



2021

GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES INDICATOR REPORT

NIGER. Faced with violence and theft of livestock, Peul communities flee Nigeria for Niger where they are welcomed by local Peul communities.
© UNHCR/Sylvain Cherkaoui

Foreword

This December, stakeholders from around the world, including refugees, will gather, both virtually and in person, for a High-Level Officials Meeting – an event foreseen in the Global Compact on Refugees to take stock of progress towards advancing burden- and responsibility-sharing to increase support, self-reliance, and access to solutions for refugees.

To pave the way for this important milestone, I am pleased to share the first indicator report for the Global Compact on Refugees. This report contributes to the evidence base needed to guide the discussions in December. It charts how far the international community has come since the development and affirmation of the compact and how far we need to go in realizing its vision. This will also inform the development of new contributions for the next Global Refugee Forum in 2023.

This report comes at an important time. In a world where displacement has continued to grow, durable solutions are in short supply, and the impact of

the COVID-19 pandemic is being felt acutely in countries that host the largest populations of refugees, the message that emerges from data is clear. While much has been achieved, responsibility-sharing must be stepped up to meet the challenges we are facing – both now and in the years to come, not least as we prepare for the medium to long-term impacts of the pandemic.

The Global Compact on Refugees, with the multi-stakeholder approach and practical arrangements that it provides, is now more crucial than ever.

Filippo Grandi

United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees

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SWITZERLAND. Family reunited after children who crossed the desert were captured in Libya.
© UNHCR/Mark Henley

Introduction

On 17 December 2018, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) affirmed the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), whereby the international community committed to do its utmost to mobilize support for the achievement of its four objectives, on an equal footing, through more predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing aimed to: (i) ease pressures on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third country solutions; and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.¹

Indicators and data are tools to inform burden- and responsibility-sharing arrangements. The GCR specified that progress is to be assessed against these objectives through indicators.² In July 2019, UNHCR, after extensive multi-stakeholder consultations, published the [GCR indicator framework](#). It is composed of 15 indicators identified under eight outcomes linked to the four GCR objectives. Against this background, this first GCR indicator report has sought to populate the agreed indicator framework in order to measure and sustain progress towards the GCR objectives and their cross-cutting principle of burden- and responsibility-sharing.

This report, like the framework of indicators on which it relies, makes no claim to be comprehensive. It is

but one tool to inform periodic stocktaking of GCR progress, and is complemented, for example, by the tracking of pledges announced at the Global Refugee Forums³ and the process to measure the impact of hosting, protecting, and assisting refugees. The report seeks to apply and promote the use of quality, comparable, and timely data based on international statistical standards and practices. The collection of data for this first report, like its main findings, was affected by the pandemic. Traditional face-to-face surveys could not take place as planned, for example. Populating the GCR indicator framework revealed important data gaps.

The first part of the report measures the scale and evolution of the overall burden and responsibility, in terms of refugee flows and populations, since the adoption in 2016 of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, including its comprehensive refugee response framework,⁴ which forms an integral part of the GCR. The second part seeks to analyse the progress towards achieving the four GCR objectives made between 2016 and 2021. It is followed by a chapter describing the main data sources and methods. The report also includes several short GCR indicator country profiles. Their purpose is to shed more light on refugee situations in some of the main refugee-hosting countries (in absolute or relative terms).

GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES: INDICATOR FRAMEWORK

Objective 1: Ease pressures on host countries.	Objective 2: Enhance refugee self-reliance.	Objective 3: Expand access to third country solutions.	Objective 4: Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.
Outcome 1.1: Resources supporting additional instruments and programmes are made available for refugees and host communities by an increasing number of donors.	Outcome 2.1: Refugees are able to actively participate in the social and economic life of host countries.	Outcome 3.1: Refugees in need have access to resettlement opportunities in an increasing number of countries.	Outcome 4.1: Resources are made available to support the sustainable reintegration of returning refugees by an increasing number of donors.
Indicators: 1.1.1 Volume of ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities in the refugee-hosting country. 1.1.2 Number of donors providing ODA to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities in the refugee-hosting country.	Indicators: 2.1.1 Proportion of refugees who have access to decent work. 2.1.2 Proportion of refugees who are able to move freely within the host country.	Indicators: 3.1.1 Number of refugees who departed on resettlement from the host country. 3.1.2 Number of countries receiving UNHCR resettlement submissions from the host country.	Indicators: 4.1.1 Volume of ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugee returnees in the country of origin. 4.1.2 Number of donors providing ODA to, or for the benefit of, refugee returnees in the country of origin.
Outcome 1.2: National arrangements and coordinated refugee responses are supported.	Outcome 2.2: Refugee and host community self-reliance is strengthened.	Outcome 3.2: Refugees have access to complementary pathways for admission to third countries.	Outcome 4.2: Refugees are able to return and reintegrate socially and economically.
Indicators: 1.2.1 Proportion of ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities channeled to national actors in the refugee-hosting country. 1.2.2 Number of partners supporting national arrangements in the refugee-hosting country.	Indicators: 2.2.1 Proportion of refugee children enrolled in the national education system (primary and secondary). 2.2.2 Proportion of refugee and host community populations living below the national poverty line of the host country.	Indicators: 3.2.1 Number of refugees admitted through complementary pathways from the host country.	Indicators: 4.2.1 Number of refugees returning to their country of origin. 4.2.2. Proportion of returnees with legally recognized documentation and credentials.

USA. Sang Rem, a Burmese refugee who came to the USA at age 15. She now works at the Spero Project, a refugee advocacy service in Oklahoma City, USA
© UNHCR/Nick Oxford

CHAPTER 1

Key findings and recommendations

1. Tangible progress towards the GCR objectives.

The report provides evidence of tangible progress, including incremental increases in bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA)⁵ to refugee situations in countries with developing economies; more partnerships in support of comprehensive refugee responses; enhanced legal access to decent work, freedom of movement, and national education systems; actual implementation of policy measures mitigating poverty and impacts of the pandemic on refugees and host communities; and more refugees having received a durable solution (resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and local integration) between 2016 and 2020 than during the previous five years.

2. New increases in the scale of the burden and responsibility call for more equitable and predictable sharing.

The report shows that the scale of the burden and responsibility to provide international protection for refugees and concrete material support to both refugees and host communities has continued to grow since 2016, the year of the adoption of the New York Declaration. By the end of 2020, nine out of ten refugees continued to be hosted in countries with developing economies.

3. Several trends inconsistent with GCR objectives need to be addressed.

Beyond the tangible progress underpinned by the data, several GCR indicators also show some trends that are inconsistent with the GCR objectives. Some negative trends began before the pandemic, which has only aggravated them. In particular, the annual number of refugees accessing durable solutions (resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and local integration) has almost continuously declined since 2016, reaching historically low levels. At the end of 2020, 16 million refugees lived in a protracted situation: four million more than in 2016. In addition, although data are scarce, there is evidence that the self-reliance and resiliency of both refugees and host communities have deteriorated in the context of the pandemic.

4. International financing to refugee situations in countries with lower income economies increased, and 'in-donor refugee costs' decreased.

Based on available evidence, it appears that there was a general upward trend

in bilateral ODA to refugee-hosting countries with low- and middle-income economies between 2016 and 2019. During the same period, donors' domestic spending for hosting refugees ('in-donor refugee costs') steadily declined after a peak in 2016, owing to fewer arrivals of asylum-seekers and refugees in donor countries and new rules narrowing the definition of what can be included in the calculation of in-donor refugee costs⁶.

5. Accelerating progress towards inclusive education is both necessary and do-able.

Although a large share of countries has legislation and policies granting explicit access for refugees to national education systems on par with nationals – particularly at the primary level – important practical barriers remain. At the secondary level, many barriers – most notably costs – are severely hampering access. However, recent research led by the World Bank and UNHCR on the costing of [inclusive education for refugees](#) shows that this objective is do-able with the collective effort of the international community and host governments.

6. Need for further targeted support to reduce poverty and mitigate the impact of the pandemic on refugees and host communities.

Refugee poverty is a reality in many contexts. Continued efforts to promote inclusion, as well as targeted support to address specific vulnerabilities, are needed to promote self-reliance and address refugee poverty. Policies to enhance freedom of movement, the right to work, property rights, and other aspects of the regulatory and institutional environment are especially important where refugees are in unsustainable or economically dependent situations. Building on progress achieved through the International Development Association's investments in host communities and refugees (IDA18 and IDA19), the Refugee Policy Review Framework, developed by the World Bank in close consultation with UNHCR and others, aims to identify and support institutional reform processes further. A growing body of evidence shows that mitigating the long-term socio-economic impacts of displacement and addressing poverty require targeted health (including mental health), educational and other basic services, particularly for women and children.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. Joana Niyokwizera and her family, in their refugee housing unit in Kigoma refugee camp. © UNHCR/Clemence Eliah



7. Need for a surge in third country solutions.

Concerted efforts are necessary to boost opportunities for third country solutions for refugees. To meet the objective of the GCR for greater responsibility sharing, additional efforts are needed from the international community to expand third country solutions significantly. The resettlement needs of those most at risk continue to exceed departures greatly. Globally, third country solutions were available for less than one per cent of the total refugee population in 2020. The adoption of the Three-Year Strategy (2019-2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways was a significant step forward and direct response to commitments made in the GCR. However, the targets adopted, which have not been achieved, remain below the level of needs for solutions.

8. The pandemic has revealed opportunities to accelerate GCR implementation.

While progress under the GCR objectives was curtailed by the pandemic, the crisis should be considered less as an excuse for hampered performance than an opportunity for States and other stakeholders to develop and expand innovative approaches. Digital education systems, targeted poverty mitigation programmes, and the use of technology and pragmatic flexibilities for family reunification, resettlement, and complementary admission pathways are among the avenues to be explored further.

9. Improved cooperation between political, humanitarian, development, and peace actors is needed for countries of origin.

Between 2018 and 2019, the data collected by the OECD show a 26 per cent decline in ODA in support of refugee returnees in their countries of origin.

The total amount of bilateral ODA provided to countries of origin accounted for only 6 per cent of all bilateral ODA to refugee situations. The preponderance of development over humanitarian assistance for countries of origin seems consistent with the GCR's emphasis on addressing root causes and enabling conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation. There is a need for more comprehensive analysis of ODA contributions and for more cooperation between the various actors whose interventions can help address root causes, remove obstacles to return, and enable conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation. The lack of Global Refugee Forum pledges towards GCR objective 4 appears to confirm this need.

10. Need to strengthen the GCR indicator framework. The application of the GCR indicator framework has contributed to the

first 'evidence base' and measurement of progress towards attaining the GCR objectives. It has also revealed important data gaps and limitations. Going forward, it will be necessary to strengthen the implementation and scope of the GCR indicator framework, especially through a multi-stakeholder and partnership approach aiming to further the inclusion of refugees and host communities in data collection efforts at national and international levels, and in line with international statistical standards. Regular data collection by the OECD, particularly on financing for refugee situations, will be essential. Addressing data gaps will also mean improving data disaggregation by age, gender, and diversity, including under the GCR objective of enhancing refugee self-reliance, as none of the related indicators enabled trend analysis.


GCR Trends at a Glance


+3.5 million refugees

under UNHCR's mandate at the end of 2020 than in the year of the adoption of the New York Declaration. This brings the total number of refugees to 26.4 million, including 5.7 million under UNRWA's mandate.ⁱ


16 million refugees

By the end of 2020, there were **4 MILLION MORE REFUGEES** in protracted situations than in 2016.

 **NEARLY 1 OUT OF 5** refugees lives in Turkey


 **9 IN 10** refugees continue to be hosted in countries with developing economies

WHILE THERE IS **1 REFUGEE FOR EVERY 400 PEOPLE IN THE WORLD,** **LEBANON HAS 1 FOR EVERY 8.**

 **1 in 100**

while more refugees received solutions between 2016 and 2020 than in the previous five years, only 1 in 100 found a durable solution in 2020.

