related to this fight in their communication strategy carries the risk of negatively affecting the perception of those who legally stay in the country or have temporary protection and international protection status. This may even lead to the perception of all foreigners, and in a sociological context, all asylum seekers, as "threats". Therefore, the difference between combating irregular migration and harmonization efforts for those who are staying in the country legally should be conveyed to the public.

- ***TURKISH SOCIETY SHOULD ALSO BE THE TARGET GROUP OF SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES***

Social cohesion policies and programs usually target the newcomers. In Türkiye, similarly, social cohesion efforts have generally targeted Syrians and other foreign groups. However, since social cohesion is not a unidirectional process, Turkish society should also be targeted in social cohesion policies and programs to strengthen social acceptance and to foster the support of host communities for social cohesion. It is a fact that Turkish society is concerned about the permanent existence of Syrians in Türkiye and they want Syrians to leave Türkiye. It will not be surprising that the society approaches the social cohesion policies, which will encourage permanence to some extent, with a distance. For this reason, efforts should be made to increase the resilience of Turkish society and to understand the aims of social cohe-

sion efforts. In addition, although it is known that social cohesion activities are developed to enable those who come after them to lead a dignified life, to have the opportunity to develop themselves and to contribute to the society they come from, it cannot be denied that these are based on a security concern. In this context, it should be well explained to the Turkish society that a social cohesion policy for Syrians is actually aimed at preventing the Turkish society from encountering additional problems, reducing risks and harms, and preventing the formation of social tensions and conflicts.

- ***VOLUNTARY RETURN CAN ONLY BE A REALISTIC POLICY IF PEACE AND STABILITY ARE RESTORED IN SYRIA AND THE COUNTRY IS RECONSTRUCTED. IN THIS REGARD, A NEW AREA OF COOPERATION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TÜRKIYE-EU AGREEMENT OF MARCH 18, 2016:***

It is clear that there are some important conditions for the voluntary return of Syrians living outside their country, particularly those in Türkiye. Foremost among these are the security risks that Syria is fragmented and still at war or is likely to be at war. The second major obstacle to the return of Syrians outside Syria is the distrust of the Assad regime. The third issue is the country's war-torn infrastructure and the economic situation, which has suffered a major collapse. Therefore, the establishment of peace in Syria and the reconstruction of Syria are of utmost importance both for the strengthening of voluntary return and perhaps for the prevention of new influxes. There has been a radical change in Türkiye's previous policy of not meeting with the current Syrian administration, but this time the Syrian administration has conditioned the start of relations with Türkiye on its withdrawal from Syria. However, Türkiye has concerns that withdrawal from Syria, where authority has been lost, would create serious security risks. One of the serious concerns is that a new wave of asylum seekers would be faced if Türkiye withdraws. In this framework, the issue of "cooperation in Syria" in Article 9 of the EU-Türkiye 18 March Statement should be brought back to the agenda and the normalization of Türkiye-Syria relations and the reconstruction of Syria with EU financial support should be discussed on a platform to be developed by the EU.

SB policy recommendations are put forward by taking into account the findings of SB studies, experiences gained after 2011, and changes in the national, regional and international arena. A significant number of these policy recommendations have been expressed in previous SB studies and are still valid. The extent to which these recommendations put forward by the SB studies will be considered by policy makers and implementers is independent of the SB team. SB studies cannot claim anything other than developing ideas/recommendations within an academic framework in the decision-making processes of policy makers and practitioners on this highly politicized issue, which has been of utmost importance to society in recent years. The priorities, knowledge, experience and capabilities of the final decision-makers and implementers will depend on their decisions on how to manage this dynamic process. However, the SB team, which conducts research centered on social cohesion and then shares its analysis and recommendations with the public, considers itself obliged to update and share them with the public again as long as it still finds the policy recommendations it has put forward to be correct and valid.

Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

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Prof. ERDOĞAN is Director of Mülkiye Migration Research Center of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science (SBF) since February 2022 . Prof. Erdoğan is a member of UNESCO-Türkiye Communication Committee, board member of ISC of Metropolis International and the President of IGAM-Academy.

He was between 2017-2022 at Turkish German University. He was also the founder and director of the Migration and Integration Research Center of TGU between November 2017, May 2021; and Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center (HUGO) between 2009-2017. He carried out the research of his PhD dissertation from Ankara University -titled "The Relationship between Türkiye and European Union after the Cold War: Geo-Strategic Perspective: 1990-2005"- as a Konrad Adenauer Foundation fellow at Bonn and Freiburg universities in Germany in 1994-1999. In 2000-2003, Erdoğan worked at the Press Section of the Turkish Embassy in Berlin, and later as an advisor at the Turkish Grand National Assembly's Commission on EU Integration (2004), also as an advisor to the president of Turkish Higher Education Council, and to the Rector of Hacettepe University (2012-2016).

Prof. Erdoğan carried out studies as a visiting researcher with different fellowships at universities as Duisburg-Essen (2007), Berlin-Humboldt (2010), Oxford University (2012), Johns Hopkins University-AICGS (2014), and Humboldt University (2019). He was fellow at CATS (Centre for Applied Türkiye Studies) of SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -German Institute for International and Security Affairs) in Berlin (April 2022-April 2023).

