Country Strategy Evaluation:
Peru 2019-2023

UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

ORIGINAL VERSION IN SPANISH

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UNHCR Evaluation Office

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ABOD	Administrative budget
AWF	Affiliated workforce
CAREMI	Centros de Apoyo a Refugiados y Migrantes (Refugee and Migrant Support Centres)
CBI	Cash Based Interventions
CBP	Community-based Protection
CBO	Community-based organization
CCA	Common Country Analysis
CEBAF	Centro Binacional de Atención en Frontera (Binational Border Care Centre)
CEM	Centros de Emergencia Mujer (Women's Emergency Centres)
CEPR	Comisión Especial para los Refugiados (Special Commission for Refugees)
CIREMI	Comité Interreligioso para Migrantes y Refugiados (Interfaith Committee for Migrants and Refugees)
CMER	Calidad Migratoria Especial Residente (Special Resident Migration Status)
CMH	Calidad Migratoria Humanitaria (Humanitarian Migration Status)
CPP	Carnet de Permiso Temporal de Permanencia (Temporary Stay Permit Card)
DP	Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ENPOVE II	Encuesta sobre población venezolana que reside en el país (Survey of Living Conditions of the Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru)
EXP	Expenditure
FO	Field Office
FP	Field Presence
FTA	Fixed Term Appointment
FU	Field Unit
GBV	Gender-based violence
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoP	Government of Peru
HDI	Human Development Index
IACHR	Inter-American Court of Human Rights
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Office
IM	Information Management
INEI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (National Institute of Statistics and Informatics).
IOL	Indicative Operating Level
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LGBTQIA+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual and others
MTF	Multi-Functional Equipment

MTIGM	Mesa de Trabajo Intersectorial para la Gestión Migratoria (Intersectoral Working Group for Migration Management)
MYMP	Multi-year, Multi-Partner Protection and Solutions plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCR	Oficina del Coordinador Residente (Resident Coordinator's Office)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODE	Oficina Desconcentrada del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Deconcentrated Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
UN	United Nations
OL	Operating Level (approved prioritised budget)
OP	Needs-based Operations Plan Budget
OPS	Operational Budget
PNM	Política Nacional Migratoria (National Migration Policy)
PPA	Project Partnership Agreement
PTP	Permiso Temporal de Permanencia (Temporary Permit to Stay)
R4V	Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants
RARL	Research, Analysis, Reporting, and Learning Team
RBM	Results-Based Management
RSD	Refugee Status Determination
SAMMIR	Sede de Atención Migratoria para Migrantes y Refugiados (Migrant and Refugee Migration Centre)
SNM	Superintendecia Nacional de Migraciones (National Superintendency of Migration)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TA	Temporary appointment
TUPA	Texto Único de Procedimientos Administrativos (Consolidated Text of Administrative Procedures)
UNS	United Nations System
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Co-operation Framework
WGRM	Working Group on Refugees and Migrants
WFP	World Food Programme

READING NOTES

- The report uses the terms "refugees and migrants" or "Venezuelan population" or "forcibly displaced Venezuelan population" as this is the terminology commonly used by UNHCR, the United Nations system (UNS), the Working Group on Refugees and Migrants (WGRM), public administrations and other humanitarian and development actors in Peru (and other countries in the region receiving forcibly displaced Venezuelan populations). The term refugees and migrants are exclusive to the situation in Venezuela and is not a replacement of the note issued by UNHCR's Department of International Protection with the proposed new terminology for persons in need of international protection[1]).

- The evaluation team uses the terms "*Operation's needs-based budget*" and its acronym "*OP*" and "approved prioritised budget" and its acronym "*OL*" (Operating level budget), as presented in the Terms of Reference of the evaluation and in the document *UNHCR Budgetary Definitions; Last updated: 06 October 2022* made available to the evaluation team.

- The report uses the terms "asylum", "international protection" or sometimes "refugee status", following indications provided by UNHCR and precedents in the Inter-American system that recommend adopting only the term "asylum" and avoiding the use of the term "refuge".

- In general, the reference to UNHCR in the text also includes partner organisations and allies that play a strategic and crucial role in the deployment of programmes and actions on behalf of the forcibly displaced and stateless persons. The systematic use of the term "UNHCR and partners" has been avoided for ease of reading.

- The original version of the report has been written in Spanish. The English version is a machine translation, internally revised by the evaluation team and UNHCR Evaluation Office. The translation has not undergone professional translation and proof editing.

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1 Note on selected terminology alternatives to *Persons of Concern* (POC) [to UNHCR], DPI, UNHCR, March 2023. 1. "Forcibly displaced and stateless persons" or "People forced to flee and stateless people" - preferred option for regular use -. 2. Forcibly displaced and stateless persons. 3. Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), [refugee and/or IDP] returnees, and stateless persons.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The UNHCR's Country Strategy Evaluation in Peru aims to generate evidence to strengthen operational improvements in protection, solutions and assistance for forcibly displaced and stateless persons, including host communities. Country strategy evaluations focus on the UNHCR's strategic positioning, comparative advantage and performance.

The evaluation was conducted between September 2023 and May 2024, with fieldwork carried out in October 2023, with preliminary results produced by the end of 2023. The elaboration and revision of the different versions of the report took place between February and May 2024. The findings and recommendations of the evaluation of the UNHCR's country strategy in Peru have been used to inform the current Multi-Year Strategy.

The primary audiences for this evaluation are the UNHCR Representative in Peru, the Director of the Regional Bureau for the Americas and UNHCR staff, both in the country and in the Regional Office for the Americas. Secondary audiences are in-country partner organisations, other partners and donors.

PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The geographical scope covers the entire national territory, although the analysis has focused on areas with a UNHCR presence (borders of Tumbes and Tacna, Lima, Arequipa and Trujillo). The population scope covers mainly Venezuelan nationals seeking asylum, refugees and those in need of international protection, as well as host communities and stateless persons. In the case of statelessness, the absence of a statelessness law and the scarcity of data have limited the depth of analysis. In temporal terms, the evaluation covers the period between 2019 and June of 2023.

The evaluation is structured around five evaluation criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability), based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definitions, and four main evaluation questions. The evaluation analysis is structured at three distinct levels (strategic, operational and organisational). The evaluation uses a non-experimental design, adopts the principles of participation and utilisation, and is both summative and formative in nature. The evaluation incorporates the international (Geneva Convention and associated instruments, Global Compact on Refugees), regional (e.g. Cartagena Declaration) and national frameworks on asylum and international protection, as well as the 2030 Agenda perspective.

The evaluation used a mixed method approach, using primary and secondary sources, and was conducted in a hybrid format (face-to-face and remote). Data collection methods included: (i) Mapping and categorisation of key actors (81 key actors grouped into seven main categories, plus the UNHCR); (ii) Document review of some 309 documents (58% external and 42% UNHCR); (iii) Semi-structured interviews with 191 informants (63% women and 37% men); iv) Online surveys of UNHCR staff in Peru and selected partner organisations; v) Direct observation of projects and care services in the five locations where the UNHCR is present; vi) Timelines to identify key developments from 2019 to 2023.

FINDINGS

UNHCR POSITIONING AND STRATEGIC ACTIONS

The UNHCR has been instrumental in strengthening the protection response of public administrations at the central level and humanitarian actors to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population. However, at subnational level, the efforts of the UNHCR and other organisations to analyse and raise awareness regarding the forced displacement among a number of regional and local governments were less effective; the municipal involvement in responding to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population has been uneven and varied depending on local political, social and economic circumstances. UNHCR (in collaboration with the Working Group on Refugees and Migrants - WGRM - and other organisations) has carried out several campaigns to raise awareness of the situation of refugees and migrants, to raise the profile of donors and partnerships with the private sector and, in general, to build a culture of integration by highlighting the contribution of the Venezuelan population to the country's development. However, communication efforts have faced a political, social and media context of increasingly xenophobic discourses, and social rejection has been exacerbated in the last two years by public perceptions that associate Venezuelan migration with crime.

UNHCR's support to various government institutions has contributed to the development of the national asylum system and has been decisive in helping to manage the massive inflows at critical moments of the displacement of the Venezuelan population . However, various studies published by universities, research centres and NGOs have documented protection gaps resulting from the implementation of the humanitarian visa in 2019 as well as from the limited implementation of the Cartagena Declaration. These national and international publications reflect the challenges of reconciling international obligations and standards with changing national political, economic and social circumstances.

The establishment of a UNHCR country office in Peru in 2018 with full institutional and operational capacity, alongside the creation of the WGRM, took place at a time when the Peruvian Government was receiving the support of the United Nations system to respond to the massive arrival of Venezuelans. These factors were instrumental in ensuring that protection and assistance to refugees and migrants were included, for the first time, as priorities in the UN framework for sustainable development cooperation and the National Humanitarian Network. UNHCR's co-leadership of the WGRM has positively influenced

the implementation and supported the management of the various migration regularisation programmes and access to documentation as a pathway to access rights and local integration as the main durable solution. Local organisations have been instrumental in facilitating UNHCR's territorial deployment and complementing its operational capacity. UNHCR's influence (in its role as co-leader of the WGRM) on donors has been decisive in mobilising international funding in a chronically underfunded displacement crisis.

EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCESS TO TERRITORY, ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION, ACCESS TO SERVICES, LOCAL INTEGRATION AND LIVELIHOODS

UNHCR has been able to demonstrate the importance of addressing the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population in a complementary manner between the migration and asylum systems, supporting public administrations that lacked experience in the large-scale migration and asylum management. UNHCR played a key role in facilitating access to territory and partially mitigating the risk of refoulement during 2018 and 2019. However, the widespread use of asylum as a mechanism to facilitate temporary legal entry and stay in the territory in 2018 and 2019 exceeded the processing capacities of the national asylum system and generated a persistent backlog. Later, the restrictions on entry and asylum implemented by the Peruvian government increased the flow of irregular entries and the exposure of the Venezuelan population to risks. This led UNHCR (and GWRM) to intensify advocacy efforts, with only modest results.

The joint work of UNHCR and IOM and their coordinated support for the government's migration policy has been crucial to the regularisation of refugees and migrants without distinction, and thus to the facilitation of the legal stay of the Venezuelan population as a whole. UNHCR's contribution has been effective in facilitating local integration through the various migration regularisation processes (including migration and legal counselling). However, this has been at the expense of recourse to other international protection mechanisms which has created a kind of grey zone between the roles of UNHCR and IOM. The regularisation programmes, despite the support of the UNHCR and other organisations, have not implemented specific measures for the protection of vulnerable profiles. UNHCR has systematically integrated a focus on vulnerable profiles and accountability to affected populations into its interventions, although its capacity to support organisations working on gender-based violence and children has been insufficient.

The increase in needs arising from overlapping crises (forced displacement and the pandemic) led to a generalisation of the UNHCR's humanitarian assistance, in particular cash-based interventions distributed through partners,. The expansion of assistance enabled the immediate needs of a greater number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, as well as host communities, to be addressed in an exceptional context. However, this resulted in a weakening of the linkages between cash assistance and protection, as well as gaps in case management through partners. The harmonisation and simplification of cash-based interventions (CBI) in 2023 (alongside direct implementation by UNHCR) has contributed to the streamlining of CBI types, the standardisation of amounts and criteria, and reduced risks of inconsistencies and fraud.

With regards to inclusion, UNHCR's efforts have enabled the incorporation of critical cases into Peru's Comprehensive Health Insurance regime (*Seguro Integral de Salud*) and the provision of medical assistance to Venezuelan refugees and migrants during the pandemic (including vaccination against COVID-19) but have not succeeded in significantly expanding health coverage for this population. In the field of education, the actions of UNHCR and the WGRM have resulted in enhanced access for children and adolescents to public schools at the local level. Furthermore, during the pandemic, they facilitated internet connectivity for migrant and refugee families with limited resources. At the central level, there has been a lack of alignment between data on school enrolment generated by UNHCR and the WGRM and the Education Ministry's information and management system. This has resulted in difficulties in integrating the school-age refugee and migrant population into national education system medium-term planning.

UNHCR has achieved a success story with the professional certification and labour integration programme for Venezuelan health professionals. The country operation has capitalised on its experience in health to expand the certification of professionals in other fields (e.g., engineering, law, and other technical university degrees) and has contributed to generating greater openness from private companies and public bodies in hiring refugees. In the area of entrepreneurship, UNHCR has designed a well-structured programme, although with limited scope and limited connection between protection work and livelihood interventions. Resettlement has become the main line of action for durable solutions thanks to the increase in resettlement quotas in the United States, showing a rapid and effective growth in processing capacity and a high rate of case acceptance.

The country operation's contributions to institutional capacity building to protect the rights of refugees and migrants have positive sustainability prospects (e.g. information systems, training, protocols, quality standards). The support provided to the national asylum system has had an overall positive impact on the increased and improved capacity of the Special Commission for Refugees (CEPR. Spanish acronym). However, the continuity of the additional human resources for CEPR recruited by UNHCR in recent years is unsustainable without external funding, a situation that could jeopardise some of the achievements made so far. UNHCR's support to local organisations and networks has expanded community-based care mechanisms, but the humanitarian assistance mechanism to respond to basic needs is unsustainable without external funding. The country operation's livelihood actions have opened up space to provide opportunities for access to employment and entrepreneurship; while the outcome may be sustainable, "process" actions (e.g. training courses) have limited prospects for continuity.

UNHCR STRUCTURE IN PERU AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES

In Peru, UNHCR has managed to have an appropriate and coherent capacity to respond to protection and integration needs in prioritised areas (key border points and the main settlement cities for Venezuelan refugees and migrants). The expansion of UNHCR's presence has occurred over a relatively short period of time (due to the rapid growth of funding) and has been instrumental in consolidating the WGRM,, reinforcing the protection lens of governmental and other humanitarian responses, sustaining the protection space in a context of increasingly restrictive measures due to the influx of Venezuelan migrants, and fostering synergies in the delivery of assistance and local

integration initiatives. The swift and simultaneous establishment of field offices in border regions and urban areas within the country's major cities has facilitated the combination of humanitarian assistance with a local integration strategy in a complementary manner.

The territorial deployment of UNHCR has been identified as a key comparative advantage in relation to other international organisations. Notwithstanding the consistent distribution of resources by UNHCR across the territory and its efforts to monitor the situation at the borders, the organisation has lacked the resources to meet the needs at all border crossing points (which were also dynamic) and in all locations with a refugee and migrant presence. UNHCR's presence in intermediate cities (Arequipa, Trujillo), although modest, has generated valuable knowledge of different local realities and needs, created working spaces with local authorities, strengthened UNHCR's legitimacy with public administrations at central level (linking local and national levels) and created opportunities for possible relocation initiatives.

The opening of the Lima field office in 2023 has enabled the implementation of the community-based protection strategy in key neighbourhoods. The field office was staffed with three community-based protection profiles to cover a large and densely populated urban area (home to 75% of the total Venezuelan population in the country) with significant social and integration challenges. However, the Lima field office has to cover the Lima metropolitan area and the locality of Ica (300 kms away), which adds complexity and workload to a reduced team with limited resources.

The country operation experienced a notable expansion in both budgetary resources and personnel up to 2021, largely due to the funding from the US (representing 74% of the total funds for the period). However, the operation's budget, in particular in operations, has decreased significantly over the last two years. Local integration has a very low and decreasing budget allocation, which seems to contradict the prioritisation of local integration as a durable solution in Peru. The country operation has sought to maintain a balanced budget for administration and staff at around 38% of the approved prioritised budget on average between 2019 and 2022. However, some key positions remain under temporary and affiliated contracts, leading to a potential staff turnover risk, lack of continuity and, at times, loss of credibility before partners and counterparts.

The operation has implemented COMPASS as UNHCR's global results-based management framework and in parallel has consolidated a team to strengthen monitoring and evaluation work and promote the use of data. The perceptions of staff surveyed on the improvements brought about by multi-year planning and COMPASS are evenly split between positive and slightly sceptical views; The main limitations of COMPASS identified by respondents to the survey were the difficulty of reconciling multi-annual planning with annual budgets and of adapting planning to regular changes in the operational context.

The integration of two information management teams into a single team beginning in 2021 has been a key measure for the quality of data generation, the comprehensiveness of UNHCR's and WGRM's analysis, the strengthening of monitoring and reporting, and the carrying out of dissemination-related actions. In terms of public information,

CONCLUSIONS

STRATEGIC LEVEL

C1) National asylum system. UNHCR has been instrumental in modernising the national asylum system, in particular strengthening the registration and processing of asylum claims and developing the capacities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CEPR. Nevertheless, the national asylum system remains dependent on UNHCR support and faces challenges to ensure its efficient and responsive functioning (e.g. backlog) and the sustainability of the acquired capacities. The government response, including access to territory and the focus on refugee and migrant rights, would not have had the same characteristics without the accompaniment of UNHCR and the commitment of the CEPR.

C2) International protection in mixed movements and migratory regularisation programmes. UNHCR "dual" approach to supporting the State's response to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population (first using asylum applications as a mechanism for access to the territory, and then supporting regularisation programmes) was in line with national policies, UNHCR guidelines on mixed movements, regional frameworks and global agreements with IOM. However, it resulted in increasingly limited access to international protection mechanisms and UNHCR's work being embedded in a predominantly migratory narrative.

C3) Working Group for Refugee and Migrants (WGRM). UNHCR's co-leadership has been widely recognised and its investment in the WGRM has yielded positive returns, but there are areas where complementarity between the co-leaders has not been well articulated. In addition, the humanitarian architecture of the WGRM has not evolved sufficiently to adapt to the current challenges of mixed movements in Peru and to strengthen public policies on migration. The development of sound evidence by UNHCR, both as a contribution to the WGRM and as data for the operation, has been instrumental in influencing institutions and guiding programmes, although some gaps have been perceived in the disaggregation of data.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

C4) Humanitarian assistance to overlapping crises. UNHCR's humanitarian assistance has met the basic needs of a significant number of refugees, migrants and, to a lesser extent, host communities, but the maintenance of assistance to a certain profile of "caminantes" (wanderers) without a clear migration project or integration prospects has raised questions about the possible dependency of these profiles on assistance, the principle of "do no harm" and the approach to be adopted in moving from assistance to promoting self-reliance in vulnerable profiles.

C5) Localisation,. Community-based organisations have been essential in enabling UNHCR to adapt its strategy to changing flows and needs (e.g. pandemic) and to local specificities. In Lima, social organisations have been instrumental in facilitating the implementation of UNHCR's community-based protection strategy. The joint work

between UNHCR and community and faith-based organisations has demonstrated the potential of these organisations for frontline social work and for providing continuity of assistance and protection in critical neighbourhoods where public services are lacking.

C6) Refugee-led organisations. UNHCR has been instrumental in facilitating the growth and advancement of a small but effective group of organisations that represent refugees and migrants, as well as host communities, constituting one of the main achievements of the operation and a success story with potential for replication or scalability.

C7) Local integration and livelihoods. The UNHCR has made some progress in creating opportunities for refugee and migrant recruitment with the private sector (with a notable success story in the health sector) and entrepreneurship initiatives. However, these efforts have been relatively modest in scope compared to the scale of the needs. Furthermore, the complementarity between protection and livelihoods actions has not been effective in ensuring the "continuum" of protection (internally and through partners).

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL

C8) Lima field office. The formalisation of the Lima field office in April 2023 represented a significant step forward in terms of providing enhanced coverage and proximity to the needs of urban refugees and migrants, in line with the overarching strategy of local integration. However, the field office lacked the profile and resources to effectively address the challenges it was facing (both in terms of scope and intensity). Furthermore, the articulation with local authorities in an area characterised by a complex network of district governments was still at an early stage.

C9) National staff. UNHCR managed to steadily increase the size of its staff up to 2022 in order to strengthen its protection, livelihood and external relations units and develop the operation, thanks in large part to the recruitment of qualified and motivated Peruvian professionals, one of the operation's main strengths. However, rapid growth, the succession of emergencies, turnover and resource constraints have not allowed for sufficient reinforcement of staff to cope with the number of needs, the streamlining of recruitment processes, the management of the expansion of the programme, the mitigation of a certain degree of staff frustration and the avoidance of silo working, despite UNHCR's efforts and the commitment of individuals.

C10) Funding model.. Emergency funds and US funding have been instrumental in enabling UNHCR's extensive deployment in Peru. However, they are no longer deemed adequate to ensure the stability of the UNHCR's territorial presence, the development of the national asylum system and the implementation of socio-economic integration actions that require a medium-term perspective.

C11) Business Transformation. The implementation of corporate platforms in parallel (Cloud ERP, PROMS, COMPASS, Workday), although still in the roll-out and testing phase in several cases, has generated additional workload and dysfunctions in several areas of the operation without having provided clear value yet.

RECOMMENDATIONS

STRATEGIC LEVEL

R1) <u>National asylum system.</u> UNHCR should continue to provide technical and resource support to the CEPR in order to clean up the asylum claims database, reduce the backlog and strengthen the quality and credibility of the national asylum system.

To this end, UNHCR should implement the joint work plan to review and clean up the QORICANCHA II database and explore the possibility of developing a strategic plan for the development and consolidation of the national asylum system with the CEPR. In addition, UNHCR should undertake advocacy and communication activities to promote the right to asylum at various levels of government. UNHCR should facilitate joint and cross-border analysis between operations.

R2) <u>WGRM in Peru.</u> UNHCR, in collaboration with the IOM, WGRM members and public administrations, should encourage closer articulation of the WGRM with national migration governance mechanisms (MTIGM) and sectoral ministries.

This should include: i) better alignment of UNHCR and WGRM information and data systems with sectoral public policy planning and management systems, and ii) strengthening the capacities of institutions in charge of public policies related to human mobility..

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

R3) <u>Protection and CBI.</u> UNHCR should consolidate cross-functional work between units (e.g. protection, CBI, programmes, livelihoods) and with partners in order to harmonise the protection approach.

UNHCR should reinforce the mainstreaming of protection through the following measures: i) the standardisation of criteria and procedures for the identification and management of protection cases; ii) the standardisation of exclusion criteria and of cash transfer amounts; iii) the updating of referral protocols; and iv) the updating of the data quality plan in the various registration platforms. In collaboration with partners, the UNHCR should develop tools to facilitate the identification of risks (particularly security and violence) and explore collaboration with other agencies to enhance the response to gender-based violence, child protection and human smuggling and trafficking.

R4) <u>Community-based protection in urban contexts.</u> Promote human mobility and protection on the municipal agenda, strengthening advocacy with local governments and the capacities of community-based organisations.

UNHCR should strengthen institutional and technical dialogue with municipalities, especially in relation to local plans and intersectoral coordination mechanisms, to: i) include asylum and the integration of refugees and migrants in municipal agendas, ii) promote exchanges of best practices among municipal authorities, and iii) capitalise on

successful experiences and government commitment (Global Refugee Forum) to promote social cohesion through sports.

R5) <u>Socio-economic integration and livelihoods.</u> Expand UNHCR's advocacy on livelihoods, establishing partnerships with development actors, financial institutions, public administrations, and the private sector to promote the recruitment of refugees and migrants.

UNHCR should draw upon the experiences of other operations (e.g. Mexico, Ecuador) in livelihoods, expand its partnerships with specialised organisations, and identify opportunities for entrepreneurship with greater integration into value chains. This may be achieved through market research and collaboration with economic development agencies and the private sector.

R6) <u>Collaboration with partners.</u> Capitalise on local partners' migration expertise (including assistance and protection and their knowledge of diverse local contexts) and streamline procedures for working together.

To this end, UNHCR should strengthen the involvement of local partners in the processes of defining or revising the multi-year strategy and annual planning. In terms of process and efficiency gains, UNHCR should streamline information requirements and procedures.

R7) <u>Evidence-based data and decision-making.</u> Build on the UNHCR's experience in data generation to strengthen national institutions in characterising the flows and needs of refugees and migrants, and to promote inclusive public policies and services.

UNHCR should optimise the investments made in the Survey of Living Conditions of the Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru (ENPOVE, Spanish acronym) through more in-depth analysis, and promote integration between sectoral migration databases and the inclusion of refugee-related parameters in national censuses and surveys. UNHCR should develop a specific monitoring framework for livelihood interventions, improve document management and promote internal monitoring exercises.

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL

R8) <u>Lima Field Office.</u> Strengthen the capacity of the Lima field office to ensure the implementation of the UNHCR's urban strategy.

UNHCR should strengthen the field office team with additional profiles (protection, programmes, livelihoods) and material and logistical resources. The UNHCR should define the geographical coverage of the Lima office, assessing other modalities for continuing operations in Ica and clarifying the functions and responsibilities of the field office in relation to district authorities.

R9) <u>Functional organisation.</u> Strengthen multidisciplinary cooperation, horizontal and vertical communication and closer links between units, offices and levels of the operation to achieve more synergies and cohesion between teams.

UNHCR should promote closer coordination between the country office and field offices, better define the scope of the Legal Protection Unit and strengthen complementarity between the Public Information and External Relations Units.

R10) <u>National staff.</u> Continue to promote the "nationalisation" of positions and a broad understanding of the UNHCR's mandate among newly recruited local staff.

The UNHCR should review aspects of national staff management by improving working conditions / environment, establish mechanisms to mitigate the impact of international staff rotation, and activate a complaints and feedback mechanism for staff.

1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. The UNHCR Country Strategy Evaluation in Peru is part of a series of evaluations designed to contribute to learning and planning processes. Such evaluations aim to generate evidence to strengthen operational improvements in protection, solutions and assistance to forcibly displaced and stateless persons, including host communities, in a given country. Country strategy evaluations focus on UNHCR's strategic positioning, comparative advantage and organisational performance. While they support organisational learning and accountability based on past performance, they are intended to be forward-looking. By highlighting lessons learned and operational strengths and challenges, the recommendations of these evaluations help inform UNHCR's future directions in operational planning, resource mobilisation and implementation in each country.

2. The evaluation was carried out from September 2023 to May 2024, with fieldwork in October 2023 and preliminary results by the end of 2023. The drafting and revision of the different versions of the report took place between February and May 2024. The findings and recommendations of the evaluation of UNHCR's country strategy in Peru were used to inform the planning or revision of the current Multiyear Strategy.

3. The evaluation period was characterised by internal UNHCR reforms, including: i) a change in the structure and approach to strategic planning, in line with the Global Compact for Refugees; ii) the process of regionalisation and decentralisation to strengthen country operations through increased responsibilities and capacities; iii) the development of multi-year country strategies. In Peru, these reforms were gradually implemented during the evaluation period, but were particularly visible from 2022 onwards.

4. The primary audiences for this evaluation are the UNHCR Representative in Peru, the Director of the Regional Bureau for the Americas and UNHCR country and Regional Office staff. Secondary audiences are in-country partner organisations, other partners and donors.

2 PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. Purpose and scope

5. The Country Strategy Evaluations are intended to generate evidence to strengthen improvements in protection, solutions and assistance for the forcibly displaced and

stateless people and communities. These evaluations focus on UNHCR's strategic positioning, comparative advantage and organisational and programmatic performance[2].

6. The geographical scope covers the entire national territory, although the analysis has focused on areas where UNHCR is present (borders of Tumbes and Tacna, Lima, Arequipa and Trujillo). The population scope covers mainly the Venezuelan population seeking refugee status, refugees and those in need of protection, as well as host communities and stateless persons. In the case of statelessness, the absence of a statelessness law and the scarcity of data have limited the depth of analysis. The temporal scope covers the period 2019 - 2023 (until June).

