



**UNHCR**

**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**

Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés

# **Country Operations Plan 2008**

## **Lebanon**

**Country Operations Plan 2008-2009**  
**LEBANON**  
**(including the Resettlement Hub and other regional functions)**

**Part One: Context, Strategy and Results Achieved**

**1. Operational Context**

**1.1. Country/Sub-Regional Situation as it relates to the work of UNHCR:**

- Political, Social, Economic, Security, Human Rights and Asylum issues

A. At the end of January 2007, UN Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari told the Security Council that “none of us can afford another year like the last one in Lebanon”. There is very little doubt that 2006 was “annus horribilis” for Lebanon, with a 34-day conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah, which in Lebanon claimed some 1200 lives, injured more than 4400 people, mainly civilians, destroyed or damaged thousands of homes, 612 public schools, 97 bridges and part of the infrastructure of the country. Unfortunately, the end of the war in August 2006 was not the end of the problems for the Lebanese people. In his remarks to the Security Council, USG Gambari described the months of December 2006 and January 2007 as a period of “heightened levels of instability and suffering”. In November 2006, after weeks of tensions between the government and the opposition around a number of unresolved political issues, five Shiite and one Christian ministers resigned from the cabinet, and Pierre Gemayel, the Industry Minister, was assassinated. Lebanon entered into a cycle of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, political paralysis, economic crisis and most unfortunately physical violence leading to the death of at least 9 people in three separate incidents and the killing of 3 civilians in a bus explosion on 13 February 2007. At the time of writing, the crisis was still unresolved and the security situation remained very volatile and tense.

Such a volatile and tense environment has necessarily an impact on the way UNHCR operates and the results it can achieve. Among the most obvious and visible effects, we can mention:

a) On a positive note, UNHCR was able – for the first time since the early 1990s - to provide both assistance and protection to the Lebanese displaced persons (IDPs). During the war of July and August 2006, UNHCR mounted a large-scale relief operation and led the inter-agency protection cluster and emergency shelter cluster (the latter including the coordination of Non-Food Items distribution). At the end of the emergency phase in October 2006, UNHCR continued its involvement with IDPs by providing protection monitoring, assistance to vulnerable groups and capacity building to the Social Development Centers of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Though the IDPs’ operation will be phased out by December 2007, the latter has made UNHCR more visible. It has helped UNHCR expand its partnership with both government and non-government institutions and convinced the Lebanese people that UNHCR’s empathy was not limited to “foreigners”. UNHCR is now better known and it has gained the respect of many in Lebanon.

b) Between October 2005 and the July 2006 war, the UNHCR office in Beirut took a number of initiatives to improve the protection climate in Lebanon and held a number of high-level (*inter alia* the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Director General of the General Security, the Public Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary) and follow-up meetings during which a number of initiatives forward were discussed and agreed upon. Unfortunately, the war and subsequent political tensions have put on hold most of these initiatives. The very fact that the parliament has not been convened for months prevents UNHCR from proposing amendments to the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country. The amendments aim at putting an end to the detention of persons of concern for immigration related

offenses. It is worth mentioning that just before the war, UNHCR had been able to garner the support of a number of members of parliament who were willing to endorse the proposed amendments and include them in the parliament's agenda. The same MPs, after the war, and because of the ongoing and unresolved political tensions, made it clear that any substantial discussion in the parliament on immigration/refugee issues would be postponed - possibly for a very long time - .

c) In a country where sectarian tensions may lead to civil unrest, the refugee question is not perceived as a priority, to say the least. For some, it is even seen as a complicating factor. In an environment where national security is the main concern, many consider that the presence of foreigners can be exploited by some groups and lead to further destabilization. This issue is particularly sensitive in Lebanon because of the presence for more than two generations of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees.

d) The constant fear of internal tensions is not conducive to "doing business as usual". Crucial meetings are getting postponed, delicate issues are not put on the agenda and UNHCR, government and NGO staff are all concerned about their safety and the safety of their families. Such an environment discourages people to take initiatives and agreements can only be reached around the smallest common denominator.

e) With the presence of thousands of police and military on the streets of Beirut and other cities or villages, refugees and asylum seekers without valid documentation run a bigger risk of being arrested and detained.

B. Since the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese authorities have circumscribed the protection space by the following benchmarks:

a) Lebanon does not consider itself as an asylum country and has very strong reservations about acceding to the 1951 Refugee Convention / 1967 Protocol. The reasons for not acceding range from the presence of some 400,000 Palestinian refugees, to the delicate confessional and political balance in the country, to security and economic considerations;

b) Refugees (in this context the word "refugees" means "non-Palestinian refugees") can be tolerated for a short period of time, provided that UNHCR undertakes to systematically, consistently and rapidly resettle them;

c) Local integration or any form of legalizing the stay of refugees is not acceptable;

d) A complete ban on the detention of refugees and asylum seekers for illegal entry or stay is considered as a potential pull factor that should be avoided. While sweep police operations against persons of concern are normally not conducted, random arrests – followed by detention – do occur, usually during identity checks. These random arrests are seen as a necessary deterrent and as a way of limiting the number of asylum seekers entering Lebanon;

e) Though acknowledged by the authorities, the humanitarian dimension of the non-Palestinian refugee question is not sufficient to counter-balance the political and security concerns and justify a radical change of approach, which would mean a full respect of international standards.

C. From a domestic legal viewpoint, refugees and asylum seekers in Lebanon continue to be treated as illegal immigrants, subject to arrest and detention, the payment of a fine and deportation (Law of 1962 mentioned above). A major breakthrough was achieved in September 2003 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between UNHCR and its main government counterpart, the Directorate General of the General Security (GSO), which for the first time acknowledged that persons of concern could temporarily stay in Lebanon. But the circulation permits granted to refugees and asylum seekers are of limited relevance, since they cannot be extended beyond one year and cannot be issued to persons who entered the country before September 2003. The MOU is also not applicable to persons who have stayed in Lebanon more than two months before approaching UNHCR and only exceptionally applicable to asylum seekers who entered the country legally and overstayed their visa.

These restrictions in the MOU mean for example that if UNHCR cannot resettle some refugees within a period of one year from the date of registration, the latter are subject to arrest and detention, and theoretically to deportation after the one-year “grace” period. While UNHCR has had mixed results on the detention front (persons of concern have been released upon UNHCR’s intervention but many have also remained in detention for a prolonged period of time), it has fortunately been able to consistently suspend the deportation of persons of concern. Following a formal and detailed request from UNHCR to the Ministry of Justice, the latter issued on 19 June 2006 an advisory to all judges and prosecutors in Lebanon, inviting them to systematically suspend the deportation of persons of concern to UNHCR on the basis of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture (CAT), to which Lebanon is a party. This was the second major breakthrough in terms of refugee protection, though the Ministry of Justice fell short of taking a similar position concerning the arbitrary detention of persons of concern.