OBJECTIVE 1: EASE PRESSURES ON HOST COUNTRIES



Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to refugee situations **increased by 23% from 2015 to 2016** and by **10% from 2016 to 2019**.

In-donor refugee costs **increased by 33% from 2015 to 2016** and **decreased by 42% from 2016 to 2019**.


In 2019, the total volume of ODA to refugee situations was **USD 22.3 BILLION**, including bilateral ODA (USD 11.9 billion), in-donor refugee costs (USD 9.7 billion) and core contributions to refugee-mandated agencies (USD 710 million).*



Between 2018 and 2019, **71% OF THE TOTAL BILATERAL ODA TO REFUGEE SITUATIONS WAS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE** and 29% was development assistance. This does not include financing from development banks.*



Between 2018 and 2019, 6% of the total bilateral ODA was **CHANNELED DIRECTLY THROUGH NATIONAL ACTORS**. This does not include ODA received by international organizations transferring it to national actors. In 2019, **UNHCR REACHED 26%***.



The number of partners contributing to refugee responses **INCREASED ALMOST THREEFOLD.**


i. The increase is +7.3 million (+43%) if the Venezuelans displaced abroad are added.
 ii. When the 480,000 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA living in Lebanon are included, this proportion increases to one in five.
 * Total bilateral ODA is without distinction between countries of asylum and countries of origin. Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

GCR Trends at a Glance

OBJECTIVE 2 : ENHANCE REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE

THREE-QUARTERS of refugees have access in law to key attributes of 'DECENT WORK'.

Close to **TWO-THIRDS** of refugees enjoy freedom of movement **UNDER THE LAW**.



MUCH FEWER REFUGEES ENJOY ACCESS TO DECENT WORK AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN PRACTICE

- a situation aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

POVERTY

Following two decades of progress, global poverty is projected to rise again in 2020 and 2021 with the pandemic-related economic downturn, pushing some

100 million or MORE PEOPLE

into extreme poverty, including many refugees.




Limited available data show that around **TWO-THIRDS** of refugees live in poverty.



Assistance provided by humanitarian agencies, development partners, and governments has been shown to mitigate or reduce exposure to poverty among refugees.

EDUCATION

Refugees can access **PRIMARY EDUCATION** on the same terms as nationals in three-quarters of surveyed countries, and **SECONDARY EDUCATION** in two-thirds of surveyed countries.



68% Gross enrollment rates of refugee children at the **Primary Level**.



34% Gross enrollment rates of refugee children at the **Secondary Level**.



Almost **HALF OF REFUGEE STUDENTS** are out of school.



REFUGEE GIRLS are still less likely to have access to education than refugee boys.

OBJECTIVE 3 : EXPAND ACCESS TO THIRD COUNTRY SOLUTIONS


1.4 million

Between 2016 and 2020, close to 1.4 million refugees accessed third country solutions

- **286,900 MORE THAN DURING THE FIVE PREVIOUS YEARS.**

4:1

Four refugees were admitted through **complementary pathways** for every one refugee admitted through resettlement with UNHCR assistance.




The percentage of the world's refugee population with access to third-country solutions declined **FROM 2% IN 2016 TO LESS THAN 1% IN 2020.**

In 2021, **1.4 MILLION REFUGEES ARE IN NEED OF URGENT RESETTLEMENT** - an increase of 25% from 2016.

The number of countries receiving UNHCR resettlement submissions declined from **35 IN 2016 TO 25 IN 2020.**



OBJECTIVE 4 : SUPPORT CONDITIONS IN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN FOR RETURN IN SAFETY AND DIGNITY



ODA provided in support of refugee returnees in countries of origin decreased from **USD 784 MILLION IN 2018 TO USD 584 MILLION IN 2019.***

Some **2.0 million REFUGEES HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN** since 2016 compared to 1.8 million between 2011 and 2015. Three quarters of the solutions accessed by refugees were returns. In 2020, only one per cent of refugees was able to return to their country of origin compared to three per cent in 2016. **Afghanistan was the first country of refugee returns** between 2016 and 2020.

COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN HAVE FEWER DONORS than countries of asylum.*



Data available for a few countries show big differences in access to civil documentation for refugee returnees.

* Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO. Alain, 51, is a refugee from the Central African Republic who fled his hometown of Lisara together with his wife in December 2020 because of post-electoral violence. © UNHCR/Vittoria Moretti



CHAPTER 3

The scale of the burden and responsibility

The GCR calls for more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking into account existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States. This chapter provides an overview of the scale of the burden and responsibility, focusing on the period since the adoption of the New York Declaration in 2016, which led to the affirmation of the GCR in 2018.

Globally, the scale of the burden and responsibility has continued to grow since 2016

By the end of 2020, the total number of refugees was estimated at 26.4 million, including 20.7 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate and 5.7 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate (Figure

1). There were 3.5 million (+20%) more refugees under UNHCR's mandate in 2020 than in the year of the adoption of the New York Declaration. The increase is 7.3 million (+43%) if the Venezuelans displaced abroad are added.

The growth of the burden and responsibility has slowed since 2018

There was a relative reduction in annual refugee flows in recent years. The slowdown observed in 2020 is partially due to a series of travel restrictions or closures of borders and asylum institutions in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented people seeking to flee persecution, conflict, and human rights violations from accessing asylum. Some 1.3 million individual asylum applications were registered in 2020, one million fewer than in 2019.

Figure 1: Refugees, Venezuelans displaced abroad and asylum-seekers, 2010 – 2020 (end-year)




Figure 2. Number of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad by region, 2016 and 2020 (end-year)



Apart from a decrease in the Middle East and North Africa, all regions hosted more refugees in 2020 than in 2016

Between 2016 and 2020, the number of refugees hosted (Figure 2) increased in the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region (+33%), Southern Africa (+9%), West and Central Africa (+25%), the Americas (+10% refugees; and +600% when adding Venezuelans displaced abroad), Asia and the Pacific (+15%), and in Europe (+30%), including Turkey. Only the Middle East and North Africa region hosted slightly fewer refugees in 2020 compared to 2016 (-6%).


Nine out of ten refugees continue to be hosted in countries with developing economies

By the end of 2020, 86 per cent of people displaced across borders lived in countries with developing economies.⁷ According to the World Bank’s country-income classification,⁸ low-income countries (e.g., Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia), accounting for less than one per cent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), host 18 per cent of the world’s people displaced across border (Figure 3).⁹ Countries with high-income economies host 17 per cent, while they account for 63 per cent of global GDP.¹⁰ Nearly two-thirds of those displaced across borders (65%) lived in middle-income countries, including upper-

middle-income countries (e.g., Turkey, Colombia, and Lebanon) and lower-middle-income countries (e.g., Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Islamic Republic of Iran). Compared to 2016, the share of refugees

hosted by countries with higher-income economies increased slightly (by three percentage points for high-income countries and one percentage point for upper-middle-income countries).¹¹

Figure 3. Hosting people displaced across borders by countries’ income level (end-year), 2010-2020




More than three-quarters of all refugees are hosted by 20 countries, and nearly one in five live in Turkey

Figure 4 shows the 20 countries hosting the largest number of refugees in 2016 and 2020, accounting

for more than three-quarters of the world’s refugees.¹² Sixteen countries remain in both the 2016 and 2020 lists. New countries appearing in 2020 are Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile, for hosting large numbers of Venezuelans displaced abroad. In terms of income levels, more than three-quarters

Figure 4. Top 20 countries hosting refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad, in absolute terms, end-2016 and end-2020




of the top 20 hosting countries are low- or middle-income economies (17 in 2016 and 16 in 2020). Three countries with high-income economies, Germany, France, and the United States of America, were in the top 20 in both 2016 and 2020. They were joined by another high-income country, Chile, in 2020. Of the top 10 hosting countries in 2016, eight had more refugees in 2020 (Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kenya). Lebanon and the Islamic Republic of Iran had fewer refugees in 2020. Nearly one in five refugees lives in Turkey, which hosted close to 3.7 million refugees in 2020 - a number that rises to 4 million if asylum-seekers are included.

Ten countries are among the top 20 refugee-hosting countries in both absolute and relative terms, and almost all are low- or middle-income countries

Comparing the size of the refugee population with that of the host country provides a complementary measure of the impact of hosting refugees and the scale of the burden. Figure 5 shows the top 20 host countries in relative terms, i.e., the number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, in 2016 and 2020. In 2016, the countries in the top 20 list, both in absolute and relative terms, were Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Chad, South Sudan, Uganda, Cameroon, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sudan, and Kenya. In 2020, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Colombia, Uganda, Chad, Ecuador, Chile, Sudan, and Cameroon appeared on both lists in absolute and relative terms. The only high-income country was Chile.¹³

Figure 5: Top 20 countries hosting refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad per 1,000 host country inhabitants, end-2016 and end-2020




UNITED KINGDOM. Syrian family resettled in London with local community support. © UNHCR/Andrew McConnell

While there is one refugee for every 400 people in the world, Lebanon has one for every eight

Despite a decrease during the period, the number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants remains high by international comparison in Lebanon, with 151 in 2016 and 128 in 2020. In 2020, this was still equivalent to one refugee per eight inhabitants.¹⁴ Meanwhile, with the influx of Venezuelans displaced abroad in recent years, Aruba recorded an increase with 159 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants in 2020. In contrast, worldwide, there is one refugee for every 400 people (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Refugee hosting, Worldwide and Lebanon, 2020



16 million refugees are in protracted situations, 4 million more than in 2016

Based on UNHCR’s definition of a protracted refugee situation, where 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given host country, it is estimated that some 15.7 million refugees (76%) were in a protracted situation at the end of 2020.¹⁵ Compared to 2016, when 69 per cent of all refugees were in protracted situations, there were 4.1 million more in 2020. There were nine more protracted situations in 2020 (49) than in 2016 (40).

One in two refugees is a woman or girl, a constant over the reporting period, requiring commensurate gender-based responses

In 2020, 11.5 million of all people displaced across borders are estimated to be women or girls (47%)¹⁶. Some 41 per cent of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad were children, or 10.1 million at the end of 2020.¹⁷ Several million refugees are likely to have disabilities or other characteristics

requiring specific responses, although available data do not currently allow for the establishment of further global aggregates.¹⁸ The need for measures to ensure protection and livelihoods for women, girls, boys, persons with disabilities, older persons, and other groups at risk has intensified with the COVID-19 pandemic.

More refugees found a solution between 2016 and 2020 than in the previous five years

The three durable solutions are voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration. If more refugees return voluntarily in conditions of safety and dignity to their country of origin, access third country solutions, or integrate locally, then the overall scale of the burden and responsibility decreases. As data about the local integration of refugees remain elusive, naturalization – the legal act or process by which a non-citizen in a country may acquire citizenship or nationality of that country – is used as a proxy measure of local integration.¹⁹ Since 2016, 2.8 million refugees have found a solution (Figure 7). This was 435,000 more (+19%) than in the previous five years (2011-2015).


In 2020, only one refugee in 100 found a solution, and this cannot only be attributed to the pandemic

A significant factor in the decline in solutions in 2020 relates to the COVID-19 pandemic response, including measures that have been found to be contrary to international law, the right to protection from *refoulement*, and the spirit of the GCR.²⁰ At the end of 2020, the rate of refugees who found a solution was 1.5 per cent; the lowest rate over the last 20 years. The number of persons resettled with UNHCR assistance in 2020 was 82 per cent lower than in 2016. The number of returns declined by 55 per cent. The pandemic has, however, exacerbated a downward trend that started earlier. In 2019, just before the pandemic, the rate of refugees finding a solution was only moderately higher (2.4%). The rate has continued to decline since its relative peak in 2016 (4.6%).