2.2. Evaluation questions

7. The evaluation is structured around five evaluation criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability), based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definitions, and four main evaluation questions. Some evaluation sub-questions were slightly adjusted during the development of the Inception report and the evaluation team provided comments to one evaluation sub-question[3].

Main evaluation questions	Criteria
How strategic were UNHCR's actions with the Government of Peru (GoP) and other partners aimed at strengthening the coordinated response to internal displacement, mixed movements, protection and local integration in relation to the Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants (R4V) and other international and national frameworks and agreements?	Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability
How effective and sustainable have UNHCR's programmes been in humanitarian assistance, protection, community empowerment and durable solutions (humanitarian - development - peace triple nexus)?	Effectiveness, Relevance, Sustainability
How appropriate, effective and sustainable is UNHCR's current organisational model considering Peru's dynamic context?	Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence, Sustainability
What lessons and good practices can be drawn to inform UNHCR's next medium-term strategic planning in the country?	Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability

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[2] See Annex 2 Purpose, scope and methodology (detailed version) for a fuller description of this chapter.

[3] What mechanisms does UNHCR have to ensure organisational learning?

For the evaluation team, the question is formulated very broadly, it is not clear whether it refers to the corporate level or the operation level, and corporate learning tools are part of a global policy not necessarily related to the country strategy.

2.3. Methodology

2.3.1. General evaluation framework

8. The evaluation uses the OECD evaluation framework and has structured the analysis into three distinct but interrelated levels (strategic, operational and organisational[4]) in order to contribute to UNHCR's analysis of its future positioning in the country.

9. The evaluation uses a non-experimental design, follows the principles of participation[5] and use[6], and is both summative and formative in nature. It uses a theory-based[7] approach as an evaluation framework to understand achievements and challenges, to identify explanatory factors (why it works and why it doesn't, under what conditions and circumstances), to capitalise on the strengths and to mitigate the weaknesses of UNHCR's strategy. The evaluation takes into account the international (Geneva Convention and related instruments, Global Compact on Refugees), regional (e.g. Cartagena Declaration) and national frameworks on asylum and international protection, as well as the 2030 Agenda.

2.3.2. Data collection methods

10. The evaluation used a mixed methods approach, drawing on both primary and secondary sources, as detailed below. The evaluation was conducted under a hybrid format (face-to-face and remote).

- Mapping and categorisation of key actors: A total of 81 key actors were identified and grouped into seven main categories (in addition to UNHCR): i) public administration, ii) community-based, faith-based or university-based organisations, iii) UN agencies, funds or programmes, iv) civil society, v) donors, vi) private sector, vii) UNHCR partners with annual agreements. UNHCR partners with annual agreements.

- Document review: The document review included approximately 309 documents, of which approximately 58% were external and 42% internal to UNHCR.

- Semi-structured key informant interviews: 191 informants were interviewed (63% women and 37% men), representing the seven categories of actors and locations where UNHCR is present.

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[4] The strategic level analyses UNHCR's higher-level contributions in terms of political, legal, and systemic transformations within the framework of international protection. The operational level primarily analyses UNHCR's achievements and difficulties in implementing its different programmes and interventions; in general, this level of analysis is related to the criterion of effectiveness. The organisational level primarily analyses resource management (human, technical, financial and logistical); in general, this level of analysis is related to the criterion of efficiency and assesses the extent to which UNHCR's resources were fit to achieve its objectives ("fit-for-purpose").

[5] To involve a wide range of stakeholders and adopt a co-creation approach to define recommendations, agreed with the PO and partners.

[6] To develop practical recommendations for UNHCR's positioning in Peru and its operations, considering the evolving regional and country environments in which the country office operates.

[7] Theory-based approach

- Online surveys: Two surveys were conducted; the first with UNHCR staff in Peru and the second with selected partner organisations. The UNHCR staff survey covered UNHCR's positioning in the country, identification of lessons learned, assessment of new planning tools, office and staff structure, and the regionalisation and decentralisation process. The response rate was 45% of all staff (female gender 55%, male gender 40% and non-binary gender 5%). The survey of selected individuals from partner organisations focused on cooperation with UNHCR, the positioning of UNHCR in the country and the assessment of the new planning tools introduced by UNHCR. Six partner organisations participated, representing about 75% of funding through partners, and a total of 24 respondents (54% female and 46% male). The response rate was 71%.

- Direct observation: the evaluation team was able to visit field projects and care services during fieldwork in the five locations where UNHCR is present.

- Timelines: Timelines were developed in team meetings to identify key events from 2019 to 2023, programme milestones, and facilitating and constraining factors.

2.3.3.   Data analysis and validation

11.   Data analysis was based on notes collected during document review, interviews, surveys, field observations and other data collection methods. Artificial intelligence tools were used by the evaluation team for document analysis (on a limited and test basis). Where disaggregated data was available, the evidence collected was categorised by age, gender and diversity, following the guidelines of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), UNHCR and the United Nations System-wide Plan of Action on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-SWAP)[8].

12.   Data triangulation was the main validation process; findings and conclusions were aggregated, reviewed by evaluation question and triangulated by data type (primary and secondary), collection method, information source or type of informant and evaluator. Immediately after the field phase, a restitution workshop was held with the UNHCR team in Peru to share preliminary findings and conclusions. This process of analysis, validation and co-creation of recommendations was further supported by two workshops (UNHCR and partners) held in May 2024.

2.3.4.   Evaluation governance

13.   The evaluation team consisted of five professionals and was multidisciplinary. The evaluation was monitored by the Senior Evaluation Officer of the Regional Bureau, the focal point of the country office in Lima and the team leader. The group held regular meetings throughout the process (and almost daily during the field data collection phase) in order to oversee the evaluation process.

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[8] United Nations system-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

2.3.5. Quality control

14.   Quality control was based on the UNHCR Evaluation Quality Guide, UNEG standards and good practices from the evaluation community (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance - ALNAP, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD). Quality control was carried out in three domains: internally, by the evaluation team through self-assessment. Externally, by the country office teams in Peru and the UNHCR Evaluation Office in Panama, and by an independent quality control mechanism contracted by UNHCR.

2.3.6. Ethical issues

15.   The evaluation was based on the UNEG and United Nations (UN) Codes of Conduct and Ethical Guidelines[9] , the UN Supplier Code of Conduct[10] , UNHCR's policies on age, gender and diversity, disability inclusion and data protection. The evaluation is also guided by international ethical guidelines and best practices for quality assurance, evaluation and research processes, without the need for ethical approval as long as certain principles are ensured[11]. The evaluation team adhered to UNHCR's Code of Conduct, has completed UNHCR's introductory training module on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and has respected confidentiality requirements. The evaluation has systematically sought voluntary participation or informed consent from all interviewees and did not require the approval of an ethics committee as no personal data was collected, no minors, victims of violence or abuse and no particularly vulnerable profiles were interviewed or contacted.

2.3.7. Limitations

16.   The evaluation team and UNHCR have agreed on the mitigation measures to be implemented throughout the evaluation process. To summarise[12], the main constraints have been:

- Disparity and fragmentation in budget data and monitoring data to build an analytical performance framework.

- Transition between UNHCR planning and monitoring frameworks and heterogeneity of formats and reporting

- Disaggregation of data (especially in terms of age, gender and diversity)

- Political and institutional instability and staff turnover, resulting in possible biased information or absence of key informants, especially in relation to the early years of the evaluation.

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[9] UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN system (2008)

[10] UN Supplier Code of Conduct (2018)

[11] DFID ethical guidance for research, evaluation and monitoring activities (2019)

[12] See Annex 14 for a detailed list of Limitations and mitigation measures.

- Informant "fatigue", especially of individuals and communities facing studies, evaluations, etc.

3 UNHCR CONTEXT AND OPERATION

3.1. National context

3.1.1. Social context and the Human Development Index (HDI)

17.   Peru has 34,049,588 inhabitants[13] - of which six million recognise themselves as indigenous and almost one million as Afro-Peruvian[14]. Since 2010, the country has maintained a high Human Development Index (HDI)[15] although progress was disrupted during the pandemic. In the latest United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) measurement in 2022[16], the country scored 0.0762, ranking 84th in the world.

18.   The pandemic had serious economic and social repercussions, causing significant setbacks in several areas. Peru had one of the highest mortality rates per 100,000 inhabitants in the world[17]. In addition, the limited capacity of the state to provide social services and respond to the health emergency described by the IDB[18] resulted in a loss of two and a half years of life expectancy for the population in 2020 compared to 2019[19].

19.   According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),[20] Peru has one of the lowest fertility rates in the region, with teenage pregnancies accounting for 56.1% of the total. Between 2020 and 2022, Peruvian health authorities reported 12,589 girls and adolescents in this situation[21].

20.   In terms of gender equality, the country experienced a slight decline in the four-year period from 2017 to 2022. On the Gender Inequality Index (where the value closest to zero represents less inequality), it ranks 90th with a score of 0.38. In a regional

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[13] World Bank figure in 2022.

[14] The most recent figure for indigenous and Afro-Peruvians is from the 2017 National Population and Household Census cited in the report 'Emerging Stronger: Peru's Poverty and Equity Assessment', World Bank, April 2023.

[15] In 1990, Peru had an HDI of 0.613, in 2010 it reached the high development category with 0.0721 and has not decreased since. The next frontier: human development and the Anthropocene. Country briefing note on the Human Development Report 2020, UNDP.

[16] Human Development Report 2021/2022, UNDP (2022).

[17] Peru had a differential count of the number of deaths from the coronavirus. The figure from the National System of Deaths (Sinadef) was three times higher than the one provided by the Ministry of Health. Ultimately, the government appointed a team to unify criteria. Peru registers the world's highest death rate from COVID', El País, 2021.

[18] Peru: Development Challenges in Post-COVID-19, Inter-American Development Bank, 2020.

[19] Human Development Report 2021/2022, UNDP (2022).

[20] Population trends in Latin America and the Caribbean Demographic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, ECLAC (2022).

[21] Violence and Family Members Observatory Newsletter, August 2023.

comparison, Peru ranks below Chile (47th) and Ecuador (85th), but above Bolivia (118th), Colombia (102nd) and Brazil (94th). Violence against women is on the increase. Migrant women are also affected by abuse and violence; in 2022, the Women's Emergency Centres (CEM, Spanish acronym) reported 2,374 cases (85% Venezuelan victims)[22].

21.   The National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) reported that between March and August 2023, 28.1% of the population (over 15 years old) were victims of crime in urban centres. This is five percentage points higher than in the same period in 2022.

3.1.2.   Economic indicators

22.   According to the World Bank, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by 10.9% during 2020, but the country overcame the crisis caused by the pandemic, reaching a growth of 2.7% in 2022. Looking ahead, this indicator is projected to rise steadily by 2.6% in both 2023 and 2024[23]. Despite the positive projections, the Multidimensional Poverty Index 2023 (UNDP) shows that the reduction has not been as expected. In 2018, 7.4% of the population (2.5 million people) lived in multidimensional poverty and another 9.6% were vulnerable[24]. Four years later, the former figure was 6.6%, while vulnerability rose to 10.4 %[25]. The Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion expects poverty to reach 30% by 2024, although it stated that preventive measures are being taken to avoid exceeding this percentage[26] .

23.   An analysis, conducted by ECLAC in 2021, found that the less educated population is "largely concentrated in low-density rural areas" of the country. In Lima, ECLAC found that there was a high degree of residential segregation, both at the level of exclusion of "disadvantaged groups, which are often located in less favourable areas, and at the level of clustering of advantaged groups, which isolate themselves in order to differentiate, protect, and enhance their material and cultural resources."[27].

24.   For the World Bank, in 2017, the country had two major structural problems affecting economic and social growth: low private sector productivity and geographic disparities. Five years later, in its new assessment, the organisation says that the challenges remain and have worsened.[28] Another aspect to consider is that the labour market is concentrated in informality. According to the Permanent National Employment

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[22] Peru: UNHCR and Ombudsman's Office present photo exhibition on the situation of refugee and migrant women',2023.

[23] Data are for 2022. 'Global Economic Prospects 2023', World Bank Group.

[24] The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene', 2020

[25] UNDP noted that Peru was one of only seven countries for which they obtained complete post-pandemic poverty data. Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2023, UNDP.

[26] El Comercio, 24 October 2023.

[27] New tools and analysis on socio-economic residential segregation, internal migration and daily mobility in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Peru, 1980-2018, ECLAC 2021.

[28] Peru Systematic Country Diagnostic Update, World Bank, 2022.

Survey, 17 million people were employed in Peru in March 2023[29]. Of these, 73.5% were informal workers. The unemployment rate reached 5.9% in the first quarter of 2023, with women being the most affected.

3.1.3. Government action on migration

25.   In terms of legislation, the Peruvian government had made significant progress following the creation of the National Migration Policy (2017-2025) and the Refugee Law. The Peruvian government's response to migration dates back to 2011 (at that time the focus was on Peruvian emigration - an estimated 10% of the Peruvian population has emigrated), with the creation of the Intersectoral Working Group for Migration Management (Mesa de Trabajo Intersectorial para la Gestión Migratoria, MTIGM, in Spanish), a Permanent Multisectoral Commission led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[30]. Since then, the legal framework has seen a series of regularisation programmes for migrants in an irregular situation. Between 2017 and 2019, the GoP launched the issuance of the Temporary Permit to Stay (PTP, Spanish acronym), which was later replaced by the Temporary Stay Permit Card (CPP, Spanish acronym). The Commission also approved an important policy for migration management: the National Migration Policy (PNM, Spanish acronym) for the period 2017-2025. The PNM represented an important legislative advance as it sought to articulate different government bodies and institutions to protect the human rights of migrants and their families[31].

26.   The Peruvian authorities have implemented a number of regularisation programmes in recent years. For applicants for refugee status, or for those who do not qualify for refugee status but are in a situation of high vulnerability (based on humanitarian criteria), the GoP can grant humanitarian migratory status (CMH, Spanish acronym) or humanitarian residence. In May 2023, a resolution[32] was published establishing a new regularisation process for citizens of all nationalities who entered Peru before 10 May 2023 and were in an irregular migratory situation, including those who entered the territory without migration control. This resolution allowed them to apply for a PTP, valid for one year, and to regularise their stay and work in the country[33].

27.   However, since 2019 and, especially, since 2023, various legal provisions have had an impact on the migration and asylum system. In parallel to the notable progress and efforts made by the GoP, Venezuelan nationals still need a passport and visa to enter Peru. While existing legislation protects persons in need of international protection from deportation, there is a lack of clear and standardised procedures for the reception

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[29] "Informal employment refers to self-employed persons whose productive units belongs to the informal sector; wage earners without employer-financed social security and unpaid family workers", according to the [Technical Report Peru: Behaviour of Labour Market Indicators at the national level and in 26 cities](), for the first quarter of 2023, INEI.

[30] Supreme Decree N° 067-2011 Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM)

[31] Supreme Decree N° 015-2017-RE.

[32]   Superintendence   Resolution   No.   000109-2023-MIGRACIONES https://www.gob.pe/institucion/migraciones/campa%C3%B1as/27203-nuevo-permiso-temporal-de-permanencia

[33] UNHCR (2023) New CPP: Temporary Permit to Stay: https://help.unhcr.org/peru/nuevo-cpp-permiso-temporal-de-permanencia

and transmission of asylum claims to the competent authorities, which makes it difficult to exercise the right to seek asylum. As of 31 October 2022, almost 60% of those registered with the National Superintendency of Migration still did not have a valid migration permit. More recently, in January 2023, the Congress amended the Migration Law, severely restricting access to housing[34]. In addition, since 26 April 2023, the government has declared a state of emergency in seven border regions of the country, following the attempt of around 200 migrants who tried to cross from Arica (Chile) to the city of Tacna[35].

28.   In 2023, legislative initiatives continued to restrict foreigners' access to the territory or to restrict the exercise of their rights under equal conditions once they have settled in the country, which according to several organisations[36] are questionable from a human rights and gender perspective. The Ombudsman's Office has filed a complaint against the unconstitutionality of Law 31689 on the grounds that it violates the international obligations of the Peruvian State and the national legal framework for the protection of persons in international mobility, as well as for promoting stereotypes that stigmatise refugees and migrants, associating them with criminality and for constituting a threat to their fundamental rights.

3.2. Brief description of the forcibly displaced and stateless populations

3.2.1.   Venezuelan refugee and migrant population[37]

29.   According to UNHCR data[38], Peru is the first country of destination for Venezuelan nationals in need of international protection, and the second most preferred destination country after Colombia[39]. Arrivals of Venezuelan nationals have doubled in recent years from 813,000 in 2019 to 1,542,000 in August 2023[40]. Of this population, more than one million live in eight main cities, with Lima and Callao accounting for 75% of this population[41] in 2024[42]. 78% settled in Metropolitan Lima, mainly in four districts that gathered 25% of the new arrivals - San Martín de Porres, Santiago de Surco, Los Olivos, San Juan de Lurigancho. The influx of refugees and migrants from Venezuela was mostly concentrated (63%) in just two years (2018 and 2019). In general, the districts where the Venezuelan population has settled in Lima have the most critical

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[34] Plenary approves by insistence amendments to the Legislative Decree on Migration', Congress of Peru, 2023.

[35] Migration crisis strains diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru', El País, 28 April 2023.

[36] Regulatory setbacks in migration: an analysis of the recent amendments to the Legislative Decree on Migration. Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (IDEHPUCP) of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (https://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/analisis1/retrocesos-normativos-a-nivel-migratorio-un-analisis-a-las-recientes-modificaciones-al-decreto-legislativo-de-migraciones/).

[37] See Annex 10 - Evolution of the characterisation of the Venezuelan population in Peru (2019 - 2022).

[38] UNHCR statistics by refugee population whose destination is Peru between 2017 and 2022.

[39] General context of Peru, UNHCR.

[40] Official letter GTRM-SNM March 31st 2024

[41] Living conditions of the Venezuelan population living in Peru, INEI, 2022.

indicators in terms of violence (including gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against children), vulnerability and poverty, and the deterioration of citizens' security (often associated with Venezuelan migration), which led to the declaration of a state of emergency in 2023[43].

30.   The records of the Integrated Migration System ("Sistema Integrado de Migraciones", in Spanish) show that 58% of the Venezuelan population in Peru is in an irregular situation[44], which has had an impact on the perception of the host population. According to the "Study of attitudes towards the foreign population in Peru" carried out by UNHCR and the Universidad del Pacífico (2021), 70% of Peruvians believe that the displacement of Venezuelans has had a negative impact, being associated with insecurity (63%), informality and fewer jobs for nationals (39%)[45].

31.   During the pandemic, the Venezuelan population's access to health services and vaccinations was partial, as documented by several organisations during the pandemic (access to COVID-19 vaccine). The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reported that Venezuelan families did not have access to cash-based assistance provided by the government. In education, the lack of connectivity made access to education difficult, and 30% of children were not enrolled in the school system[46].

32.   In 2023, the R4V platform identified the following as the greatest needs of Venezuelan refugee and migrant population: (i) better access to documentation to regularise their migratory status, (ii) opportunities for integration into the labour market - given that 79.8% of them experience some degree of food insecurity, (iii) access to social programmes and the mitigation of xenophobia[47].

3.2.2.   Refugee Status and Return

33.   Between 2017 and 2022, Venezuelan nationals topped the list of asylum seekers with a cumulative 531,579 asylum applications, according to the Special Commission for Refugees (CEPR)[48], of which 5,586 have been granted refugee status[49]. Cubans (3,000) and Colombians (1,800) are the next largest groups of asylum seekers[50]. The vast

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[43] World Bank (2023). Emerging Stronger: Peru Poverty and Equity Assessment. Lima Office, Peru: World Bank Group.

National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (2023) District monetary poverty map 2018

National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (2023) Perú: Medición de la Pobreza Multidimensional, Dimensiones e Indicadores (Revision 2023). Lima

Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, Vulnerability Statistical Reports.

Most dangerous districts of Metropolitan Lima in 2023 according to the National Police's Computer System for the Registration of Police Complaints (Sidpol) (https://www.infobae.com/peru/2023/11/13/los-distritos-de-lima-metropolitana-mas-peligrosos-del-2023-segun-la-pnp-robos-extorsiones-secuestros-y-mas)

[44] IOM-Peru Country Strategy 2022-2026, IOM.

[45] Study on Public Opinion of the Foreign Population in Peru', UNHCR-Universidad del Pacífico, 2021.

[46] Peru: Development Challenges in Post-COVID-19, Inter-American Development Bank, 2020.

[47] Assessment Analysis: Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, R4V,2023

[48] Refugee Data Finder, UNHCR.

[49] UNHCR's internal statistics show 5,586 refugees at the end of the year, of which 4,250 were accounted for up to June of that year. UNHCR Peru: Semi-annual report - January to June 2022

[50] Living conditions of the Venezuelan population living in Peru, INEI, 2022.

majority of Venezuelan asylum seekers are awaiting a decision, and it is estimated that 5.3%[51] have abandoned their application and many others have opted for migration channels (regularisation programmes).

34.   Although 75.3% of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population expresses the intention to stay in Peru, the second survey on Living Conditions of the Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru shows a decrease in the intention of the Venezuelan population to stay in Peru from 93.8% in 2018 to 75.3% in 2022[52]. The return programme promoted by the Venezuelan government "Vuelta a la patria" ("Return to the homeland") presents modest figures, although return trends have been observed to some extent due to the difficulties for integration in Peru.

35.   The asylum system in Peru is based on Law 27.891, the Refugee Law of 2002, and its regulations, which incorporate the refugee definitions of the Geneva Convention and the Cartagena Declaration. The asylum application process is carried out by the Special Commission for Refugees (CEPR, for its Spanish acronym), which issues the asylum seeker with a provisional document (either a work permit or a refugee status card) that allows them to stay and work in the country while their application is being processed. Once refugee status is granted, individuals receive a foreigner's card and have access to all the rights protected by international human rights treaties and national human rights legislation. The Peruvian authorities grant refugee status to those who meet the definition of the Geneva Convention and apply the expanded definition of the Cartagena Declaration to specific profiles. In recent years, access to the asylum system and international protection has been hampered by legislative initiatives and changes to the legal framework, in a context of increasing stigmatisation of the Venezuelan population[53].

3.2.3.   Statelessness

36.   Although Peru is a signatory to the two Statelessness Conventions, it lacks a legal framework for determining statelessness and the rights of stateless persons. Nationality legislation contains a combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis provisions that provide a relatively high level of protection against statelessness for children born abroad to a Peruvian mother and/or father and for children born in Peru to a foreign mother and/or father. In the absence of a mechanism for determining statelessness, no official statistics were available. The Peruvian Government acceded to the two Statelessness Conventions in 2011, which led to the drafting of a Law on Statelessness, which is still pending. At the recent Global Forum on Refugees in December 2023, Peru committed to establish a competent body and a procedure for the assessment of statelessness. For the time being, the absence of a national legal framework on statelessness remains a factor of vulnerability for children in Peru born to foreign parents in transit in countries that do not apply jus soli or that exempt from its application children whose parents do not reside in the country of birth. In the same situation are children in Peru of foreign

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[51] Living conditions of the Venezuelan population living in Peru, INEI, 2022.

[52] Living conditions of the Venezuelan population living in Peru, INEI, 2022.

[53] Amnesty International (2023) Regularise and protect: international obligations to protect Venezuelan people. London

parents who were born abroad and have only a birth certificate, which is not valid as proof of nationality, and who have not been able to register their birth. This is because late consular birth registration is not available for children born in Venezuela or in countries of transit to Peru.

3.3. Summary of UNHCR's strategy and presence in Peru

37.   UNHCR's country strategy in Peru for 2019-2023 is structured around annual planning documents, various programmatic strategies (e.g. international protection, inclusion and livelihoods 2022-2026) and operational protocols (e.g. protection, case management, family reunification). The main planning documents for the operation are: i) Regional Activities for the Americas: Operations Plan 2019; ii) Peru ABC: Operations Plan 2020, Operations Plan 2021, Operations Plan 2022 (COP); iii) Peru - Interim Strategy 2022[54].

38.   In 2023, UNHCR Peru developed a new Multi-year Protection and Solutions Plan for 2023-2026 (based on an updated needs analysis) along with the corresponding annual implementation plan for 2023. A significant shift in the planning and monitoring of the country strategy was the integration of the new corporate planning and results framework in 2022, organized around new impact areas. The COVID-19 pandemic required adjustments to all strategies and planning in 2020 and 2021, including partnership agreements and budget commitments with partners, which were reflected in the annual reports. In addition to the impact of the pandemic, the various planning documents present a logical chain structured around UNHCR's four impact areas. UNHCR's strategic planning in Peru is aligned with global, regional, national, and corporate orientations and guidelines, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda, the Global Compact on Refugees, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. The main focus of UNHCR's strategy in Peru has been on the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population in transit or settled in the country (including asylum seekers) and the host communities.

3.3.1.   Key aspects of in-country presence and resources[55]

39.   UNHCR established its country office in Peru in November 2018, although the agreement with the GoP was not formalised until 2020. Previously, operations were managed as an office under the Southern Cone Regional Office in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Before this, operations were managed under the Southern Cone regional office in Buenos Aires. Due to the increasing influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, UNHCR decided to establish a representation with programme management capacity, staff, and field presence. As of 2023, UNHCR operates in Peru through the Country Office (CO) in Lima, two Field Offices (FO) in Tumbes and Lima, a Field Unit (FU) in Tacna (covering the provinces of Puno, Cuzco, and Madre de Dios through partners), and two Field Presences (FP) in Trujillo and Arequipa.

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[54]See Annex 4 Schematic reconstruction of the theory of change.

[55] See section on UNHCR Structure in Peru for more detail and analysis.

40.   UNHCR Peru's needs-based Operation Plan Budget (OP) increased significantly from 2019 to 2021, rising from USD 20.5 million in 2019 to USD 61.1 million in 2021, and remained stable in 2022[56]. However, the ratio of the approved Operating Level budget (OL) to the needs-based budget (OP) decreased over the same period, from 74% in 2019 to 34% in 2022, averaging 42% over the review period. Budget execution at the operational level is at its highest (93% in 2019 and 98% in 2022).

41.   In terms of human resources, UNHCR Peru has gone from 67 professionals recruited in 2019 (including affiliated workforce) to 118 professionals in 2022, an increase of +76% (+126% for STAFF). The increase in the affiliated workforce in 2022 represents 41% of the global workforce[57].

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[56] UNHCR PERU: Global Analysis and Reporting & Country Financial Report (2019-2022)

[57] UNHCR PERU: Staff summary statistics 2018-2022 & 2023 workforce statistics

4 FINDINGS

4.1. UNHCR's strategy

EQ1. To what extent were UNHCR's positioning and actions strategic in its co-leadership of the inter-agency response to the Venezuelan crisis and the implementation of the Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, in relation to its engagement with stakeholders (government, UN agencies, and civil society?)

Visibility and understanding of mixed movements and protection. UNHCR, individually and as co-leader of the Working Group on Refugees and Migrants (WGRM), has been instrumental in strengthening the protection lens in the response of public administrations at central level and humanitarian actors to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population. However, at subnational level, the efforts of UNHCR and other organisations to analyse and raise awareness about the forced displacement among some regional and municipal local governments were less effective; the municipal involvement in responding to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population has been uneven, depending on political, social and economic local circumstances. UNHCR (in collaboration with the Working Group on Refugees and Migrants - WGRM - and other organisations) has carried out several campaigns to raise awareness of the situation of refugees and migrants, to raise the profile of donors and partnerships with the private sector and, in general, to build a culture of integration by highlighting the contribution of the Venezuelan population to the country's development. However, communication efforts have faced a political, social and media context of increasingly xenophobic discourses, and social rejection has been exacerbated in the last two years by public perceptions that associate Venezuelan migration with crime.