D. Since late 2005, UNHCR has been negotiating a revision of the MOU and the GSO has shown willingness to amend some of its provisions, though not compromising on some of the core issues, such as Lebanon not being an asylum country and UNHCR’s duty to quickly resettle all recognized refugees. Because of the war and subsequent problems in the country, discussions between UNHCR and the GSO have not been finalized. An additional reason for not putting too much emphasis on the revision of the MOU is the fact that Lebanon is faced with an unprecedented increase in the number of Iraqis present in the country and UNHCR’s position that all Iraqis from Central and Southern Iraq are to be considered as *prima facie* refugees. With an estimated 40,000 Iraqis in the country and a surge in the number of Iraqis approaching UNHCR in Beirut (from an average of 15 cases/week in February/March 2006 to 125 cases/week in February/March 2007), most of the provisions of the MOU have become irrelevant and unimplementable. Since the Iraqis constitute more than 90 % of the asylum seeker and refugee caseload in Lebanon, it is important for UNHCR and the Lebanese authorities to “think outside the MOU box”, which, apart from its inherent limitations, becomes unworkable in case of a significant refugee influx, as it is currently the case. One of the main assumptions of the MOU - i.e. that all recognized refugees will be quickly resettled to a third country - cannot apply in the context of a refugee crisis of the magnitude of Iraq, with some 2,000,000 Iraqi refugees in the Middle East region. Though the Lebanese authorities have some legitimate concerns about the presence of a large number of Iraqi refugees on their territory, they have at the same time shown a high degree of tolerance and understanding. However, given the current tensions and an uncertain future in Lebanon, tolerance may be short lived. Any serious security incident in the country or the feeling that the number of refugees becomes “unmanageable” could be easily translated into very strict border control and more generally into severely restricting the protection space in Lebanon. Given the delicate political and religious balance in Lebanon, the fact that Iraqi refugees have been the victims of sectarian violence and belong to the three main religious groups present in Lebanon (Shiites, Sunnis and Christians) is seen by the Lebanese authorities as a complicating factor, in particular in case of renewed tensions in the country.

E. The strategy and the objectives of the UNHCR Office in Beirut for 2008-2009 are based on a number of assumptions, which are not easy to make, given the very volatile situation in Iraq and political tensions in Lebanon. Unfortunately, the most likely scenario is the non-stabilization of Iraq in the near future, the continuous forced migration of people inside Iraq and, if borders remain open, across borders, as well as the impossibility to engage in any significant repatriation program. Given the nature of the violence, which is largely sectarian, and the volume of atrocities committed on a daily basis, any rapid resolution appears unlikely. The Office in Beirut believes that the number of Iraqis in the country as well as the number of those approaching UNHCR will continue to increase. It is expected that given the proactive role played by UNHCR in the region vis-à-vis Iraqi refugees, a larger proportion of those who are not yet registered by UNHCR will indeed seek UNHCR’s

protection and assistance. Beyond the situation in Iraq and probably more importantly, the visa and border policy of the Lebanese authorities will determine the number of Iraqis entering Lebanon. Another important factor will be Lebanon's stability. A stable and prosperous Lebanon can be a magnet, while tensions in the country can discourage some asylum-seekers. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that during the July-August 2006 war, very few Iraqis volunteered to return to Iraq and they instead chose to remain in Lebanon, in spite of the daily bombardments.

F. Bearing in mind all of the above, the UNHCR Office in Beirut will be using the following planning figures, which are considered as rather conservative:

	31.12.07	31.12.08	31.12.09
- Number of Iraqi refugees in Lebanon:	45,000	60,000	65,000
- Out of which registered with UNHCR:	10,000	20,000	30,000
- Number of non-Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers:	350	400	440
- Number of refugees resettled:	1,000	1,200	1,500
- Number of refugees directly and indirectly assisted:	12,000	15,000	16,000
- Number of refugees benefiting from UNHCR's protection interventions (detention, residence permits, court cases, etc.):	3,000	3,500	4,000

G. With an operation refocusing on refugees, the phasing out of our involvement with IDPs on 31 December 2007 and the presence of a large number of Iraqis in the country, the operational goals will be similar to the neighboring countries (in particular Syria and Jordan), in order to ensure a consistent approach to the Iraqi caseload, while at the same time taking into account the specific protection and security challenges in Lebanon. Our priorities will be the following:

- Ensure that there is a real protection space in Lebanon for Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees. The approach will be both pragmatic and principled. Two concrete objectives will be the revision of the September 2003 MOU with the GSO and the amendment of the Law of 1962. As to the Iraqis, the objective will be a suspension of arrests and detentions, a ban on deportations, a generous visa, residence and work permit policy, access to health and education, and in general respect for fundamental human rights.
- Building its own capacity and providing improved services to persons of concern was one of the main objectives of the UNHCR Office in Beirut for 2006-2007. Both have been largely achieved. The main challenge for 2008-2009 will be to make these efforts sustainable on a much larger scale. Both the Lebanese authorities and the refugees must be convinced that UNHCR is a reliable, predictable and professional agency, providing outstanding services in a rapid and flexible manner. Ensuring the quality of protection and assistance services, building UNHCR's capacity to respond to the rapidly growing needs of refugees as well as building partnerships and coalitions of the like-minded must be a declared objective. The operation space in Lebanon will also be largely dependent on UNHCR's "capacity to deliver".
- The Resettlement Hub as well as a number of regional functions (Community Services, Refugee Status Determination and Registration) are now concentrated in Beirut. One of the objectives of the Office in Beirut is to provide support to other offices in the Middle East and North Africa, ensure consistency in the region and contribute to policy development. Synergy and complementarity between resettlement and community services is a must, and particularly in case of large caseloads. Apart from the massive presence of Iraqi refugees in many countries in the region, which requires a concerted and coordinated response, the Somalis in Yemen with spill-over in neighboring countries and the migration/refugee question in North Africa are likely to remain the main focuses.

H. Although the decision has been taken to phase out our IDP operation by 31 December 2007, it is unfortunately impossible to completely rule out an international conflict or civil unrest during 2008-2009, leading to both internal and external displacement. In such a case, UNHCR would naturally play a leading role within the inter-agency framework (leading the cluster for protection and emergency shelter/NFI). In that respect, UNHCR has been an active participant in the efforts of the UN Country Team to finalize a contingency plan. UNHCR will also constitute in the course of 2007 with two NGO partners an emergency stockpile. Our involvement in an emergency IDP operation can neither be planned nor budgeted at this stage, but it is important to remember that we operate in an environment where there are both internal and international tensions.

## 1.2. Planning Figures Table

<b>Planning figures</b>				
<b>Population</b>	<b>Dec. 2006</b>	<b>Dec. 2007</b>	<b>Dec. 2008</b>	<b>Dec. 2009</b>
Iraqis*	561	10,000	20,000	30,000
Non Iraqis	314	350	400	440
Promotion**	20-40,000	45,000	60,000	65,000
<b>Total</b>				

\*Asylum-seekers and refugees combined (UNHCR assisted)

\*\* Potential total number

## 1.3. Participatory assessment

Lebanon was among the 14 pilot countries that first applied the Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming (AGDM) approach in 2004. Since then, participatory assessments (PA) with refugees have been regularly carried out by UNHCR and its partners at various stages of the operation. This Office has also improved dialogue and coordination with both local and international NGO's to ensure better protection and assistance for refugees. Positive feedback on the open communication channels has been received from refugees and partners.

In preparation for the 2008- 2009 Country Operations Plan (COP), The Beirut Office carried out meetings and open dialogue with refugees from various groups, ages and backgrounds. The main purpose was to identify protection gaps, coping mechanisms through and within the refugee community and jointly explore options for solutions.