Voluntary return accounted for 75 per cent of solutions

From 2016 to 2020, voluntary returns accounted for almost three quarters (73%) of all solutions, followed by resettlement (18%), and naturalization (9%). The most significant increase observed during the last five years was in terms of naturalization.²¹ Their cumulative number of 96,000 between 2011 and 2015 contrasts with the 250,000 naturalizations recorded over the following five years (+160%). Bearing in mind data limitations, regional disaggregation of the naturalizations shows that their number was highest in Europe, with 156,000, followed by the Americas at 82,000, West and Central Africa with 9,100, and Asia and the Pacific, Southern Africa, and the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region with less than 1,000 between 2016 and 2020.²² There were 253,000 more returns (+14%) and 31,000 more refugees resettled (+6%) over the same two periods.

Figure 7: Refugees accessing durable solutions, 2010-2020



JORDAN. Refugee doctors contribute to COVID-19 response. © UNHCR/Meshal Alfayez

INDIA. Sidiqa Shafaie, 15, has been an Afghan refugee youth leader in Delhi, India for the past two years. As a young woman leader, she continues to encourage her friends by sharing life lessons that she has learned over the years.
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CHAPTER 4

The extent of burden- and responsibility-sharing

4.1 Global Compact on Refugees Objective 1: Ease pressures on host countries

While contributions to burden- and responsibility-sharing by the international community as a whole go beyond funding, the mobilization of timely, predictable, adequate and sustainable public and private funding is key to the successful implementation of the global compact.

GCR, para. 32

OUTCOME 1: Resources supporting additional instruments and programmes are made available for refugees and host communities by an increasing number of donors


The GCR calls for more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States. It enshrines a commitment to make resources available to countries faced with large-scale refugee situations, both new and protracted, relative to their capacity, including through efforts to expand the support base beyond traditional donors. The following preliminary findings are based on the data collected as part of the [Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020](#), which was developed and implemented by the OECD in collaboration with UNHCR, and in which participation was on a voluntary basis.²³ Further information on the survey, including the list of participants, is provided in the note on data sources and methodology at the end of this report.

The total volume of bilateral official assistance to refugee situations increased between 2016 and 2019

According to the 2020 OECD survey data, donors contributed a cumulative total of USD 22.8 billion in bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to refugee situations in countries with lower incomes over 2018 and 2019.²⁴ This total is USD 24.2 billion

when core contributions to refugee-mandated agencies (USD 1.44 billion), such as UNHCR and UNRWA, are included. The total amount of ODA increased by 9 per cent (or 8 per cent when the core contributions are included) from USD 10.9 billion in 2018 to USD 11.9 billion in 2019.²⁵ This growth in bilateral ODA to refugee situations (Figure 8) in host countries with lower incomes continues the positive trend observed in the previous survey conducted by the OECD in 2018.²⁶ Despite comparability limitations between the two surveys (with several methodological improvements made in the 2020 survey), the data previously collected by the OECD revealed an increase in bilateral ODA to refugee situations of 23 per cent between 2015 and 2017.²⁷

Figure 8: Bilateral ODA to refugee situations, by type of recipient, 2018 – 2019 (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020, gross disbursement, 2019 constant prices, US dollars)



The OECD survey asked donors to distinguish bilateral ODA to refugee situations in countries of asylum (GCR indicator 1.1.1a) and ODA for refugee returnees in the country of origin (GCR indicator 4.1.1).²⁸ Between 2018 and 2019, bilateral ODA provided to countries of asylum with lower incomes increased by 17 per cent. They accounted for 60 per cent of the total of bilateral ODA, equivalent to USD 13.8 billion, over the two years. Unmarked core contributions to multilateral organizations, funding provided by multilateral development banks, and

“in-donor refugee costs” not included in the above figures, are reported separately in this chapter.

Five out of seven regions received more bilateral ODA to refugee situations in 2019

All but two regions received more bilateral ODA in 2019 than in 2018 (Figure 9). While ODA decreased by 27 per cent in West and Central Africa and nine per cent in the Middle East and North Africa, it grew in Southern Africa (3%), Asia and the Pacific (3%),

Figure 9: Regional distribution of bilateral ODA to refugee situations, 2018-2019 (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020, gross disbursement, 2019 constant prices)





Figure 10: Top recipients of bilateral ODA to refugee situations, 2018-2019 (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020, gross disbursement, 2019 constant prices)



(15%), the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region (19%), the Americas (105%), and Europe (174%), including Turkey. Both in 2018 and 2019, the Middle East and North Africa region nonetheless received the largest portion of bilateral ODA to refugee situations.²⁹

Countries hosting the most refugees are generally among the largest recipients of ODA to refugee situations, with Turkey being the largest recipient

From 2018 to 2019, Turkey, which hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide, received cumulatively USD 1.8 billion or eight per cent of total ODA to refugee situations. Lebanon and Jordan both received USD 1.6 billion (7%) over the two-year period.³⁰ ODA to the top 20 recipients (Figure 10) accounted for around 60 per cent of total ODA to refugee situations captured by the survey.

Although ODA, for the most part, was provided to the contexts where it was most needed, there are refugee situations that did not receive commensurate assistance from the donor community. For example, countries like Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Peru, and the Islamic Republic of Iran were not included in the list of top ODA recipients, even though they were among the top hosting countries (refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad), in absolute terms, at the end of 2020.³¹

After a peak in 2016, in-donor refugee costs steadily decreased

ODA disbursement from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors for the first 12 months of subsistence of refugees hosted by OECD countries are commonly referred to as “in-donor refugee costs”.³² Driven by significant arrivals of refugees in OECD countries, particularly in Europe, in-donor refugee


costs of DAC countries peaked in 2016 (Figure 11), reaching USD 16.8 billion (in 2019 constant prices). Since then, these costs have continued to decline, coinciding with the arrival of fewer refugees in developed countries and new rules narrowing the definition of what can be calculated as “in-donor refugee costs”.³³ Between 2018 and 2019, these expenditures declined by USD 0.86 billion (-8%). In 2020, they amounted to USD 8.7 billion, namely about half (-48%) of their value in 2016.³⁴

Adding in-donor refugee costs to bilateral ODA to refugee situations provided to countries with low- and middle-income economies, the total volume of ODA amounted to USD 21.4 billion in 2018 and USD

21.5 billion in 2019. This corresponds to a 0.4 per cent increase.

Trend analysis between 2016 and 2019 is difficult due to the lack of comparable data between the 2018 and 2020 OECD surveys on financing to refugee situations. Notwithstanding these limitations, based on available data, there was an overall decline in in-donor refugee costs between 2016 and 2019 (-42% or USD 7.1 billion) and an increase in ODA to refugee situations in low- and middle-income countries (approximately +10% or USD 1.1 billion).

Figure 11: In-donor refugee costs, 2010-2020. OECD data, 2019 constant prices



MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS (MDBS) PROVIDED AT LEAST USD 2.33 BILLION IN FINANCING


The [OECD Refugee Financing Survey 2020](#) shows that MDBs are significant actors in financing refugee situations. Four members of the [MDB Coordination Platform on Economic Migration and Forced Displacement](#) launched in 2018 responded to the survey: the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). Together, they provided at least USD 2.33 billion in financing for refugees and host communities from 2018 to 2019. This estimate of MDBs’ financing is equivalent to 9.6 per cent of bilateral ODA to refugee situations. The OECD report on the survey specified that not all of MDBs’ financing qualifies as ODA, as MDB financing may include lending in non-concessional terms, and that financing reported by the MDBs may also include volumes already reported by bilateral ODA donors. This explains why this data is presented separately. The World Bank was by far the largest MDB financing provider to refugee situations with at least USD 1.24 billion over the two years. The World Bank financing includes the International Development Association (IDA) Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities in 2018 and 2019, as well as the Global Concessional Financing Facility. The EIB primarily engaged via its Economic Resilience Initiative, while the EBRD financing focused primarily on municipal infrastructure under the Municipal Resilience Refugee Response Framework, targeting host communities and refugee populations in Turkey and Jordan. MDBs provide substantial support beyond financing, including to empirical analysis and data collection relevant to the GCR, as exemplified by the World Bank - UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement established in 2019 (see also the poverty section and note on data sources and methodology in this report).

Source: *Financing for Refugee Situations 2018-19*, OECD Refugee Financing Survey 2020. Forced displacement series

‘More donors’ usually means ‘more funding’

To enhance burden- and responsibility-sharing, the GCR calls for broadening the support base, including the number and type of donors. The data collected via the 2020 OECD survey does not allow for inferences to be drawn about the evolution of numbers of donors. The data show significant differences in the base of donors per recipient. Although “more donors” does not necessarily mean “more funds”, Figure 12 shows that the top recipients of ODA are generally also in the list of countries with the higher numbers of donors.


Figure 12: Number of donors of bilateral ODA to refugee situations, 2019 (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)



ODA to refugee situations continues to focus heavily on humanitarian assistance

The nine per cent increase in bilateral ODA to refugee situations in 2018 and 2019 was driven by a surge in humanitarian aid (+21%). During the period, development assistance decreased by 15 per cent. As a result, 74 per cent of bilateral ODA going to refugee situations was in the form of humanitarian assistance in 2019 (a rise of 7 percentage points compared to 2018).

Figure 13: Proportion of humanitarian assistance in bilateral ODA to refugee situations, by region, 2018-2019. (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020, gross disbursement)



*The country classification by regions is based on division according to UNHCR standards (UNHCR Regions).

The proportion of ODA to refugee situations in development aid is higher in Africa

The distribution of humanitarian and development assistance to refugee situations varies across regions (Figure 13). In 2019, humanitarian assistance comprised 85 per cent of ODA in Europe, and in West and Central Africa (63%), Middle East and North Africa (62%), East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes (60%), Asia and the Pacific (75%), the Americas (73%), and Southern Africa (71%). Between 2018 and 2019, the most notable changes were in West and Central Africa, where the share of humanitarian assistance climbed from 49 to 63 per cent, and in Europe where the share of humanitarian assistance was 49 per cent in 2018 and 85 per cent in 2019. This increase was mainly due to the share of humanitarian assistance received by Turkey, which rose from 51 per cent in 2018 to 90 per cent in 2019.

While some donors continued to focus on short-term funding, others significantly increased their share of longer-term assistance

Among the donors that provided the information in the OECD survey, almost half allocated between 50 and 100 per cent of their bilateral ODA to refugee situations in projects and programmes with associated durations of one year or less.³⁵ While short-term funding remains significant among donors,³⁶ some donors are providing sizeable shares of their assistance for long-term projects, enhancing the predictability of burden- and responsibility-sharing. For example, the proportion of ODA to refugee situations with durations between two and five years amounted to 96 per cent for Germany, 91 per cent for Sweden, and 84 per cent for Poland in 2019.

While important improvements in terms of data comparability are still necessary, these data provide useful yardsticks in relation to the GCR's commitment to improve the predictability of burden- and

responsibility-sharing, especially when considering the protracted nature of many refugee situations.

All donors' ODA contributions, in absolute or relative terms, matter

In 2019, the top 10 donors of ODA for refugee and host communities in refugee-hosting countries were, in absolute terms and USD billions, the United States of America (3.6), Germany (2.4), European Union Institutions (2.1), the United Kingdom (0.95), Norway (0.55), Japan (0.39), Sweden (0.36), the Netherlands (0.31), Canada (0.26) and Australia (0.21).³⁷ In proportion to the Gross National Income (GNI) of donor countries, the top 10 donors (in descending order) are estimated to be Norway, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States of America, Australia, Hungary, and Iceland.³⁸ It is worth noting that in 2020, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom were also the countries that met or exceeded the internationally agreed and SDG target of 0.7 per cent of GNI for ODA.