UNHCR's influence (including co-leading the WGRM) on key actors. UNHCR's accompaniment of various government institutions has contributed to the development of the national asylum system and was instrumental in supporting the management of massive inflows at critical moments of the displacement of the Venezuelan population, which exceeded national capacities to respond. Nevertheless, the activation of the humanitarian visa and the limited implementation of the Cartagena Declaration have been questioned in several publications as not being in line with national and international standards. UNHCR's co-leadership has influenced the implementation and supported the management of the various regularisation programmes and access to documentation as a pathway to access rights and local integration as the main durable solution. National non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including community-based organisations (CBOs) and faith-based organisations, have been instrumental in facilitating UNHCR's rapid territorial deployment and complementing its operational capacity.

UNHCR's influence with donors (in its role as co-leader of the WGRM) has been crucial in mobilising international funding in a chronically underfunded displacement crisis. The fluid relationship between the GoP and the UNS, the creation of the WGRM and the establishment of UNHCR as a fully-fledged office in Peru have facilitated the prioritisation of refugees and migrants in the UN Cooperation Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) and in the National Humanitarian Network. UNHCR's co-leadership of the WGRM has been positively acknowledged by international and national actors, and the WGRM has provided a common response mechanism with broad consensus on coordination, representativeness and participation, data generation, comprehensive analysis of flows and needs, and mobilisation of resources. However, co-leading the WGRM has also posed organisational and operational challenges for UNHCR.

***Lessons from the relationship with IOM in co-leading the WGRM.** The lessons learned from co-leading the WGRM show that inter-agency work: i) is feasible, reasonably effective, and positively perceived; ii) strengthens inter-agency complementarity to support the government response, reducing competition and achieving efficiency gains; iii) requires a joint work plan between the two agencies to harmonise approaches and tools.*

***Contributing to the governance framework for displacement and protection.** Prior to UNHCR's institutional and operational deployment in Peru, the country already had an established institutional, political and legal governance framework. However, despite UNHCR's efforts to strengthen the technical, human, and logistical capacities of key asylum governance institutions (Special Commission for Refugees, National Superintendency of Migration, and Ombudsman's Office) and to introduce protection elements in line with international standards, some public policy decisions and norms have shown gaps and contravened both national legislation and international frameworks.*

4.1.1. How did UNHCR's actions complement and influence the response of the government, the UN, civil society in Peru and donors?

To what extent did UNHCR contribute to increasing the visibility and understanding of mixed movements and their protection needs?

42. **UNHCR has contributed to the visibility and understanding of the mixed movements and protection needs of the Venezuelan population mainly within the framework of the co-leadership of the WGRM in two distinct areas[58].** Firstly, in the sphere of public administrations (mainly supporting the Special Commission for Refugees[59] -CEPR- and the Superintendency of Migration[60], but also developing stable

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[58] Quantitative parameters to measure "visibility" and "understanding" of different audiences or publics are not available. The following paragraphs summarise qualitative findings related to the concepts of "visibility" and "understanding" based primarily on interviews and document review.

[59] Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[60] Under the Ministry of the Interior.

partnerships with other state institutions[61]) and at different levels (central, regional and local). Secondly, UNHCR has contributed to raising public awareness through its presence in the media, notably the campaign #TuCausaEsMiCausa[62] , the #Solidaridad Azul campaign, the actions to commemorate World Refugee Day, the publication of videos in digital media, as well as other short-term actions.

43. **At the level of central public administrations, UNHCR has contributed to raising visibility (and awareness) of international protection for refugees and migrants among the three branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial), as well as to strengthening public policy and services at the national level (including legal aspects, systems, procedures and capacities related to international protection).** The combination of institutional dialogue and advocacy, technical assistance, capacity building and data generation[63] have been key to broadening institutional understanding of mixed movements and encouraging public administrations to adjust their responses to the changing flows and needs of the Venezuelan population and host communities.

44. **At the regional and local level, UNHCR's territorial deployment (offices and field units) has facilitated analysis and support to regional governments and selected municipalities (border localities with a high presence of Venezuelan population) in addressing the opportunities and challenges arising from the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population, influencing their public policies and services, and partially strengthening their response capacities**, both for humanitarian needs and local integration. Although public migration policy in Peru is managed at the central level (perceived as state policy), these are shared competencies between the national government and regional and local governments that include key areas for the local integration of the refugee and migrant population (e.g. education, health, culture, tourism, citizen security, housing, social programmes)[64].

45. **Since 2022, the participation of UNHCR and IOM in the MTIGM and the support provided to the Decentralised Offices (ODE[65], Spanish acronym) at the local level have enhanced the analysis and understanding of the specificities of human mobility in different regions and municipalities**. This involvement has improved coordination and communication among sectors and multiple actors and strengthened the connection between central and local levels. However, there remains a gap between the analytical and coordination roles and the actual capacity for local

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[61] Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, Ombudsman's Office, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion.

[62] UNHCR reports 2 million views (UNHCR Operations Plans Peru 2021) and 20,000 followers on Facebook (insider).

[63] In addition to the regular data and analyses produced by UNHCR and WGRM (e.g., flow monitoring, protection monitoring, asylum claims, needs analysis, etc.), notable examples include support provided to INEI for the two surveys of the Venezuelan population (ENPOVE), the World Bank report offering evidence on the contribution of migrants and refugees to the national economy (World Bank, 2019, "An Opportunity for All: Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees and Peru's Development"), and situational analyses during the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the refugee and migrant population.

[64] International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2022. Governance Indicators of Migration at the Local Level Profile 2022 - Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. IOM, Geneva.

[65] Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

response and action. Additionally, there is a lack of clarity between the responsibilities of local institutions and the support provided by international organizations.

46. **In certain instances, the efforts of UNHCR and other organizations to raise awareness and analyse the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population among regional and local governments have not translated into an understanding or concrete action on human mobility at the regional or local levels**. Various contextual factors have contributed to this gap (e.g. intensity of displacement and critical needs at certain times, staff turnover, inadequate public services, persistent xenophobia, political and media narratives, perceptions of insecurity and criminality, and the economic crisis). For example, the political, institutional, and social contexts in Tumbes (a border point on the northern frontier), Ica (the third city with the largest Venezuelan population), and the metropolitan authorities and the district of San Martin de Porres (the district with the highest concentration of Venezuelan population in Lima) have not been sufficiently conducive to developing more structured collaborations or interventions.

47. **UNHCR's efforts to increase the visibility of forced displacement have aimed not only to enhance understanding of the needs of the Venezuelan population but also to highlight the opportunities that human mobility brings to host societies[66] These efforts have also sought to combat the growing rejection and xenophobia** in political[67] , media[68] and social[69] spheres. During the pandemic, UNHCR's communication initiatives were crucial in mitigating the stigmatization of the refugee and migrant population.

48. **Despite the efforts of UNHCR (the UNS, and many other organizations) levels of rejection towards Venezuelan migrants have persisted and even worsened over the past two years due to the perceived association between Venezuelan migration and crime, despite a lack of clear evidence supporting this link**. Numerous interviews[70] have highlighted a growing concern for security, reporting incidents that, although limited in scale, have begun to impact the security of humanitarian and social operations[71]. Examples include the refusal or limitation of

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[66] The World Bank estimated that the integration of the Venezuelan population in Peru could improve the country's productivity by 3.2%.

[67] From January to June 2022, 14 draft laws were submitted to the Congress of the Republic concerning human mobility. Eleven of them aimed to introduce restrictions to the Migration Law - Legislative Decree No. 1350 (UNHCR. Semi-annual report January to June 2022).

[68] See, for example: Universidad del Pacífico (2021) Diagnosis of media coverage of the situation of refugees and migrants, which presents results along the same lines.

[69] See, for example: Universidad del Pacífico (2021) Estudio de opinión sobre la población extranjera en el Perú (in collaboration with UNHCR). See also Oxfam International (2019) Yes, but not here: Perceptions of xenophobia and discrimination towards migrants from Venezuela in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Cited in: Paula Camino, Uber López Montreuil (2019) Asylum under pressure in Peru: the impact of the Venezuelan crisis and COVID-19. Forced Migration Review nº 65.)

[70] Internal and external informants

[71] The latest available national figures show an upward trend in the number of criminal acts and homicides, with a clear concentration in Lima (INEI, citizen security statistics; INFOBAE: bloody 2023 in Lima: more than 400 crimes by hired gunmen committed in the capital so far this year https://www.infobae.com/peru/2023/12/21/2023-sangriento-en-lima-mas-de-400-crimenes-por-sicariato-se-cometieron-en-la-capital-en-lo-que-va-del-ano). The authorities interviewed have expressed concern about

access to some shelters or assistance services for certain migrant profiles and the necessity for professionals to contract private security services in workplaces. Additionally, the launch of the #YourCauseIsMyCause campaign was delayed due to reluctance, and UNHCR has recently adopted a lower public profile due to the social and political sensitivity surrounding migration.

How did UNHCR (including the co-leadership of the WGRM) influence the actions of: i) government; ii) NGOs; iii) donors; iv) UN (contributions to the CCA and UNSDCF)? How did this co-leadership help UNHCR's role in Peru?

Government

49.   **During a critical period for the asylum system (2019), UNHCR influenced the activation of the humanitarian migratory status[72] in a context where, at the discretion of the Peruvian authorities, the majority of asylum claims did not qualify under the expanded definition**, implementing qualification interviews in Tumbes, biometric registration at the ODE, and updating the registration and case management system (QORICANCHA2). These actions facilitated access to the territory for the Venezuelan population, in accordance with international standards, by providing documentation and humanitarian assistance at the Binational Border Care Centre (CEBAF, Spanish acronym) until an administrative decision was made. Furthermore, UNHCR supported the adoption of a profiling procedure, which increased efficiency in a context where *prima facie* refugee status determination was not applied.

50.   **However, various studies and organisations have documented protection gaps resulting from the implementation of the humanitarian visa at that time (2019) and also from the limited implementation of the Cartagena Declaration**[73, 74, 75, 76]. National and international literature reflects the challenges of reconciling international

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the intensity of the violence (the appearance of new types of crime and more violent offences, apparently not present in the country until now, such as hired killings, kidnapping) and the arrival of foreign criminal structures (e.g. Tren de Arauca, Tiguerones, MS), rather than the numbers themselves. In fact, Peru continues to show low crime rates in relation to the region (UNODOC (2023) Global Study on Homicide 2023; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_on_homicide_2023_web.pdf). Furthermore, the percentage of Venezuelan inmates (2,464 inmates - 2,361 males and 103 females) is equivalent to 2.7% of the entire prison population (INPE, Sistema de Información Estadístico Penitenciario) and is lower than the percentage of Peruvian inmates. Various analyses in Peru and the region disprove the association between migration and crime (see, for example: Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, National Observatory of Criminal Policy (2022) Migration and Crime in Peru / Bahar, Dany, Meagan Dooley and Andrew Selee (2020) Venezuelan Immigrants, Crime and Misperceptions: An Analysis of Data in Colombia, Peru and Chile. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute and Brookings Institution.

[72] Migration Legislative Decree No. 1350, Article 29. Types of Migratory Qualities. (https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/1654512/Decreto_Legislativo_N_1350.pdf.pdf?v=1612592 488)

[73] Feline Freier, Marta Luzes (2019) Public policy proposal; towards humane borders. The adverse impacts of humanitarian visas. Universidad del Pacífico, Research Centre. Lima

[74] Refugee Law No. 27891, art. 3.

[75] Irregular migration, smuggling and human trafficking.

[76] Feline Freier, Marta Luzes (2019) The adverse impacts of humanitarian visas. Public policy proposal. Research Centre of the University of the Pacific.

obligations and standards with changing national political, economic and social circumstances[77, 78, 79, 80].

51.   **UNHCR's co-leadership has influenced various public administrations to facilitate the implementation and management of the various regularisation programmes and access to documentation**[81] for the Venezuelan population in the country. These efforts have been effective to guarantee the right to documentation, enable access to other social services and, importantly, contribute to local integration as the primary durable solution.

Networks of social organisations including CBOs, faith-based and refugee-led organisations

52.   **UNHCR's positioning and operational capacity in Peru has been developed largely through key partnerships with various social organisations** with extensive experience in social and community work. In turn, UNHCR has influenced national NGOs and CBOs in three main areas:

- **Integration of human mobility and the perspective of asylum and international protection in organisational missions and strategies and in**

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[77] Freier, L.F., Berganza, I., & Blouin, C. (2020). 'The Cartagena Refugee Definition and Venezuelan Displacement in Latin America,' International Migration.

[78] Berganza, I., Blouin, C., & Freier, L.F. (2020). 'The situational element of massive human rights violations of the Cartagena expanded definition: towards an application in the Venezuelan case.' Revista Chilena de Derecho, 47 (2): 385-410.

[79] Amnesty International (2023) Regularise and protect: international obligations to protect Venezuelan individuals.

[80] The debate on the use of asylum as a migration tool (in states with insufficient migration tools or those not adapted to the response to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population) and on the non-application (or limited application) of the Cartagena Declaration has also been reflected in the evaluations of UNHCR's country strategies in Ecuador (2022) and Mexico (2021). In addition, numerous publications by international and refugee law and human rights organisations describe both good practices and gaps in states' legal and protection responses to forced displacement of Venezuelan populations.

[81] There have been several regularisation and documentation programmes in Peru; in short:

In 2017, Supreme Decree No. 002-2017-I established the same procedure for granting the Temporary Permit to Stay (PTP) to foreigners who had entered Peru regularly. The State approved similar measures specifically for Venezuelan nationals.

In 2018, Supreme Decree No. 001-2018-IN granted a PTP for one year to Venezuelan nationals who entered Peruvian territory regularly.

In 2020, Supreme Decree No. 010-2020-IN approved special, exceptional and temporary measures to regularise the migration status of foreigners, and granted a Temporary Stay Permit Card (CPP) to regularise the foreign population with irregular migration status in the country, either for exceeding the authorised period of stay or for entering the country irregularly. Applicants approved for the permit were issued a Temporary Stay Permit Card (CPP), which allowed them to stay in the country and authorised them to work for one year.

In 2023, Supreme Decree N° 003-2023/IN was approved with the aim of regularising migrants so that, once identified and holding a valid document from the Peruvian State, they can engage in lawful activities. One of the measures allows beneficiaries of the Temporary Stay Permit Card (CPP) to access the Special Resident status, through which they can obtain the Foreigner's ID and residence for a period of one year, renewable. In this way, CPP beneficiaries can maintain a regular immigration status. An amnesty of fines due to administrative non-compliance was also approved. Recently (November 2023), Legislative Decree 1582 established an Exceptional Special Administrative Sanctioning Procedure (PASEE) against migrants with irregular status (those who have not regularised under the previous procedure) and against those who commit offences that may lead to expulsion.

the community work of grassroots organisations. The visibility, analysis and understanding of the complexities of the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population in its different phases and the implications for the host communities have been areas that have generated complementarity and synergies between national NGOs and UNHCR.

- **Organizational capacity building, strengthening key areas of non-profit management and performance** (e.g. planning, monitoring, reporting and accountability, communication, management systems and tools). UNHCR's ongoing technical and support, as well as the close collaboration between UNHCR and NGO teams, has been highly valued[82].

- **Coordination and networking**, both as part of the WGRM (national or local), and through the establishment of joint working mechanisms (e.g. generation and analysis of shared information, common protocols and referral circuits).

53.   **UNHCR has also significantly influenced the promotion of pre-existing faith-based organisations** (and networks) (e.g. ENCUNTROS, CIREMI – Spanish acronym -, Scalabrinian Mission) and organisations led by Venezuelan refugees settled in Peru[83], representing one of the main differential aspects and achievements of the operation.

Donors

54.   UNHCR's influence on donors has been reflected in two main areas. First, the WGRM (and UNHCR's co-leadership) have been instrumental in **mobilising international funding** for the displacement crisis response that is chronically underfunded compared to other large-scale humanitarian crises,[84, 85]. Donors such as Canada and the US have valued participation in the WGRM as an eligibility criterion for accessing funds.

55.   Secondly, UNHCR's role (both individually and through the WGRM) has influenced **donors' strategies and visions.** Donors have been interested in joint (inter-agency) regional responses that have proven capable of coordinating efforts, creating synergies and gaining efficiency in the face of cross-border movements. In Peru, resettlement development (as part of UNHCR-supported durable solutions) has become an area of interest for the US and Canada, with funding levels increasing in the last two years.

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[82] Partner survey

[83] See section on partnership building below.

[84] Dany Bahar, Meagan Dooley (2019) Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and most underfunded in modern history. Brookings Institution Washington, D.C.

Financial Times (2020) Venezuela's refugee crisis needs a proper response (https://www.ft.com/content/af000cac-2d51-11ea-bc77-65e4aa615551) THE SYRIAN AND VENEZUELAN

Carlos Abaunza (2023) Refugee and migrant crises. A comparative analysis of the regional response to large-scale displacement. Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS), American University in Cairo.

[85]   Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP): https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1069/summary

56.   **UNHCR began operations in Peru in 2018, relying on the multi-country office based in Argentina until the Memorandum of Understanding entered into force in 2020. The establishment of a fully-fledged country office** (administratively, technically, financially and logistically) allowed UNHCR to **have** one of the largest country presences **in** the **UN** system. The launch of the R4V platform (or WGRM[86]) in 2018 was a milestone in terms of the humanitarian architecture for responding to the forced displacement of Venezuelan people and transformed UNHCR's role in Peru (and in the Americas) by assuming the co-leadership of the WGRM with IOM.

57.   **UNHCR went from having a very limited presence in 2018 to representing 11% (USD 18 million) of the funds executed or mobilised by the UNS in 2020[87] and 9% (USD 13.6 million) of the funds executed by the UNS in 2022[88]**. For IOM, the budget executed in 2020 represented 4% (USD 6.4 million) of the UNS and in 2022 represented 29% (USD 44.7 million). Between 2020 and 2022, IOM increased its budget six-fold[89].

58.   **In the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2021, UNHCR was listed as a non-resident agency, and the refugee population was not included among the priorities of the UN cooperation framework in Peru**. However, the UNDAF evaluation (November 2021) highlighted the responsiveness of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in addressing emerging needs during the period, including those of refugees and migrants (in addition to COVID-19 and the El Niño climate emergency). The evaluation also recognised the contribution of agencies to the WGRM as one of the main achievements and recommended that refugees and migrants be included in the next UNSDCF (with special attention to evidence generation, advocacy and communication on sensitive issues, regularisation programmes, and economic inclusion). From 2019 onwards, the UNS, through the Office of the Resident Coordinator (OCR, Spanish acronym) and in coordination with UNHCR and IOM, responded promptly to the priorities expressed by the GoP to assist the refugee and migrant population, particularly during the pandemic, in a context of smooth relations between the UNS and the GoP but with increasing controversy regarding human mobility.

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[86] In April 2018, the UN Secretary-General instructed IOM and UNHCR to lead and coordinate the regional response to the situation of refugees and migrants in Venezuela. Hence, the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants (R4V or WGRM) was established as a forum to coordinate response efforts in 17 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Peru, the WGRM is made up of more than 100 organisations, including UN agencies, national and international non-governmental organisations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, churches and other faith-based organisations, academia, embassies, donors and financial institutions.

[87] 2020 UN Peru Annual Report

[88] 2022 UN Peru Annual Report (Annual Report 2021 n.a.)

[89] The funds reported in UN Peru's annual reports do not necessarily coincide with each agency's own budget execution data, as there may be differences between the dates on which the reports are prepared to the UNS and the closing dates of each agency's accounts. In any case, the figures reported to the UNS allow for an overall and relatively homogeneous view of the mobilisation and execution of funds between agencies.

59.   **The UNSDCF in Peru 2022-2026 incorporates the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation, identifying the integration of the Venezuelan refugees and migrants as a priority area**. The UNS included the strengthening of national capacities across various sectors, recognising that the attention given to the Venezuelan population in Peru had not been uniform or comprehensive. UNHCR is now listed as a resident agency and participates in all four strategic priorities[90]. The updates made to the UN common country analyses (2021 and 2022) provided a more detailed account of the situation of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, reflected the changes in the needs of this population, and incorporated adjustments in three of the four strategic priorities of the Cooperation Framework.

60.   In this context and with UNHCR as a consolidated agency in Peru, **the needs of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population were also incorporated into the National Humanitarian Network**, and UNHCR assumed the leadership of the protection sector. Joint work between the WGRM (especially through UNHCR and IOM's co-leadership of the Emergency Coordination Response for Refugees and Migrants) and the National Humanitarian Network has contributed to integrating the needs of refugees and migrants into the emergency preparedness and response actions of state actors, particularly in the face of the El Niño phenomenon.

How did this co-leadership help UNHCR's role in Peru?

61.   **The co-leadership of the WGRM has garnered recognition for the work of UNHCR (and IOM) in managing a joint response mechanism where there is broad consensus, particularly on coordination, representativeness and participation[91], information and data generation [92], comprehensive analysis of flows and needs at regional and national levels[93] and fund mobilisation.** Since 2018, the WGRM has been integrated into the governance architecture of the UNCT (as part of coordination mechanisms that include external actors at the "advisory and expert support level"[94]) and has regularly interacted with the MTIGM[95], in the framework of the National Migration Policy 2017 - 2025.

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[90] SP1: People's well-being and equal access to opportunities; SP2: Environmental, climate change and disaster risk management; SP3: Inclusive and sustainable competitiveness and productivity; SP4: Effective democratic governance and equitable exercise of citizenship.

[91] The number of organisations participating in the WGRM has been increasing to become the platform with the largest number of partners in the region, including the presence of 13 organisations with Venezuelan populations since 2021, and 75% of partners reporting regularly to the WGRM (internal informants). The presence of local WGRMs in several border cities with a relevant presence of Venezuelan population complements the work at the central level.

[92] https://www.r4v.info/es/peru

[93] https://www.r4v.info/es/PERCapituloRMRP2023-2024

[94] UNSDCF in Peru; governance architecture.

[95] The Intersectoral Working Group for Migration Management (MTIGM) is a multi-sectoral commission attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). It was created in 2011 by Supreme Decree N° 067-2011-PCM, and is permanently constituted to coordinate, evaluate, propose, prioritise and supervise policies and actions related to comprehensive migration management. The MTIGM is made up of 23 State institutions, 3 observer entities, 4 United Nations agencies, and 19 representatives of Civil Society.

62. The co-leadership of the WGRM has contributed to UNHCR's organisational positioning vis-à-vis government institutions and national and international organisations involved in the response, at different levels:

- **The WGRM in Peru is considered one of the most active and well-structured in the region**, in terms of representativeness, internal organisation and dialogue capacity[96]. The WGRM has acted as a legitimate platform to communicate and advocate on important issues in a neutral and collective manner (e.g. advocacy with parliamentarians for legislative changes, amnesty of fines, campaigns and actions against rejection or xenophobia of refugees and migrants, support for integration and regularisation), areas that an organisation on its own would not have been able to influence sufficiently.

- **The co-leadership of the WGRM has contributed to positioning UNHCR as a reference and visible organisation** in the field of human mobility and protection vis-à-vis government institutions at different levels of public administrations, international organisations and donors in Peru.

- **The co-leadership and joint work of UNHCR and IOM in the WGRM has also been decisive in harmonising a joint discourse, strengthening institutional advocacy** (e.g. executive, legislative and judicial branches) and raising awareness on asylum issues, international protection, and the needs of the Venezuelan population in Peru. This joint effort has succeeded in prioritizing these concerns on both the political and UNS agendas. However, gaps and opportunities to strengthen and streamline the work of co-leadership are identified.

- **In a context of human mobility where Venezuelan individuals have not always applied for asylum[97] and a in a political, media and social discourse that is predominantly migratory, co-leadership has made it possible to provide a response without distinction, and to offer a dual response** (migratory permanence and international protection or asylum), incorporating elements of international protection. In the case of UNHCR, the co-leadership of the WGRM has allowed it to have legitimacy and presence in national and regional fora related to human mobility.

63. However, the co-leadership of the WGRM has also confronted UNHCR with organisational and operational challenges.

- **The investment in resources dedicated to data generation and analysis has enhanced the public projection and legitimacy of the WGRM, but it has also**

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[96] Internal and external informants

[97] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is categorical in stating that persons coming from Venezuela should be recognised, prima facie, as refugees under the Cartagena declaration. Indeed, most people leaving Venezuela are displaced by imminent threats to their life, integrity and liberty as a consequence of massive human rights violations (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Refugees and migrants from Venezuela: approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on 20 July 2023. p. ; cm. (OAS. Official documents; OEA/Ser.L) ISBN 978-0-8270-7728-7).

consumed internal resources that could have been allocated to more detailed analyses on protection or sectoral issues and to bolstering UNHCR's advocacy actions. The debate on UNHCR's visibility within the WGRM has highlighted a challenging balance between the advantages (recognition of UNHCR's contributions to information under its co-leadership role) and the disadvantages (limited UNHCR's visibility under the WGRM umbrella).

- **The workload for some UNHCR positions, combining internal operational functions with supporting the WGRM** (comprising over 100 organizations), has complicated and, at times, hindered the effective coordination of sectors led by UNHCR (protection, CBI, basic needs, communication). The coordination of the WGRM has coexisted with participation in other fora, adding further complexity. In addition, UNHCR staff who took on coordination responsibilities in the WGRM did not always have the time (due to the complexity of the coordination role of multiple fora and organisations) or specific training or preparation for coordination tasks in a complex humanitarian architecture.

What can be learned from the relationship with IOM in the co-leadership of the WGRM?

64.   Key learnings from the WGRM's co-leadership with IOM include the following[98]:

- **The co-leadership of the WGRM not only fulfils the mandate set by the UN Secretary-General in 2018 but also facilitates the consistent operationalization of global[99] and regional frameworks[100] and agreements by both agencies**[101]. From the UNS perspective, the co-leadership of the WGRM exemplifies the principles of "*Delivering as One*" and "*New Ways of Working*".

- **From an operational standpoint, co-leadership enhances the complementarity between agencies to support the State's response and address people's needs, thereby reducing competition for visibility, funds, partners, or humanitarian spaces**, despite challenges and gaps. The efficiency gained[102] is beneficial amid the progressively reduced funding for the response[103] in a middle-to-high-income country with structured government institutions and public policies.

- **Co-leadership allows for better interlocution and capacity for action vis-à-vis institutions, a more comprehensive and coordinated response** among

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[98] Internal and external informants, staff survey UNHCR

[99] New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, Global Compact on Refugees, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, *United Nations Network on Migration*

[100] Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection in 2022

[101] IOM-UNHCR Joint Letter February 2019, IOM/UNHCR Framework for Action June 2022, UNHCR and IOM call for a joint response to refugees and migrants in the Americas in 2023.

[102] No quantitative measurements or parameters are available but have been expressed by several external and internal informants.

[103] https://fts.unocha.org/countries/175/summary/2022

multiple organisations involved in the response, and an example of inter-agency work.