PA revealed that resettlement was the main interest of almost all groups. Other concerns included the need for proper documentation, lack of security and stability, lack of free movement and exploitation in the workplace (menial jobs for long hours for meagre fees). Hence, results of PA revealed the following common areas of concern to refugees:

**Security, documentation and freedom of movement:** The need for officially recognized documentation was among the main concerns of refugees, as well as the gloomy protection environment and fear of detention for illegal entry. This situation restricts the movement of refugee men; hence women and children become the breadwinners of the family. They often work under exploitative conditions. Adolescent girls within certain Iraqi communities play a major role in supporting the family. During home visits, it was noticed that some had been exposed to work related injuries.

The security environment and the consequent increase in army and internal security force checkpoints are forcing refugees to remain isolated within their areas of residence and workplace. In field visits, Iraqis stated that they fear to approach the office. Fear of detention is of particular concern for refugees of African origin who are easily singled out by law enforcement officials.

Moreover, Iraqis with legal entry permits were unable to renew their documentations due to exorbitant fees. Some Iraqis reported that sponsors had taken fees but had not carried out the regularization process as promised.

**Health:** Refugees strongly requested support in health costs coverage, particularly the provision of chronic treatments and in-patient services (surgeries). While initially these requests were made by the elderly and families, single men had begun requesting medical support. However, most of the NGOs providing medical assistance focused mostly on families.

There has been an increase in persons requesting support for expensive operations and treatment. Some refugees reported war related injuries. UNHCR has also received requests through NGOs to provide life saving health support to non-registered Iraqis.

**Living conditions:** In light of their overall situation, refugees expressed difficulties to cover rent. Given that a large number of refugees reside in war affected areas, some lost their apartments and places of employment (non-formal). Moreover, due to the limited number of apartments as a result of the war, Iraqi refugees were requested to give up their apartments for locals and had to search for others at inflated rates. Many refugees live in very poor conditions and share apartments to reduce rental costs (6-10 residing under one roof).

Children are affected with respiratory infections and other health problems which are attributed to high humidity level and lack of ventilation in such houses. The congested living conditions have also impacted the education performance of children.

**Self-reliance:** The difficult asylum conditions forced some refugees to be dependant on the limited financial assistance provided by UNHCR. Refugees usually engage in non-formal labour market. Despite their skills and education levels, refugees work as daily/weekly wage earners without any social security. The deteriorating economic situation in the country leaves refugees to compete with cheap labour force (migrants).

In 2006, around 20% of the refugee population received skill training. Six persons received support for livelihood projects.

A Community Centre was established and funded by UNHCR in 2004 and is currently run by a local NGO, Arc-en-Ciel. The Centre's activities are guided by refugee needs and include language and computer training, beadwork, hairdressing, ceramics, and home based care. Refugees also have access to Arc-en-Ciel's independently run centres. In addition to capacity building, the Centre has an important role in building the confidence and self-esteem, especially amongst youth, and it may contribute to the improvement of their economic situation.

**Education:** Since 1999, refugee children have been able to enter public schools regardless of their status in the country. Refugee children found difficulties in foreign languages and the different curriculum. UNHCR in collaboration with NGOs is paying particular attention to this problem through initiation of some activities aiming to alleviate its negative impact on refugee children.

It is evident that the situation in Lebanon has caused major difficulties for Iraqi children to attend school, as they are reportedly working to provide for their families in order to spare their fathers from being arrested. Girls working in factories and at homes become more at risk of being targets of sexual and gender based violence.

**Discrimination against refugees:** especially amongst school children, was reported by many groups. Adolescents showed feelings of isolation within their communities and remained confined in their households. Mothers talked about the need for their children to vent their energy in useful activities. Discrimination at work and in detention was also mentioned by refugees in general, and of African origin in particular.

**Psychological problems:** refugees (particularly Iraqis) have been exposed to various forms of violence, torture and trauma. They have witnessed the disappearance or death of their loved ones. Some have lost their homes and communities. The office continues to struggle in dealing with frustrated refugees some of whom have developed psychological problems including a few cases suffering from severe forms of depression...

## **2. Report on Impact and Achievements regarding UNHCR Strategy in the Country per Population of Concern / Theme**

### **2.1. Population of Concern / Theme 1: Ensure that there is a real protection space in Lebanon for Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees and provide improved services to persons of concern.**

First objective: Suspend deportations, and suspend or at least decrease the number of arrests and detentions. As mentioned above, asylum-seekers and refugees continue to be subject to arrest and detention on account of their illegal entry or/and illegal stay. In addition to constant lobbying and sensitization, achieving this objective will require the systematic monitoring of places of detention and timely interventions through UNHCR's NGO network. The timely legal representation to prevent imprisonment on account of illegal entry will also be a must. Training of law-enforcement agents and judges on refugee law, as well as lawyers will also play an important role in preventing the arrest of asylum-seekers and refugees. To address these issues, there is a need to develop a network of lawyers through UNHCR's funded project with Caritas, as well as with the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Second objective: Secure a more generous residence scheme whereby asylum-seekers and refugees can legally work and earn their own living in a secure environment free from exploitation. This should reduce child labour, since parents with irregular status often send their children to work so as to avoid identity checks. Legal assistance and advocacy will play a major role in achieving this objective. The office will also pursue the amendment of the existing legal framework (see Promotion of Refugee Protection below). In order to promote better acceptance of UNHCR documents, the office will conduct a number of training sessions for law-enforcement agents in cooperation with NGOs and civil society. This office will intensify the relations with and training of the media in order to sensitise the Lebanese society and to galvanise their support for the refugee population.

Third objective: Ensure and facilitate access to services. Asylum-seekers and refugees should have access to the basic services, most notably education and medical care. UNHCR used to provide regular financial assistance to almost all recognized refugees. Recently, UNHCR shifted from automatic and open ended financial assistance to a more targeted one, based on individual needs assessment, using a solution oriented approach.

Supporting vocational and skill training, as well as providing tools, all with an enhanced individual follow-up and support to ensure initiation of sustainable and cost effective interventions that decrease dependency on humanitarian assistance, is now a priority.

Fourth objective: Prevent and address the instances of SGBV, with interventions particularly addressing women at risk. This entails identification, assessments, empowerment activities, legal and financial support, as well as support to children. Particular attention will be given to survivors of torture and trauma in collaboration with specialized organizations.

### **Asylum-seekers and refugees of various nationalities (non-Iraqis)**



### *Achievements to date*

While the majority of asylum-seekers and refugees continue to be Iraqi nationals, a sizeable number of non-Iraqis also approach the office seeking international protection. Some 350 non-Iraqis are currently registered with UNHCR as asylum-seekers and refugees with the Sudanese being the majority, followed by Somalis. In 2006, the Beirut Office revamped its reception and status determination procedures in order to fully implement the RSD Procedural Standards. This initiative was also driven by the results of a series of participatory assessments with various segments of the refugee population, one of their main concerns being better access to the office and UNHCR services. In addition, the Office has established a system of regular visits to prisons and places of detention to intervene on behalf of detained asylum-seekers and refugees. While detention remains a major concern in Lebanon, UNHCR has been able to stop deportations whenever it was informed about potential cases.