His academic research interests include voluntary and forced migration, refugees, people of Turkish origin living abroad, EU, political cartoons, political behaviour, Islamophobia, and Germany and Turkish foreign policy. He conducts comprehensive public opinion research on a regular basis and publishes particularly the "Euro-Turks-Barometre" on Turkish diaspora in Europe, and the "Syrians Barometer" on Syrians in Türkiye.

Prof. Erdoğan's recent books include the following:

- Forced Migration in Türkiye: Refugee Perspectives, Organisational Assistance, and Political Embedding (2024) (Edts with B.Ş.Z.Savcı-L.Pries) Routledge.
- Marmara's Urban Refugees: Municipalities & Process Management (& B.Şener, M.Ağca) (2022)
- Syrians Barometer-2020: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Türkiye (2021)
- Demographical Development of the Syrian Refugee Population and its Potential Impacts on The Education, Employment and Municipality Services in Türkiye in Near Future (& M. Çorabatır) (2019) (in Turkish&English)
- Göç Uyum ve Yerel Yönetimler (2019) (Migration, Integration and Local Governments) (in Turkish) (2018)
- Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Türkiye
- Syrians Barometer-2017: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Türkiye (2018)
- Syrian Refugees and Process Management of Municipalities: The Case of Istanbul (2017)
- Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Türkiye (2015)
- "Türkiye's Migration History: Migration to Türkiye from the 14th Century to the 21st Century " (with A. Kaya) (2015)
- "Syrians in Türkiye: Social Acceptance and Integration" (2015)
- Turks in German Cartoons, 50 Jahre 50 Karikaturen/50 Years 50 Cartoons: Turken in Deutschland aus der Sicht Deutcher Karikaturisten (2012) • Turks Abroad: Fifty Years of Migration and Integration (2010)

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SYRIANS BAROMETER-2022

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION
WITH SYRIANS IN TÜRKİYE



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
When the first group of 252 Syrians arrived in Türkiye on 29 April 2011 through the Hatay border, nobody expected these movements either to reach such a scale or to last this long. However, just three years after, in 2014, Türkiye has become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. After 12 years, the number of Syrians in Türkiye has exceeded 3,5 million, accounting for 3,9% of the Türkiye's population. More than 98% of Syrians in Türkiye are living together with the Turkish society as "urban refugees"; between 2011 and 2022, at least 750 thousand Syrian babies have been born in Türkiye; more than 730 thousand Syrian children have enrolled in Turkish public schools; more than 50 thousand young Syrians have been studying at Turkish universities; around 240 thousand Syrians have obtained Turkish citizenship. There is a significant decrease in the voluntary return trends among Syrians due to the war, which has turned into a chronic issue in Syria, and the efforts of Syrians to rebuild their lives in Türkiye. However, despite this, serious concerns and complaints caused by large numbers and prolonged durations are coming to the fore in the social sphere each day and the issue is becoming a particular concern for daily politics.

"Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Türkiye", as an effort to understand the social aspects of social cohesion, instead of the institutional or formal aspects, has been designed and regularly conducted since 2014 by Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan the study. The study, which aims at understanding the developments related to the "common social life", social cohesion processes and tensions, from both the perspective of the Turkish society and Syrians, and developing related policy recommendations, is conducted through highly representative public opinions surveys and focus group discussions (FGD). The primary objective of the study is to take, in consideration of the academic limitations, the best possible realistic snapshot of this significant and highly dynamic process and build on this, to share with the public the assessments and recommendations focusing on social peace.

Under normal circumstances, SB studies are conducted with both the Turkish society and Syrians. However, SB-2022 survey and FGD studies could not be completed with Syrians due to the earthquake disaster on February 6, 2023. Therefore, SB-2022 only includes data on Turkish citizens. SB-2022 field study was conducted in December 2022-January 2023 in 26 cities according to NUTS 2 classification with 2,267 individuals on "individual basis" from among the citizens of the Republic of Türkiye (confidence level: 95%, confidence interval: ± 2.06). Within the scope of SB-2022, 10 FGDs were held in 7 cities with 57 participants.

The SB-2022 study was chaired and drafted by Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan and commissioned by UNHCR Türkiye. Dr. Nihal Eminoğlu, Tülin Haji Mohamad, Assoc.Prof. Dr. Fulya Memişoğlu, Dr. Onur Unutulmaz and Deniz Aydınlı took part in the research team.

In addition, comprising the most esteemed/distinguished academics in the field of migration, refugees, and social research both from Türkiye and abroad, "Syrians Barometer Academic Advisory Board" including Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın, Prof. Dr. Banu Ergöçmen, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali Eryurt, Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Ferris, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Nuri Gültekin, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kasım Han, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu, Omar Kadkoy, Prof. Dr. Neeraj Kaushal, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman, Ümit Kızıltan, Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi, Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Narlı, Kathleen Newland, Prof. Dr. Ludger Pries, Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez, Prof. Dr. H. Halil Uslucan, Prof. Dr. Nasser Yasin, Prof. Dr. Ayselin Yıldız and UNHCR-Ankara Team provided invaluable support and contributions.



ISBN: 978-625-98070-1-0



SB-2022 and Executive Summary
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