- **Joint planning and harmonisation among co-leaders favour convergence on approaches and tools for work in key areas** (e.g. border monitoring, reporting to government institutions, employability databases), but requires clarifying the levels of dedication and resource mobilisation of each co-leader to avoid disparate or variable dedications and commitments.

What were the results of these actions (intended and unintended) and the factors (decisions, changes in context) that facilitated or hindered the achievement of results?

65.   The following table (Table 1) presents a synthesis of the most salient intended and unintended results[104] .

Table 1: Summary of intended and unintended results

Intentional results	Unintended results
- Management of the emergency response (legal, protection and humanitarian - including the activation of the humanitarian migratory status) to critical moments of the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population in border areas, supporting various state institutions (CEPR and SNM, as well as other central, regional and local bodies) and NGOs. - Continued humanitarian response to the needs of the Venezuelan population, in border areas, transit routes and settlements, and adapted to overlapping crises (e.g. pandemic, El Niño) and to changes in the context (e.g. militarisation of borders). - Strengthening and digitalisation of the national asylum system, in particular the technical, human and logistical capacities of the CEPR at central and decentralised levels (ODE). - Strengthening knowledge and capacities on asylum, international protection and the rights of the Venezuelan population of a wide range of public administrations, NGOs and CBOs in Lima and cities with a high migratory presence (thanks especially to the investment in evidence generation and a good capacity for	Overflow of the national asylum system, backlog of applications, inconsistencies in the quality of backlog data and limitations on asylum claims since 2020 due to the use of asylum as an exceptional mechanism.

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[104] See more details in the chapter on Effectiveness.

Intentional results	Unintended results
dialogue with central and decentralised institutions). • Facilitation of governmental regularisation programmes as an essential mechanism to allow access to documentation, social services and contribute to the local integration of the Venezuelan population. • Empowerment of CBOs and faith and refugee-led organisations to enhance their advocacy capacities and promote local integration.	

66.   The following table (Table 2) presents a synthesis of the main facilitating and inhibiting factors[105] of the above-mentioned results.

Table 2: Summary of the main facilitating and inhibiting factors

Enabling factors	Inhibiting factors
External • A state that guarantees rights[106], favours protection and is committed to asylum, international protection[107] and local integration (in particular through the regularisation programmes). • Smooth and constructive institutional relations with CEPR and SNM, and commitment and professionalism of public officials at a political and technical level. • Consolidated partnerships with international and national NGOs (including CBOs) experienced in working in neighbourhoods, communities and territories. • Leadership of prominent Venezuelan individuals accepted among the Venezuelan population to act as	**External** • Chronic underfunding of the comprehensive response to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population. • Rotation of civil servants in public administrations, at political and technical levels. • Unstable political context and unfavourable macroeconomic situation to boost local integration. • Increasing migration requirements for the entry of the Venezuelan population into the territory. • Persistent rejection and xenophobia towards the arrival and settlement of the Venezuelan population. • COVID-19 pandemic and impact on humanitarian needs and prioritisation of interventions.

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[105] See more details in the chapter on Effectiveness.

[106]   Equal rights protection index, Peru   (https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/equal-rights-protection-index?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~PER)

[107] Peru has been a State Party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) since 1964 and to its 1967 Protocol since 1983. In 2014 Peru acceded to the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961). Peru's national refugee legislation includes key protection principles, such as non-refoulement, non-punishment for irregular entry, confidentiality, family reunification and non-discrimination. The 2017 Migration Law also contains refugee protection safeguards (e.g. provisions for the regularisation of persons staying in the country irregularly and protection for particularly vulnerable groups). Peru also acceded to the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees.

Enabling factors	Inhibiting factors
credible and legitimised representatives.	• Reluctance of the GoP to apply the expanded definition of refugee contained in the Cartagena Declaration and national legislation.
Internal • Rapid transition from a UNHCR operation under the multi-country office in Argentina to a fully-fledged operation. • WGRM co-leadership with IOM, good overall inter-agency communication and facilitating role by the Office of the Resident Coordinator (OCR). • National staff with a high level of knowledge of the operational environment, adequate preparation and commitment. • Installed capacities and expertise in data and evidence generation. • Capacity to liaise with national institutions.	**Internal** • Critical shortage of UNHCR staff (and rotations) in the operation given a broad portfolio of sectoral programmes and interventions and diversity of priorities. • Complexity and lengthy timelines involved in changes to UNHCR's planning and management systems (as part of the Business Transformation process), particularly in planning and monitoring, leading to bureaucracy and inefficiencies in internal procedures.

4.1.2. How did UNHCR's actions support the Quito Process led by the governments of the region, and the leadership of the Government of Peru in the Plan of Action of the Quito Process (2021)?

67. **UNHCR (bilaterally and through the WGRM) has supported the Pro Tempore Presidency of the Quito Process[108] held by the GoP[109].** This support has facilitated the exchange of best practices, alignment of regularisation programmes among countries in the region and strengthening of sectoral initiatives related to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population (particularly in health and socio-economic integration). Additionally, **it has enhanced communication between the MTIGM, similar entities in neighbouring countries, and the WGRM**. The collaboration between the Chancellor's Office and UNHCR has been positively perceived, especially considering the limitations both organizations face in meeting the demands of various regional fora.

68. **From UNHCR's perspective, the Quito Process has contributed to addressing protection issues related to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population within a coherent regional framework and has mobilised other actors[110]. From the perspective of the GoP, the Pro Tempore Presidency has**

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[108] The Quito Process is an intergovernmental initiative launched in Quito in 2018 aiming to establish non-binding mechanisms and commitments to coordinate the response to the challenges posed by human mobility at the regional level. Currently, the Process includes 14 countries from the region. For more information: https://www.procesodequito.org

[109] September 2020 to May 2021

[110] Francisco Rey, Beatriz Abellán, Andrés Gómez (2021) The application of the "triple nexus" approach between humanitarian action, development and peace in the context of Venezuela's migratory flows. Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria. Madrid

served as a platform to enhance the visibility and projection of the National Migration Policy 2017-2025, aligned with Peru's foreign policy and its commitments to the 2030 Agenda.

69. **However, the dynamics of the Quito Process and the Action Plan seem to have diminished in a context with other regional fora** (e.g. Andean Community[111], MERCOSUR[112], Los Angeles Declaration[113], South American Conference on Migration[114]) and limitations of the process itself (e.g. limited practical implementation of joint declarations, monitoring of results and systematisation of good practices, varying levels of state's involvement [115]).

4.1.3. To what extent and in what ways did UNHCR contribute to or hinder the development of a governance framework116 on displacement117 and protection, and alignment with international frameworks?

70. **The institutional, public policy, and largely legal governance framework predated UNHCR's institutional and operational deployment in Peru to address the needs of forced displacement of the Venezuelan population[118] and was reasonably aligned with international standards. Since 2019, UNHCR has contributed to strengthening the technical, human and logistical capacities of national asylum institutions (CEPR, SNM, Ombudsman's Office) and to introducing protection elements aligned with international standards in public policy and national laws**. For example, UNHCR has influenced (with IOM and other organisations) the modification of the Consolidated Text of Administrative Procedures (TUPA, Spanish acronym) for the amnesty of fines, access to territory and non-refoulement, the enhancement of CEPR's capacity to process asylum claims, the standardization of refugee status application procedures at the border, the promotion of various regularisation programmes and, therefore, partial access to rights and inclusion.

71. **Despite the efforts of UNHCR, IOM, WGRM and other actors, some public policy decisions and approved regulations related to migration and asylum have shown gaps and have contravened both national legal and international reference**

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[111]   https://www.comunidadandina.org/notas-de-prensa/aprueban-estatuto-migratorio-andino-que-establece-residencia-temporal-y-permanente-en-paises-de-la-can/

[112] https://www.argentina.gob.ar/interior/migraciones/foro-especializado-migratorio-del-mercosur

[113]   https://www.acnur.org/noticias/news-releases/acnur-acoge-con-beneplacito-la-declaracion-de-los-angeles-sobre-migracion-y

[114] https://csmigraciones.org/es

[115] José Carlos Exebio Quintana (2021) Master's thesis in diplomacy and international relations; the impact of the Quito Process on the Peruvian response to the Venezuelan migration crisis from the fields of migration governance and international cooperation during the period 2018-2021. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Diplomatic Academy of Peru, Master's Degree in Diplomacy and International Relations.

[116] Governance refers to all the government processes, institutions, procedures and practices through which the affairs of society are decided and regulated (ECLAC).

[117] The term displacement here is associated with 'forced migration' (IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019), and 'other persons in need of international protection' (UNHCR) in a context of mixed movements, to differentiate it from 'refuge' and 'internal displacement' (so far, an undocumented phenomenon in Peru).

[118] See annex for a compilation of the most relevant institutions, public policies and laws that make up the governance framework for migration and refugee issues in Peru.

frameworks. This has occurred in a context of increasingly stringent migration policies and growing stigmatization of the Venezuelan population, especially from 2023 onwards. National and international organisations[119] and various publications[120] have documented barriers to the entry and stay of asylum seekers in the country that are not aligned with international protection frameworks. These barriers include the limited application of the Cartagena Declaration, regulation of the entry of foreigners without determining exceptions, the introduction of entry requirements, military deployment in border areas, restrictions on submitting asylum claims, failure to issue asylum seeker cards, lack of system interoperability between migration and asylum authorities (and an exceptional procedure for the expulsion of migrants in irregular situation)[121].

4.1.4. To what extent and in what ways has UNHCR contributed to building partnerships on displacement and protection?

72. **The establishment of formal and stable partnerships (including the technical, logistical and financial assistance provided by UNHCR to the CEPR, the SNM and the Ombudsman's Office) has been crucial in supporting the Peruvian state in meeting some of its international obligations in terms of asylum and international protection and in responding to a forced displacement of the Venezuelan population that has surpassed national capacities**. In addition, UNHCR's operational deployment from 2017 onwards in Tumbes (northern border, at a critical moment of displacement) and, progressively, in Tacna (southern border), Lima and other localities has been decisive in establishing partnerships with regional and local authorities, although in this case the intensity and results of the collaborations vary depending on local circumstances. UNHCR has structured its partnerships with key public administrations by signing annual Project Partnership Agreements (PPA), memoranda of understanding and other ad hoc agreements. In the case of some public administrations, PPA have involved additional procedures (based on UNHCR norms and standards) that were not in line with regular public administration procedures.

73. **UNHCR's collaborations with INEI and universities have been instrumental in generating essential data and evidence for characterizing and understanding**

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[119] UNHCR (annual reports), Ombudsman's Office, Amnesty International, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Institute of Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IDEHPUCP), Peruvian Judiciary.

[120] Blouin, Cécile. 2021. "Complexities and contradictions of migration policy towards Venezuelan migration in Peru". Colombia Internacional 106: 141-164. https://doi.org/10.7440/

Feline Freier, Marta Luzes (2019) Public policy proposal; towards humane borders. The adverse impacts of humanitarian visas. Universidad del Pacífico, Research Centre. Lima

Freier, L.F., Berganza, I., & Blouin, C. (2020). "The Cartagena Refugee Definition and Venezuelan Displacement in Latin America," International Migration.

Berganza, I., Blouin, C., & Freier, L.F. (2020). "The situational element of massive human rights violations of the Cartagena expanded definition: towards an application in the Venezuelan case." Revista Chilena de Derecho, 47 (2): 385-410.

Castro Padrón, Marta and Freier, Luisa Feline. "Invisible or made invisible? COVID-19 and Venezuelan refugee claimants in Peru". Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, n.º 129 (December 2021), p. 31-55. DOI: doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2021.129.3.31

[121] Ombudsman's Office

displacement. These outcomes have guided public policy and government actions, as well as strategies and programmes implemented by UNHCR, WGRM, and other organizations. In 2018 and 2022, the two National Surveys aimed at the Venezuelan population (ENPOVE, Spanish acronym) were the most comprehensive profiling exercises of the refugee and migrant population residing in Peru, enabling the identification of settlement trends in the country. Other collaborations, such as those with the Ombudsman's Office, have facilitated legal analyses (e.g., right to identity[122]) while partnerships with universities have delved into sectoral or thematic analyses (e.g., psychosocial needs).[123]

74.   **UNHCR has played a decisive role in mobilising and structuring a network among a growing number of actors within the WGRM, representing a wide spectrum of organizations involved in the response to forced displacement of the Venezuelan population.** This network covers all relevant sectors[124] necessary for a comprehensive response and has consolidated the WGRM as the central platform for the protection, assistance, and integration "ecosystem." The membership of the WGRM has increased from 68 in 2019[125] to over 110 in 2023[126], including agencies, national and international NGOs, the Red Cross, churches, academia, embassies, donors, and financial institutions. The progressive establishment of local WGRMs starting in 2019 in Tumbes, Tacna, and Arequipa has facilitated the involvement of local authorities and organizations, enhancing territorial coverage and representation. Interaction between the WGRM and the MTIGM has promoted the alignment between the humanitarian architecture of the response and the governance of the national migration policy. However, opportunities have been identified to further strengthen convergence between humanitarian logic and public policy approaches[127],[128].

75.   **UNHCR has established partnerships with some 94 organizations between 2019 and 2022 to address the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population in Peru**. Of these organizations, nearly 30% are governmental, followed by civil organizations (20%) and community-based organizations (15%). These collaborations have enabled a comprehensive approach to addressing migration challenges in Peru, facilitating the implementation of multiple interventions. The diversity of partnerships reflects UNHCR's holistic approach to addressing forced displacement.

76.   **UNHCR's operational capacity in Peru has relied significantly on collaboration with organizations through annual partnership agreements,**

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[122] Ombudsman's Office (2021) Special Report Series No. 020-2021-DP. Right to identity of children born in Peru during the health emergency due to the COVID19 pandemic. Lima

[123] Cécile Blouin et al (2019) A look at the psychosocial impacts on Venezuelan refugees and migrants housed in shelters in Lima (Peru). Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (IDEHPUCP), Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Lima

[124] Protection, basic needs, integration, health and nutrition, education

[125] UNHCR 2019 Operations Plan Report.docx

[126] https://www.r4v.info/es/peru

[127] External informants

[128] Francisco Rey, Beatriz Abellán, Andrés Gómez (2021) The application of the "triple nexus" approach between humanitarian action, development and peace in the context of Venezuela's migratory flows. Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria. Madrid

increasingly involving community-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations, and those led by Venezuelan nationals (via Project Partnership Agreements - PPA or others). From having a single national NGO partner in 2016[129] (Encuentros), UNHCR expanded to 16 partners (including international NGOs and government partners) in 2019, and to 23 partners by 2022[130], operating across 7 provinces in Peru. National NGOs and CBO partners accounted for 44% of the total funds implemented between 2019 and 2022[131]. In addition to formal agreements with national NGOs and CBOs, UNHCR has collaborated with and engaged other NGOs and CBOs (including parish networks like CIREMI) that played crucial roles (e.g., hosting Venezuelan populations in parishes, helping during the COVID-19 pandemic). Overall, the diversity of actors involved stands out, encompassing both national government entities and non-governmental organizations at national and international levels. The active participation of community organizations in various regions, including border areas such as La Libertad, Madre de Dios, Puno, Tacna, Cuzco, Tumbes, and Arequipa, highlights UNHCR's decentralised approach and adaptation strategy to address the specific needs of affected communities.

77.   **For the period 2019-2022, international partners received 51% of the funds allocated to Project Partnership Agreements (PPA) annually**. In 2019, Plan International and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) accounted for 66% of the total budget allocated to international organizations, constituting 32% of the annual budget allocated to partners with PPA. However, starting from 2020, HIAS became the international organization receiving the largest budget, increasing its funding nearly 8 times in 2022 compared to 2019. On the other hand, World Vision International received funding only in 2019, and despite increasing its budget by 2.4 times in 2022 compared to 2019, Action Against Hunger represented 16% of the total allocated to international partners between 2019-2022.

For the period 2019-2022, local NGOs, CBOs, faith-based organizations, and organizations led by refugees constituted the second largest group of partners[132] with significant budget allocations through annual agreements. ENCUENTROS Servicios Jesuitas de la Solidaridad, on average, accounted for 50% of the total budget allocated to local organizations and approximately 22% of the total budget allocated to partners during this period. The increase in budget allocation corresponds with the rise in the number of organizations; the budget allocated to local organizations in 2022 is 1.7 times higher than in 2019. In 2019, there were 7 local organizations, whereas by 2022, this number had increased to 18 organizations (see

78.   Figure 1 below). Lastly, the budget allocated to the two governmental partners represented 5% of the total budget over these 4 years.

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[129] At the time, the Peru operation was part of the multi-country office managed from Argentina.

[130] This includes both incorporated NGOs as well as community-based and faith-based organisations.

[131] Part of the Venezuelan population, especially individuals in an irregular migratory status, has resorted to parishes as the first and main mechanism for help and guidance, fearing to turn to official bodies and unaware of aid networks and organisations.

[132] Implementing partners with PPA and other types of agreements.

Figure 1: Evolution of the number of PPAs and allocated budgets by UNHCR (2019 - 2022)

Source: UNHCR PERU Detailed OPS financials by Partner or UNHCR implementation

79.   **UNHCR has contributed to the organisational development of the Interreligious Committee for Migrants and Refugees (CIREMI, Spanish acronym), which has strengthened its visibility and advocacy capacity with state institutions and community leadership.** Through CIREMI and Encuentros[133], UNHCR has managed to set up Support Centres for Refugees and Migrants (CAREMI, Spanish acronym) in priority neighbourhoods of Lima to provide social and legal services to refugees and migrants, promote integration and create spaces for coexistence between Peruvians and Venezuelan nationals. The CAREMIs have subsequently served as a reference for the implementation of the migrant and refugee attention centres (SAMMIR, Spanish acronym) in 2023, with the SNM, in order to support regularisation programmes. The Migracentros and SAMMIRs were the first experiences of decentralisation of migration services in Peru. Since December 2023, the CEPR has been present in the SAMMIRs with biometric registration and issuance of ID cards to asylum seekers[134].

80.   **UNHCR's support for refugee-led organizations, from their inception to the present, has enabled 13 refugee-led organizations to achieve implementation within their communities, enhance their capacity for community mobilization, become part of the WGRM, and offer a comprehensive range of services.** These organizations provide services and manage projects in key locations, with varying in intensity based on their capacities and presence. They also developed advocacy and communication capabilities to promote integration and peaceful coexistence.

81.   **The establishment of partnerships between UNHCR, the private sector, and public administrations[135] to facilitate the socio-economic integration of refugees and migrants has been relevant[136], and has provided tools (albeit on a small scale) for access to livelihoods, generating some success stories.** However, efforts to influence the private sector and expand alliances with companies faced challenges due

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[133] Promoting Protection and Durable Solutions for Refugees and Migrants project.

[134] Information provided by UNHCR during the preparation of the report (outside the temporal scope of the evaluation).

[135] E.g. Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion, employment exchanges of the Mancomunidad Municipal de Lima Norte, Ministry of Production, Centro de Empleo Región Lambayeque (among others).

[136] UNHCR Participatory assessment 2019; OIOS Internal Audit Division, Report 2021/057. Audit of the operations in Peru for the UNHCR. 30 November 2021.

to an unfavourable macroeconomic context, the onset of the pandemic, national labour regulations[137], bureaucratic hurdles in hiring and validation of diplomas, low qualifications among part of the Venezuelan population, and certain levels of xenophobia[138]. Nevertheless, the "Integrating Companies" initiative[139] ("Empresas Integradoras", in Spanish) helped raise awareness about the potential of Venezuelan migration. UNHCR was also able to promote corporate social responsibility[140], validate diplomas for health professionals, create employment databases, support entrepreneurship and provide training on access to work.

4.1.5. To what extent has UNHCR promoted and ensured coherence across the humanitarian-development nexus?

82. **UNHCR's response has incorporated some development-oriented interventions (e.g., socioeconomic integration, inclusion in social programmes) and peace initiatives (e.g., integration into host communities, peaceful coexistence). However, their practical application has been limited due to the pandemic's impact and resource constraints. The peace component has seen more progress through community and school interventions implemented by partners** (e.g., peace culture campaigns, reducing discrimination and stigmatization, integration spaces for youth, healthy coexistence workshops)[141]. From a development perspective, the inclusion in government social programmes has been partial (e.g., Cuna Mas[142, 143, 144]), due to documentation issues among the Venezuelan population[145, 146, 147]. The development component is also reflected in UNHCR's planning, particularly in water and sanitation, shelter, and environment sectors (sustainable development and resilience of host communities and Venezuelan people), but progress has not been documented. UNHCR has also explored collaborations with the Inter-American

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[137] Law for the hiring of foreign workers (D. L. Nº 689) and its Regulation (D.S. Nº 014-92-TR). They impose a maximum limit of 20% of foreign workers in companies in Peru (among other limitations).

[138] Equilibrium Social Development Consulting (2022) Evaluation on professional qualification and employment projects funded by UNHCR. Lima.

[139] https://empresasintegradoras.pe/

[140]

[141] UNHCR Annual Partner Reports

[142] UNHCR Annual multiyear strategy 2023 - 2026

[143] International Organization for Migration (2022) Study on Food Security in the Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Population: Challenges in accessing food supplementation social programs in Peru, 2022. Lima.

[144] The early childhood care program, Cuna Más, has been attending to the Venezuelan population in an extraordinary way, through specific actions for families in transit on the border between Peru and Ecuador. In September 2018, the program provided care services for children between 6 and 36 months with families in transit at CEBAF Tumbes, as part of the emergency declaration for districts in the area due to the increase in international population. The program is not open to children of foreign nationality on a regular basis.

[145] Blouin, C., Palla, I., Zamora, C. and Ruiz, Y. (2021). Social inclusion of migrants and refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic in Peru. CAMINAR Working Paper Nr. 2. Available at: https://www.caminaramericas.org/documentos

[146] For example, in Peru there is a non-contributory social pension (Pensión 65), but it is not available to Venezuelans, because it is only for Peruvian nationals in extreme poverty. There is a pension for persons with severe or multiple disabilities for nationals or foreigners, as long as they have the required documentation (Pensión 65).

[147] Action Against Hunger Foundation America (2020) Multi-sectoral study on refugees and migrants from Venezuela living in metropolitan Lima.

Development Bank (aligned with regional agreements and experiences in neighbouring countries like Ecuador), but no concrete actions have been identified so far.

4.2. Effectiveness and sustainability of UNHCR's programmes in Peru

EQ2. To what extent has UNHCR been effective in promoting access to territory and legal stay for refugees and migrants, expanding the provision of targeted assistance and protection services to persons with specific needs, and supporting access to quality services through public systems, fostering local integration and livelihood opportunities?

Asylum, international protection and access to territory. Within the framework of the WGRM and together with IOM, UNHCR has been able to demonstrate the importance of addressing the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population through a complementary approach between the migration and asylum systems. UNHCR provided support to public administrations that lacked experience in managing large-scale migration and asylum. UNHCR played a crucial role in facilitating access to the territory in 2018 and 2019, partially mitigating the risk of refoulement. However, despite advocacy by UNHCR and numerous organizations, subsequent restrictions established by the GoP on entry and asylum increased irregular entry and the associated risks for the Venezuelan population. The widespread use of asylum as a mechanism to facilitate legal entry and temporary stay in 2018 and 2019 overwhelmed processing capacities, resulting in a persistent backlog that is no longer representative of active asylum claims.

Migratory regularisation programmes, legal assistance and specific needs. The joint work of UNHCR and IOM and their coordinated support for the government's migration policy has been crucial to the regularisation of refugees and migrants without distinction, and thus to the facilitation of the legal stay of the Venezuelan population as a whole. UNHCR's contribution has been effective in facilitating local integration through the various migration regularisation processes (including migration and legal counselling). However, this has been at the expense of recourse to other international protection mechanisms which has created a kind of grey zone between the roles of UNHCR and IOM. Despite the support of UNHCR and other agencies, regularisation processes have not implemented specific measures to facilitate access to documentation, residence, and protection for vulnerable profiles. UNHCR has consistently mainstreamed a focus on vulnerable profiles and accountability to affected populations in its interventions. However, support to public administrations and organizations working on the prevention, assistance, and management of gender-based violence (GBV) and child protection cases has been insufficient due to resource constraints.

Humanitarian assistance. The exacerbation of needs due to overlapping crises (forced displacement of the Venezuelan population and the pandemic) led to the

expansion of UNHCR's humanitarian response, particularly through cash-based interventions distributed through partners This expansion increased population reach (refugees, migrants and also host communities) but weakened the protection focus. Protection activities, largely implemented through partners, have shown variability, leading to gaps in case identification and management. The harmonisation and simplification of CBI in 2023, (alongside with direct implementation by UNHCR) has helped to streamline the types of CBI, standardise amounts and criteria, and reduce the risk of inconsistencies and fraud.

Inclusion, health and education. UNHCR's efforts have enabled critical cases to be included in the Comprehensive Health Insurance scheme but have not contributed to a significant increase in health coverage for refugees and migrants (except during the pandemic). In education, UNHCR's contributions have facilitated access to education for Venezuelan children and adolescents and supported local case management and internet access during the pandemic. However, these efforts have had limited coordination with the governance of the education system at the central level. From an inclusion perspective, UNHCR has implemented its urban protection response by developing a localisation strategy and involving a wide range of social organisations. This has enabled UNHCR to interact with Venezuelan and host communities in the implementation of social cohesion interventions, case management, and inclusion in community services. In Lima, while the qualitative achievements are significant, the quantitative impact appears to be more limited.

Livelihoods. UNHCR professional empowerment and job placement programme for Venezuelan health professionals has been a success story. Building on this experience in the health sector, UNHCR is expanding its professional certification efforts to other sectors and has helped to increase the openness of private companies and public administrations to hiring refugees. In the area of entrepreneurship, UNHCR has developed a well-structured programme with evaluations showing positive effects, although gaps have also been reported due to insufficient initial feasibility analysis. The implementation of entrepreneurship initiatives has had a limited reach and shows more qualitative than quantitative results, with limited linkages between the protection component and the various livelihood activities.

Resettlement. Resettlement has become the main line of action for durable solutions as a result of quota increases in the US, with a rapid and reasonably effective increase in processing capacity and a high rate of case acceptance. Resettlement efforts have also contributed to highlighting the refugee profile as a distinct category from the migrant profile in a predominantly migratory context.

Sustainability. UNHCR's contributions, together with other organisations, to strengthening institutional capacity to protect the rights of refugees and migrants show promising prospects for sustainability, although support to the national asylum system has had mixed results. On the one hand, the strengthening of competencies and systems has had a significant impact on the increased and improved installed capacity of the CEPR. On the other hand, support in terms of human resources has

relied on external funding. UNHCR's support to local organisations has expanded community-based support mechanisms, but the humanitarian assistance has been entirely dependent on UNHCR funding and is therefore unsustainable. UNHCR's livelihood initiatives have created opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship. While these outcomes may be sustainable, the "process" interventions supported by UNHCR have limited prospects for continuity.

4.2.1.   To what extent has UNHCR been effective in providing i) protection; ii) short-term assistance (CBI, shelter, emergency protection) to refugees, asylum seekers and other populations in need of international protection?