### *Partnership and collaboration*

UNHCR Lebanon is establishing partnerships in three different areas, legal aid, detention and assistance, keeping in mind all the necessary cross cutting issues. As to legal aid, the Office will continue to work with Caritas to provide legal counselling to and representation of individual asylum-seekers and refugees. The cooperation with the Bar Association for pro-bono representation will be expanded. Furthermore, a coordination mechanism has been established with a number of human rights NGOs and civic groups, most notably “Frontiers”, who represent asylum-seekers and refugees at court as well as at UNHCR’s RSD process. In the area of detention, the Beirut Office will expand its operational partnership with a number of NGOs having projects or working in places of detention such as CARITAS, MECC, MDM, AJEM and Frontiers through the existing “Working Group on Detention”. This network serves as a monitoring and intervention mechanism.

The Office has a particularly close partnership with five national NGO’s.

The Middle East Council of Churches (MECC), which has been the longest standing implementing partner, continues to provide a set of services to the refugee population. These services include health, primary/lower secondary education, vocational training, social counselling, home visits, and financial assistance to the most vulnerable after a detailed assessment. The most recent partner,

A Lebanese NGO called Arc-en-Ciel(AeC), has recently taken over the management of UNHCR’ Community Centre, in addition to running its own independently funded centres across Lebanon with a comprehensive programme targeting the disabled, youth and other individuals with specific needs, to which refugees as well have access. Given the important role of the Community Center, UNHCR will seek to continue its partnership with Arc-en-Ciel for 2008-2009.

Caritas Lebanon (Migrants Centre) with its own sources of funding provides assistance among others, to “extremely vulnerable Iraqis” (EVI) in areas of education, health, financial support, non-food items, social counselling, etc. In 2005, a sub-agreement was signed with Caritas in order to improve their education assistance programme for Iraqis. Currently, a legal aid project is also implemented by this partner.

The Chaldean Charity Association receives independent funds and provides ad hoc assistance mainly to Chaldean Iraqis in areas of primary education, health, non-food items, financial support, etc. Since 2005, UNHCR has provided support to the association’s education programme.

Frontiers Association is a Lebanese advocacy NGO that will carry out awareness trainings in 2007 and beyond for pro-bono lawyers and lawyers given the increasing importance of legal intervention on behalf of refugees, especially for cases of arrests on account of illegal entry and prolonged detention. UNHCR will be supporting some of the Frontiers’ training activities.

UNHCR will continue its coordination with Medecins du Monde (MDM), AJEM and other relevant actors who have been granted access to places of detention. Access to detention centres around the country will continue to be a priority.

UNHCR has revised its health package to support persons of concern on a case by case basis following a social assessment. This is a marked change from the previous coverage of 85% for inpatient and outpatient medical services accorded to all recognized refugees.

Refugees have access to local clinics and dispensaries for subsidized consultation and medicine. However, certain gaps have been noted such as the lack of readily available chronic medications. Another gap is that admission for hospitalization relies on presentation of some form of social security, private insurance or provided proof of capacity to pay which most refugees cannot secure.

In the education sector, UNHCR will focus on providing skill training for out-of-school children for whom formal education is not possible. UNHCR will also provide remedial courses to recent out-of-school children, as well as education grants. Language and computer courses will also be provided. All this will be carried out through the Community Centre and in collaboration with other partners.

UNHCR will also promote partnerships with other UN sister agencies and international organizations with the aim of better protection and assistance to refugees. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has already expressed its interest in including out-of-school refugee children for skill training under its International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). UNHCR is also expanding its collaboration with the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), since the latter has finally been granted access to all places of detention.

Moreover, many international NGOs interested in working with refugees have approached UNHCR, such as Danish Refugee Council (DRC), International Medical Corps, International Orthodox Christian Churches, Care, Relief International, Save the Children – Sweden, Save the Children – UK and the Norwegian Refugee Council. In order to maximise the assistance and prevent overlap, UNHCR will coordinate all these initiatives.

#### *Assumptions and constraints*

- The general reluctance to accepting refugees and integrate them in Lebanon will persist. Similarly, the Lebanese government maintains its policy of circumscribing the protection space in the country by treating asylum-seekers and refugees as illegal migrants, resorting to arrests and detention and depriving them of the right to work.
- The Lebanese government will not accede to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol during the planning period.
- For most of the non-Iraqi refugees, the situation in their countries of origin, in particular Sudan and Somalia, will remain volatile, and there will probably be no opportunity for large-scale, organized repatriation.

#### *Potential for durable solutions and phase out*

UNHCR Lebanon will continue to explore and assist in every opportunity for voluntary repatriation on an individual basis. As the government will continue to resist any attempt to locally integrate any refugee, resettlement will remain the only viable and principled durable solution. It is expected that the number of non-Iraqi asylum-seekers and refugees will remain constant with the number of resettled cases and new arrivals balancing out. In a country where the government refuses to take responsibility for non-Palestinian refugees, a phase out strategy is a non-starter.

### **Iraqis**

#### *Achievements to date*

Until the end of 2006, UNHCR implemented the policy of Temporary Protection (TP) to all Iraqis approaching the office in Lebanon. This has had mixed results as the Lebanese authorities did not officially accept the UNHCR policy and Iraqis continued to remain in a limbo situation. UNHCR

stopped short of providing them with full refugee status while the authorities continued to consider them as illegal immigrants. In the course of 2006 the office improved drastically its registration procedures as the entry point to documentation and access to different kinds of services provided by UNHCR's implementing partners. The introduction of the new policy of prima facie recognition has increased the number of refugees registered with UNHCR. The first two months of 2007 alone, UNHCR recognized over 570 Iraqi individuals upon registration. As seen in Annex 3, this surpasses the total accumulative number of Iraqi refugees (561) recognized by UNHCR Lebanon in previous years. At the time of writing, the Office in Beirut was recruiting 4 new registration clerks to clear a 5-month registration backlog, created by a surge in new arrivals. As it is the case for non-Iraqi refugees, UNHCR has established a system of regular visits to prisons and places of detention to intervene on behalf of detained asylum-seekers and refugees.

#### *Partnership and collaboration*

See non-Iraqi population.

A mapping exercise was conducted in early 2007 and a number of local NGOs and charity institutions were identified. They provide wide range of support education, health, social and material assistance. Coordination meetings with over 15 services providers has taken place with the aim of identifying and exploring areas of further collaboration. So far, areas of concern were deemed to be primary education, primary and secondary health care, skill training and financial support. The problem of shelter remains to be the most challenging issue, especially for female headed households. Specific interventions for women at risk are required.

In a bid to know more about the Iraqi population in Lebanon, UNHCR, after consultation with and approval by the Ministry of Interior, has requested DRC to conduct an in-depth survey that is currently taking place, in order to determine profile, numbers, locations, needs and coping mechanisms of this group, as well as provide information on recommended areas of intervention. The results of this survey will help in orienting the 2008-2009 programme.

One of the major challenges will be in the health sector. The Office continues to explore the best options for medical support through arrangements with implementing and operational partners and collaboration with specific hospitals and clinics. This includes improving the capacity for detection, psychosocial counselling as well as setting up mechanisms for referral and treatment. Support from HQs, namely CDGECS, will be required in terms of technical guidance and training. Although some of the cost may be covered under the health budget, additional resources will be required.