Unearmarked core contributions decreased, hampering the flexibility called for by the GCR

Core contributions are defined in the OECD survey as funds provided on an unearmarked basis to international refugee-mandated agencies, such as UNHCR and UNRWA, or other entities whose principal activity is to provide assistance to refugees and host communities. The core contributions reported by donors as part of the survey amounted to USD 710 million in 2019. Compared to their level in 2018 (USD 733 million), the reported unearmarked funds declined by 3.2 per cent. While keeping in mind data limitations, this tendency is consistent with reductions in the share of unearmarked or softly earmarked voluntary contributions received by UNHCR (35%, 33%, and 30% in 2017, 2018, and 2019 respectively).³⁹ These relative decreases in unearmarked contributions limit the important role that core contributions can play in financing responses to emergencies and forgotten crises.⁴⁰

Despite an overall increase in ODA to refugee situations, a large portion of funding needs for comprehensive responses to refugees and host communities remains unmet

To have a comprehensive picture of the levels of assistance and the sharing of burden and responsibility, it is also necessary to consider the actual needs for external assistance. This kind of analysis relates to the process called for by the GCR (para. 48) regarding the measurement of the impact arising from hosting, protecting and assisting refugees. As this is beyond the scope of this GCR indicator report, only some preliminary observations based on available complementary data and analysis are provided here. Despite the increase in international assistance observed between 2016 and 2019, substantial funding gaps persisted and may even be widening in several instances. A few illustrations are provided here based on available evidence.

Filling the resource gap for inclusive refugee education is both necessary and do-able

According to the joint World Bank-UNHCR report on the cost of inclusive refugee education,⁴¹ the annual cost of providing access to basic education to refugee children in low- and middle-income countries is estimated at USD 4.85 billion.⁴² Save the Children⁴³, cited by the report, estimated that approximately 56 per cent of the funding for refugee education would have to be financed externally.⁴⁴ This means that USD 2.72 billion of the total financing envelope needed would have to be funded through international assistance. This would amount to about three times the levels of external financing for refugee education that was provided in 2016.⁴⁵ The report concludes that financing inclusive education should not be out of reach. The average annual cost of educating refugees would represent less than 5 per cent of public education expenditures in nations with low- and middle-income economies which are hosting 85 per cent of the world's refugees.⁴⁶

Data-based evidence shows significant and even growing funding gaps

As part of the regional application of the GCR, the seven countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador,

Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama) have engaged in quantifying the resources required to implement comprehensive refugee responses at the national level.⁴⁷ Drawing on the process on measuring the impact arising from hosting, protecting, and assisting refugees, and with the technical assistance of UNHCR, a funding gap of 63 per cent (USD 141 millions) was identified across all countries that are part of the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework for Central America and Mexico (“MIRPS”). Within this average, funding gaps varied considerably from country to country, ranging from 30 to 91 per cent (Belize 69%, Costa Rica 76%, El Salvador 65%, Guatemala 91%, Honduras 46%, Mexico 37%, and Panama 30%), depending upon the size of the concerned population, local costs, the scope of support, and other context-specific parameters.⁴⁸

UNHCR’s budgetary situation also illustrates the persistence and evolution of funding gaps at global level. Between 2016 and 2020, the gap between budgetary needs and available funds hovered around 42 per cent, ranging from USD 3.1 to 3.8 billion. Despite a significant 22 per cent increase in funding received in the period following the adoption of the New York Declaration and the GCR, the financial shortfall in meeting protection and livelihood needs in 2020 (USD 3.7 billion) was more than half a billion higher than in 2016 (USD 3.1 billion).⁴⁹

Preliminary data indicate that donors either maintained or increased ODA contributions to help countries with lower incomes respond to COVID-19 and refugee situations

Due to a lack of data for 2020 and 2021, it is too early to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on ODA to refugee situations.⁵⁰ In terms of humanitarian assistance in support of refugees, 16 out of 17 donors indicated that they were either maintaining (11) or increasing (5) funds in 2020. A broadly consistent prospect for development assistance was also emerging, with a majority (14) promising the same levels and some (2) increases. Several donors noted that a substantial share of their contribution to refugee situations was going to be allocated to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The unprecedented humanitarian, social, and economic crisis caused by the pandemic will continue to test the solidarity called for in the GCR. It is hard to know what the future holds for the

pandemic, and for international assistance from donors also affected domestically. What is certain, however, is that considerable needs remain unmet, and the pandemic has revealed glaring inequalities between countries in terms of the response they are able to provide given their resources. In this context, it may be worth noting that bilateral ODA to refugee situations in countries with low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income countries amounted to approximately 0.1 per cent of the amount donors mobilised over the past year in economic stimulus measures to help their own societies recover from the COVID-19 crisis.⁵¹

OUTCOME 2: National Arrangements and coordinated refugee responses are supported

The overall proportion of ODA for refugee and host communities channelled directly through national actors⁵² reported by the 2020 OECD survey decreased (Figure 14) during the period, with levels at 8 per cent in 2018 and 4 per cent in 2019. The percentages are well below the target agreed by major donors and aid organizations under the Grand Bargain in 2016, to provide 25 per cent of global humanitarian funding to local and national responders ‘as directly as possible’ by 2020.

There are, however, data limitations for this indicator, especially on the extent to which the OECD survey captures the re-allocation of ODA received by UN and other multilateral actors to national actors. In 2019, UNHCR allocated USD 1.376 billion to over 1,100 partners, including USD 752.6 million to local responders, national NGOs, and governments. As a result, UNHCR met the Grand Bargain target by transferring 25.8 per cent of its annual programme expenditure to national actors.

Disaggregating this GCR indicator (1.2.1) by region and cumulating 2018 and 2019 data reveal that the proportion of ODA delivered through national actors is highest in countries in the Middle East and North Africa region (12%) and Europe (9%). It is lower in the Americas (8%), Asia and the Pacific (3%), East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region (3%), Southern Africa (2%), and West and Central Africa (1%). However, there were notable changes during the period (Figure 15). In 2019, donors reduced bilateral ODA channelled to national actors in the Middle East and North Africa region and Europe, while they increased it in Asia and the Pacific and the Americas, where the proportion rose significantly.

Figure 14: Proportion of bilateral ODA to refugee situations channelled through national actors, 2018 and 2019 (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)





Figure 15: Proportion of ODA to refugee situations channelled through national actors, disaggregated by region,* 2018 and 2019 data (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)



*The country classification by regions is based on division according to UNHCR standards (UNHCR Regions).

GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES COUNTRY PROFILE: JORDAN

As the Syrian refugee crisis continues into its second decade, Jordan remains the third largest host of Syrian refugees, after Turkey and Lebanon, while also giving a home to refugees of other nationalities. Jordan has continued to live up to its reputation of hospitality towards refugees. According to a June 2021 study commissioned by UNHCR, 94 per cent of the Jordanian public continues to view refugees positively, and a majority are empathetic towards refugees, a sentiment which remains unchanged despite the hardships brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the end of 2020, close to 753,200 refugees and asylum-seekers were living in Jordan. This means that approximately 69 out of every 1,000 people living in the country are refugees or asylum-seekers. The size of the refugee population in Jordan has increased by 4.5 per cent since 2016.

According to OECD data, Jordan received significantly less ODA in 2019 than in 2018 (-18%). The target of the Grand Bargain was achieved, however, with approximately 25 per cent of bilateral ODA channelled directly through national actors. At the time of writing, the Jordan Response Plan brought together eight Government ministries and 65 partners to support both refugees and host communities. These figures have remained relatively stable since 2016. Support for refugee self-reliance has been demonstrated by the commitment to provide free work permits to Syrian refugees, allowing them the legal right to work, and through a change in the legal framework that has permitted Syrian-owned home-based businesses. From 2016 to the end of 2020, more than 215,000 work permits were issued to Syrians. The impact of COVID-19 on the labour market raises concerns for the future, since the majority of refugees work within the informal economy, namely without appropriate access to social protection, despite the availability of work permits. Moreover, women received 6 per cent of all work permits issued. Approximately 83 per cent of refugees are residing in urban areas and can move freely within the country, if documented by the Government or UNHCR. The remaining 17 per cent residing in camp locations are formally required to obtain permits to be able to leave the camp, including for work.

Throughout the country, out-of-school rates are higher for non-Jordanian children. More than 39,800 Jordanians, 50,600 Syrians, and 21,500 children of other nationalities are estimated to be out of school. According to a report by No Lost Generation, there was an enrolment rate of 61 per cent for Syrian refugee children in 2020, which represented an 8 per cent decrease when compared to enrolment rates in 2017. Nearly all children complete primary school, but the high secondary education drop-out rate remains a challenge.

In 2016, Jordan was one of the largest resettlement operations globally, with a spike in resettlement departures due to the scale-up of resettlement for Syrians. From 2017-2020, the halt of resettlement to the United States of America saw departures decrease to a rate of 4,000-5,000 a year, primarily to Europe and Canada. In 2021, 5,500 refugees will be submitted for resettlement to 11 different resettlement countries. With the resumption of the United States' resettlement programme, departures are expected to increase in 2022 and beyond. In 2020, UNHCR supported 278 refugees to depart through complementary pathways. Since the reopening of the official border crossing between Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic in October 2018, around 30,000 Syrian refugees voluntarily repatriated from 2018 to 2019. Returns in 2020 were substantially lower as the border was closed due to COVID-19 restrictions. Since October 2020, a monthly return rate of between 400 and 600 refugees has been observed.

National arrangements may be established by concerned host countries to coordinate and facilitate the efforts of all relevant stakeholders working to achieve a comprehensive response.

Such efforts could support the development of a comprehensive plan under national leadership, in line with national policies and priorities, with the assistance of UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders.

GCR, paras. 20-21


Instead of a direct measurement of GCR indicator 1.2.2 on the number of partners supporting national arrangements in the refugee-hosting country, UNHCR compiled a proxy (or indirect) indicator on the number of partners listed per country in Refugee Response Plans (RRPs).⁵³ This indicator is defined as the total number of partners, including UN agencies, NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), listed in publicly available RRP, which are developed under UNHCR's leadership or co-leadership.

RRPs may be developed at country level to reflect the needs of the entire refugee population in a given country (Country RRP) or at regional level, involving multiple countries, to respond to the needs of a specific refugee population which fled to neighbouring countries (Regional RRP). In the latter case, they present individual response plans for each country, within the framework of a regional response strategy. Regional and country-based RRP contribute to the implementation of the GCR

by articulating prioritized, multi-sectoral, and multi-stakeholder responses for the benefit of refugees and host communities, in support of the efforts made by host governments. These plans can be seen as a means of operationalizing, as well as strengthening, existing 'national arrangements'. For the purpose of this indicator, 'partners' includes all local, national, and international stakeholders who are expressly listed in these plans under the partnership section. As 'partners', they are actively involved in delivering the RRP, including for securing funding for its implementation. (More information on this indicator, including its limitations, is provided in the chapter on data sources and methodology.)

The number of partners contributing to responses increased significantly

Between 2016 and 2020, by strengthening partnerships and promoting inter-agency coordination for large-scale or complex refugee situations, including for mixed movements, UNHCR coordinated six regional RRP. These included Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, and South Sudan RRP, as well as the regional refugee and resilience plan in response to the Syria crisis (3RP), co-led with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the regional refugee and migrant response plan for refugees and migrants from Venezuela, co-led with IOM. In addition, UNHCR and IOM continued to co-lead the joint response plan (JRP) for the Rohingya humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh. These regional inter-agency responses were implemented in 37 refugee-hosting countries.⁵⁴



Each response plan explicitly lists the national and international partners supporting the RRP. Between 2016 and 2020, the number of such partners rose from 364 to 1,036; a steady and almost threefold increase (Figure 16). An important factor in the growth of partners was a near two and a half-fold increase in the number of country refugee plans from 17 in 2016 to 42 in 2020 – due to the establishment of new regional RRP during this period for the DRC and Venezuela situations. While the level of participation of partners varies, with the majority providing continuous support and some providing intermittent support, the data demonstrate a continuous upward trend in the number of partners engaged in inter-agency responses in support of refugee-hosting countries.