Protection

Legal and policy environment favourable to international protection and asylum

83.   **The favourable legal environment for international protection and asylum, which ensured certain standards and levels of protection for asylum seekers and migrants until 2019, has evolved into a more restrictive environment due to increasing political and social concerns, despite efforts by UNHCR and other international organizations.** The national asylum system has received sustained support from UNHCR to address the growing needs for international protection (through the Chancellor's office and CEPR). The government's perspective on migration has shifted from primarily focusing on internal and international migration of Peruvian citizens (Peru as a migrant-sending country in recent decades[148]) to a broader view that aligns with the diverse mixed movements in the region (Peru as a transit and destination country, committed to international obligations). The state's commitment to protection and regular migration is reflected in various regularisation programmes and mass campaigns launched in the past five years, allowing entry into the country with expired passports or documents and some humanitarian access mechanisms (despite criticisms and limitations, admission on humanitarian grounds[149] has allowed particularly vulnerable cases to be addressed). Some UNHCR actions have contributed to maintaining a favourable environment for protection but have not succeeded in preventing the approval of legislative initiatives contrary to the rights of refugees and migrants. In the past three years, several reports[150] have documented how legal, regulatory, and procedural changes approved by national authorities have led to breaches of human rights obligations (e.g., limited application of the Cartagena

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[148] See for example: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (2023) Peru: International Migration Statistics by 2023 (A View from the Administrative Registers).

[149] Resolution of the National Superintendency of Migration, Resolution Nº 000177-2019: "this resolution permits the entry of Venezuelan nationals into Peru on humanitarian grounds with only an identity card and no passport. The beneficiaries of this decision include: (i) Minors in transit reuniting with parents in Peru without an identity card or passport, only a birth certificate, (ii) adults in transit to Peru reuniting with their nuclear family residing in Peru, (iii) adults in a situation of extreme vulnerability in transit to Peru, (iv) pregnant women in a situation of extreme vulnerability in transit to Peru; and, (v) older adults, over 60 years of age, in transit to Peru.

[150] See, for example: Amnesty International (2020) Seeking Refuge; Peru turns its back on those fleeing Venezuela. London

Declaration to specific profiles, requirements for obtaining a "humanitarian visa," ad hoc decisions during asylum procedures at the border, exceptional procedures for the expulsion of migrants in an irregular situation)[151]. For example, in terms of national jurisprudence, Constitutional Court ruling No. 00688-2020-PHC/TC declared in 2022 that the requirement for a visa-stamped passport for persons in particularly vulnerable situations and for those deserving protection under an international asylum figure was unconstitutional[152]. The evolution of the legal environment reflects the evolution of the political environment which, in turn, reflects social trends[153].

84. **UNHCR has successfully raised the visibility of asylum, international protection, and the role of the CEPR and the national asylum system. Within the framework of the WGRM, in collaboration with IOM, it has highlighted the importance of addressing the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population through a complementary approach between the migration and asylum systems**. Public administrations lacked the means and experience to manage large-scale immigration or asylum in a country that had primarily been a source of emigration. The joint advocacy and support provided by UNHCR / IOM (e.g. training in international law, asylum) to the CEPR, the SNM, the Ombudsman's Office and other institutions[154] has helped to maintain the protection space and promote the inclusion of refugees and migrants

Access to the territory and Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedure

85. **UNHCR played a key role in protecting the right of refugees to access the territory during 2018 and 2019 and partially mitigating the risk of refoulement by increasing CEPR's presence in the CEBAF of Tumbes (northern border) in a period of massive arrivals and overstretched migration and asylum management capacities**. In the framework of the Guidance Notes on the Venezuelan displacement and on international protection considerations for Venezuelans, and taking into account the difficulty for these people to comply with regular migration requirements, UNHCR supported CEPR and SNM response capacities as a mechanism to facilitate access to the territory and protection. Since 2018, access to the territory has been progressively restricted with new entry requirements for the Venezuelan population, border closures and militarisation, disparity in the application of entry and refugee eligibility criteria directly at the border, among other factors. Despite the advocacy of UNHCR and numerous organisations, these factors increased the flow of irregular entries, costs

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[151] See section: To what extent and in what ways did UNHCR contribute to or hinder the development of a governance framework on displacement and protection, and alignment with international frameworks?

[152] Constitutional Court. Plenary. Sentence 266/2022 EXP. No. 00688-2020-PHC/TC, Lima (https://tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2022/00688-2020-HC.pdf). This judgment nullifies the new entry requirements established in 2018 and the subsequent humanitarian visa requirement imposed by the Peruvian State in June 2019.

[153] For example, in January 2020, the Minister of Interior created a "Special Police Brigade against Criminal Migration". In the Government Presidency, the welcoming statements of 2018 ("Venezuelan citizens are welcome in Peru, and migrant workers will receive wages according to the law") shifted to stigmatising remarks in 2023 ("800,000 Venezuelans and many Haitians have entered, and unfortunately, they are committing these acts […] Therefore, we must almost uniformly associate migration with public insecurity").

[154] E.g. the National Police of Peru's Immigration Division, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations.

(payment to "coyotes"), risks of violence or abuse, and vulnerability to smuggling and trafficking networks. The reopening of borders in 2022, after more than two years closed due to the pandemic, did not significantly change the restrictive circumstances of access to the territory.

86. **The widespread use of asylum claims as a mechanism to facilitate legal entry and temporary stay in the territory in 2018 and 2019[155] exceeded national processing capacities and generated a persistent backlog that, following various regularisation programmes[156] and due to the inability to ensure the interoperability of migration and asylum databases, does not accurately represent current active asylum claims**. As of 2022, 98% of refugee status applications were pending resolution (see figure 2 below), and the situation has not significantly evolved in 2023. The review of the asylum claims database has been a priority for UNHCR and the CEPR over the past three years[157] to ensure reliable figures on asylum seekers[158]. There is consensus that the figure of approximately 600,000 accumulated asylum claims is not representative, and initial analyses have identified about 100,000 duplications[159]. In this regard, UNHCR, the CEPR, and the SNM plan to advance in the interoperability between databases. Previous UNHCR experiences with reviews of registration systems in other countries suggest that the new figures will show a significant reduction in asylum claims, allowing UNHCR and the CEPR to prepare for the proper processing of effective claims and reduce the backlog in the medium term[160]. The downward revision of registered asylum claims may create a new scenario with significant institutional, operational, and communication implications.

Figure 2: Asylum claims and decisions for the Venezuelan population (2016 to June 2022).

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
[155] Asylum seekers in Peru cannot be deported and received a temporary work permit.

[156] It is estimated that many asylum seekers have managed to obtain legal residence in Peru through the different regularisation programmes. There is no data on this subject due precisely to the impossibility of cross-checking databases between SNM, CEPR and other institutions, although it is under study.

[157] UNHCR Annual Operational Plans

[158] Joint work plan agreed during 2023, with support from the Panama Regional Bureau.

[159] Internal and external informants

[160] Internal informants

87.   **The implementation of QORICANCHA2 (alongside other supporting actions such as training, procedures, hiring support staff, and acquiring IT equipment) has been crucial in achieving significant advancements in the national asylum system.** For example, there has been an expansion and digitalisation of registration points across the territory, the ability to request appointments online, reduction of delivery times for the asylum claim certificate, improved early identification of specific needs and case management, automatic prioritization and assignment of cases to officials, issuance of fraud-proof identification cards, etc.[161]. During QORICANCHA2's first operational year in 2019, the system increased the issuance of asylum application cards by 152% (53,200 cards issued) compared to the previous three years.[162] During the lockdown in 2020, more than 42,000 new asylum claims were received, and 9,000 asylum seekers renewed their expired identification documents online[163]. However, since October 2020, the system has been closed due to the pandemic[164] and indications of unscrupulous use, despite advocacy efforts by UNHCR and the Ombudsman for its reactivation (see figure 3 below[165]). Although asylum claims could still be submitted through other means, this closure has posed a barrier to asylum seekers.

Figure 3: Evolution of new and active asylum claims (2019 -2022)

Source: UNHCR   Refugee   data   Finder   (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=y0Dx0t)

88.   **UNHCR's continued presence at the northern (Tumbes) and southern (Tacna) borders, as well as missions to other border points in the country (Bolivia**

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[161] Other improvements include biometric registration throughout the country, decentralisation of the system through 12 ODE, unification of several application registers (EXCEL files) in QORICANCHA2, campaigns to update applicant data in the system.

[162] UNHCR Operations plan report 2019.

[163] UNHCR Operations plan report 2020.

[164] During the pandemic, the border with Ecuador was militarised and no specific protection-sensitive border control measures were foreseen.

[165] See also: OIOS, Internal Audit Division, Report 2021/057. Audit of the operations in Peru for the Office of the UNHCR

and Brazil borders), and the deployment of a wide range of interventions have been acknowledged by both refugees, migrants, local authorities, and aid organisations. UNHCR has undertaken numerous advocacy efforts, training sessions, and awareness campaigns for officials, provided information and guidance to individuals, delivered humanitarian assistance, coordinated and supported networking, monitored official and irregular border crossings. UNHCR's collective actions have proven instrumental in maintaining the visibility of international protection, addressing information gaps and confusion regarding access to migration procedures, analysing refugee and migrant flows and needs, and, albeit to a limited extent, influencing public administration responses. For example, in 2019, UNHCR conducted over 3,000 border monitoring visits [166] and in 2022, more than 500 visits were carried out.[167]. These monitoring visits progressively engaged partners (and members of the WGRM), strengthening sustainability prospects, and expanded to new border crossing points in response to detected changes in cross-border flows (e.g., Madre de Dios, Desaguadero, Puno). UNHCR has contributed to dozens of monitoring reports produced annually and shared through the WGRM. UNHCR's bi-national monitoring (on both sides of the border, involving operations sharing a border) has been relevant but limited due to resource limitations. The monitoring data and analyses generated by UNHCR have been highly appreciated by ODE, WGRM, and local actors as they have contributed to local analysis and to build a national broader perspective.

Legal assistance, access to information and regularisation programmes

89.   **UNHCR has provided sustained and decisive support to successive regularisation programmes and mechanisms (PTP, CPP, CMH , CMER[168] , CPP2), reflecting the government's commitment to establishing a framework for legal migration and facilitating the integration of the Venezuelan population despite some gaps and barriers in procedures and access to rights[169].** For instance, a significant portion of the Venezuelan population was unable to change their special migratory status after their PTP document expired due to lack of funds or work restrictions, among other reasons. The extensive rollout of regularisation programmes in various cities (campaigns, online platforms, information, and application points in neighbourhoods) has benefited from UNHCR's field offices technical, human, material, and financial assistance (as well as other national and international organizations), enabling hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals to obtain documentation[170]. However, the mobilisation and advocacy of multiple organizations have not succeeded to ensure sufficient standards of international protection in the regularisation programmes (e.g., principles of family reunification or non-refoulement), optimal levels of access to rights (e.g., health, uncertainty regarding the transition from regularisation

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[166] UNHCR monitoring system (# of monitoring visits conducted and recorded)

[167] UNHCR monitoring system UNHCR – COMPASS (# monitoring visits conducted at border and transit points)

[168] Calidad Migratoria Especial Residente (Spanish acronym meaning Special Resident Migration Status).

[169] Civil society perceives that the regularisation programme exhibits technical deficiencies and access limitations for vulnerable populations, those in remote areas, or with limited connectivity, which have hindered significant outcomes (cited in the International Organization for Migration (2023) Study on Migrants in Situations of Vulnerability).

[170] No denominators or official coverage data are available.

to residency), and specific attention to vulnerabilities (e.g., gender-based violence[171]). Despite these challenges, UNHCR's actions have enabled many asylum seekers (and migrants) to resort to one of the regularisation programmes to obtain migratory documentation and legal residency in the country.

90. **The legal assistance provided by UNHCR has evolved from a border-focused approach, aimed at facilitating regular access to the territory, to also providing reliable information about regularisation programmes. This approach has been effective in facilitating access to documentation and establishing referral pathways for identifying and managing cases with specific protection needs, both at the border and in settlement areas.** The collaboration within the WGRM framework with institutions, partners, CBOs, faith-based organizations, and other international agencies has been crucial in delivering reliable migration and legal information to many Venezuelan individuals [172]. The support to institutions and the coordination with Binational Border Care Centres (CEBAF) during periods of mass arrivals (e.g., donations of Refugee Housing Units to expand capacity and processing space, informational equipment, training) enabled the processing of 377,000 asylum claims in 2019 and an additional 42,000 new applications in the few operational months of 2020[173], [174]. UNHCR and IOM's Fixed and Mobile Assistance and Orientation Points (PAO, Spanish acronym) in Tumbes and Tacna borders have gradually incorporated additional services (e.g., distribution of basic aid kits, healthcare and psychosocial support, data collection on people in transit), allowing for comprehensive assistance. However, the opening of new PAOs in 2022 (in a context of lower migration flows) and the presence of other PAOs in Tumbes managed by other agencies suggest the need to reconsider or update the PAO approach. Subsequently, strengthening the community protection strategy (especially from 2022 in Lima) and developing stable agreements with refugee-led organisations have facilitated the organisation of community activities (*comunafests*), widespread dissemination of information, and access to migration procedures in districts with Venezuelan population presence and vulnerability. In 2023, UNHCR presence at community level facilitated the establishment of four SAMMIR centres [175] to support the latest regularisation programmes (2023) in collaboration with partners and the SNM. During the fieldwork of this evaluation, SAMMIR centres (and other assistance points) experienced long queues. Incorporating partners specialising in legal assistance and protection (including refugee-led organisations), agreements with legal clinics[176] and the Ombudsman's Office has been essential in establishing case management mechanisms for protection.

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[171] Amnesty International (2023) Regularise and protect: international obligations to protect Venezuelan individuals. London

[172] Although monitoring data and partner reports do not allow for precise quantification, available indicators show that tens of thousands of people have been reached over the five years due to the collaborative efforts of UNHCR and WGRM organizations. UNHCR's annual reports indicate that between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals have received guidance and legal advice annually.

[173] COVID-19, militarisation of borders, changes in migration requirements.

[174] UNHCR Operations Plan Reports.

[175] In the districts of San Martin de Porres, Chorrillos, San Juan de Lurigancho and Villa María del Triunfo in Lima.

[176] Linked to universities

<u>Persons with special protection needs.</u>

91.   **UNHCR has systematically integrated a focus on vulnerable profiles (age, gender, and diversity) and accountability to affected populations in its interventions. This approach has enabled the analysis of needs, generated evidence to adjust responses, and consolidated regular participation and communication for a with individuals, particularly vulnerable profiles[177].** Between 2021 and 2023, UNHCR conducted 35 participatory assessments[178] interviewing 483 people, with most participants being women (59.74% in 2022 and 76.74% in 2023). These workshops provided relevant information on needs related to access to legal documentation, health, education, livelihoods, and integration. Segmenting workshops by category of refugees/migrants and prioritising the most vulnerable categories has yielded valuable insights into the situations of sex workers, LGBTQIA+ individuals, persons with disabilities, and Afro-descendants. The workshops have led to the formulation of useful recommendations with the potential to be translated into UNHCR interventions. Additionally, specific analyses[179] and regular protection and border monitoring (particularly significant in the context of irregular entries, trafficking, and smuggling) have identified protection risks for vulnerable profiles (e.g., minors, minorities, single women, LGBTQIA+ individuals). This focus has been crucial during the pandemic, where the exacerbation of vulnerabilities (monitored by UNHCR) prompted changes in programmatic responses. These changes included diversifying and adapting kits according to specific profiles, providing access to connectivity for online education, and initiatives like the UNHCR/UNESCO Learning Together programme ("Aprendiendo Juntos", in Spanish).

92.   **UNHCR has strengthened the capacities of relevant public administrations[180] and networks to prevent, assist, and manage cases of gender-based violence (GBV). This has been crucial both during periods of massive inflows and in contexts of local integration. However, the collective response has been insufficient to address the gaps in the national protection system and the magnitude of the needs.** One relevant service aimed at providing information about rights and managing protection cases is the interagency helpline INFOContigo. By the end of 2022, UNHCR, IOM, WFP, and UNICEF launched INFOContigo as a support mechanism for refugees and migrants. This interagency effort built on previous initiatives by local organisations and the hotline initiated by UNHCR during the pandemic. The UNHCR hotline was one of the initiatives that maintained the organisation's operational capacity and response during an exceptional crisis. INFOContigo has provided general guidance to refugees and migrants (handling 6,000 calls in its first year) and helped report and address protection cases, including GBV and cases involving vulnerable children and adolescents. UNHCR reported 437 cases of GBV and 997 cases involving

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[177] In line with corporate policies on age, gender and diversity, sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment, and accountability to affected populations.

[178] See Annex 8 - Analysis matrix of participatory assessments conducted by UNHCR between 2021 and 2023.

[179] UNHCR, GBV Report, March 2023

[180] e.g. Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, Ombudsman's Office, Municipal Ombudsman Office for Children and Adolescents

children in 2022. UNHCR also offered guidance, advice, training, medical, psychosocial, and legal assistance, care protocols, and referrals to Women's Emergency Centres (CEM, Spanish acronym), and in limited numbers, provided CBI and seed capital for GBV survivors. Additionally, UNHCR established a specialized gender-based violence unit within the helpline.[181]. Since the onset of massive inflows at the northern border, UNHCR helped establish a referral route between the CEBAF, the PAO, and the CEM in Tumbes, coordinating with other local actors (e.g., Community Mental Health Centres[182]). However, critical deficits in public services remain unresolved, such as limited capacities in CEM, lack of specialized centres and shelters for the LGBTQIA+ population, psychosocial and mental health support, and vital medical assistance for handling rape cases, among others[183, 184]). UNHCR's capacity to respond to needs in GBV appears to be one of the main limitations of the operation[185]. A critical issue has been the insufficiency of shelters, particularly in cities like Trujillo, including shelters for LGBTQIA+ persons. To address this gap, UNHCR supported and financed temporary housing and shelters for the LGBTQIA+ community, aiming to provide safe and supportive spaces. Despite these efforts, the lack of available accommodations, temporary housing (e.g. Airbnb, hotels), the volume of needs, and challenges like immigration control measures (e.g., police checks in hotels in Tumbes in 2021 under human trafficking accusations) have posed significant obstacles. Furthermore, UNHCR's actions to prevent and respond to human trafficking and smuggling, (one of the major protection risks identified in border areas[186]) has been very limited[187] due to insufficient means.

93. **UNHCR has effectively raised awareness and mobilised officials, communities, and leaders regarding gender-based violence (GBV). This approach has had an effect not only the provision of services but also the demand. However, the reach of UNHCR actions is challenging to quantify due to data limitations (both internal and external), the sensitivity of the issue, the complexity of addressing this issue in mixed movements[188] and underreporting of cases[189].** On the demand side, awareness and communication actions have been implemented across all field

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[181] UNHCR Annual results report; External informants

[182] Internal and external informants

[183] UNHCR Operations plan report

[184] Ombudsman's Office, UNFPA (2021) Working Paper N°002-2021-DP/ADM Gender-based violence against migrant women in Peru. Lima

[185] UNHCR staff survey.

[186] Border monitoring reports; External informants

[187] R4V (2021) Standard Operating Procedure for the Protection and Care of Refugees and Migrants from Trafficking in Humanitarian Assistance in Peru. IOM Peru. Lima

[188] There are multiple studies documenting how cases of gender-based violence (GBV) in all its forms have increased in Peru (e.g. Ombudsman's Office, National Institute of Statistics and Informatics, ECLAC, Congress of the Republic). In particular, the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population is at high risk of GBV. In 2021, the Women's Emergency Centres (CEM) attended to 2,025 Venezuelan nationals in 2021 (a 66% increase from 2020). By July 2022, nearly 1,350 cases had been reported, indicating a continuing upward trend in GBV incidents.

[189] Due to underreporting, refugees and migrants urgently need information on accessing justice and health services. Despite not needing identification to file a report, fear of deportation persists, particularly among those with irregular status. Additionally, GBV survivors often refrain from reporting due to distrust in national protection actors and services (GTRM Peru, 2023 Joint Needs Analysis, Refugee and Migrant Response Plan)

offices, supported by regional technical assistance[190] and the deployment of the community protection strategy has allowed UNHCR to increase case identification and management in 2022 (+29% compared to 2021 in general care and 13.5% in mental health care[191]).

94.   **The various regularisation programmes and mechanisms have not adopted or implemented specific measures to facilitate access to documentation, legal residence, and protection for vulnerable profiles, particularly survivors of gender-based violence (GBV), despite support from UNHCR, national, and international organisations**. Access barriers have persisted (e.g., requirement for police or official social care reports, coordination difficulties between institutions, risk of re-victimisation, lack of awareness among officials and individuals). These barriers affected also the "paradigmatic" case of the Special Resident Migratory Status (CMER, Spanish acronym), which was created precisely to provide protection to particularly vulnerable individuals (e.g., unaccompanied children, trafficking victims, GBV survivors, pregnant women) regardless of their entry and migratory status in the country (regular or irregular). In 2022, only 17 Venezuelan women obtained the CMER, in a context where GBV among the Venezuelan population is one of the main protection concerns.[192] The lack of access to regular migration status is critical for women survivors of GBV who, in addition to traumatic experiences, remain unprotected in the host country[193].

95.   **In terms of child protection, UNHCR established reception mechanisms as part of the emergency response (e.g., child-friendly spaces in shelters and day centres, nutritional support) and expanded its interventions for children during the pandemic in response to negative coping mechanisms[194] (e.g. increased child exploitation and begging) and persistent school closures. UNHCR has supported case management (e.g., disability, HIV) and advocated for the inclusion of children in national systems considering the increasing number of Venezuelan children[195], focusing on education, health, protection, disability, documentation (regularisation), and nationality (risk of statelessness).** However, progress has been limited by systemic barriers and gaps. The study on the right to identity conducted by the Ombudsman's Office with UNHCR's support is a relevant advocacy tool to address the risk of statelessness, and the national law on statelessness is a priority for UNHCR, but no institutional advances have been recorded so far[196]. Critical gaps are reported in access to comprehensive health insurance for children over six years old; education is considered a universal right, but barriers exist due to lack of documentation, late

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[190]   No   place   for   abuse   -   UNHCR   and   Amnesty   International (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3l9VvBoIQ80)

[191] UNHCR Annual results report

[192] WGRM Protection reports (among other publications)

[193] The increase in the displacement of Venezuelan people highlights the failure of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile to fulfil their obligations (www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2023/09/exodus-venezuelans-colombia-peru-ecuador-chile-obligations).

[194] UNHCR, Protection monitoring during the pandemic.

[195] According to the National Surveys of the Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru (ENPOVE), the Venezuelan population under 14 years of age increased from 16% to 23% between 2018 and 2022.

[196] UNHCR Peru Multiyear strategy 2023 - 2023

registration, or limited places[197]. Public child protection services are scarce and under-equipped in terms of resources and professionals, severely affecting unaccompanied or separated minors (approximately 5% of the migrant population)[198, 199]. Since 2022, UNHCR has been promoting the foster family strategy with the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations to improve the response for unaccompanied or separated minors, but progress has been slow due to limited information on this programme, a limited number of participating families, and resource constraints in both the public system and UNHCR. UNHCR's capacity to respond to child protection needs, alongside GBV mentioned earlier, appears as one of the operation limitations[200].

Short-term assistance

<u>Basic needs and case management.</u>

96. **UNHCR's humanitarian assistance has been one of the central interventions of the operation in Peru to respond to the needs arising from the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population and the pandemic and has made it possible to mitigate essential short-term needs for a large number of refugees and migrants[201] and, to a lesser extent, host communities** (with a scope determined by the resources available at any given time). The deployment of humanitarian assistance has evolved in intensity and geographical coverage according to changes in the flows and patterns of entry, transit and settlement (temporary and permanent). For example, the delivery of basic aid items was concentrated in border areas, but the distribution of cash-based interventions (CBI) was expanded during 2019 from border areas (Tumbes, Tacna) to the rest of the field offices (Arequipa, Cuzco, Lima) and locations with a UNHCR presence (Piura).

97. **UNHCR's response to the widespread increase in needs (among the Venezuelan population and host communities) resulting from the outbreak of the pandemic was swift and flexible. The organisation managed to maintain high operational presence in the field (stay and deliver) despite strict public health measures, thanks to the commitment and dedication of its network of partners, CBOs, faith-based organisations, and UNHCR professionals. This capability has been widely recognised as part of the added value of UNHCR.** The dramatic increase in needs due to the pandemic led to a widespread provision of humanitarian assistance, including CBI, to address the deterioration in living conditions, exceptional health expenses, and other critical situations during a period of severe movement restrictions.

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[197] INEI - ENPOVE data consulted in UNICEF report (2021). New kids on the block. Evidence of the situation of Venezuelan children and adolescents in Peru. https://www.unicef.org/peru/informes/chicos-nuevos-barrio-evidencia-situacion-ninez-adolescencia-venezolana-peru

[198] Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Interdisciplinary Research Group on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2023) Report on the international event "Unaccompanied Migrant Children and Adolescents: Between Protection and Autonomy" (with data from IOM and UNICEF 2020).

[199] UNHCR's monitoring system in 2023 reports 599 children and adolescents who received specialised child protection services and 39 children and adolescents who received alternative care. There are no similar indicators for previous years.

[200] UNHCR staff survey.

[201] UNHCR's monitoring indicators do not have denominators to estimate coverage.

In line with UNHCR's CBI policy and to avoid disparities with the national response to the pandemic, the amounts of cash-based interventions were aligned with the standards and norms of the GoP.

98.   **In a context of overlapping crises (forced displacement and pandemic), the distribution of cash-based interventions (CBI) significantly expanded, and the prioritisation criteria were made more flexible.** This allowed for rapid disbursements to meet immediate needs, increasing the number of people reached and mitigating their economic vulnerability. However, it weakened the the protection nature of cash-based interventions. The pandemic's exceptional circumstances, the operational limitations of UNHCR and its partners (who managed CBI distribution), and the lockdowns affecting protection and solution activities (e.g., case management and livelihood actions had to be significantly reduced or cancelled) explain the challenging balance between responding to large-scale needs and maintaining the protection lens of CBI. In 2020, the implementation of CBI reached its peak with a significant increase (+217% of the OPS[202]-OL) as part of the emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic[203]. UNHCR adapted its working modalities to maintain humanitarian assistance and access to protection (through remote means[204]) during the pandemic and adjusted the aid elements to new needs (e.g., incorporating hygiene products, modifying the content of kits). Various rounds of post-distribution monitoring (2020, 2021, 2022) of cash-based interventions indicate that they primarily helped cover housing rent, food, and health expenses. All respondents reported that the cash-based interventions improved their living conditions.

99.   **Humanitarian assistance has been delivered primarily through cash-based interventions (CBI),** mainly through sectoral cash modalities until 2022, and through the generalisation of multi-purpose cash and other aid modalities from 2023 onwards (e.g., basic aid items, shelter, emergency health care and psychosocial support, food, water and sanitation). This approach has enabled comprehensive support for the refugee and migrant populations. Between 2019 and 2022, CBI implementation accounted for 22% of the executed OPS budget (10.7 million USD) and reached 121,040 beneficiaries. For example, in 2022, approximately 11,000 basic aid items and 12,000 kits containing household and hygiene items were distributed to both settled individuals and those in transit.

100.   **Until 2022, UNHCR used a wide variety of cash-based interventions (CBI) - 23 different types grouped into three areas (Basic Needs, Health, and Livelihoods) - reflecting the diverse and comprehensive nature of the needs, but also a dispersion that made it difficult to evaluate the reach and results obtained. The reduction to 6 types of CBI in 2023 (alongside with direct implementation by UNHCR) contributed to simplifying and rationalising the types of CBI, standardising amounts and assistance criteria, and limiting the risk of inconsistencies and fraud.** Additionally, the reorientation of CBI from 2023 (with support from the Regional Bureau) has promoted a more cohesive and multidisciplinary approach (involving multifunctional teams), which represents a good practice to prioritise

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[202] Operational budget.