#### *Assumptions and constraints*

- While wary of an increasing number of Iraqis arriving in Lebanon, the number is perceived as “manageable” by the Lebanese authorities and they do not resort to drastic measures against Iraqis such as complete border closure and systematic arrests and deportation targeting Iraqi nationals.
- The situation in Iraq will continue to remain unstable and forced displacement continues.

#### *Potential for durable solutions and phase out*

Based on the assumptions above, the situation in Iraqi is unlikely to improve during the planning period. UNHCR will not be in a position to promote or even facilitate the return of Iraqis. Given Lebanon's uncompromising position against local integration, UNHCR will need to heavily invest in programmes to support the temporary dignified stay of Iraqis in Lebanon, while pursuing resettlement for well identified groups and individuals.

## **2.2. Population of Concern / Theme 2. Promotion of refugee protection**

#### *Achievements to date*

As previously mentioned, the war and subsequent political tensions have put on hold most of the initiatives taken by the Office between October 2005 and the July-August 2006 war. Nevertheless, the

Office organised in January 2007 two workshops which had been postponed, one for journalists, which was attended by representatives of all important media in Lebanon, and the other one for the staff of the General Security. Both workshops yielded immediate results, with the Lebanese press qualitatively and quantitatively increasing its reporting about Iraqi refugees, and the General Security becoming more flexible and tolerant about the stay of Iraqis in Lebanon.

#### *Overall objectives*

UNHCR Lebanon's overall objectives in the area of promotion of refugee protection are threefold. **First**, the existing MoU with the GSO needs to be revised and the discussions which had been abruptly cut off because of the war in the summer of 2006 need to resume in earnest. **Second**, the office will lobby for the amendment of the 1962 Law. **Third**, there needs to be a climate of tolerance and support for refugees among the Lebanese public so as to enhance protection in the society.

For these objectives to be achieved, the Office will intensify its lobbying activities with various stakeholders, including GSO officials and parliamentarians, once the political situation allows UNHCR to engage in meaningful discussions on policy issues with the government and Lebanese politicians. The celebration of World Refugee Day will be expanded to cover a wider audience of the Lebanese society through engagement of national NGOs, universities, schools and artists. The Community Centre will continue to play an important role in creating opportunities for interaction between refugees and local population, through joint activities, expansion of art and music, participation of refugee children in national events, such as the International Marathon, Children's Parliament, etc...

The office will also highlight the role of media in correcting misperception about refugees, spreading positive messages in order to raise the awareness on non-Palestinian refugees and galvanise the support of Lebanese people for better treatment and protection space for the refugee population.

#### *Partnership and collaboration*

UNHCR has its traditional interlocutors in the government such as the GSO, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These contacts have expanded to the judiciary and legislative in the course of 2005-6, as well as to other ministries, such as the Ministries of Social Affairs, Education and Health. UNHCR Lebanon will also collaborate closely with NGOs and civil society with advocacy outfit. The office also will continue to have regular interaction with the main media outlets in Lebanon.

#### *Assumptions and constraints*

- The general reluctance to accept refugees and integrate them in Lebanon will persist.
- The political situation in Lebanon will remain volatile and policy-level discussions will be dependent on how the situation evolves.

### **2.3. Population of Concern / Theme 3. Regional functions and support to other offices in the region, in particular – but not limited to – the Resettlement Hub**

#### *Operational Context*

The Office in Beirut, in addition to being a Country Office for Lebanon, has now become a Regional Hub, concentrating four regional global functions: a Resettlement Hub, composed of several staff, community services, RSD and registration. It is expected that the Beirut Hub will play an important role in 2008-2009 as a service provider, as contributing to policy making and as a natural link between the functional units and the Bureau at Headquarters on one hand, and the field on the other. Since the Iraqi caseload will continue to be by far the largest in the region, the Hub will play an important role in ensuring consistency at the regional level and in having an approach which creates a proper balance between community services, assistance, protection and resettlement.

Since the establishment in December 2005 of a Regional Resettlement Hub based in the Beirut Office and with a dual reporting line to the Resettlement Service and the Representative (representing the MENA Bureau), Beirut has served as a key regional outpost providing coordination, support and oversight for the conduct of resettlement activities in the Bureau. In 2008 and 2009, the Hub is expected to continue these functions, in respect of both large refugee populations such as the Iraqis, but also in favour of intractable and sensitive situations.

## UNHCR strategy

### *Achievements to date*

The RSD regional global function is new and will play an essential role in ensuring that the RSD procedural standards are fully implemented in all offices in the region. In addition and under the supervision of the Representative, it will become the focal point for exclusion, a major issue when it comes to the Iraqi caseload. The post of Regional Global Senior Registration Officer will be transferred from Cairo to Beirut in the course of 2007 and the main priority for the incumbent will be the registration of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees in the region and to put in place checks and balances.

The Regional Global Senior Community Services Officer provides technical support to offices in the region to ensure that policy priorities are met in a coherent and consistent manner. Community development approach, age and gender mainstreaming, sexual gender based violence, education and child protection are key areas in that respect. The Regional Global Senior Community Services Officer has been working in collaboration with CDGECS to adopt and implement a strategy for assistance programmes for Iraqi refugees and has initiated mapping exercises in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to promote and expand partnership with new NGO's and charity organizations.

Since its inception, the Beirut Hub has bolstered resettlement from the region by: increasing numbers of persons submitted, and accelerating the speed with which they are submitted; increasing acceptance rates by improving submission quality; providing significant and timely (emergency, quick impact) support to field offices; bringing resettlement into mainstream of UNHCR protection and solutions strategies in the region (e.g. Maghreb, Iraqis); helping to use resettlement in a strategic fashion, in particular in tight asylum situations and in respect of protracted refugee situations; and serving as a one-stop liaison with regionally based embassies.

The existence of a Regional Resettlement Hub was of major significance in respect of the Office's new policy towards Iraqi refugees announced at the end of 2006, which proposed a central role for resettlement. The Hub has provided crucial support and guidance functions to offices in the region as they have prepared to meet the challenge of making 20,000 Iraqi submissions in 2007.

The Resettlement Hub will continue to work towards the global protection and durable solutions goals by:

- Coordinating: serving as an outpost of the Headquarters Resettlement Service in the field, liaising with regionally based resettlement countries; promoting the strategic use of resettlement in support of wider protection and solutions strategies; ensuring harmony and consistency amongst UNHCR offices in respect of global and regional resettlement policies and practice, in coordination with the respective Bureaux and the Resettlement Service; collating and analyzing statistical data on submissions;
- Supporting: building the capacity of country offices to effectively and efficiently manage resettlement through training, reviewing resettlement submissions, managing deployments in response to specific needs, and fielding support missions;
- Monitoring: ensuring the transparency and maintaining the integrity of the resettlement process through the review of submissions; field missions; and the collation and analysis of performance data.

The Hub will take a sub-regional, joined-up approach to refugee resettlement from MENA. It will focus on Iraqis in the Middle East, Somalis in Yemen and the Middle East, the North Africa situation (mainly mixed flows of Sub-Saharan Africans to Europe), and smaller, intractable' situations (these situations are usually protracted, involve difficult but finite populations who share common claims and are often 'residual', and who are located in countries with very tight asylum climates where resettlement is one of the only possible options).

#### *Assumptions and constraints*

The assumption behind the regional global functions is a strong support from both the Bureau and the functional units, and more generally, a clear policy about the possible further decentralisation process. Regional global functions also need adequate funding and resources.