The growth in number of partners is distributed across different stakeholder groups

Available data demonstrate trends in relation to two main categories of partners – UN partners and NGOs (including the IFRC). Instances of UN partners being listed in country plans stood at 143 in 2016 and more than doubled to 312 in 2020. Instances of NGOs being named in country plans more than tripled from 221 in 2016 to 678 in 2020.⁵⁵

The number of refugee situations supported by the World Bank increased significantly since 2016

Another important stakeholder group is international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and regional development banks. These are of particular interest due to their ability to leverage development capacities and resources in support of country-level refugee responses, their direct engagement with refugee-hosting governments, and the broad and sustained nature of their contributions – which support the strengthening of national systems and the use of approaches that benefit host communities as well as refugees. Typically, IFIs are not named partners in RRP. However, available data on the World Bank's support to refugee-hosting countries through mechanisms specifically designed to contribute to burden- and responsibility-sharing – such as the Concessional Financing Facility⁵⁶ and the Refugee Sub-Window⁵⁷ – demonstrate that this support increased steadily from 2016 to 2020.

The number of countries in which the World Bank supported refugee responses in this way rose from two in 2016 to 19 in 2020.

Data on the extent to which the whole UN family (across the Humanitarian, Development, and Peace nexus) is contributing to refugee responses and supporting them through national development plans can be derived from publicly available UN Sustainable Development Frameworks (UNSDCFs). In a 2021 desk review of UNSDCF for refugee-hosting countries⁵⁸, data show that attention to refugees has gradually increased. Eighty-nine per cent of UNSDCF in 2020 mentioned refugees in their outcome statements, and 79 per cent mentioned refugees in their results frameworks. The value for both measures was 60 per cent in 2019, so this increase signals a more consistent engagement across the UN and national stakeholders on refugee issues.

PLEDGES TOWARDS GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES OBJECTIVE 1

Over 1,400 pledges were announced as part of the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in 2019. States and other stakeholders have continued to make additional commitments and contributions after the first GRF. Since then, nearly 200 new pledges and contributions have been received. The COVID-19 pandemic posed challenges and caused delays in the implementation of many of the GRF pledges globally. As a result, many pledging entities were forced to adapt and innovate in fulfilling their commitments immediately after the first GRF. Despite these challenges, significant progress was made across the thematic areas of focus in the GCR and among all stakeholder groups, attesting to a continued spirit of international solidarity and demonstrating the GCR in action.⁵⁹

Globally close to 47 per cent (698 of 1,477) of the total GRF pledges were made towards GCR Objective 1 (Figure 17). Africa is the top receiving region with 186 pledges (27%), followed by the Middle East and North Africa region with 106 (15%), the Americas 92 (13%), Europe 84 (12%), and Asia and the Pacific 74 (11%).⁶⁰ A total of 146 (21%) were categorized as 'global' pledges, which encompass commitments and contributions to more than one region. Of the updates received towards this

Figure 17: Proportion of GRF Pledges towards Objective 1, August 2021




objective, 74 per cent are in progress while 8 per cent are in the planning phase. Currently, 142 pledges are reported as fulfilled.

The largest portion of the pledges of support to refugee-hosting countries focus on protection capacity (22%) and education (21%). Support in the area of statelessness and jobs and livelihoods also received a substantial commitment from donors and other stakeholders with 19 per cent and 13 per cent respectively (Figure 18).⁶¹ NGOs made the largest number of pledges and commitments, followed by traditional donor States, development actors, and other international organizations.⁶² The private sector entities also engaged and made significant contributions to ease the pressure on host countries with close to 80 pledges targeting various regions.

In the **health sector**, notable progress was made towards the implementation of global pledges from entities such as the Global Fund, GAVI -The Vaccine Alliance, and UN agencies. Pledges relating to refugee inclusion in wider health systems or health insurance schemes that were not yet being implemented before the onset of the pandemic have seen limited progress in several countries. Consequently, the inclusion of refugees in national health systems requires additional financial and technical support, including matching pledges⁶³ of support from the donor community.

Figure 18: Proportion of GRF Pledges towards Objective 1, disaggregated by sector, August 2021.



In terms of **jobs and livelihoods**, there is a greater need to provide financial support to host countries that pledged to open labour markets to refugees in order to create jobs. This could take the form, for example, of direct investment in households, investment in skills training, or investment in general in refugee-hosting areas (infrastructure, etc.). Some pledges remain “aspirational”, often due to insufficient funding, such as pledges from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The Poverty Alleviation Coalition, and Amplio.⁶⁴ Among the key areas not addressed through existing pledges is support to mobilize partners and resources to help host countries implement the pledges they have made in relation to jobs and livelihoods in the agriculture sector.⁶⁵ Comparatively few pledges were made by the private sector to foster refugee employment and to include refugees directly in value-chains.

Despite the notable progress made in commitments to prevent and address **statelessness**, enhanced financial support to host countries is required for pledges focused on resolving major situations of statelessness, removing gender discrimination from nationality laws, acceding to the UN Statelessness Conventions, and establishing Statelessness Determination Procedures.



UNITED KINGDOM. Liverpoolians welcome Syrian family to Merseyside
© UNHCR/Andrew McConnell

ASYLUM CAPACITY SUPPORT GROUP

As underlined in the UN Secretary-General's report on Our Common Agenda, legal identity and status for asylum-seekers and refugees is crucial. To this effect, the GCR's Asylum Capacity Support Group (ACSG) aims to help States strengthen any aspect of their national asylum/Refugee Status Determination (RSD) systems, such as their fairness, efficiency, adaptability, and integrity. Since its launch at the first GRF, the ACSG mechanism has been operationalized and, to date, pilot projects have been launched or announced, mainly, through State-to-State matching. In the ACSG portal, States and other stakeholders can find information about the ACSG mechanism's operational modalities, other relevant State-pledges, existing matches, and pilot projects⁶⁶, as well as examples of good practices from different regions. Of the 48 State pledges in relation to developing or strengthening national asylum/RSD capacities, 11 are offers of support, thus pointing to the need for more State pledges offering support in this area.

In relation to the humanitarian and development nexus called for in the GCR, the efforts of development actors have been essential to supporting more inclusive, progressive, and sustainable policies of refugee-hosting countries. This requires their early involvement, dedicated investments, and diversified and flexible financial instruments both in short-term humanitarian and long-term efforts, in particular those needed to address the socio-economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic and to prevent further displacement. Among the notable pledges at the GRF, the World Bank pledged a USD 2.2 billion scale-up for refugees and host communities. As of mid-May 2021, nine projects were approved under the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) project portfolio as part of the World Bank's International Development Assistance (IDA 19).⁶⁷

As evidenced by the progress reported on pledges under objective 1, many **private sector** partners not only adapted, but also diversified, renewed, and in some cases even increased their support. Some pledging to employ refugees modified production lines to manufacture and donate essential items, involving refugees in the effort. Loans to refugee entrepreneurs were converted into or supplemented by grants, to help weather the effects of the pandemic on their business. There was also expanded support for digital education, connected learning, digital literacy, and digital skills programmes.⁶⁸

GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES SUPPORT PLATFORMS

Support Platforms reinforce regional refugee responses. At the first GRF in December 2019, three support platforms were launched: the platform for the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) supporting Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Pakistan; a platform to support the efforts of the *Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y Soluciones* (MIRPS) countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Support Platform, which builds upon the pre-existing Nairobi Process and supports Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Since their launch, progress was made in expanding the base of support, including through greater involvement of development actors. [Multiple stakeholders](#) are actively contributing to the Support Platforms as Members and in the Core Groups.

Since their launch, the Platforms have been consolidated as effective mechanisms to promote a coordinated regional response, gathering all relevant stakeholders and galvanizing the most relevant humanitarian, developmental, peacebuilding, and public and private sector initiatives. Despite their differences, the core of the three Support Platforms is the same: they are State-led groupings of Governments and other key actors that place refugees and their hosts at the centre, with donors and other key supporters rallying around them.

Through one initiative of the SSAR Support Platform, over 2.2 million Afghan refugees were supported with inclusive national policies in health, education, and livelihoods in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the country-level, Core Groups were constituted in Kabul, Islamabad, and Teheran to drive forward localized priorities and partnerships. Despite the fluid situation in

Afghanistan, Members are committed to provide and scale up their support for Afghanistan and the region, and to continue investing in the resilience of communities through the Platform and in line with the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees.

The MIRPS Platform under the Chairmanship of Spain organized a Solidarity Event, which served to increase awareness of the displacement crisis in Central and North America, and generated new financial commitments, totalling more than USD 110 million.

Through the IGAD Support Platform, the Member States' Declarations on Education and Jobs and Livelihoods have been translated into national policies and plans of action, with specific budgetary and other resource allocations, which integrate refugees into national planning frameworks. A flagship initiative of the Platform is the Solutions Initiative for Sudan and South Sudan, which highlights the commitment of IGAD Member States to pursue durable solutions for over 7 million forcibly displaced Sudanese and South Sudanese in the region. This initiative expands the scope of the IGAD-led Nairobi Process and leverages a regional approach to durable solutions in line with the GCR, the peace agreements in both countries, the AU Agenda 2063, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Going forward, there will be a focus on shared learning and building an evidence base across the three Support Platforms to inform future Platforms.



JORDAN. Refugee graduates find work in clothing factory.
© UNHCR/Mohammad Hawari

4.2 Global Compact on Refugees

Objective 2: Enhance refugee self-reliance

To foster inclusive economic growth for host communities and refugees, in support of host countries and subject to their relevant national laws and policies, States and relevant stakeholders will contribute resources and expertise to promote economic opportunities, decent work, job creation and entrepreneurship programmes for host community members and refugees, including women, young adults, older persons and persons with disabilities.

GCR, para. 70

OUTCOME 1: Refugees are able to actively participate in the social and economic life of host countries

The GCR is grounded in the international refugee protection regime. At its core, the 1951

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees recognizes refugees' need for access to decent work and calls for accessing wage-earning employment, self-employment, and practicing liberal professions as well as access to labour rights and social protection.⁶⁹ Access to work and participation in the social and economic life

of the country is also dependent on the ability of refugees to move freely in the host country, which is another freedom recognized in the 1951 Convention.

Decent work involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income; security in the workplace; social protection for families; prospects for personal development and social integration; freedom for people to express their concerns, organize, and participate in decisions that affect their lives; and equality of opportunity and treatment for people of all genders. Decent work for refugees is fundamental to their resilience, benefitting both refugees and host economies and societies, and enhancing prospects for durable solutions.

The GCR indicators developed under this outcome measure refugees' access to decent work and free movement rights in law (*de jure*) only. It must be borne in mind that the situation may be different in practice since the laws may not be fully implemented. The results outlined in this report merely capture the *de jure* situation and not the day-to-day realities that may exist for many refugees. They also do not capture the full spectrum of entitlements covered by the concept of decent work.


A total of 25 countries, across all regions, were covered by the UNHCR survey.⁷⁰ These 25 countries account for more than 11.1 million refugees, which represent more than half (54%) of the world's refugees.⁷¹ Twenty of these countries are States Party to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol (hereafter referred to as "Contracting States").

Three-quarters of refugees have access in law to decent work

Out of the 11.2 million refugees covered by the survey, 8.4 million have either full (52%) or partial (23%) access to decent work in law (Figure 19). Seventeen of the 20 Contracting States surveyed allow refugees full access to decent work under their law (14 Contracting States, covering 5.7 million refugees), or with restrictions (3 Contracting States, covering 1.7 million refugees). In addition, two non-Contracting States provide partial access to decent work for refugees under

their law, affecting more than 1.5 million refugees. One Contracting State surveyed does not allow under its law refugee access to decent work, affecting more than 270,000 refugees, whereas two other Contracting States allow refugees in law to access the labour market, but no data were available as to workplace protection. The three remaining countries surveyed were not Contracting States and do not allow refugees under their laws to access decent work, affecting more than 2.3 million refugees.