[203] See Annex 12 Analysis of assistance through cash-based interventions (CBI).

[204] E.g. cash-based interventions via mobile or prepaid cards, remote post-distribution monitoring.

responses to the most in need profiles in a context of limited resources. Until the end of 2022, the amounts used by UNHCR and its partners were set by the national Cash-Based Interventions Working Group of the WGRM, co-led by UNHCR and the WFP. Due to the significant inflation and rising commodity costs[205] , the amounts were outdated and insufficient to cover needs. At the end of 2022, the amounts to cover basic needs were updated, as were the amounts of the monthly basket. Additionally, until 2023, the 2019 CBI Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)[206] had been the reference framework for CBI implementation. Until then, partners set their own evaluation procedures, assistance criteria, and progressively expanded CBI types. This lack of harmonisation in CBI application led to significant variations both among partners and locations. According to the 2021 OIOS audit[207], this fact and the mixing of the operation's funds with those of other donors, increased the risks related to the safeguarding of resources[208]. In 2023, the CBI SOPs of the three implementing partners (HIAS, Encuentros and Caritas) were updated and approved, reflecting the new simplified types of CBI and the standardisation of evaluation criteria across all partners. In June 2023, the Regional Bureau approved the UNHCR direct implementation SOP.

101. **The work in protection, largely implemented through partners, has shown variability due to the diversity of organizations, multiple field offices that need to adapt to local specificities, limited experience in international protection of some organizations, staff turnover in partners and UNHCR, which resulted in gaps in case identification and management**. The tools and mechanisms to accompany and homogenise the work of protection partners were updated in 2023, along with the roll-out of the multi-purpose CBI. In previous years, there had been some gaps in standards and approaches in the protection response of partners, although there were improvements during 2023. The interaction between partners and the Case Management Committee has worked well to respond to critical cases and exceptional situations but has not been sufficient to promote a common approach for all partners.

Temporary collective shelters

102. **UNHCR's support to temporary collective shelters has been essential in addressing one of the most critical needs, though it has only been partially effective. The shelter strategy has enabled a comprehensive, coherent, and complementary response (within the WGRM framework) to the needs of thousands of people in transit. However, its scope has been modest compared to the volume of needs, the scarcity of resources, and the lack of specialised national public services for shelter and the protection critical cases.** Shelter needs, both for people on the move and for managing specific protection cases (e.g. GBV, Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual, Intersex, Queer, Intersex, Asexual and other people, unaccompanied children and minors, psychosocial support, victims of smuggling and

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[205] Due to the war in Ukraine, the slow economic recovery after the pandemic, etc.

[206] The strategy was first drafted in 2019 and updated in July 2020 to consider the circumstances related to COVID-19.

[207] UNHCR PERU - Audit Report 2021

[208] The operation identified this problem and worked on the development of a scoring system to standardise and streamline the assessment of eligibility and prioritisation for MPGs.

trafficking, and homelessness) have been consistently documented in multiple reports and monitoring efforts as protection priorities[209]. These needs have been exacerbated by situations where people were stranded at borders, set up improvised camps in transit locations, and during the pandemic. In Lima, only 5 shelters out of a total of 1,520 temporary shelters mapped by UNHCR could be supported in 2019, and the WGRM estimated that only 24% of the population with shelter needs was reached in 2021. Since 2019, UNHCR has provided regular support to rehabilitate facilities, expand capacities, define care protocols and referral pathways among partners, and improve the quality (Sphere standards) of about 14 shelters in Lima, with a smaller number in Tacna and Tumbes[210]. Collaborations, both occasional and stable, between UNHCR and parishes or shelters linked to faith-based organizations have been particularly important in mitigating critical needs and assisting victims. UNHCR has also donated refugee housing units and established agreements with hotels and accommodation companies to expand response capacity in times of high demand or to manage specific protection cases. UNHCR limited resources also hindered the provision of stable solutions in cities like Arequipa, Cuzco, or Madre de Dios, apart from occasional hotel contracts.

Health

103.   **UNHCR has successfully deployed a basic healthcare system (including psychosocial care) across seven regions in Peru[211] targeting borders, transit points, and settlement neighbourhoods through community outreach.** UNHCR has supported the health system's response to the pandemic and addressed immediate health needs via case management and CBI. **UNHCR's (and other organisations') efforts have helped critical cases[212] (with regular migratory status[213]) to be included in the Comprehensive Health Insurance; however, efforts have not resulted in expanded healthcare coverage for refugees and migrants[214] or cover complex pathologies and critical health conditions (e.g., mental health, GBV, certain chronic diseases).** Starting in 2020, the pandemic forced UNHCR to intensify its health response. This included hiring Venezuelan health professionals as an exceptional support to the government's response[215], donating Refugee Housing Units and biosecurity materials, and ensuring that refugees and migrants were included in vaccination campaigns. During the pandemic, UNHCR also provided healthcare to

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[209] Both UNHCR and other actors

[210] UNHCR Operations plan reports

[211] Lima-Callao, Arequipa, Tacna, Tumbes, Puno, Ica and la Libertad

[212] E.g. HIV patients

[213] This is a clear example of the importance of UNHCR-supported regularisation programme as a pathway to access services and inclusion.

[214] According to ENPOVEII, access to health insurance for the Venezuelan population has increased from 8.5% to 27% between 2018 and 2022, but barriers to access remain regularly reported in both UNHCR and other organisations' reports.

This is due to multiple factors, including the SIS regulations themselves, the lack of migratory documentation among a large part of the Venezuelan population, and the limited capacity of health services, among others.

[215] See previous section Education and training

critical medical cases (e.g., pregnant women[216], chronically ill patients[217], mental disorders) who could not be treated in public hospitals due to the saturation of the national health system. Regular health brigades in border areas and selected neighbourhoods have effectively promoted health and community cohesion, partially mitigating access barriers to the health system. However, this has created a nearly parallel healthcare system[218] supported by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies but seemingly dependent on external funding. UNHCR has allocated significant cash-based interventions to meet immediate health needs but could not finance the costs of healthcare given the high volume of needs (health has been consistently reported as a major need among the Venezuelan population in various protection and post-distribution monitoring) and the budget limitations of the operation. In 2022, through joint advocacy between UNHCR, IOM, PAHO/WHO and UNICEF, the Ministry of Health became the co-leader of the WGRM Health and Nutrition Sub-Working Group.

Education and training

104.   **UNHCR's contributions, in coordination with the WGRM, have focused on reducing discrimination and barriers to accessing public education for Venezuelan children and adolescents. Key efforts include case management support at the local level and ensuring internet access during the pandemic[219].** These initiatives took place within a public policy framework that guarantees the universality of right to education and suggest some progress in the enrolment of Venezuelan children and adolescents in school[220], though gaps remain[221]. During the pandemic, additional resources mobilized by UNHCR provided kits, tablets, educational

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[216] Data show an increase in maternal mortality during the pandemic in Peru for both Venezuelan and Peruvian women (see for example: Maternal Mortality in Peru in COVID-19 pandemic contexts. Peruvian Journal of Maternal and Perinatal Research, 12(1), 9-10. https://doi.org/10.33421/inmp.2023325)

[217] According to ENPOVEII, 68 % of the Venezuelan population suffering from a chronic disease does not receive treatment.

[218] For example, in 2022, a total of 15,013 medical services were provided through four care modalities: care for refugees and migrants and in transit, outreach sessions in community settings, services at fixed points of care, and virtual telemedicine consultations. The Mental Health and Psychosocial Support component reached a total of 1,318 individuals, with 76% being women and 24% men (Annual Report 2022, IFRC).

[219] The school closures in Peru lasted for about two years and were among the longest in the region.

[220] According to the 2nd Survey of the Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru, the net enrolment rate of Venezuelan school-age children is high (85% in early childhood education, 99% in primary school, 91% in secondary school), although lower than that of Peruvian school-age children. The trend in enrolment is positive according to the 2022 protection monitoring report by UNHCR (increasing from 73% to 77%).

PISA test scores (OECD) in Peru indicate that Venezuelan students have higher reading skills at age 15 than their Peruvian counterparts, contrary to the typical trend (cited in: "Migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean: Mapping Socioeconomic Integration" / Inter-American Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Development Programme). Learning outcomes are similar between Venezuelan migrant students and nationals according to the recent Final Progress Evaluation conducted by the Regional Directorate of Education of Lima with UNESCO support in 2023. The evaluation covered primary and secondary students in reading, mathematics, and social sciences, showing that regardless of nationality, the majority are still in the learning process.

[221] There is a higher year-on-year dropout rate among Venezuelan migrant students compared to national students due to mobility (in 2023, out of every hundred Venezuelan migrant students enrolled in 2022, 20 did not continue studying. In the case of national students, 3 did not return), lack of guidance and tools to address pedagogical diversity in the classroom (UNESCO, 2023). Other barriers include unfamiliarity with administrative procedures in the education system, lack of available spaces, lack of documentation, child labour, among others (UNHCR, UNICEF).

materials, and internet access to vulnerable families[222]. UNHCR's educational interventions addressed local cases (in a decentralised education system) but lacked sufficient coordination with the Ministry of Education at the central level Overall, the alignment between international organisations and the governance of public education policy appears limited, particularly in terms of data sharing, capacity building, leveraging interventions, and scalability.

105. **UNHCR responded swiftly and effectively to the need for healthcare professionals during the pandemic by facilitating the recognition of Venezuelan health professionals' university degrees. This initiative not only generated better job opportunities for Venezuelan migrants but also stands as a success story that could be replicated in other sectors, considering that 38% of the Venezuelan population in Peru holds a university degree[223].** In April 2020, the GoP simplified hiring requirements for health personnel due to the COVID-19 crisis[224]. UNHCR created a registry to identify Venezuelan healthcare professionals with regular status, collecting detailed information about their specialisations, availability, and documentation. By September 2020, approximately 1,200 medical professionals had registered in this database, which was shared with the Ministry of Health. By February 2021, several hundred Venezuelan professionals[225] were working on the front lines of the health emergency, employed by the Ministry of Health and regional governments. The recognition of diplomas, however, faced opposition from the national Medical Association, despite the positive impact of UNHCR's intervention. The World Bank's analysis indicated that the recognition of university degrees and professional diplomas, particularly for medical doctors and teachers in underserved areas, could help mitigate xenophobia and enhance integration. Throughout 2021 and 2022, some 700 health professionals successfully recognised their Venezuelan university diplomas[226].

4.2.2.   To what extent has UNHCR been effective in empowering communities (refugees, asylum seekers, other populations in need of international protection and host populations), strengthening their self-management and ensuring access to services?

Communities fostering integration and access to rights

106.   **UNHCR has swiftly deployed its urban protection response, particularly reinforcing community-based protection from 2022 onwards. This involved creating a localisation strategy and establishing grant agreements with CBOs to**

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[222] Compared to other services (water, electricity), Venezuelan households have a moderate level of internet connectivity - 63.5% (ENPOVEII).

[223] National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (2023) National Survey of the Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru (ENPOVE II)

[224] Emergency Decree No. 037-2020 establishes extraordinary measures and a special regime for the recruitment of health personnel and considers the incorporation of foreign professionals. Thus, the Decree creates the Special COVID Service (SERVICER), where Peruvian and foreign medical professionals can get registered to be hired and guarantee the attention of the Health Emergency due to the COVID-19 outbreak without having performed the Rural and Urban Marginal Health Service (SERUMS).

[225] Exact figure not available.

[226] UNHCR Operations Plan reports.

address the concentration of the Venezuelan population in four districts of Lima. **UNHCR and its partners have achieved significant acceptance and interaction with both Venezuelan and host communities, which was crucial for implementing social cohesion interventions, case management (GBV and child protection), and inclusion in some community-based services. While the qualitative achievements have been substantial, quantitative progress has been more limited.** This is due to the recent establishment of the UNHCR Lima field office, the insufficient size of the field team in relation to the multidimensional and complex nature of urban protection[227], the difficulties in conceptualising and measuring social cohesion[228] and the operation's budget constraints. A participatory assessment with the Venezuelan population in 2019 already highlighted the need for more integration spaces in key neighbourhoods due to occasional frictions with host communities and other integration challenges. UNHCR generation of data about the situation in these districts has been exceptional and instrumental for guiding UNHCR's interventions, supporting programmes of other organisations and the WGRM, and influencing municipalities and state institutions in favour of public policy and service planning. UNHCR's increasing operational capacity and presence in selected neighbourhoods have been facilitated by partnerships with CBOs, parishes, refugee-led organisations, and a network of volunteers. These partnerships allowed UNHCR to maintain humanitarian assistance for both communities during the pandemic and reach marginalised population groups, enhancing UNHCR's visibility and acceptance. The pilot grant agreements launched by UNHCR in 2022 were effective in strengthening small CBOs and is a successful initiative, though sustainability issues remain to be addressed[229].

107.   **UNHCR has played a pivotal role in fostering the presence of refugee-led organisations, predominantly in Lima, and in empowering their leadership to influence institutions at the central level. There are also Venezuelan-led organisations in provincial cities, smaller in size and reach, but able to offer specialised services that are well-tailored to the specific needs of their local communities**. They enjoy positive levels of acceptance and recognition from both the Venezuelan population and local institutions. Overall, refugee-led organisations exhibit strong mobilisation capabilities and some of them have established volunteer networks,

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[227] The Lima field office (established in 2023) has three profiles community-based protection profiles . Nonetheless, the field office manages a vast and densely populated urban territory with significant social and integration challenges. It also extends its coverage to the city of Ica, where 2.6% of the total Venezuelan population residing in Peru lives, making it the fourth city with the highest number of these individuals (ENPOVEII).

[228] Social Cohesion Hub (www.socialcohesion.info)

Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford (2023) Social Cohesion as a Humanitarian Objective? (https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/completed-projects/social-cohesion-as-a-humanitarian-objective-socho)

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (2023) Social Cohesion: Concept and Measurement. Geneva

Delhey, J., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. Social Cohesion in International Comparison: A Review of Key Measures and Findings. Köln Z Soziol 75 (Suppl 1), 95-120 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00891-6

Phuong Pham, et al (2023) Policy Research Working Paper 10099 Hosting New Neighbours, Perspectives of Host Communities on Social Cohesion in Eastern DRC. World Bank, Washington DC

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2023. Multidimensional Integration Measurement Toolkit: Offering A Multidimensional Approach to Measure Migrant Integration Outcomes. IOM, Geneva.

[229] Internal informants

which are valuable assets for community work and support UNHCR's community-based actions. The relatively modest number of refugee-led organisations in the country (about 13) presents an opportunity to consolidate a core group of organisations with adequate levels of organisational maturity. This consolidation can ensure legitimacy and operational effectiveness while avoiding the dispersion of efforts and resources[230].

108. **UNHCR's strengthening and capacity development of CBOs and faith-based organisations has facilitated the provision of social assistance and inclusion in community support networks in neighbourhoods with high concentration of Venezuelan population, particularly during the pandemic. This has been crucial in a context where inclusion in public social services or programmes was partial**. UNHCR has relied on organisations with a strong presence in selected neighbourhoods and extensive experience in community and social work, which has enabled the provision of basic assistance to the Venezuelan population (and host communities). Efforts to increase the inclusion of Venezuelan nationals in government social programmes have been hindered not only by sector-specific regulations but also by a media and social discourse that is often negative toward Venezuelan refugees and migrants. For example, government assistance during the pandemic ("Bono COVID", in Spanish) was only granted to Peruvians.

Employability

109. **UNHCR has achieved a success story with the professional certification and labour integration programme for Venezuelan healthcare professionals. This success was achieved thanks to a combination of institutional advocacy, (addressing the needs of the public and private health sectors), political and institutional decisions to respond to a public health crisis, and UNHCR's administrative support to individuals and institutions.** The evaluation of the professional certification and labour integration programme in the health sector[231] shows that it was effective in reducing unemployment, increasing income, and improving working conditions, particularly among Venezuelan female health professionals residing in Lima (over 80% of the programme participants were women living in the capital). However, the reinstatement of the Rural and Urban Health Service (SERUMS, Spanish acronym)[232] as a requirement for professional practice has diluted the progress made during the pandemic, despite the visible contributions of Venezuelan professionals during the emergency response. Nonetheless, the experience during the pandemic continues to hold potential; in 2022, UNHCR and the Ministry of Health inaugurated the

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[230] See, for example, the evaluation of UNHCR's country strategy in Ecuador, which identified a higher number of refugee-led organisations but with much smaller sizes, capacities and representativeness, leading to fragmentation, difficulties in collective mobilisation and coordinated or complementary work.

[231] Equilibrium Social Development Consulting (2022) Evaluation on professional qualification and employment projects funded by UNHCR. Lima.

[232] The Rural and Urban Marginal Urban Health Service (SERUMS) is a community service programme conducted by qualified and licensed health science professionals, with priority given to the poorest and most remote populations of Peru (Law No. 23330). Completion of the SERUMS is compulsory for working in public entities and accessing the Second Specialisation Programmes at the national level.

Los Olivos Rehabilitation Centre in North Lima, which is predominantly staffed by Venezuelan professionals.

110.   **UNHCR has initiated actions to expand the certification of professionals in other fields (engineering, law) and other university degrees (technical), leveraging the experience in the health sector and regularisation programmes[233].** This has also contributed to greater openness from the private sector to hiring refugees and migrants. However, UNHCR's efforts in employability have faced barriers due to foreign labour legislation, employers' unfamiliarity with migration documentation, institutional turnovers, and the costs associated with professional certification of foreign diplomas, among other issues. The evaluation of the employability programme shows positive results but to a lesser extent when compared to the previous case of the certification of Venezuelan health professionals[234]. Additionally, specific attention to vulnerability factors or protection risks was not systematically identified for the selection of participants, except in the case of two UNHCR's partners. UNHCR has also conducted market studies to identify employment-generating sectors, harmonised its databases and those of partners (although apparently not with IOM, which has a similar database[235]) promoted agreements with regional and local governments and trade associations, and launched communication campaigns. These efforts have been effective in highlighting the potential of the Venezuelan population. Recently, UNHCR Peru visited UNHCR Mexico to learn about the Local Integration Programme and explore the voluntary relocation of Venezuelan people from Lima to other cities with dynamic economic sectors that can generate livelihood opportunities (e.g., higher demand for employment).

Entrepreneurship

111.   **UNHCR has designed a well-structured entrepreneurship programme[236], with a broad territorial presence[237], and diversification of partners. The programme balances participant selection criteria between vulnerability and basic conditions that offer reasonable prospects of feasibility[238], focusing on gender and sexual diversity and tailoring technical support to specific situations**. Launched in 2020 as part of UNHCR's response to the economic and job deterioration caused by the pandemic, the entrepreneurship programme includes a wide range of training actions[239]

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[233] Supported by UNHCR as part of access to documentation and demonstrating the effectiveness of connecting migration residence with livelihoods.

[234] For example, it is observed among programme participants a reduction of more than half in the unemployment rate after the programme, and an improvement in working conditions. However, only 26% of participants believe they found employment directly because of the programme. Therefore, the entirety of the effect on employment levels cannot be solely attributed to the programmes, and the increase in income was modest.

[235] External informants

[236] Businesses according to phases and stage of maturity: Subsistence entrepreneurships, Micro-businesses, Dynamic entrepreneurships.

[237] Cusco, Arequipa, Madre de Dios, Piura, Tacna, Trujillo, Tumbes and Lima.

[238] An important condition for providing seed capital (CBI) to all entrepreneurs has been ensuring that their basic needs are met. For those with debts, family issues, among others, efforts were made to address their urgent situation through other interventions before the CBI was disbursed.

[239] For example, more than 3,000 people trained in entrepreneurship between 2020 and 2021 (UNHCR monitoring indicators; *# of PoC provided with entrepreneurship / business training*).

on technical issues and soft skills, market studies, support for diploma certification and recognition[240], provision of CBI[241] and seed capital, and other forms of support for entrepreneurs[242]. UNHCR has played a "catalytic" role, mobilising or establishing agreements with the private sector, trade associations, public administrations, and social organisations. With the support of the Regional Bureau, UNHCR has defined strategies and tools on livelihoods, partnerships with the private sector, and sector-specific CBI that have helped to map key actors, opportunities, and challenges, and provide a clear framework for UNHCR and partner livelihood teams.

112.   **The evaluations of the entrepreneurship programme[243] show positive effects on the lives of supported entrepreneurs, who are mostly women. These evaluations document a dozen cases of success, and the recommendations have helped UNHCR update the programme's approach from 2023 onwards. However, some failed entrepreneurships[244] have also been identified due to limited initial feasibility analysis.** During 2021 and 2022, UNHCR provided seed capital for some 2,000 entrepreneurships[245], mostly led by women. The vast majority (80%) of the assessed entrepreneurships are active[246]. The entrepreneurs are highly satisfied with the support, show a high level of financial inclusion, rely on their entrepreneurships as their primary source of income, and have seen an increase in income levels. The data reveals that 50% of the entrepreneurs have university or higher technical education, although the education levels are not correlated with the sectors where the entrepreneurships have developed. About 60% of the active entrepreneurships are concentrated in the following sectors: i) bakery and pastry, ii) food sales, iii) beauty and hairdressing These sectors have a certain level of saturation, which may pose medium-term risks. The challenges faced by the entrepreneurships are largely external (obtaining funding, cash flow management, bureaucracy, and economic uncertainty) and are likely common to Peruvian entrepreneurs as well. Descriptions of some failed entrepreneurships[247] suggest that the feasibility analyses were insufficient to determine success and risk factors.

113.   **The entrepreneurship programme shows limited scope due to internal factors (funding limitations of the operation, changes in the livelihoods team) and external or systemic factors (including the pandemic's impact, economic informality, access to funding, bureaucracy). The achievements are more**

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[240] For example, 539 persons have qualified their diplomas (UNHCR monitoring indicators; *# of PoC with recognised diplomas from their country of origin*).

[241] As an example, 693,069 USD disbursed in CBIs for livelihoods and entrepreneurship during 2022 (UNHCR Peru's work in cash-based interventions - CBIs - July 2023).

[242] E.g. mentoring, seed capital, strengthening capital, etc.

[243] EQULIBRIUM (2022) Evaluation of UNHCR-funded entrepreneurships. Lima

EQULIBRIUM (2022) Success cases of UNHCR-funded entrepreneurships. Lima

EQULIBRIUM (2023) Evaluation of UNHCR-funded entrepreneurships in metropolitan Lima. Lima

[244] Quantitative data is unavailable, and the evaluation does not include an analysis of the entrepreneurships. Several cases of failed entrepreneurships have been reported and exemplified by various informants (internal and external).

[245] UNHCR Operations Plan Reports (2021, 2022)

[246] No data is available on the level of continuity or success in relation to total entrepreneurships.

[247] Internal and external informants

qualitative (e.g., success stories, replicable or scalable learnings) rather than quantitative (number of successful entrepreneurships considering the volume of needs among the refugee and migrant populations). The entrepreneurship programme, and livelihoods in general, have been the least funded programmatic areas of the operation, especially given the country's macroeconomic context[248] and the needs of most Venezuelan nationals[249]. Additionally, multiyear funding, which is essential for livelihood interventions, is not easily secured under UNHCR's budgeting mechanism. While there are no denominators available to estimate coverage, the number of active entrepreneurships or seed capital appears limited in relation to the reported needs of the Venezuelan population. Although livelihoods became a priority for the operation and the team was reinforced in 2022, expansion has been hindered by funding constraints. For instance, the pilot implementation of the "graduation model"[250], which began in late 2020, has not seen significant consolidation or development.

4.2.3. To what extent has UNHCR facilitated the transition to long-term solutions (mainly local integration) for refugees, asylum seekers and other populations in need of international protection?

114. **Resettlement has become the primary durable solution thanks to quota increase in the US, showing a growth in processing capacity and a high acceptance rate of cases (96%).** Resettlement became the main unit of the operation, increasing annual quotas between 2021 and 2023 to some 1,500 individuals. The costs and resources for the resettlement process are high, with a unit cost exceeding that of assistance or protection through other means. The resettlement unit has implemented effective measures[251] to address challenges in identifying cases under the 1951 Convention[252], mitigate fraud risks, resolve delays, and demonstrate the relevance of resettlement in a context of mixed movements. Indeed, one of the added values of resettlement work has been raising visibility for the refugee profile, clearly distinguishing it from that of migrants. Alongside these achievements, resettlement has faced challenges such as the requirements set by receiving countries and their decision delays, the burden of responsibilities assumed post submission[253] and the exit procedure from Peru for individuals accepted for resettlement. These factors have resulted in prolonged waiting times (between one to two years) to facilitate departure from the country.

115. **UNHCR's efforts to explore the voluntary return of Venezuelan people to their country of origin are in an early phase, driven by increased intentions and**

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[248] E.g. informality of the economy (Peru's labour market reported the highest informality rate in the past ten years in 2021 - 76.8% - according to the National Observatory of Prospective).

[249] The primary need consistently reported by the Venezuelan population in protection monitoring by UNHCR (and various other studies and analyses) is economic.

[250] The "graduation model" has been implemented in other operations in the region, it can provide useful lessons and experience to UNHCR in Peru.

[251] E.g. involvement of partners in case identification, agreement with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), merged procedure.

[252] Countries hosting resettlement cases are not governed by the Cartagena Declaration.

[253] For example: funding for transportation to Lima from provincial areas for pre-screening by IOM and medical check-ups.

growing South-to-North flows[254], although a conducive environment seems to be absent at the moment due to the persistent instability in Venezuela. Available data indicate a predominant desire to remain in Peru, although integration challenges are motivating the search for better opportunities either in Venezuela or North America, resulting to a small-scale outflow towards the north[255].

4.2.4. To what extent are UNHCR's initiatives sustainable (strategic and operational level)?

116.   **The contributions of UNHCR, in collaboration with other organizations, to the strengthening of institutional capacities[256] for the protection of refugee and migrant, as well as to the management of certain aspects of the migration policy and the national regulatory framework, present positive sustainability prospects thanks to their systemic impact.** The laws, decrees, or regulations developed, updated, or implemented, along with the institutional experience accumulated in the response to unprecedented mixed movements in Peru are now essential part of the current public policy and will remain in force unless changes occur in the legal and administrative frameworks.

117.   **The support and modernisation of the national asylum system show mixed results.** On one hand, the enhancement of skills, along with the implementation of systems and technological platforms to improve the registration and eligibility of asylum claims, has significantly increased the installed capacity of CEPR and has become an integral part of its regular functioning. UNHCR's support has been extensive, reaching both the central level (Executive Secretariat) and the decentralised level (ODE). On the other hand, the support in human resources (e.g., qualifiers and assistants)[257], while crucial for enabling CEPR to respond to a massive displacement and provide a certain level of protection response, has been heavily dependent on external funding. Currently, conditions do not seem favourable to absorb the human resources hired and funded by UNHCR. Furthermore, CEPR has faced the paradox of benefiting from UNHCR capacity-building actions while simultaneously experiencing brain drain to UNHCR, which has weakened the capacity development that UNHCR intended to strengthen. Despite the progress made[258], the national asylum system continues to face challenges that exceed the available resources and will require ongoing support from UNHCR.