Some of the challenges related to regional global functions will be:

- Managing refugee expectations;
- Ensuring that resettlement does not predominate as a protection tool or solution, but is balanced by the other available protection, assistance and solution responses;
- Turning strategic use into a reality;
- Maintaining an appropriate level of human and financial resources.

### **3. Summary Management Strategy**

The management strategy of the Beirut Office is guided by the following considerations:

- The Office in Beirut is not only a Branch Office but also a Regional Hub, with four vital regional global functions (Resettlement Hub, Community Services, Registration and RSD) operating from Beirut. With the exception of the Resettlement Hub, which has received some additional funding from the USA (BPRM), all the other functions have to be financially covered by the Branch Office's ABOD and the officers receive administrative support (travel, communication, payment of salary, etc.) from the Branch Office. It is our experience that every regional global officer requires a travel budget of US \$ 12,000-18,000 in order to carry out her/his regional functions. Part of this cost will be absorbed by country offices, but part of it will be charged against Beirut's ABOD.
- Beirut is under UN security phase 2 and mainly because of insecurity has been downgraded to a D duty station. Unfortunately, security has a cost. UNHCR, like all other UN agencies in Lebanon, is participating in the common UN security system and UNHCR's financial participation amounts to US \$ 38,690.- / year. In addition, contracting the company providing guards at UNHCR's premises costs US\$ 50,160.- / year, out of which half is charged against the AB and the other half against the SB for Iraq. The total cost of security under our regular ABOD is close to US \$ 60,000.- and this amount is unfortunately a non-negotiable "given".
- Lebanon is a very expensive country, with some of our administrative costs being artificially high, such as internet (over US \$ 22,000.- / year) and phones, which are the highest in the region and much higher than in most European countries. Renting office space and utilities are also above average.
- It is understood that the additional costs – programme, ABOD and posts – linked to the dramatic increase in the number of Iraqi refugees will be absorbed by the SB for Iraq. But it is also understood that the annual budget approved by EXCOM should reflect the regular needs of the office and help it fulfil its core functions. Based on this understanding, the Office in Beirut is proposing the creation of four posts, all of them national positions, and the upgrading of another national post. The justification for post creations / upgrading is the following:
  - a) Driver G-2: At the moment, the Office has two driver's posts for a relatively large and complex operation. Since August 2003, an additional driver has been recruited under the SB for Iraq. The

incumbent has been under FTA for close to four years and DHRM has asked on several occasions the FTA position to be converted into a regular post. It is unfortunately obvious that an office like Beirut, which combines a Country Representation and a Regional Hub (with four regional global international posts under the AB), cannot operate with only two drivers. Two additional facts need to be taken into account. First because the office operates in a very volatile security environment, staff cannot use taxis for security reasons. So, any official meeting or any travel to and from the airport has to be in UNHCR official vehicles. Secondly, there is an average of 150 refugees or asylum seekers in detention at any one time in Lebanon. Interestingly, at least half of them are non-Iraqis. Each person of concern needs to be seen by UNHCR staff, sometimes two or three times (registration, first instance RSD interview, second instance RSD interview, health intervention, etc.). In one year, there is an average of 1700 visits to detained refugees or asylum seekers. Unfortunately, refugees and asylum seekers in detention are not concentrated in Beirut. Since UNHCR's rapid response is the only way to avoid deportation, i.e. refoulement, the Office in Beirut needs to have two drivers on duty just for detention. In this case, the creation of the driver's post is a direct response to an acute protection call.

b) Programme Clerk G-4: Following its involvement in the emergency IDP operation in July 2006, UNHCR has now become a major humanitarian player in Lebanon. UNHCR has expanded its partnership both with the NGO community and government bodies. An operation of the complexity and the size of Lebanon would normally require one international staff and one national staff. Since it is possible to find qualified staff in Lebanon, the Office in Beirut would like to propose a less costly scenario, which combines the upgrading of the G-7 post to NOA (Assistant Programme Officer) and the creation of a G-4 Programme Clerk's post. For almost 20 years, UNHCR had one single implementing partner (MECC), with a "no surprise" care and maintenance project. Since 2005, UNHCR had to diversify this partnership to include legal aid, education and health projects. Given the sectarian nature of the Lebanese society and the fact that some 75% of the persons of concern are Muslim, UNHCR could not limit itself to having Christian NGO partners. An effort has been made to identify Muslim NGO partners operating in areas with high concentration of refugees and asylum seekers. A number of sub-agreements with these new partners will be signed in the course of 2007 and will be extended in 2008-2009. The volume of programme work between 2005 and 2007 has tripled and this is mainly due to the initiatives taken by the office to increase and improve partnership, and implement the participatory approach advocated by the High Commissioner.

c) Senior Administrative Clerk G-5: As mentioned earlier, the fact that Beirut is both a Branch Office and a Regional Hub has created additional work for the Assistant Administrative Officer. Regional global officer posts are particularly taxing in terms of administrative support since their travel requires booking of air tickets, hotel reservations, airport transportation, etc. Two tasks have been particularly time consuming. First, since Lebanon is under UN security phase 2 every travel to / out of Lebanon as well as every in-country trip outside Beirut requires formal security clearance. For the first two months of 2007, the Office did request and followed up on more than 100 security clearances. For each security clearance, a form needs to be filled. Secondly, the Office is systematically claiming the reimbursement of VAT. It is a very bureaucratic process and unfortunately, UNHCR is not allowed to deduct VAT at the time of payment, but has to claim it post facto with the Ministry of Finances. UNHCR has already recovered US\$ 10,000.- for expenses incurred during the first half of 2006 and is in the process of recovering US\$ 31,000.- for the second half of 2006. The amount to be recovered in 2007 should be around US\$ 20,000.-. If UNHCR Beirut has been able to fill in and follow up on security clearance requests, obtain reimbursement of VAT and offer decent services to regional global officers it is thanks to the recruitment under the IDP project of a G-5 Senior Administrative Clerk, giving a hand to a completely overwhelmed Assistant Administrative Officer, dealing with the whole of the administrative, finances and human resources tasks. The Office strongly believes that the tasks highlighted above are core tasks which need to be reflected in the AB. It is also believed that the cost of a G-5 post will be easily upset by the savings made thanks to improved administrative and financial

support (amply illustrated by the reimbursement of the VAT). Since the IDP programme will be phased out at the end of 2007, the G-5 position needs to be created under AB in 2008-2009.

d) Protection Assistant G-6: Since August 2003, a temporary post of Repatriation Assistant has been funded by the Iraq SB. Though the incumbent has been only marginally involved with repatriation (given the situation of generalized violence in Iraq) - she has mainly been engaged in activities aiming at preventing detention and deportation -, the FTA position was titled Repatriation Assistant (post # 5269). As for the driver's post, DHRM has been challenging the "chronic" extension of such a post. The Office in Beirut is recommending the conversion of this FTA into a regular post at the same grade, but re-titled Protection Assistant, to reflect the activities undertaken. As mentioned earlier, detention will remain the most acute protection problem in Lebanon, with an average of 1700 visits to persons of concern in detention. There is an imperative need for these visits to be coordinated by a protection person, who will prioritize the visits, assign legal representation when needed and recommend protection interventions to the Senior Protection Officer. Given that unattended detainees are always at risk of deportation (UNHCR can only stop deportation after the person has been seen by UNHCR), the creation of this post will be at the core of the core of UNHCR's protection mandate in Lebanon.

e) Upgrading of post # 541023 Senior Programme Assistant G-7 to Assistant Programme Officer (NOA): The comments made concerning the creation of the Programme Clerk post above are valid for this upgrading, in the sense that the increase in the number of partners justifies closer scrutiny, a proper reporting line and checks and balances. In the absence of an international Programme Officer, the financial responsibility which goes with the current programme should not be left with a G staff. With the exception of Protection and Resettlement, functional units in the Office (Administration, Community Services) are led by a national officer. This unbalance towards programme, which has assumed increased responsibilities during the last two years, is neither justified nor managerially sound.