Figure 19: Proportion of refugees for the surveyed countries with access to decent work in law, 2021



At least 10 countries surveyed explicitly provide under their laws refugee access to decent work. In countries whose laws do not explicitly provide refugees access to decent work, but where refugees' access is based on a general reference to non-nationals or foreigners, access to decent work may be difficult since employers may be reluctant to hire refugees, based on perceived lack of clarity about whether they are lawfully permitted to work. Moreover, the lack of clarity in law may result in authorities not issuing business licences to refugees, based on the same absence of specific authorization. Where countries grant refugees access to the labour market based on explicit provisions in their asylum or refugee laws, it is important that their treatment is further regulated in the countries' labour laws or by enacting further implementing regulations, avoiding gaps and inconsistencies in the legal framework. In at least two countries surveyed, refugees are only partially provided access to

GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES COUNTRY PROFILE: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has a history of hosting refugees since before its independence. Among the first were those arriving in the aftermath of events in Rwanda in 1957 and Burundi in 1965, followed by the arrival of the “1972 Burundians” and successive waves from other neighbours. As of the end of July 2021, the DRC hosted more than half a million (519,200) refugees, the largest number in Southern Africa. The National Institute of Statistics (INS) and other State authorities, with the assistance of UNHCR, are working to ensure that refugees are specifically included in the planned census and national statistical systems.

OECD data show a 19 per cent increase in bilateral ODA disbursed to refugees and host communities in the DRC between 2018 and 2019. No bilateral ODA was channelled directly through national actors during the period under review. According to UNHCR’s country presence, the number of partners participating in the refugee response led by the Government more than doubled, from 13 in 2016 to 29 in 2020. The law grants refugees the right to work, move and settle freely, and access services on the same basis as nationals. However, there is no formal integration policy framework through which inclusion can be supported. In addition, the quality of services is generally low, both for refugees and host communities. At the GRF, the DRC pledged to offer long-stay visas with a pathway to nationality for Rwandans who opt to remain after the invocation of the cessation clause. A total of 27,500 children were enrolled in primary and secondary schools. Lack of data prevents calculation of proportions. The national level poverty ratio was 64 per cent in 2012. According to the INS and UNHCR, the ratio is most likely to be higher for refugees. The number of refugees who departed from the DRC on resettlement reduced considerably, from 19 in 2016 to one in 2020, and no refugee departed in 2021 (as of August). From 2018 to 2021 (August), DRC, with the support of its partners, facilitated the voluntary departure of 20,400 refugees to their countries of origin, including 6,900 despite the pandemic.

decent work under their laws, making a distinction based on the country of origin of the refugee. In contrast, at least one country surveyed provides preferential treatment to refugees compared to other non-nationals.

In at least seven countries surveyed, refugees are required, as other non-nationals, to obtain a work permit before entering the labour market. Obtaining a work permit may require payment of fees and a minimal duration of prior lawful residence, thereby possibly excluding refugees in practice from accessing the labour market. Where obtaining work permits is not clearly regulated, the authorities have wide discretion as

to when and to whom a work permit is provided. In 18 countries surveyed, refugees are explicitly allowed to start their own businesses.

In practice, far fewer refugees have access to decent work

Notwithstanding laws providing access to decent work for refugees, the situation in practice is often very different from what the law permits. High unemployment rates, informal economies, administrative challenges, and unaffordable fees for recruiting refugees make it difficult for refugees to have access to decent work. Furthermore, employers may not be aware of refugees’ right to work.

Refugees as well as host communities’ access to work has deteriorated further with the COVID-19 pandemic. This jeopardizes efforts to support refugees’ self-reliance, improve their skills to become competitive on the job market, and include them in local and national development plans. As a result, refugees may only have access to low or unskilled work or may resort to work in the informal economy. According to UNHCR’s Global Livelihoods Survey from 2021, globally only 38 per cent of refugees live in countries with unrestricted access in practice to formal employment, including wage-earning or self-employment. However, this is a rough estimate, and measuring access to decent work in practice would benefit from data collected through household surveys (e.g., inclusion of refugees in labour force surveys) to know more about the daily experiences of refugees and host communities.


Close to two-thirds of refugees enjoy freedom of movement under the law

Refugee participation in the social and economic life of host countries depends on the refugees’ freedom of movement and free choice of residence. Out of the 11.2 million refugees covered by the survey, 8 million had either full (64%) or partial (7%) in law access to free movement rights, and more than 3 million (29%) have no freedom of movement (Figure 20). Of the 20 Contracting States surveyed, 17 countries provide full access in law to free movement rights. One non-Contracting State also provides in law full access to free movement rights. Combined, this affects close to 7.2 million refugees. Three countries surveyed provide partial access to free movement rights, including in one non-Contracting State. This affects close to 800,000 refugees. Two Contracting States do not provide refugees in law access to free movement rights, affecting more than 2.2 million refugees. Two non-Contracting States surveyed do not provide refugees in law access to free movement rights, affecting close to another 1 million refugees.

While 21 countries surveyed provide refugees access to free movement rights in law, in at least seven countries surveyed, refugees face restricted access in practice due to heavy

administrative burdens, such as regular identity checks, non-recognition of identity cards, corruption, or the prevailing security situation. In countries where refugees can choose under the law to live in camps or outside camp settings, in urban or rural areas, the choice may in reality not be entirely free. In at least five countries surveyed, the choice is heavily influenced by the availability of (and entitlement to) assistance, which is available in camps but not for those who live elsewhere. Additionally, in at least six countries surveyed, the freedom of movement of refugees residing in camps is controlled by the authorities, such that leaving the camp requires an exit permit, and/or travelling outside of the camp is geographically limited. One country surveyed restricts free movement rights for refugees who have been recognized on a *prima facie* basis.

Figure 20: Proportion of refugees for the surveyed countries with freedom of movement in law, 2021



In at least one country, free movement requires refugees to prove that they meet certain criteria indicating that they can support themselves, whether through self-reliance, sponsorship, or holding a work permit allowing them to work legally. Urban assistance programmes, which can support the self-reliance of refugees, may require that refugees have a permit to reside in urban areas, which is subject to security, medical, or humanitarian considerations.

GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES COUNTRY PROFILE: KENYA

Kenya has hosted refugees for over three decades. As of 31 August 2021, close to 530,000 refugees and asylum-seekers resided in the country, making this the fifth largest refugee population in Africa and the eleventh largest worldwide. Somali refugees reside mainly in the Dadaab refugee complex in Garissa County. Large numbers fled to Kenya following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, with arrivals continuing due to generalized violence and the absence of effective State protection. The protracted crisis in South Sudan has caused significant numbers to seek protection in Kenya since 1999, as a result of armed conflict, human rights violations, forced recruitment, family separation, general insecurity, and starvation. South Sudanese refugees mainly reside in Kakuma Camp and the nearby Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement in Turkana County. In addition, some 16 per cent of the refugee population resides in urban areas, mainly Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru.

Between 2018 and 2019, the volume of bilateral ODA in support of the refugee situation in Kenya increased by 33 per cent. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of inter-agency partners working within the framework of the Country Refugee Response Plan and in support of national arrangements increased from eight to 24.

Kenya allows refugees to access the labour market under the same conditions as foreigners. They can apply, free of charge, for a work permit and may engage in any occupation, trade, business, or profession, or in any form of self-employment, subject to meeting specific county governments' regulatory requirements. Due to challenges in practice, most refugees work in the informal sector, and their situation has been aggravated by the pandemic. The law does not provide refugees with a right to move freely. Kenya continues to implement an encampment policy whereby refugees must obtain authorization to leave the camps temporarily. Refugees in urban areas are included in the national education system. Refugee children in camps (85% of all refugee children) follow the Kenyan curriculum and can sit for national exams, even though schools in the camps are managed by the international community. A joint 2018-2019 study with the World Bank on poverty rates of refugees and host communities demonstrated the comparatively better situation of refugees in Turkana County.

Access to solutions is a cornerstone of the Roadmap for Solutions being implemented jointly by the Government of Kenya and UNHCR, following the decision to close the camps in Dadaab and Kakuma. The number of refugees departing on voluntary repatriation peaked in 2017. Figures have declined since then, partly due to a deterioration in the situation in countries of origin, particularly Somalia and South Sudan, and to travel restrictions following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.


OUTCOME 2: Refugee and host community self-reliance is strengthened

UNHCR estimated that at the end of 2020, around 41 per cent of people displaced across borders⁷² were children, or 10.1 million of the total 24.5 million.⁷³ Yet, data on access to education for refugee learners and Venezuelans displaced abroad in reporting countries

indicates that learning opportunities are still limited. Considering data for more than 40 countries, the average gross enrolment ratios (GER) for 2019/2020 were 34, 68, and 34 per cent at the pre-primary, primary, and secondary levels, respectively (Figure 21). At the tertiary level, enrolment rates for the same period were five per cent. Around 1.8 million children are out of school, out of a total of 4 million school-age children in reporting countries.⁷⁴ This means that almost half of refugee students in reporting countries

are out of school. At the same time, some progress has been made in access to primary education in selected countries when comparing data for previous years. For example, the GER for Turkey increased from 79 per cent in 2018/2019 to 86 per cent in 2019/2020. For the same time period, the GER increased in Chad from 76 per cent to 78 per cent. Though the changes may appear small, they represent access to education for thousands of refugee children in these countries.


Figure 21. Gross enrolment rates for refugee children, 2019/2020



Despite gender parity in access to education globally, refugee girls are still less likely to have access to education than refugee boys

While according to UNESCO there is globally gender parity in access to primary and secondary education,⁷⁵ there is still a disparity in access to education that affects refugee girls. Gross enrolment rates at the primary level were estimated at 70 and 67 per cent, for boys and girls, respectively (Figure 22). There was more inequality at the secondary level, where the gross enrolment rates were estimated at 35 per cent for boys and 31 per cent for girls.⁷⁶

Figure 22. Gross enrolment ratios by sex, 2019/2020




Progress has been made in ensuring the inclusion of refugee children in national education systems, but barriers still exist

Opening education to refugee children and their inclusion in national education systems constitutes a step towards improving access to quality education for both refugee learners and local communities in host countries. According to a recent joint World Bank and UNHCR report, this inclusion is not out of reach (see chapter on GCR objective 1).⁷⁷

Refugees can access primary education on the same terms as nationals in three-quarters of countries

Data (Figure 23) seem to support that most countries have moved in a positive direction, with 75 per cent having a national education policy or other policies that explicitly indicate that refugees can access primary education under the same conditions as nationals (see the note on data sources and methodology). Twenty-two per cent of countries provide refugees with access to education, but they face limitations. All countries covered had official policies for refugees; and in only three per cent of countries, refugees cannot access primary education.