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[254] The absence of prospects and integration in the host country, as well as reunification with family and friends, are driving return (Mixed Migration Centre (2022) Returning to Venezuela: motivations, expectations and intentions. Available at: https://mixedmigration.org/resource/returning-to-venezuela/)

[255] El País, The challenge of returning to Venezuela after years of exodus (https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-05-15/el-reto-de-volver-a-venezuela-tras-anos-de-exodo-el-pais-no-esta-mejor-pero-es-otro-pais.html)

[256] For example, the Ombudsman's Office currently has a team specialised in refugee issues linked to the Office of the Deputy for Human Rights.

[257] Between 70 -80 people annually.

[258] External informants.

118.   **UNHCR's support to local organisations and networks (NGOs, CBOs, faith-based organisations[259]) and refugee-led organizations has strengthened and expanded existing community-based assistance services, fostering the emergence of new organisations rooted in their communities. These organisations are likely to continue playing a significant role in addressing needs, mitigating protection risks, and integrating the Venezuelan population**. The integration of an organisational development component of local organisations since 2020, as part of UNHCR's collaboration with partners[260] has been instrumental in developing and consolidating community networks in vulnerable neighbourhoods. This network has responded with temporary shelters, welcoming parishes for vulnerable profiles, community kitchens, aid distribution, organisation of social activities, and identification of violence or protection risks, etc. These organisations will maintain their commitment to the community, although likely with varying intensities depending on available funding at any given time.

119.   **The humanitarian assistance to address basic and short-term needs has been entirely dependent on the funds mobilized by UNHCR. Consequently, it is hardly sustainable without external financial support.** Indeed, the scope reported by UNHCR, for instance, in cash-based interventions or basic aid items in recent years, shows annual variability precisely due to fluctuations in available funding. While local organizations could partially alleviate some immediate needs, they are unlikely to maintain sustained aid distributions without additional resources. In fact, the decrease in available funding for the humanitarian response to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population has already impacted the response capacities of both national and international actors.

120.   **UNHCR's livelihoods actions that have raised awareness about the rights and validity of migration documentation among public administrations (e.g. Ministry of Labour and regional delegations) and the private sector (businesses and trade unions) have created opportunities for access to employment and entrepreneurship**. Although the result can be sustainable, many "process" actions (e.g. training and education, seed capital[261], mentoring, market studies) show more limited prospects for continuity.

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[259] Interreligious Council for Refugees and Migrants (34 religious communities), Network of Community-Based Organizations (32 organizations), Network of Temporary Collective Accommodations (9 shelters in Lima), Community Leadership Programme).

[260] See for example, the Organizational Development Assessment Tool for Community-Based Organizations (2020), and the ongoing technical and budgetary support provided by UNHCR as reported by partners (partner survey).

[261] For example, the lack of funding for seed capital for start-ups has been recurrently mentioned as one of the main barriers (interviews).

4.3. Adequacy of UNHCR's structure and organisational changes in Peru

EQ3. To what extent have UNHCR's structure in Peru and its organisational changes been adequate to achieve its objectives?

UNHCR has established a locally adapted and coherent capacity in Peru to respond to the evolving protection and integration needs of refugees and migrants in priority areas (key border points and the main settlement cities for Venezuelan refugees and migrants). The rapid expansion of UNHCR's presence, facilitated by a rapid increase in funding, has been instrumental in consolidating the WGRM, reinforcing the protection lens of governmental and other humanitarian responses, sustaining the protection space in a context of increasingly restrictive measures due to the influx of Venezuelan migrants, and fostering synergies in the delivery of assistance and local integration initiatives. The swift and simultaneous establishment of field offices in border regions and urban areas within the country's major cities has facilitated the combination of humanitarian assistance with a local integration strategy in a complementary manner. Notwithstanding the consistent distribution of resources by UNHCR across the territory and its efforts to monitor the situation at the borders, the organisation has lacked the resources to meet the needs at all border crossing points (which were also dynamic) and in all locations with a refugee and migrant presence. UNHCR's presence in intermediate cities (Arequipa, Trujillo), although modest, has generated valuable knowledge of different local realities and needs, created working spaces with local authorities, strengthened UNHCR's legitimacy with public administrations at central level and created opportunities for possible relocation initiatives.

UNHCR has seen a significant increase in its budget (and staff) until 2021, which allowed to expand its programmes, staff and field presence. However, the operation's budget, particularly the OPS line, shows a significant decrease over time. Local integration shows a low and decreasing budget allocation over the period, which seems to contradict its prioritisation as the main durable solution in Peru. UNHCR has sought to maintain a balanced budget in the administration and staff components at an average of around 38% of the OL between 2019 and 2022. However, some key positions remain under temporary (TA) and affiliated (AWF) contracts, which has led to staff turnover, lack of continuity and, at times, loss of credibility with partners and national institutions.

The operation has implemented COMPASS as the UNHCR's new global results-based management framework and, in parallel, has consolidated a team to strengthen monitoring and evaluation work and promote the use of data. Surveyed UNHCR staff member's perceptions of the improvements brought about by the multiyear planning and COMPASS are evenly split between positive and slightly skeptical views. The main limitations of COMPASS identified by respondents to the

survey were the difficulty of reconciling multi-annual planning with annual budgets and of adapting planning to regular changes in the operational context.

The integration of two information management teams into a single team under the Interagency Unit for Data Collection and Processing from 2021 onwards has been a key measure for the quality and regularity of data generation, the comprehensiveness of UNHCR and WGRM analysis, the strengthening of monitoring and reporting, and dissemination activities.

The main financial contributions to UNHCR have come from bilateral aid (98%), with the US as the main donor (74% over the whole period), despite efforts to diversify funding. The funding structure has been heavily dominated by emergency funds.

4.3.1. To what extent has UNHCR's country office and field office/unit structure been adequate to achieve its objectives? What have been the most important strengths and shortcomings of UNHCR's office structure in service delivery?

121. **UNHCR has managed to build a fully-fledged country office in a complex context (Level 2 emergency, COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and changing migration and asylum policies) in a short period of time. Organisationally, UNHCR has managed to consolidate the functioning and structure "on the go", build capacities and tools to manage the growth in needs, staff and funds, respond programmatically to growing challenges, and assimilate changes in corporate tools and policies** (e.g. regionalisation and decentralisation, new results-based management framework, planning and monitoring, systems and technologies). Despite progress, the operation is still in a transition process to consolidate its organisational "model" (e.g. national human resources policy, direct CBI implementation, internal and partner SOP update and implementation, Lima field office, among others).

122. **Since 2021, the distribution of UNHCR offices in the territory reflects a dual operational environment; on the one hand, immediate and humanitarian assistance at border points, on the other hand, work on socio-economic integration in selected neighbourhoods in the city of Lima and in provincial localities** (Cusco, Arequipa and Trujillo) that present greater livelihood opportunities. UNHCR's presence in intermediate localities such as Arequipa and Trujillo, although modest and with smaller operational capacities, allows for geographic coverage and relations with regional and municipal authorities that generates greater knowledge of the diverse local realities and work experience at the territorial level, reinforces UNHCR's legitimacy at the national level (connecting both local and national) and creates opportunities for potential relocation initiatives for the Venezuelan population within the country. In a context of resource constraints and even without detailed figures, the relationship between the cost and the "value" or efficiency of these local presences is positively perceived[262].

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[262] Internal and external informants

123.   **The field offices/units deployed in Peru are in line with the dynamics of mixed movements and the concentration of Venezuelan communities in certain urban centres (Lima, Arequipa and Trujillo) and border areas (Tumbes and Tacna). In some cases, and despite territorial deployment, some field offices/units have had logistical and institutional limitations to monitor and respond to needs at other border crossing points** which, moreover, have been changing according to migratory flows. In fact, UNHCR's geographical scope has been conditioned (and limited) by the resources available and some of the areas of the country that have also been exposed to mixed movements have not been reached; thus, for example, several interviews have mentioned the need for a presence in Puno and Madre de Dios, areas where UNHCR has not been able to reach. The deployment of offices/field units is perceived as coherent and effective by most staff surveyed (59%), although 30% of respondents consider it to be inconsistent[263].

124.   **Despite the widely recognised importance of UNHCR's deployment in border areas, certain challenges have been identified**; the management tools of field offices and units have limited UNHCR's capacity to react swiftly to volatile contexts, especially in Tacna[264], and hindered the "synchronisation" between organisational changes and new needs (e.g. responses to basic needs). However, it is important to note that: i) strengthening the field offices requires greater certainty in allocated funds to ensure better planning and implementation; and ii) some geographical areas without field offices (Puno and Madre de Dios) are covered from the Tacna FU.

125.   **The establishment of the Lima field office (2023) has facilitated the implementation of the community-based protection strategy in key neighbourhoods of the metropolitan area.** However, its resource allocation does not seem proportional to the magnitude of the urban challenges. The office is staffed with three community-based protection profiles to oversee an extensive and densely populated urban territory with significant social and integration challenges. In addition, the Lima field office also covers the city of Ica, which hosts 2.6% of the total Venezuelan population residing in Peru, making it the fourth city with the highest number of Venezuelan individuals, according to ENPOVEII).

Budget of UNHCR's operation in Peru

126.   **Between 2019 and 2022, UNHCR experienced significant budgetary growth, enabling the expansion of its programmes, personnel, and field presence** through the opening of new offices and field units. During this period, UNHCR recorded a total expenditure of 77.9 million US dollars, which represented 96% of its OL budget. UNHCR executed 68% of its programmatic activities (OPS) through an increasing number of partners, rising from 15 to 23 partners between 2019 and 2022. Budget-wise, there was

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[263] UNHCR Personal Survey

[264] Expenditure, supplier management managed from the Lima CO, use of *Head FU* bank accounts for some one-off expenses.

a notable increase in OL budgets from 2019 to 2021 (+61%)[265], followed by a decrease in 2022 (-15%).

127. **There is a growing gap between OP and OL budgets, particularly for the OPS budget line**, which shows a significant decrease in available funds (from 74% to 14% between 2019 and 2024) compared to programmed funds (see figure 4 below).

Figure 4: Evolution of OP, OL and EXP budgets[266] (2019-2022) and OPS-OP and OPS-OL budget lines (2019-2024).

Source: OL OPS financials with implementers data 2019-2023, 1_Peru financial data_2019-2022 and 20220811 Budget Prioritization

128. Generally, the OPS budget is most affected by variations due to the criteria from the Regional Bureau for determining the ABOD (administrative budget), as well as the budget ceiling for STAFF. Additionally, **to ensure an adequate budgetary balance (OPS-ABOD-STAFF)[267] during the evaluated period, the UNHCR budget for direct implementation (OPS-UNHCR) was significantly impacted, with only 22% of funds, compared to the partner implementation line (OPS-PARTNER, 46%). The priority has been given to honouring commitments with partners (OPS - Partner) and supporting the strengthening of UNHCR's structure (STAFF and ABOD), at the expense of UNHCR's operational budget (OPS-UNHCR).**

129. Furthermore, considering the total workforce[268] (FTA[269], TA[270] and Affiliates) charged to the STAFF budget line and, partially, to ABOD and OPS budget lines, the UNHCR **direct implementation represents only 10% of available funds in 2022, compared to 49% allocated to partners and 41% to the structure** (workforce and administration) (see Figure 5 below).

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[265] UNHCR PERU - Achievement Report 2019-2021(FOCUS), Annual Result Report 2022(COMPASS) & Peru financial data_2019-2022

[266] Expenditure

[267] UNHCR PERU - Achievement Report 2019-2021(FOCUS), Annual Result Report 2022(COMPASS) & Peru financial data_2019-2022

[268] Affiliated staff are charged under OPS direct implementation, TA under ABOD.

[269] Fixed term appointment

[270] Temporary appointment

Figure 5: Evolution of OL budget lines (2019-2022) - "Weight" of budget lines in the overall OL budget grouping staff in workforce (2019-2022)[271]

Source: OL OPS financials with implementers data 2019-2023, 1_Peru financial data_2019-2022 and Peru workforce summary statistics 2019-2022.

130. **Despite the trend of increasing budget (until 2021), resources and programmatic rol-out (e.g. Basic Services, Regulatory frameworks and Public Policies, Community Engagement), UNHCR has lacked the capacity and technical expertise due to funding constraints to fully cover all the priority programmes**. The uncertainty about the available funding and, in some cases, the type of funding[272] or its availability, has limited UNHCR's capacity to react. For instance, not all programmes could be adequately financed, some were rushed due to donor deadlines, or grant conditions forced UNHCR into unplanned actions. This has led to an "accordion effect" in budgeting and execution, forcing UNHCR to continuously make choices regarding the prioritisation of needs, types and amounts of assistance provided.

131. In accordance with the new results framework structure, in the period 2019-2023[273] the emphasis was placed on OPS budget execution for the "Protect" and "Respond" objectives (70% of total resources between 2019 and 2023)[274] and the "Empower" objective (23%). Although during emergencies the focus was on humanitarian response for basic items (50%), the weight of this objective remained high in the OPS budget until 2023 (46% between 2021 and 2023). The "Solve" objective shows a low and decreasing budget allocation over the period, which seems to contradict the prioritisation of local integration as a durable solution in Peru (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 6: Evolution of *Operating Level* - OL - (2019-2022) and *Indicative Operating Level - IOL* - (2023-2024) budgets by objectives - Weight of objectives in OL (2019-2022) and IOL (2023-2024) budgets

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[271] In the *workforce*, personnel assigned to STAFF, ABOD, and OPS are grouped together. ADMIN corresponds to the ABOD category without the assigned personnel.

[272] See section Funding model

[273] Data for 2023 and 2024 correspond to the IOL (Indicative OL)-20220811 Budget Prioritization

[274] UNHCR PERU - Peru financial data_2019-2022/ 20220811 Budget Prioritization / Continuity between FOCUS and COMPASS

Source: OL OPS financials with implementers data 2019-2023, 1_Peru financial data_2019-2022; 20220811 Budget Prioritization and IOL 2024.

132. However, the impossibility of allocating STAFF and ABOD expenses to outputs or outcomes (except for the AWF accounted in OPS)[275] limits the analysis of the cost of activities and, therefore, makes it difficult to comprehensively assess the performance of the operation. Analysing only the OPS budget line does not reflect the real cost of activities and limits the contribution analysis of the structure to outcomes, as well as the "catalytic effect" that human resources can have on results.

133. **From 2022 onwards, UNHCR activities are particularly focused on local integration: (i) Regularisation and documentation (11% of the budget), (ii) Integration and economic inclusion (27% of the budget), (iii) Resettlement and labour mobility (6% of the budget) and (iv) Support to refugees and asylum seekers with basic needs (45% of the budget with 20% earmarked for cash assistance)[276].** However, according to the projections reflected in the *Indicative Operating Level* (IOL) proposal for 2024, the operation's strategy seems to refocus on Regularisation and documentation (34% of the budget), basic items (37%) and to a lesser extent community engagement (12%).

Human resources

134. **In 2023, UNHCR has 43 established positions (STAFF) and 75 affiliated (AWF) or temporary staff (TA) in Peru, representing a 76% increase in its *workforce* since 2019.** UNHCR representation includes: i) the *Country office* (CO) in Lima[277] , ii) the *Field offices* (FO) in Lima (from 2023) and Tumbes, iii) the *Field units* (FU) in Tacna, iv) the *Field Presence* in Arequipa (from 2023, FU until 2022) and Trujillo (from 2023). After 4 years of presence in Cusco (2 as FU and 2 as FP), UNHCR closed its office in 2022 (see figure 7 below).

**Figure 7: Evolution of staff (*workforce*) by location (2019-2023)**

Workforce in CO Lima and other representations	**Workforce in field presences**

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[275] The available (OL) and executed (EXP) budget data are not usable as they contain the values of the available and executed budgets of the "STAFF and ABOD" vented by Output or Outcome in a random way (OL Budget "SAFF and ABOD"/# of Output).

[276] OL 2022 budgets of the OPS budget line.

[277] The reduction in the workforce at the level of the Lima CO in 2023 is due to the creation of the Lima FO in the same year.

Source: Peru workforce summary statistics 2019-2022 and Detailed Staff list and positions 2019-2023

135.	**As UNHCR has continued to strengthen its capacity and presence in Peru, it has sought to maintain a balance in the administration and staff budget at around an average of 38% of OL between 2019 and 2022.** However, some key positions[278] remain under temporary (TA) and affiliated (AWF) contracts. Continuously having TA or AWF positions has posed a risk of staff turnover, lack of continuity in the operation and, at times, loss of credibility with partners and counterparts. It is worth mentioning that the operation is going through a gradual process of consolidation and formalisation of TA positions, in accordance with available budgets.

136.	**The number of staff (FTA, TA and affiliates)[279] has increased significantly (+76%) with a strong growth of national staff (+110 recruitments between 2019 and 2022), reaching 69% of total human resources in 2022. While FTA staff has remained relatively stable from 2020 onwards, its weight in the overall workforce has decreased significantly, from 48% to 36% between 2020 and 2022.** The recruitment of affiliates has increased steadily throughout the period (+109%) and although the weight of these profiles in the overall workforce corresponds to the regional average (+1%), the difference with the global average is still very significant (+17%)[280] (see Figure 8 below). Also, 53% of staff in Peru have been employed by UNHCR (as staff) for less than 2 years, while the global average for UNHCR is 30%[281]. Only 12% of staff in Peru have more than 10 years of experience with UNHCR.

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[278] Most of the positions with the highest number of affiliates are within International Protection and Operational Execution.

[279] FTA refers exclusively to national and international personnel included in the STAFF budget line. TAs are allocated to the ABOD category, and affiliates are assigned to the OPS category.

[280] UNHCR PERU: 2.1_Staff summary statistics 2019-2023

[281] Ibid

Source: Peru workforce summary statistics 2019-2022 and Detailed Staff list and positions 2019-2023

137.   It is important to highlight that although the budget allocation for staff has increased significantly (+66%) during the period, in 2022, 25% of these funds were allocated to positions with temporary or affiliated contracts, who represent 64% of the workforce.

138.   During the period 2019-2022, there was notable growth in staff in the functional groups of International Protection & Solutions and External Relations (+200% and 225% respectively), alongside consolidation in administrative and operational staff (see figure 9 below). **In 2022, the process of strengthening protection, administration, and operational support areas was consolidated** following years of growth. This consolidation included the creation of national positions[282] alongside reductions in some international roles in administration, registration, and CBI, and the elimination of a position in gender-based violence. Similarly, **the development of a fundraising strategy and donor follow-up actions led to a significant increase in the External Relations team.**

Figure 9: Evolution of staffing by functional group (2019-2022)

Source: Peru workforce summary statistics 2019-2022

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[282] Posts in cash-based interventions, protection, project monitoring, supply, gender-based violence, human resources and information technology.

139.   **During the evaluation, concerns were identified regarding the capacity and tools of field offices/units to assume management functions, siloed work between units, moderate coordination and support from the Lima office, within a context of frequent budgetary limitations or adaptations.** Additionally, complexities in personnel hiring processes, increased accountability demands on partners, transition to direct implementation, challenges in transmitting information during hand-overs[283] and changes in some procedures, all under constant emergencies and increasing workload, have led to internal functional, administrative and management tensions[284]. Although 48% of survey respondents believed that field offices/units had the appropriate profiles to meet the operation's needs and objectives, it is notable that nearly half of the respondents answered that the profiles were either not suitable (26%) or did not know (26%)[285]. Reasons cited for profiles not being considered suitable included lack of diversity (which suggests a need for greater multidisciplinarity), and the need for public information positions in the field. Moreover, there were mentions of both a shortage of staff in the field and a lack of staff with extensive experience.

4.3.2.   To what extent and in what ways have the Regional bureau and headquarters supported the country office in implementing the country strategy and achieving results?

140.   **The support from the multi-country office in Argentina (at the time) and the headquarters has been essential for evolving from a modest presence in the country to a legally and institutionally established office with full installed capacities (human, technical, financial, and logistical).** This transition has been successfully and effectively supported through the involvement of different levels and units of UNHCR in Buenos Aires and missions from headquarters initially, followed by the Regional Bureau in Panama. However, the rapid expansion of the operation within a short period has led to some organizational dysfunctions (such as in defining clear objectives and goals, implementing management procedures, imbalances between units, international staff rotation, and the incorporation of staff without previous experience in UNHCR).

141.   **The HQ and Regional Bureau support has been particularly useful in supporting the CEPR, accompanying the GoP in political processes and regional platforms (WGRM, Quito Process), restructuring and consolidating the programmes team and aligning the operation with global corporate orientations** (e.g. CBI and direct implementation, localisation, refugee-led organisations). In general, the process of regionalisation and decentralisation is poorly understood by staff.[286]

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[283] Examples: transmission of strategic, operational and organisational information between offices, departments, both horizontally and vertically. Lack of ownership of operational strategies by team leaders in some field offices, leading to duplicated efforts.

[284] UNHCR Personal Survey

[285] UNHCR Personal Survey

[286] UNHCR Personal Survey.

4.3.3. How have changes in the results-based management model (COMPASS), information management and public information strategy affected UNHCR's ability to fulfil its mandate and objectives in the country?

Results Based Management (RBM)

142.   **In 2022 and in parallel with the adoption of COMPASS, the operation set up a team to strengthen monitoring and evaluation efforts[287], promote the use of data for accountability, develop analysis and learning**, and identify data and information gaps. The transition to a new multiyear planning framework has facilitated the evolution from an operation with diverse programmatic actions to one focused on fewer and more focused areas. This shift has allowed the operation to move from a short-term annual perspective to a better-defined medium-term vision.

143.   **Surveyed staff perceptions[288] of the improvements brought by multiyear planning are equally divided between those who perceive improvements (36%) and those who do not perceive significant changes (36%). The implementation of multiyear planning is generally seen as difficult (78% of respondents) and not adaptable to reflect the changes in context (86% of respondents). The feedback on COMPASS reveals modest level of appreciation for its contribution to planning quality, monitoring, reporting, and disaggregation by age, gender, and diversity.** The most valued aspects of COMPASS include improvements in the consistency of baselines and the alignment with the budgetary planning[289]. Survey data aligns with concerns collected during interviews about the utility of a strategic, multiyear planning and monitoring framework given the annual budgeting system, annual partner agreements, short-term funding, and an unpredictable context[290]. Additionally, most UNHCR partner staff surveyed were unaware of and limitedly involved in the new multiyear planning process, though those familiar with the proGres tool rated it positively[291]. While it is too early to fully assess the implications of the new Results-Based Management system on the operation, multiple challenges have been identified (which is in line with the findings of previous country strategy evaluations[292]).

Information management

144.   **The integration of two Information Management teams into a single team under the Interagency Unit for Data Collection and Processing from 2021 was a fundamental measure for the quality and regularity of data generation, the comprehensiveness of analysis, the strengthening of monitoring and reporting, and internal and external dissemination activities through the WGRM and other coordination fora.** The coexistence of two Information Management (IM) teams at initial

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[287] RARL team (see Information Management section).

[288] UNHCR Personal Survey.

[289] The number of respondents who answered questions about COMPASS is low, but it should be noted that the number of COMPASS users in the operation is also low.

[290] Internal informants.

[291] Partner survey.

[292] See Annex 11 Approach to a framework for analysing operation performance.

years of the operation—one linked to the protection unit and the other to the interagency coordination unit— hindered the consolidation of information from both direct implementation and partner implementation, making it difficult to provide a comprehensive view of UNHCR activities. Subsequently, the "merged" IM team has adopted a cross-cutting approach across different organisational units, focusing on areas such as needs identification, reporting, various types of monitoring, and analysis of UNHCR interventions both at the country level and thematically. The addition of an IM position in the Tacna office has further strengthened subnational analysis capabilities.

145. **The IM team have effectively supported and enhanced the visibility of UNHCR[293], the WGRM and public institutions. However, they have occasionally faced challenges due to a limited organisational culture of evidence-based management, the difficulty of obtaining reliable denominators, and the use of diverse IT platforms and formats**. The IM team has generated sound data and evidence, recognised both internally and externally. For example, the evaluation has documented the relevance of information gathering and the use of maps for designing community actions and influencing municipal authorities in the metropolitan area of Lima. Nevertheless, the translation of generated data into decision-making or evidence-based actions does not appear to have been systematic.

Public information

146. **UNHCR's media and social media campaigns, in collaboration with the WGRM and partners, have raised awareness about the situation of refugees and migrants, promoted donor visibility, and fostered partnerships with the private sector, aiming to build a culture of integration. These efforts, however, have encountered a political, social, and media context increasingly marked by xenophobic discourses**. Since establishing its presence in Peru, UNHCR has launched various campaigns across different channels to reach broader audiences. Innovative strategies were implemented, such as collaborating with local radio stations, training adolescent refugees to act as UNHCR spokespersons, and leveraging high-visibility events to highlight the refugee cause (e.g., World Refugee Day, Lima Pride Parade, partnership with the football club Alianza Lima (#SolidaridadAzul). Moreover, UNHCR and IOM co-led the WGRM Communication Subgroup and, together with partners, promoted regular communication actions. Among the various campaigns, the #TuCausaEsMiCausa campaign, co-led by UNHCR and IOM[294], achieved the most extensive reach. This campaign aimed to promote understanding and coexistence between communities through diverse activities, including neighbourhood events, sports, and cultural activities.

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[293] See section on Partnerships.

[294] national and international NGOs, civil society, academia, government institutions and private companies have joined forces.

4.3.4. What mechanisms does UNHCR have to ensure organisational learning?[295]

147. **The evaluation lacks information on UNHCR's organisational learning mechanisms but has identified several challenges. These include difficulties in mitigating knowledge transmission loss due to the turnover of international staff, providing consistent training and support for new recruitments, and adequately training staff during the complex implementation of new corporate management tools[296]**. The operation has been affected by high turnover of international staff which, while part of UNHCR's usual human resources cycles, has had a greater impact due to the recent establishment of the representation in the country and the high volume of national staff without prior experience with the organisation. The corporate platform UNHCR Learn & Connect is not perceived as sufficient or appropriate for the needs of new staff. Additionally, the deployment of multiple corporate management platforms and tools in parallel over the past year (e.g., Cloud ERP, PROMS, COMPASS, Workday) has created numerous needs and difficulties for staff that have not been adequately addressed, despite corporate efforts[297].

4.3.5. To what extent has risk management helped UNHCR to achieve its planned results? Have the main risks identified materialised? If yes, has the management of the identified risks been effective? In the case of risks that have not materialised, were they correctly identified and mitigated?

148. **The application of UNHCR risk management tool in Peru has been consistent over the past five years. However, the evaluation has not been able to determine the extent to which the use of the tool has contributed to achieving results or to establish a direct relationship between the tool and the outcomes achieved (or the lack thereof).** UNHCR has conducted biannual risk identification and analysis exercises, considering the country's institutional and social instability, and has defined risk treatments and mitigation measures accordingly. The operation has evolved from a compartmentalised approach to a multidisciplinary risk management approach, guided by the Regional Bureau and headquarters[298]. UNHCR has identified an average of 15 risks per year, categorised as operational or organizational risks, with 13 risks remaining constant over the five years. Approximately 60% of the annual risks were considered high risk, and the remaining 40% were medium risk. The risks identified largely coincide with the situation analyses and scenario planning documented in other UNHCR reports *(e.g., Operations plans, Strategy reports).*

149. **Almost all operational risks have materialised and UNHCR has generally managed the risk effectively.** Recurrent and materialised operational risks over the five years include: i) limited reception conditions, ii) reduced protection space due to

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[295] The evaluation team made comments regarding the relevance and usefulness of the question in the framework of a country strategy evaluation that were not answered. For the evaluation team, the question is formulated very broadly, it is not clear whether it refers to the corporate level or to the operational level. Additionally, corporate learning tools are probably part of UNHCR global policy or tools not necessarily related to the country strategy evaluation.