- Finally, it is important to understand that protecting refugees in a country like Lebanon, which has been constantly resisting the very idea of becoming an asylum country, requires a strong, credible and fully-capacitated UNHCR. If UNHCR has been successful on the deportation (refoulement) front and partly successful with detention cases, it is because we have been following up on every single case and building our own response capacity as well as a strong partnership with both government agencies and NGOs. If the latter were to be dismantled or weakened for lack of human and financial resources, the protection climate would immediately deteriorate.



## Part Two - RBM Results Tables by Programme

- Summary Table for the Programme showing overall Budget and Sectoral Budgets
- Sectoral Tables showing Sector Objectives, Baselines, Targets, Specific Links to GSO Sub-Objectives and Targets, Summary Budgets by target for implementing partners and UNHCR

<b>Country (or Sub-Region)</b>	<b>Lebanon</b>		
<b>Population of Concern/ Theme # 1 and 2</b>	<b>Asylum-seekers and Refugees – Iraqis &amp; other nationalities</b> <b>Promotion of refugee protection</b>	<b>Relevant Project(s):</b>	<b>Care &amp; Maintenance CM200</b>
<b>Overall Goal (s)</b>	<b>Ensure real protection space in Lebanon for Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees.</b> <b>Provide improved services to persons of concern</b>	<b>Budget for the Programme</b>	
		<b>2008 \$ 1,004,947</b>	<b>2009 \$ 1,318,163</b> <b>Total \$ 2,323,110</b>

<b>Sector Objective(s)<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Current year situation</b>	<b>Objective for 2008 to 2009</b>	<b>Impact indicators</b>
1. a Sector O: Protection	Asylum-seekers and refugees are subject to arrest and detention in Lebanon	To suspend arrest, detention and deportation of asylum-seekers and refugees	Number of deportation nil; number of arbitrary arrest and detention significantly reduced.

Baseline situation for core problems/ areas of focus in sector as of end 2006 <sup>2</sup>	Link to GSO <sup>3</sup>	Target end 2007	Target end 2008	Implementing Partner Budget for 2008 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2008 in USD	Target end 2009	Implementing Partner Budget for 2009 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2009 in USD
1.1 Detention for illegal entry (PA)	1.a	Timely & regular legal representation of refugees by UNHCR & partners in court and detention centers throughout the country.	Timely & regular legal representation of refugees by UNHCR & partners in court and detention centers throughout the country.	\$21,635	\$35,929	Timely & regular legal representation of refugees by UNHCR & partners in court and detention centers throughout the country.	\$33,600	\$35,929
1.2 Non recognition of refugee certificates	1.a	Amendment of MOU signed between GSO and UNHCR. Legalization of stay	Amendment of MOU signed between GSO and UNHCR. Legalization of stay			Amendment of MOU signed between GSO and UNHCR. Legalization of stay through obtaining residence and work		

<sup>1</sup> Maximum 3 objectives per sector

<sup>2</sup> Problems that require a multi-sectoral response should be planned and budgeted for in each relevant sector. For each core problem/ area of focus indicate the source of the baseline information, (Participatory Assessment (PA), Standards and Indicator Report (SIR), Annual Protection Report (APR), Joint Food Assessment (JFA), Other Assessments (OA)

<sup>3</sup> Indicate the specific numeric reference to GSO Sub-Objectives, e.g. 2.1, 3.1, etc.

		through obtaining residence and work permit.	through obtaining residence and work permit. Amendment of the Law of 1962			permit. Amendment of the Law of 1962.		
1.3 Discrimination and exploitation by authorities and employers.	1.a	Awareness & training sessions provided to law-enforcement agents & civil society.	Awareness & training sessions provided to law-enforcement agents & civil society.			Awareness & training sessions provided to law-enforcement agents & civil society.		
<b>Sub-Totals</b>				\$21,635	\$35,929		\$33,600	\$35,929
<b>Total Budget for the Sector</b>				\$ 57,564			\$69,529	

Sector Objective(s) <sup>4</sup>	Current year situation	Objective for 2008 to 2009	Impact indicators
2. a <b>Sector C: Domestic Needs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High cost of living (basic needs i.e rent &amp; utilities) and inflation in Lebanon reduces purchasing power of vulnerable groups.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial assistance to be used as protection tool and alleviate the burden on most vulnerable cases only.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Needs assessment carried out on all cases requesting assistance to be provided to most vulnerable ones.</li> </ul>
3. b <b>Sector F: Health</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of readily available chronic medications. Gap in the admission of refugees to hospitals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical Referral system as well as adequate medical support package put in place.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>80% of refugees are guided to medical facilities and receive adequate health coverage.</li> </ul>
2. c <b>Sector H: Community Services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Systematic &amp; monthly financial assistance shifted to providence of grants based on needs assessment only.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refugees to progressively become self-reliant . Refugee's empowerment and capacity building increased</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of asylum seekers and refugees assisted in the development of their skills and livelihood.</li> </ul>
2. d <b>Sector I: Education</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Children are reportedly out of school, working to support their family and sparing their father from being arrested</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All children registered with UNHCR are enrolled in primary and lower secondary education.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>95% of children receive education grant &amp;/or remedial courses.</li> </ul>
2. e <b>Sector P: Agency Operational Support</b>	IP staff receives monthly salaries as well as part of UNHCR staff holding a service contract (UNDP). Other admin costs are charged to sector P as well.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Persons of concern receive adequate services in a professional and effective manner.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All salaries and administrative costs paid on time.</li> </ul>

<sup>4</sup> Maximum 3 objectives per sector

Baseline situation for core problems/ areas of focus in sector as of end 2006 <sup>5</sup>	Link to GSO <sup>6</sup>	Target end 2007	Target end 2008	Implementing Partner Budget for 2008 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2008 in USD	Target end 2009	Implementing Partner Budget for 2009 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2009 in USD
1.1 High cost of living (PA)	2.a	Alleviate the financial burden on most vulnerable cases among caseload.	Alleviate the financial burden on most vulnerable cases among caseload	\$93,008	Nil	Alleviate the financial burden on most vulnerable cases among caseload	\$232,862	Nil
1.2 Access to Healthcare (PA)	2.a	Improvement of Medical assistance package supporting maximum of persons and on a case by case basis.	Improvement of Medical assistance package supporting maximum of persons & on a case by case basis.	\$192,842	Nil	Improvement of Medical assistance package supporting maximum of persons and on a case by case basis.	\$ 355,076	Nil
1.3 High dependency on financial assistance. (PA)	2.b	Livelihood activities & support provided to all needy cases.	Livelihood activities & support provided to all needy cases.	\$122,695	Nil	Livelihood activities & support provided to all needy cases.	\$ 129,322	Nil
1.4 Working children (PA)	2.c	Education grant & remedial courses provided to all children at school age.	Education grant & remedial courses provided to all children at school age.	\$ 149,224	Nil	Education grant & remedial courses provided to all children at school age.	\$ 148,561	Nil
1.5 Access of Refugees to adequate services	2.e	Services are delivered in a professional manner.	Services are delivered in a professional manner.	\$358,614	\$31,000	Services are delivered in a professional manner	\$351,813	\$31,000
<b>Sub-Totals</b>				\$ 916,383	\$31,000		\$ 1,217,634	\$31,000
<b>Total Budget for the Sectors</b>				\$ 947,383			\$ 1,248,634	