Figure 23. Primary education inclusion, 2021



IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON EDUCATION

COVID-19 was predicted to have devastating effects on education. At the outset of the pandemic, Azevedo et al. estimated that the closure of schools for five months could result in a loss of learning of 0.6 years of schooling.⁷⁸ UNESCO estimated that 24 million children globally could drop out of school as a consequence of COVID-19.⁷⁹ The Sustainable Development Goals report for 2021 states that COVID-19 has wiped out 20 years of education gains, with an additional 101 million, or 9 per cent of children in grades one through eight, falling below minimum reading proficiency levels in 2020.⁸⁰ It is important to highlight that while there is still a scarcity of evidence on how COVID-19 has affected education outcomes for refugee children, evidence from previous pandemics and epidemics has shown that there is a disproportionate negative impact in both education and child protection outcomes amongst the most vulnerable children,⁸¹ and especially adolescent girls. In fact, a recent analysis in 10 countries that have quality gender disaggregated data for refugee learners found that half of all refugee girls will not return to school when classrooms reopen.⁸² In countries where the refugee girls' gross secondary enrolment is less than 10 per cent, all girls are at risk of dropping out for good.⁸³

The support that refugee learners have received throughout the pandemic has been limited – with 634,000 children and youth supported with connected or home-based learning across 71 reporting countries in 2021.⁸⁴ An additional concern is that expenditure and support to education – even prior to the pandemic – was and will likely continue to be insufficient. Only 30 per cent of all countries with data for the period 2015 to 2018 spent between 15 and 20 per cent of total government expenditure on education as recommended in the Education 2030 Framework for Action. The figures for humanitarian spending on education are also bleak. In 2019, education received 2.6 per cent of humanitarian aid spending,⁸⁵ which is well below the global target of 4 per cent and the EU's target of 10 per cent.⁸⁶ Currently, an estimated 65 per cent of governments in low- and lower-middle-income countries, and 35 per cent in upper-middle- and high-income countries have reduced funding for education since the onset of the pandemic.⁸⁷ Though the economic impacts of the pandemic are significant and can be blamed for these decreases, efforts must be made to prioritize spending in education to compensate for the impacts of the pandemic and to ensure the achievement of Goal 4 on quality education for all as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Refugees can access secondary education on the same terms as nationals in two-thirds of countries

A total of 66 per cent of reporting countries have a national education policy or other relevant policies explicitly indicating that refugees can access secondary education under the same conditions as nationals (Figure 24). Twenty-eight per cent indicated that refugees could access education, but face limitations. In two per cent of countries there is no official policy for refugees, and in three per cent of reporting countries, refugees cannot access education.

At the secondary level, it is noticeable that there is a larger share of countries where refugee students can access education but face limitations (28%) in comparison to the primary level (22%). Financial constraints constitute an important barrier to accessing secondary education across many contexts. This is partly related to the higher costs associated with the provision of secondary education in comparison to primary education.⁸⁸


Inclusion in primary education varies considerably by regions

The regions with the highest proportion of countries where refugees can access primary education under the same conditions as nationals (Figure 25) are Europe (97%), West and Central Africa (90%), the Americas (87%), and the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes (80%). Significantly lower proportions are in Asia and the Pacific (30%), Southern Africa (25%), and the Middle East and North Africa (17%).⁸⁹

Although limited, data on learning outcomes of refugee children reveal significant gaps


While data on education access for refugee learners are limited, data on learning for this population group are practically non-existent. In contexts of inclusion, where refugee students are integrated in national education systems, students are participating in national assessments. However, without disaggregated data by protection status, it is impossible to know how refugee children are performing or to make comparisons with host country students.

Figure 24. Secondary education inclusion, 2021



TUNISIA. Refugee and asylum-seeker children take part in recreational activities to prepare them to go back to school. © UNHCR/Hallouli Mohamed Ameer

Figure 25. Disaggregation of education inclusion in primary, by region, 2021



The World Bank has called attention to the ‘learning crisis’, highlighting that access to school does not automatically translate into children acquiring knowledge and skills. Fifty-three per cent of children in low- and middle-income countries cannot read and understand a simple story by the end of primary school. In low-income countries, the level is as high as 80 per cent.⁹⁰ Although there is a lack of evidence on the performance of refugee learners specifically, select assessments have found that refugee learners perform worse⁹¹ or about the same⁹² in comparison to host-country students, which reflects the reality that refugee children constitute some of the most vulnerable learners.

Overall global poverty was declining before the pandemic, but refugees were still more likely to be poor. During the pandemic the socio-economic well-being of both forcibly displaced and host populations has deteriorated in most countries


Following two decades of progress – including a decline from over 9.5 per cent in 2016 to 8.4

per cent in 2019 – global poverty is projected to rise in 2020 and 2021, with the pandemic-related economic downturn pushing 100 million or more people into extreme poverty, exacerbating existing inequalities and inflicting lasting damage on human capital.⁹³ More than 40 per cent of the global poor – including most refugees – live in economies affected by fragility, conflict, and violence. That number is expected to rise to 67 per cent in the next decade.

Limited data show that around two-thirds of refugees live in poverty

While the lack of comprehensive data precludes regional or global estimates at this time, existing country-level studies do provide an early indication of the poverty levels of refugees and host communities (see note on data sources and methodology). Surveys measuring consumption in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda and efforts to model poverty in Chad and Jordan show that, on average, two-thirds of refugees live in poverty, meaning that they do not have enough resources to satisfy minimum daily caloric intake or basic non-food needs (Figure 26).⁹⁴ On average, the poverty rate for refugees in these settings is 25 to

Figure 26: Comparative poverty rates, 2016-2020



Sources: Ethiopia, Skills Profile Survey, 2017 (World Bank); Kalobeyei Socioeconomic Survey, 2018 (World Bank and UNHCR); Kakuma Socioeconomic Survey, 2019 (World Bank and UNHCR); Uganda Refugee and Host Communities Household Survey, 2018 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics and World Bank); Chad, Beltramo et al., 2020 (World Bank Working Paper); Jordan, Welfare of Syrian Refugees, 2016 (World Bank). Estimates use different poverty lines: national (Chad, Uganda), international (Ethiopia, Kenya), assistance threshold falling between national/international poverty lines (Jordan).

40 percentage points higher than that of the national population. The conditions of host communities, meanwhile, vary widely. In Ethiopia and Uganda, for example, refugee-hosting communities fare slightly better than the national average, while in Kenya, host communities surrounding Kakuma Camp and Kalobeyei Settlement are among the poorest in the country.

Even among refugees, the incidence of poverty may vary widely by country of origin, household size, education level, arrival date, gender, and other factors. In 2019, in Kenya (Kakuma Camp), female-headed households were more likely to be poor (72%) than those led by males (61%), whereas there was little difference in Uganda (45% and 47%).⁹⁵

Refugees fell deeper into poverty during the COVID-19 pandemic and may be slower to recover employment than nationals

The economic shock associated with the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a profound negative economic blow to refugees’ ability to meet their basic needs. Surveys in eight countries show worsening socio-economic well-being of both forcibly displaced and host communities over the course of the pandemic. Both populations have lost assets, savings, income, and access to basic services, and many are severely food insecure.⁹⁶

In Uganda, poverty among refugees is estimated to have increased to 52 per cent in October/November 2020 from 44 per cent before the outbreak in March 2020. During this time, 89 per cent of households experienced declines in total income, while the number of households that reported running out of food due to lack of money or other resources

increased from 61 per cent in 2018 to 85 per cent in late 2020.⁹⁷

In Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, projections show similarly precarious conditions, with an estimated 4.4 million people in host communities and 1.1 million displaced persons, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), driven into poverty in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic. By the end of 2021, it is anticipated that, owing to the deepening social and economic crisis in Lebanon, more than half of the refugees and one-quarter of the national population will fall below the national poverty line. In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, simulations show poverty increasing by six per cent among nationals, and four per cent among refugees and IDPs.⁹⁸


Assistance provided by humanitarian agencies, development partners, and Governments has been shown to mitigate or reduce exposure to poverty among refugees

In 2020, UNHCR delivered USD 695 million in cash assistance to some 8.5 million people in over 100 countries, 95 per cent of whom reported improvements in living conditions.⁹⁹ In Turkey, beneficiaries of the Emergency Social Safety Net, which provided cash assistance to 1.2 million refugees – an estimated one-third of the total refugee population at the time – were shown to be better off after the transfer and more food secure, had lower debt levels, and were less likely to resort to negative coping strategies. In comparison, the welfare of non-beneficiaries declined during this period according to most common measures of welfare.¹⁰⁰ This is consistent with findings from Lebanon and Jordan, which show that cash assistance and food vouchers provided by UNHCR and the World Food Programme reduced poverty rates among Syrian refugees from an estimated 69 per cent to 17 per cent in 2016, leaving “little doubt that the UNHCR cash assistance and the WFP food voucher programmes have a strong poverty reduction capacity in their current form...”.¹⁰¹ Similarly, cash transfers were associated with significant reductions in the use of negative coping strategies and increased access to basic needs in Rwanda and Greece.¹⁰²

PLEDGES TOWARDS GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES OBJECTIVE 2

Globally, 31 per cent (452 of 1,477) of the total of GRF pledges were made towards GCR objective 2 in support of enhancing refugee self-reliance (Figure 27).

Figure 27. Proportion of GRF pledges towards Objective 2, August 2021




Africa is the top receiving region with 154 (22%), followed by the Middle East and North Africa with 70 (10%), the Americas with 66 (10%), Europe with 64 (9%), the ‘global pledges’ category (commitments and contributions to more than one region) with 58 (8%), and Asia and the Pacific with 40 (6%).¹⁰³ Pledge updates have been reported on 56 per cent (239) of the pledges characterized as advancing GCR objective 2. Some 43 per cent (183) of these pledges are in progress, while 6.5 per cent (27) reported being in the planning phase. Close to 30 pledges have been reported as fulfilled (7%).

Regarding sectors (Figure 28), the greatest proportion of the pledges focuses on strengthening or enhancing the self-reliance of refugees by way of education (40% or 174) and jobs and livelihoods (27% or 115). Support in local integration (solutions) together with the **Health and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene** (WASH) sector and **Energy and Infrastructure**, also received a substantial commitment from donors and other stakeholders with 18 per cent (76) and 8 per cent (33), respectively. UNHCR has nevertheless

classified some contributions in the database as ‘other’ or ‘multiple-crosscutting’ with 4 per cent (17) and 3 per cent (14) respectively.

Figure 28. Proportion of GRF Pledges towards Objective 2, disaggregated by sector, August 2021



The objective of facilitating access to durable solutions remained paramount, notwithstanding the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the pandemic, the international community will need to continue to act on the GCR by supporting countries of asylum to integrate refugees locally in the spirit of international solidarity. UNHCR has been closely following-up on GRF pledges in the areas of **health, WASH, social protection, education, and jobs and livelihoods** to ensure that their implementation could be accelerated. It is key to work towards protective social safety nets inclusive of refugees, strengthen inclusive health systems, minimize risks by applying strict prevention and hygiene measures, reduce the risks of losing livelihoods, and empower refugees to weather the socio-economic impact and repeated lockdowns.¹⁰⁴ UN organizations have also played a pivotal role in advancing inclusion through their UN common pledge and IASC pledge, while cities and communities stepped up to ensure the inclusion of refugees and displaced people in COVID-19 prevention and response.¹⁰⁵

More than ever, the coordination of **education** actors in support of host-country governments is crucial to increase sustainable funding for education and strengthen inclusion of all displaced children. The pandemic has also provided opportunities to put innovative approaches into practice and demonstrate how to ensure refugees are included in national and global education responses. Despite school closures, promising progress has been made on more than half of the pledges¹⁰⁶, highlighting the impressive level of commitment to support refugee education.¹⁰⁷ Among the gaps in the pledges, greater support is required to increase access to secondary education to meet needs globally. Thirty-five pledges were made in support of secondary education for refugees.

In relation to **social protection and local integration**, despite some key delays in advancing policy changes, partners at different levels including Governments, donors, civil society, and communities stepped up the inclusion of refugees and other persons of concern in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including access to testing, treatment and vaccinations. The inclusion of refugees in national health systems requires development of medium-term inclusion plans developed at country level, which are supported by multiple stakeholders. In parallel, support to livelihood opportunities will be key to enhance refugees’ self-reliance, enabling refugees to integrate locally and make financial contributions to, for example, health insurance schemes.