[296] Internal informants, UNHCR staff survey

[297] Internal informants, document review

[298] Internal informants

xenophobia, iii) inaccurate population figures, iv) cash-based intervention gaps (CBI), v) limited access to territory, vi) limited access to livelihoods, vii) reduced access to health, and viii) sexual and gender-based violence and child protection risks. Treatments to respond to these risks have been activities that, as explained in the Effectiveness section, have had varying levels of reach.

150. **Organisational risks have a lower level of materialisation, have been correctly identified and adequate mitigation measures have been defined**. Among the organisational risks that have materialised, two stand out as having a significant impact on the operation and for which UNHCR has been able to mitigate to a limited extent (reduction of funding for the operation and staff welfare and working conditions). Among the organisational risks that have not materialised, the government's agreement to recognise the new UNHCR representation in Peru stands out.

4.3.6. How effective has UNHCR's positioning been in increasing collaboration and fundraising with bilateral, multilateral and private donors?

151. During the period 2019-2022, the main financial contributions came from bilateral aid at 98%, with the US as the main donor (74% over the whole period), despite diversification efforts (see figure 10 below).

Figure 10: Contributions by type of donor (2019-2022) and evolution of contributions by type of donor (2019-2022)

Source: Peru funding sources 2019-2022 and Funding Update 2019-2022

152. Additionally**, the funding structure of the operation has been strongly marked by emergency funds: the peak in the operation's funding occurred in 2020 (USD 21.7 million, representing a 127% increase over the previous year) due to the combination of funds for the Venezuela situation and funds for the response to COVID-19**. Funds mobilised for the Venezuela situation remain almost constant between 2020 and 2022 (8% decrease between 2020 and 2022) and represent 85% of OL funds in 2020 and 78% in 2022.

153. **During the evaluation period, 69% of funds received by UNHCR were earmarked (56% in 2019 and 70% in 2022), which determined UNHCR's ability to prioritise programmes, limited the development of certain activities or motivated the prioritisation of actions with earmarked funding (e.g. education).** In some

cases, funding is influenced by the institutional agenda and deadlines of donors (and the receipt of funds towards the end of the year - September/October), which led UNHCR to work with uncertainty regarding budget projections and generated administrative risks and difficulties with partners.

154. **Donor mobilisation efforts and the management of new grants (essential to reduce dependency) are clearly within the operation's priorities since 2019 with a steady increase of the External Relations team**[299]. In addition to donor monitoring and reporting, the operation has developed a fundraising strategy and has taken a proactive approach to address significant funding challenges.

4.4. What lessons and good practices can be drawn to inform UNHCR's next medium-term strategic planning in the country?

4.4.1. What lessons learned from UNHCR's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic can be identified and could be integrated as standard practice?

Level	Lessons learned during COVID-19
OPERATIONAL LEVEL	• Support in connectivity, training sessions, and user-friendly guides tailored to diverse profiles, along with digital education, is essential for enabling individuals with modest resources and knowledge to access and navigate virtual platforms. This access was crucial for obtaining essential information and services during the lockdowns. • The application of the SRQ-18 and WHO-5 Well-being Index for psychosocial assistance during periods of high demand (such as during the pandemic) via hotline, or other referral mechanisms, helps screen cases of anxiety and depression. This screening determines if urgent or priority care is needed and streamlines waitlist management. • The polyvalence and easy-to-modify *Refugee Housing Units* (e.g., changing panels, improving ventilation, combining with other materials) allows for better adaptation, acceptance, and functionality across diverse environments (geographical, environmental, cultural).
ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL	• Strengthening the security of information systems and data protection (especially with the widespread adoption of new virtual tools and technologies since the pandemic) is crucial. This is necessary to protect UNHCR and partners systems and services from increasing attempts to obtain personal data by criminal groups aiming to commit frauds.

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[299] The ER area has expanded its staff from 4 to 13 professionals between 2019 and 2022.

4.4.2.   What have been the good practices and lessons learned?

Level	Lessons learned and good practices
STRATEGIC LEVEL	• The coordinated efforts of international organisations and civil society, including refugee and migrant organisations, integrated into the governance mechanisms of public migration policy are instrumental for building national capacities and ensuring sustainability. This approach contributes to adjust governmental responses to effectively meet the needs of individuals and address structural causes of exclusion and vulnerability. Currently, with the decline in the intensity of humanitarian needs, working "from" institutions (rather than "with" institutions) with a medium- and long-term perspective is essential. This ensures that protection principles and tools can be adopted and owned by public officials, influencing policy changes and public services despite the challenges of working with public administrations in the long term. • The approach to mixed movements in Peru should consider the diversification and increasing complexity of intraregional migratory flows, which have steadily risen in recent years, even excluding the impact of forced displacement from Venezuela (Peru's share as a destination country for regional migrants increased by 10 points between 2015 and 2019, excluding Venezuelan population[300]). The development of human mobility frameworks (e.g., MERCOSUR residency permits, skilled migration programmes) has been a factor leading t the rise of intraregional immigration in Peru (and other countries in the region).
OPERATIONAL LEVEL	• The reinforcement of the protection lens and activities, including Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, as a cross-cutting theme in the planning, implementation and monitoring of activities in all programme areas of UNHCR and partners allows for the homogenisation of approaches and working tools and the reduction of differences in the application of the protection lens (e.g. protection and economic inclusion in the Graduation Model). • Coordination between partners and UNHCR and the establishment of common procedures for all partners is increasingly important to optimise the use of limited resources, reduce duplication and improve complementary and case management. • The development of joint contingency and response plans (including local authorities and institutions) and the clear division of labour between organisations helps to scale up emergency responses and improve coordination during crisis situations. • Establishing coordination and referral channels among partners at the community level, involving local organizations and refugee-led organisations, is crucial for identifying cases of vulnerability and protection needs.

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[300] Jeremy Harris, Georges Lemaitre , Véronique Gindrey (2021) Migration flows in Latin America and the Caribbean: statistics on migrant permits. IDB Monograph ; 968. Washington.

Level	Lessons learned and good practices
	• Addressing essential humanitarian needs is a prerequisite to initiating psychosocial assistance (which focuses on emotional support). In complex cases involving children and adolescents, it is also important to have therapists who work with parents. • Including relevant content on youth public policies and involving youth organisations during the training process of youth promoters strengthens the role and ability of adolescents to interact with institutions and organisations. It also supports community mobilisation and leadership roles.
ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL	• The unification of the registration system in proGres between partners and UNHCR facilitates the interoperability and data exchanges and is a step forward in case management. However, certain dysfunctions within the system have increased workload. • Collaborative efforts between UNHCR and partners from the outset (including audits, continuous support from Programme and Project Control, mentoring throughout implementation, monitoring, systematization, etc.) are effective in achieving optimal communication, fulfilling processes and standards, and strengthening partner capacities. • The lack of a standardised formulation of indicators across zones/territories and establishing new indicators during project/PPA implementation with partners often leads to confusion and affects programmatic implementation.

5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Strategic level

155. **C1) National asylum system.** The establishment of the UNHCR country office in Peru has been instrumental in strengthening the response capacities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CEPR at critical moments, modernising the national asylum system, and strengthening the registration and processing of asylum claims. Nevertheless, the national asylum system remains dependent on UNHCR support and faces challenges to ensure its efficient and responsive functioning (e.g. backlog) and the sustainability of the acquired capacities. The government response, including access to territory and the focus on refugee and migrant rights, would not have had the same characteristics without the accompaniment of UNHCR and the commitment of the CEPR.

C2) International protection in mixed movements and migratory regularisation programmes. UNHCR has adopted a "dual" approach to support the state's response to the forced displacement of the Venezuelan population; initially, through asylum claims as a mechanism for legal access to the territory and international protection. Subsequently, UNHCR supporting regularisation programmes to facilitate access to documentation. This "dual" approach has been consistent with national policies, UNHCR's guidance on mixed movements[301], regional frameworks and global agreements with IOM[302]. However, it resulted in increasingly limited access to international protection mechanisms and UNHCR's work being embedded in a predominantly migratory narrative. The response to the massive influx of arrivals at the border presented a dilemma: on the one hand, to establish entry restrictions, measures limiting rights, and to use ad-hoc temporary migration formulas to manage the massive influxes of people arriving in the country at the cost of contravening norms and national and regional standards. On the other hand, promoting the implementation of the Cartagena Declaration or an expanded definition, *prima facie* recognition and full standards of protection, with the risk of a political, institutional, legal and economic cost that was difficult for institutions to assume in a context of stigmatisation of the Venezuelan population. National institutions and communities receiving refugees and migrants found themselves faced with flows and needs for which they were not sufficiently prepared technically, humanly, materially and socially, and for which the Cartagena Declaration did not provide sufficient guidance and tools to adapt public policies and services to an unprecedented phenomenon in the country.

C3) Working Group for Refugee and Migrants (WGRM). Co-leadership has contributed to UNHCR's positioning in Peru (and in the region) as it has enabled UNHCR

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[301] UNHCR Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration; The 10-Point Plan in Action

[302] Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and IOM-UNHCR Joint Letter (February 2019). The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection (2022) and the call by UNHCR and IOM for a joint response to refugees and migrants in the Americas (2023) have served to reiterate (and update in a changing context) the principles and guidance set out in the previous Global Compacts. In these circumstances, both agencies signed the IOM/UNHCR Framework for Action (June 2022).

to achieve results that would have been unlikely without the existence of this joint response mechanism. At the same time, co-leadership creates ambiguity about each agency's mandate[303]. Although work between UNHCR and IOM to promote a comprehensive and coordinated approach to mixed movements is a growing trend (e.g. the *whole-of-route approach*[304]), collected data[305] and some analysis[306] suggest the need for greater clarity in the complementarity and articulation between the two agencies. Concerning the WGRM, its "humanitarian architecture" has not evolved sufficiently to adapt to the current challenges of mixed movements in Peru and to strengthen public policies on migration (although coordination mechanisms exist between the UNS, the WGRM and the MTIGM). The development of sound evidence by UNHCR, both as a contribution to the WGRM and as data for the operation has been effective and instrumental in influencing institutions and guiding programmes.

5.2. Operational level

156. **C4) Humanitarian assistance to overlapping crisis.** UNHCR's humanitarian assistance has mitigated the essential needs of a significant number of refugees and migrants and, to a lesser extent, host communities. In the last two years, humanitarian needs have decreased in volume (although not necessarily in intensity and critical needs persist) but the humanitarian approach remains similar to the years of massive, forced displacement. In particular, humanitarian assistance to a certain profile of "caminantes" ("wanderers") with no clear migration project and no clear integration project (albeit with multiple unmet essential needs and exposure to risks) has raised questions about the possible dependency of these profiles on aid, the principle of action without harm and the approach to be adopted to move from assistance to foster self-reliance. The scope of UNHCR's response to GBV and child protection has been limited due to resource constraints in comparison to its intensity and complexity.

C5) Localisation. Community-based organisations have been essential in enabling UNHCR to adapt its strategy to changing flows and needs (e.g. pandemic) and to local specificities. In Lima, social organisations have been instrumental in facilitating the implementation of UNHCR's community-based protection strategy. The joint work between UNHCR and community and faith-based organisations has demonstrated the potential of these organisations for frontline social work and for providing continuity of assistance and protection in critical neighbourhoods where public services are lacking. In particular, the support provided by UNHCR has been key to the positioning of the

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[303] Internal and external informants

[304] See, for example, the High Commissioner's keynote speech at the 74th session of UNHCR's Executive Committee (October 2023) and the growing collaboration frameworks and agreements between the two agencies (UNHCR, IOM outline new approach to assist growing number of migrants - https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1139047).

[305] Internal and external informants

[306] See, for example: Sebastien Moretti (2020) Between refugee protection and migration management: the quest for coordination between UNHCR and IOM in the Asia-Pacific region. Third World Quarterly, 2021, VOL. 42, NO. 1, 34-51 https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1780910

Kluth, W., Jack, N. (2023). UNHCR and IOM as Actors of Global Migration Management. In: Cremades, J., Hermida, C. (eds) Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_209-1

Interreligious Committee for Migrants and Refugees (CIREMI), made up of organisations with a strong presence and experience in social work prior to UNHCR operations[307, 308]; this has consolidated a broad network of community-based organisations providing humanitarian assistance, information and case management in neighbourhoods with a high presence of Venezuelan population and vulnerability..

157. **6) Refugee-led organisations.** UNHCR's promotion and accompaniment of refugee-led organisations has been essential in building a small but effective group of organisations that represent, influence, mobilise and provide services mainly to refugees and migrants, and also to host communities, constituting one of the main achievements of the operation and a success story with potential for replication or scalability. In this instance, UNHCR's organisational development strategy has been key in supporting an exceptional experience in organising the Venezuelan community and in providing these organisations with representativeness vis-à-vis their fellow citizens, legitimacy vis-à-vis national bodies and international actors, and legal and operational capacity. The articulation between refugee-led organisations and CBOs and faith-based organisations shows complementarity and the potential for integrated work in the neighbourhoods.

158. **C7) Local integration and livelihoods.** UNHCR's progressive focus on livelihoods has reflected the challenges of socio-economic integration, in line with government priorities on mixed movements[309]. UNHCR has made some progress in creating opportunities for refugee and migrant recruitment with the private sector (with a notable success story in the health sector) and entrepreneurship initiatives. However, these efforts have been relatively modest in scope compared to the scale of the needs. Furthermore, the complementarity between protection and livelihoods actions has not been effective in ensuring the "continuum" of protection (internally and through partners). Despite progress, available data show that the majority of refugees and migrants remain in the informal sector, have irregular migratory status, are unfairly paid, assume roles that are not commensurate with their level of skills, and experience difficulties in accessing services, which is generating (small-scale) northward movements ("integration can be more difficult than arrival"[310]). The evaluation of entrepreneurship shows generally positive data for individual initiatives although associated with business of a "humanitarian" nature with little added value, innovation or insertion in value chains.

5.3. Organisational level

159. **C8) Lima field office..** The formalisation of the Lima field office in April 2023 represented a significant step forward in terms of providing enhanced coverage and proximity to the needs of urban refugees and migrants, in line with the overarching

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[307] External informants, documentary review

[308] Francisco Rey, Beatriz Abellán, Andrés Gómez (2021) The application of the "triple nexus" approach between humanitarian action, development and peace in the context of Venezuela's migratory flows. Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria. Madrid

[309] Global Forum on Refugees 2023, GoP commitments.

[310] Some reports document a situation and trends that are occurring not only in Peru but also in other countries in the region. See for example: Andrew Selee et al (2023) Changing Migration Patterns and Policies in the Americas. Migration Policy Institute. Washington, DC

strategy of local integration. However, the field office lacked the profile and resources to effectively address the challenges it was facing (both in terms of scope and intensity). Furthermore, the articulation with local authorities in an area characterised by a complex network of district governments was still at an early stage. The transition from a community-based protection team to a field office has benefited from experience with local organisations, relationships with partners, community work background and resettlement funding. During 2023, the operationality and level of autonomy of the new field office in relation to the country office does not appear clearly delineated and the staffing, equipment and logistics have been insufficient to achieve optimal functioning.

160.   **C9) National staff.** UNHCR has managed to steadily grow its team until 2022, to strengthen the protection, livelihoods and external relations units and to develop the operation thanks in large part to the recruitment of qualified and motivated national professionals, one of the operation's strengths. However, rapid growth, the succession of emergencies, rotations and resource constraints have not allowed for sufficient reinforcement of teams, to cope with the number of needs, streamlining recruitment processes, mitigating some fatigue and overcoming silo working, despite UNHCR's efforts[311] and the commitment of individuals. National professionals played a key role in the initial phase of the emergency at the border, to compensate for difficulties derived from the use of international staff without contextual and linguistic knowledge, to build solid relationships with national actors and adapt UNHCR's interventions to local contexts, but they find themselves in a situation of contractual instability and with limited opportunities to influence decision-making.

161.   **C10) Funding model.** Emergency funds have allowed for territorial and programmatic expansion and provided broad coverage, however, nowadays they do not seem adequate to ensure the stability of UNHCR's territorial presence and the development of the national asylum system and socio-economic integration actions that require a medium-term perspective. Dependence on US funding has been very high, in what seems to be a constant in other operations in the region[312].

162.   **C11)** *Business Transformation.* The implementation of multiple corporate platforms in parallel (Cloud ERP, PROMS, COMPASS, Workday), although still in roll-out and testing phase in several cases, has generated additional workload and dysfunctions in many areas of the operation. In addition to COMPASS and multiyear planning, the implementation of PROMS (which also affects partners), Cloud ERP and other tools have presented unaddressed issues, has been difficult for staff to absorb,added a bureaucratic burden on users and generated additional workload and dysfunctions in several areas of the operation without having provided clear value yet.

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[311] In 2021, initiatives to support staff safety and well-being, training and capacity building in key areas such as programme and project monitoring, communication, external relations, finance, CBI, human resources, procurement, security and data management have been a priority to ensure the effective use of UNHCR's resources and compliance with policies and regulations.

[312] See Evaluations of UNHCR's country strategies in Mexico, Ecuador and Honduras and UNHCR's *funding updates* in the region.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Strategic level

National Asylum System		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R1	**Continue to provide technical and resource support to the CEPR in order to clean up the asylum claims database, reduce the backlog and strengthen the quality and credibility of the national asylum system.**			
Suggested actions	• Implement the joint work plan to review and clean up the QORICANCHA II database and explore the possibility of developing a strategic plan for the development and consolidation of the national asylum system with the CEPR.	High (new population figures of Venezuelan applicants and migrants) + Medium	Short / medium term	• UNHCR Peru • MRE and CEPR • Migration • Donors • Regional Bureau
	• Strengthen joint and cross-border analysis between UNHCR operations, to articulate an adaptive response to frequent changes in flows, itineraries and crossing points at borders.	Medium + High	Medium term	• Regional Bureau
	• Continue influencing public administrations (Ministries, Congress and the Ombudsman's Office) to promote the exercise of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and to push public policies that favour the protection and inclusion of refugees and migrants.	High + High	Medium / long term	• UNHCR Peru • Ministries • Congress • Ombudsman's Office • Refugees and asylum seekers • Intersectoral Working Group
	• Update and reinforce a communication strategy with communities, organisations and the State on social networks (including subnational level), incorporating differentiated messages about access to the asylum system and to other rights in Peru.	High + Low	Short / medium term	• UNHCR Peru • Partners • Community-based organisations Public administrations

WGRM in Peru	Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom

R2	Promote closer articulation of the WGRM with national migration governance mechanisms (MTIGM) and sectoral ministries, in collaboration with IOM, WGRM members and public administrations.			
Suggested actions	• Promote better alignment of UNHCR and WGRM information and data systems with sectoral public policy planning and management systems and, ii) capacity building of institutions on public policies related to human mobility.	High + Medium	Short / medium term	• UNHCR Peru • Regional Bureau • Headquarters • R4V regional platform
	• Explore with the IOM the harmonisation of joint strategies and working tools and the definition of an annual "co-leadership" (or work) plan, which would more clearly define each agency's contribution and resource mobilisation to the WGRM.	Medium + Medium	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru • IOM • R4V regional platform

6.2. Operational level

Protection and CBI		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R3	Consolidate cross-functional work between units (e.g. protection, CBI, programmes, livelihoods) and with partners in order to harmonise the protection approach.			
Suggested actions	• Strengthen the alignment and mainstreaming of protection between UNHCR units (protection, CBI, programmes, livelihoods) and homogenise criteria and procedures for the identification and management of protection cases between partners.	High + High	Short/medium term	• Protection (all equipment) • Programmes (CBI, livelihoods, shelter, programmes) • Foreign Affairs • Senior Management
	• Standardise criteria for exclusion, complementarity and cash-based interventions amounts between partners and agencies, considering the updates to the calculations of the cost of living (monthly basket).	Medium + High	Medium term	• Sub-Working Group on Cash-Based Interventions-WGRM • Sectoral Sub-Groups of the WGRM • CBI UNHCR • Protection
	• Update the referral pathway between partners to improve the management of vulnerable profiles.	High + High	Short term	• Protection Unit (Registration and Protection)

Protection and CBI	Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
• Update the data quality plan in the various existing registration platforms and streamline the collection, use and application of data.	High + High	Short/medium term	• Registration • Protection • Partners
• Define basic assistance mechanisms coordinated with partners, for cases that do not qualify for CBI assistance.	High + Medium	Medium term	• Protection • Partners
• Develop tools that allow for the identification and monitoring of risk factors associated with the access to rights and services for refugees and migrants in border areas and urban contexts, with special emphasis on security and violence.	High + High	Medium term	• Protection • Partners • IM
• Explore further collaborations with other agencies to strengthen synergies through joint interventions, especially in GBV, child protection and human smuggling and trafficking.	High + Medium	Medium term	• Protection • WGRM • UN Agencies • Partners

Community Based Protection in Urban Contexts		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R4	Promote human mobility and protection on the municipal agenda, strengthening advocacy with local governments and the capacities of community-based organisations.			
Suggested actions	• Enhance institutional dialogue and technical work spaces, especially with municipalities, focusing on local plans and intersectoral roundtables to place asylum and protection on the public agenda.	High + High	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru • Municipalities and decentralised bodies.
	• Promote exchanges of good practices among municipal authorities regarding the inclusion of refugee and migrant populations in local services and programmes.	High + Medium	Long term	• UNHCR Peru • Municipalities and decentralised bodies.
	• Capitalise on successful experiences and government commitment (Global Refugee Forum) to promote social cohesion and protection through sports activities in priority neighbourhoods (strengthening links with local authorities).	Medium + Medium	Long term	• UNHCR Peru • Municipalities
	• Strengthen networks of community-, faith-based and refugee-led organisations to increase their legitimacy and participation in local government planning.	High + High	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru • CIREMI • CBO
	• Explore the possibility of replicating the CAREMI (Refugee and Migrant Support Centres) model in other cities.	Medium + Medium	Long term	• UNHCR Peru

					• Partners and counterparts

Socio-Economic Integration and Livelihoods			Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R5	**Expand UNHCR's advocacy on livelihoods, establishing partnerships with development actors, financial institutions, public administrations related to employment and entrepreneurship, and the private sector to promote the recruitment of refugees and migrants.**				
	• Capitalise on UNHCR's livelihood experiences in other operations (e.g. Mexico, Ecuador) and expand partnerships with livelihood organisations working with vulnerable communities in the region.		Medium + Medium	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru, Mexico and Brazil • Ministry of Labour • Vocational Training Institutes • Private sector
	• Identify opportunities for entrepreneurship with greater innovation components and integration into value chains, based on market studies and collaborations with economic development agencies and the private sector.		Low + Medium	Long term	• UNHCR Peru • Private sector • Microfinance institutions

Collaboration with Partners			Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R6	**Capitalise on local partners' migration expertise (including assistance and protection and their knowledge of diverse local contexts) and streamline procedures for working together.**				
Suggested actions	• Strengthen the involvement of local partners in the processes of defining or revising the multi-annual strategy and annual planning.		High + Medium	Short term	• UNHCR Peru (programmes) • Partners
	• Improve alignment between the Project Partnership Agreements, the results matrix and the progress reports required from partners.		Medium + Medium	Short term	• UNHCR Peru (programmes) • Partners
	• Rationalise UNHCR's information requirements from partners, simplify internal processes and provide feedback on the usefulness or application of the recurrent data collected.		Medium + High	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru (programmes) • Partners

		Medium + Low	Long term	• UNHCR Peru (programmes) • Partners
	• Provide dedicated budget for UNHCR's required evaluations of partner performance.			

Data and Evidence-Based Decisions		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R7	**Build on UNHCR's experience in data generation to strengthen national institutions in characterising the flows and needs of refugees and migrants, thus promoting inclusive public policies and services.**			
Suggested actions	• Optimise investments made in the ENPOVE to develop further analysis, promote the coherence and integration of migration databases, and support the inclusion of refugee and migrant parameters in national censuses and surveys.	High + Medium	Medium term	• - UNHCR Peru
	• Promote internally the effective use of evidence in decision-making and a data-driven culture, capitalising on accumulated experience.	High + High	Short term	• UNHCR Peru • Partners • Regional Bureau • INEI and relevant public administrations
	• Develop a more specific and results-oriented monitoring framework for livelihood interventions.	High + High	Short term	• UNHCR Peru • Partners
	• Optimise reporting systems and improve document management (common repository of SOP and other key documents) by promoting internal monitoring and evaluation exercises.	High + High	Short term	• UNHCR Peru • Partners

6.3. Organisational level

Lima Field Office		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R8	**Strengthen the capacity of the Lima field office to ensure the proper implementation of the urban strategy, presence in critical neighbourhoods, dialogue with district institutions and work with communities and social organisations.**			
Suggested actions	• Strengthen the configuration of the field office team with new profiles (protection, programmes, livelihoods) and appropriate resources to achieve better operational efficiency.	High + Medium	Short term	• UNHCR Peru
	• Delineate the geographical coverage assumed by the Lima field office, assessing ways to continue working in Ica.	Medium + Medium	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru
	• Define the roles and responsibilities of the field office vis-à-vis the country office, especially regarding interactions with district authorities.	High + Medium	Long term	• UNHCR Peru

Functional Organisation		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R9	**Strengthen multidisciplinary cooperation, horizontal and vertical communication and closer links between units, offices and levels of the operation to achieve more synergies and cohesion between teams.**			
Suggested actions	• Promote a closer relationship between the country office and the field offices, with more regular visits from the different units, based on the needs of field units.	High +High	Short term	• UNHCR Peru
	• Reintroduce team-building events and revitalise multi-sectoral team meetings.	Medium + Medium	Medium term	• UNHCR Peru (MTF, Human Resources)
	• Better define the scope and responsibilities of the legal protection unit.	Medium + Medium	Short term	• Protection • Field offices • Heads of units
	• Consider broader joint work or coordination between Public Information and External Relations units.	High + Medium	Medium term	• Relex • Public Information • Senior Management • Regional Bureau
	• Advocate for improved support to the operation during the deployment of the new tools linked to the Business Transformation	Medium + Medium	Short term	• UNHCR Peru • Regional Bureau

	process, identifying possibilities for simplification and adaptation to the needs of different units.			• Headquarters

National staff		Priority and feasibility	Deadlines	With whom
R10	**Continue to promote the "nationalisation" of positions and functions in the operation, and a broad understanding of UNHCR's mandate amongst newly recruited local staff.**			
Suggested actions	• Adjust or review some aspects of human resources management by improving working conditions or working environment of national professionals (e.g. professional recognition, stability, annual full-time contracts).	High + Medium	Short term	• Senior Management • Human resources • Supervisors
	• Establish mechanisms to mitigate the impact of international staff turnover in terms of loss of knowledge and information, as well as of changes in operational orientations and priorities.	High + High	Short term	• Senior Management • Human resources • Heads of unit
	• Establish a grievance mechanism (including feedback) open to all staff.	High + High	Medium term	• Human resources

7 ANNEXES