<sup>5</sup> Problems that require a multi-sectoral response should be planned and budgeted for in each relevant sector. For each core problem/ area of focus indicate the source of the baseline information, (Participatory Assessment (PA), Standards and Indicator Report (SIR), Annual Protection Report (APR), Joint Food Assessment (JFA), Other Assessments (OA)

<sup>6</sup> Indicate the specific numeric reference to GSO Sub-Objectives, e.g. 2.1, 3.1, etc.

<b>Population of Concern/ Theme # 3</b>	<b>Regional Resettlement</b>	<b>Relevant Project(s):</b>	<b>Resettlement RE500</b>	
<b>Overall Goal (s)</b>	<b>Resettlement unit to serve as a key regional outpost in respect of refugee population</b>	<b>Budget for the Programme</b>		
		<b>2008 \$ 99,640</b>	<b>2009 \$ 118,568</b>	<b>Total \$ 218,208</b>

<b>Sector Objective(s)<sup>7</sup></b>	<b>Current year situation</b>	<b>Objective for 2008 to 2009</b>	<b>Impact indicators</b>
1. a Sector C: Domestic needs	Refugees are overwhelmed with financial dues before departure on resettlement	Refugees depart in safety and dignity	Number of most vulnerable refugees is given resettlement financial grant.

Baseline situation for core problems/ areas of focus in sector as of end 2006 <sup>8</sup>	Link to GSO <sup>9</sup>	Target end 2007	Target end 2008	Implementing Partner Budget for 2008 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2008 in USD	Target end 2009	Implementing Partner Budget for 2009 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2009 in USD
1.1 Refugees are in need of financial grant for their travel to the 3 <sup>rd</sup> country.	1.a	Needy refugees receive financial grant on a case by case assessment.	Needy refugees receive financial grant on a case by case assessment.	\$15,000	Nil	Needy refugees receive financial grant on a case by case assessment.	\$20,000	Nil
<b>Sub-Totals</b>				\$15,000	Nil		\$20,000	Nil
<b>Total Budget for the Sector</b>				\$15,000			\$20,000	

<b>Sector Objective(s)<sup>10</sup></b>	<b>Current year situation</b>	<b>Objective for 2008 to 2009</b>	<b>Impact indicators</b>
2. a Sector O: Protection	The General security office issues a temporary Laissez passer to ICs charging \$40.- each	Refugees travel is processed in a smooth and timely manner.	100% of Laissez passer issued and paid and delivered to ICs.
2.b Sector P: Agency Operational Support	Same as CM200	Same as CM200	Same as CM200

<sup>7</sup> Maximum 3 objectives per sector

<sup>8</sup> Problems that require a multi-sectoral response should be planned and budgeted for in each relevant sector. For each core problem/ area of focus indicate the source of the baseline information, (Participatory Assessment (PA), Standards and Indicator Report (SIR), Annual Protection Report (APR), Joint Food Assessment (JFA), Other Assessments (OA)

<sup>9</sup> Indicate the specific numeric reference to GSO Sub-Objectives, e.g. 2.1, 3.1, etc.

<sup>10</sup> Maximum 3 objectives per sector

Baseline situation for core problems/ areas of focus in sector as of end 2006 <sup>11</sup>	Link to GSO <sup>12</sup>	Target end 2007	Target end 2008	Implementing Partner Budget for 2008 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2008 in USD	Target end 2009	Implementing Partner Budget for 2009 in USD	UNHCR Budget for 2009 in USD
1.1 Refugees should obtain LPs before departure.	2.a	All refugees accepted on resettlement depart on time and with adequate travel documents	All refugees accepted on resettlement depart on time and with adequate travel documents	\$30,333	Nil	All refugees accepted on resettlement depart on time and with adequate travel documents	\$44,261	Nil
1.2 Access of refugees to adequate services	2.b	Services are delivered in a professional manner	Services are delivered in a professional manner	\$33,216	\$ 21,091	Services are delivered in a professional manner	\$ 33,216	\$21,091
<b>Sub-Totals</b>				\$54,307	Nil		\$54,307	Nil
<b>Total Budget for the Sector</b>				\$84,640			\$98,568	

<sup>11</sup> Problems that require a multi-sectoral response should be planned and budgeted for in each relevant sector. For each core problem/ area of focus indicate the source of the baseline information, (Participatory Assessment (PA), Standards and Indicator Report (SIR), Annual Protection Report (APR), Joint Food Assessment (JFA), Other Assessments (OA)

<sup>12</sup> Indicate the specific numeric reference to GSO Sub-Objectives, e.g. 2.1, 3.1, etc.

### Part Three- Comprehensive Assessment of Needs per Programme<sup>13</sup>

- Contributions by the host government, refugee and/or local communities
- Financial contributions of partners

Programme	UNHCR	WFP (where applicable)	Operational partners	Implementing partners	Unmet needs	Total
CM200 - 2008	\$ 1,694,313	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$ 1,694,313
RE500 - 2008	\$ 141,448	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$ 141,448
CM200 - 2009	\$ 2,169,562	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$ 2,169,562
RE500 - 2009	\$ 181,176	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$ 181,176
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 4, 186,499</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>\$ 4, 186,499</b>

#### *Key Assumptions:*

- Urban caseload from different countries and residing in scattered locations in general in communities with similar ethnic and religious background.
- A detailed picture of comprehensive needs will be available after the survey that is currently carried out by DRC on the Iraqi caseload. It is our understanding that the most urgent identified needs will be covered by the Iraqi Special Programme.
- Impossible to fully quantify needs.
- No food assistance is delivered
- Majority of operational partners are charity organizations that are assisting mainly vulnerable Lebanese groups. Migrants and refugees also receive some assistance but these organizations do not keep separate records, therefore it is impossible to quantify their contributions to the refugee programme.
- Same applies to IPs; they certainly will absorb part of the administrative costs. In some cases they will provide detail information on their contribution at a later stage, when they will have clear knowledge of how much they will receive from their donors.

<sup>13</sup> The purpose of this table is to provide an indicative picture of the overall needs of persons/ issues of concern to UNHCR and to show the important contributions of other partners. Compiling this information is limited by the challenge of trying to apply standards in the contexts in which UNHCR is working. UNHCR's approach in preparing this table is to undertake standards-based assessments of need which take into account implementation capacity as well as what is reasonable in a given country context. The table includes the key assumptions underpinning the arrival at estimated financial requirements.