Concerning **jobs and livelihoods**, maintaining commitments towards refugee jobs and training, given the extent to which the pandemic affected industries that employ large number of refugees, remains a challenge. It is important to recognize the good will of Governments that have pledged to open their labour markets. Amongst the notable fulfilled pledges, Mexico has linked 10,070 refugees and asylum-seekers with formal employment opportunities through the programme of the Secretariat of Labour and Social Prevention (STPS) and the COMAR (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados). Nonetheless, host countries will need to be supported financially

to absorb these new members of the work force. In this common effort, Kiva Capital Management announced the successful final close of the Kiva Refugee Investment Fund, LLC, a USD 32.5 million facility to scale lending to fragile communities by

investing in partnership with microfinance partners across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

AGE, GENDER, AND DIVERSITY (AGD) APPROACH TO DATA AND GRF PLEDGES

To support evidence-based responses, States and relevant stakeholders will, as appropriate, promote the development of harmonized or interoperable standards for the collection, analysis, and sharing of age, gender, disability, and diversity disaggregated data on refugees and returnees.

GCR, para. 46

The GCR stresses that “the programme of action is underpinned by a strong partnership and participatory approach, involving refugees and host communities, as well as age, gender, and diversity considerations including: promoting gender equality and empowering women and girls; ending all forms of sexual and gender-based violence [GBV], trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation and abuse, and harmful practices; facilitating the meaningful participation of youth, persons with disabilities and older persons; ensuring the best interests of the child; and combating discrimination.” Accordingly, the GCR indicator report has sought to provide and analyse disaggregated GCR indicators by applying an AGD approach to

data. While certain GCR indicators are more directly concerned (e.g., indicators on gross enrolment rates, poverty statistics), the need to improve data disaggregation remains.¹⁰⁸

Regarding GRF pledges, a preliminary review revealed substantial room for strengthening implementation of the AGD approach. Seventy per cent of the GRF pledges made no reference to age, gender, disability, or other diversity considerations.¹⁰⁹ Eighty-eight per cent of GRF pledges did not mention gender. Eighty-two per cent of pledges had no specific information on children.¹¹⁰ Moving forward, there is a need for all stakeholders to work towards improving data collection, analysis, accessibility, and disaggregation by AGD criteria¹¹¹; enriching data on and programming for under-documented groups with specific and acute protection needs; and integrating AGD considerations into GRF pledges through inclusive and meaningful participation of concerned population groups. See tools and tips to operationalize AGD.¹¹²

ITALY. Refugee students defy the odds to begin new life at university in Italy through a scholarship programme.
© UNHCR/Alessandro Penso



4.3 Global Compact on Refugees Objective 3: Expand access to third country solutions

States, harnessing the contributions of a wide range of actors, demonstrate solidarity with refugees and their host communities by offering and facilitating access to third country admission avenues for refugees. The [Three-Year Strategy \(2019-2021\) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways](#) (“the Strategy”), translates the GCR’s vision for the first time into a global plan for action to build the structures needed to increase the number of resettlement and complementary pathways spaces, expand the number of engaged countries and actors, and improve the availability and predictability of third country solutions for refugees. While the Strategy constitutes a roadmap from 2019 to 2021, a period which will come to an end this year, it will continue to provide a blueprint for all stakeholders to advance third country solutions beyond 2021. The goal is that three million refugees will benefit from

effective protection and third country solutions by the end of 2028, by increasing resettlement, advancing complementary pathways, and building the foundation through promoting welcoming and inclusive societies.

Between 2016 and 2020, close to 1.4 million refugees accessed third country solutions – more than during the previous five years

Between 2016 and 2020, some six per cent or 286,900 more refugees accessed third country solutions, compared to the previous five years (Figure 29). They totalled 1.37 million at the end of 2020. After a peak in 2016, a downward trend in admissions can be observed, with a record low in 2020, representing almost 35 per cent less


admissions than in 2011, the second lowest year since 2010.

Less than one per cent of the world's refugee population has access to third country solutions

The downward trend in the number of admissions observed since 2016 is also reflected in the

overall proportion of refugees accessing third country solutions. From 2.1 per cent in 2016, it fell to a record low of 0.6 per cent in 2020. Clearly, more needs to be done to expand third country solutions and support refugee self-reliance by offering admission opportunities to countries where refugees can thrive. Today, this option is available only to a tiny minority.

Figure 29: Refugee access to third country solutions, 2010-2020



OUTCOME 1:
Refugees in need have access to resettlement opportunities in an increasing number of countries

Contributions will be sought from States, with the assistance of relevant stakeholders, to establish, or enlarge the scope, size, and quality of, resettlement programmes. In support of these efforts, UNHCR – in cooperation with States and relevant stakeholders – will devise a three-year strategy to increase the pool of resettlement places, including countries not already participating in global resettlement efforts.

GCR, para. 91

Following a landmark year for departures in 2016, declining resettlement opportunities reduced admissions in the following years

Resettlement remains a life-saving mechanism and a tool to provide protection and solutions for the refugees who are the most at risk. The year 2016 was ground-breaking, with over 126,200 refugees departing with UNHCR's assistance to rebuild their lives in safety (Table 1). Against a change in the global resettlement landscape, characterized by fluctuations in State quotas, 2017 witnessed the first drop (-48%) in resettlement admissions after five consecutive years of increasing departures. This was followed by a further annual decrease in resettlement departures in 2018 (-14%). The slight increase recorded in 2019 (+14%) was short-lived. The decline deepened in 2020 (-64%) and 2021 (-31%).¹¹³

Table 1: Three-Year Strategy 2019-2021 on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways: Resettlements, 2016 – 2021

Year	Strategy target	UNHCR-assisted resettlement departures	Percentage of target	Number of targeted countries	Actual number of countries
2016	-	126,291	-	-	35
2017	-	65,108	-	-	35
2018	-	55,680	-	-	29
2019	60,000	63,726	106	29	29
2020	70,000	22,800	33	31	25
2021*	80,000	15,774	20	33	22

*Statistics until 31 July 2021.

During the first year of the Strategy, departures exceeded the agreed target

With steady increases of 10,000, the global targets for resettlement admissions of refugees referred by UNHCR were set at 60,000 for 2019, 70,000 for 2020, and 80,000 for 2021, reaching 150,000 refugees to be admitted in 2028. The target was surpassed in 2019 by almost 4,000 additional departures.

Resettlement fell with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic

In 2020, arrivals to resettlement States were severely affected by border closures and travel restrictions. This was also the result of lower quotas allocated by States for new resettlement submissions around the world. The negative

impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was substantial on case-processing activities for resettlement by UNHCR and partners, with many embassies also suspending visa services, in-person interviews, and the collection of biometrics. Thus, by the end of 2020, fewer than 23,000 refugees had departed on resettlement, meaning that only one-third of the 70,000 target was achieved. In 2021, refugees continue to be disproportionately affected by the social and economic effects of the pandemic. This has heightened the importance of resettlement and complementary pathways as a demonstration of burden- and responsibility-sharing. As of the time of this report (which includes statistics through the end of July 2021), 15,800 refugees had departed on resettlement in 2021.

The already huge gap between resettlement needs and resettlement departures is widening further

As shown in Figure 30, there continues to be a huge gap between resettlement needs and resettlement departures. In 2016, some 11 per cent of refugees in need of resettlement were resettled. This decreased in 2019 (4%) and 2020 (2%). Based on July 2021 data, just over one per cent of those in need have been resettled in 2021. This means that over 1.4 million refugees need to be resettled in 2021, an increase of 25 per cent compared to 2016.

During the pandemic, several actors took steps to ensure resettlement continues to provide durable solutions for refugees

Despite the impediments imposed by COVID-19, several States, UNHCR, and other partners worked to maintain resettlement processing and admissions for those who are the most at risk. They adjusted their adjudication processes by implementing dossier consideration or remote interviews, to enable continued resettlement case processing, demonstrating solidarity with countries that host

large numbers of refugees and have been severely affected by the pandemic.

To meet the Strategy’s targets, multi-year planning and funding are critical

Multi-year planning and funding, including for the reception and integration of resettled refugees, will be essential to achieve a sustainable and coordinated global resettlement response. Multi-year planning will lay the groundwork to meet the 10-year goal set by the Strategy to resettle one million refugees globally by 2028.

The number of countries receiving UNHCR resettlement submissions declined

The year 2016 saw an increase and diversification of resettlement States, with 35 States engaged in resettlement programming, which remained the same in 2017.¹¹⁴ Thereafter, the number of States with regular resettlement programmes steadily decreased. The Strategy aims to increase incrementally the number of resettlement countries globally, starting with a target of 29 met in 2019. This number, however, decreased to 25 countries in 2020, and in 2021, so far, only 22

countries have received submissions from UNHCR. Continued advocacy with and support from actors, such as the European Commission, in sustaining and expanding existing resettlement programmes and establishing new ones, will be critical to achieving the goals of the Strategy.

Ten countries accounted for more than 90 per cent of all resettlement departures

From 2019 until mid-2021, the top 10 resettlement countries accounted for 91 per cent of the 102,300 recorded departures (Figure 31).

Figure 30: Identified resettlement needs against actual UNHCR-assisted resettlement departures, 2016-2021 (July)





Figure 31: Top 10 resettlement states by departures, 2019-2021 (July)



**OUTCOME 2:
Refugees have access to complementary pathways for admission to third countries**

As a complement to resettlement, other pathways for the admission of persons with international protection needs can facilitate access to protection and/or solutions. There is a need to ensure that such pathways are made available on a more systematic, organized, sustainable and gender-responsive basis, that they contain appropriate protection safeguards, and that the number of countries offering these opportunities is expanded overall.


GCR, para. 94

Along with resettlement, the Strategy includes complementary pathways for admission, with a view to increasing their availability and predictability significantly. Complementary pathways are a responsibility-sharing mechanism and constitute a progressive approach to solutions. For this report and as established in the GCR indicator framework, complementary pathways entail refugees accessing existing legal admission pathways, as well as refugee-specific admission programmes, providing for entry and lawful stay in a third country that are additional and separate from UNHCR-assisted resettlement programmes.¹¹⁵

Four refugees are admitted through complementary pathways for every one refugee admitted through resettlement with UNHCR assistance

Available data show a peak in 2017 in terms of indicative admissions¹¹⁶ through complementary

Figure 32: Indicative admissions through complementary pathways and progress against strategy targets (cumulative), 2016-2020



* Sponsorship and other admission pathways reflect the total number of non-UNHCR assisted resettlement admissions¹²⁷ as reported by States for the years 2019 to 2020. Source: [UNHCR refugee data finder](#)

** Data collected by OECD and UNHCR in the frame of the Safe Pathways for Refugees report covering first-time permits issued for family (FR), employment (EMP), and education (EDU) purposes to nationals of Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela only. No information is available yet for permits delivered in 2020 by Brazil, Colombia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Data will be updated accordingly in the [OECD-UNHCR Safe Pathways for Refugees Dashboard](#).


pathways and a progressive decline ever since. While the modest target set for the first year of the Strategy was met with 199,000 admissions, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the overall number of admissions through complementary pathways plummeted (over 108,000) by at least 40 per cent compared to the previous year (Figure 32).

Some 763,000 nationals of Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela arrived in OECD countries and Brazil through safe legal pathways between 2017 and 2020

Between 2017 and 2020, over 672,900 first-time residence permits were granted by OECD countries

and Brazil to nationals of Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) for family, work, or education-related reasons. In addition, some 91,000 were admitted through sponsorship and other pathways, bringing the total to approximately 763,000. During the same period, approximately 934,400 individuals from these seven countries of origin were granted asylum either through having been recognized as refugees or granted a subsidiary form of protection in the OECD countries and Brazil, and some 121,600 persons arrived in OECD countries and Brazil through UNHCR-assisted resettlement programmes.¹¹⁷

Figure 33: First-time permits and admissions granted by OECD countries and Brazil to nationals of Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela by permit/admission type, between 2017 and 2020



Close to two-thirds of all safe legal pathway admissions were family permits


Between 2017 and 2020, family reunification made up 65 per cent of all admissions/permits granted and reported for the seven populations. After 2017, the number of permits delivered for family reasons progressively decreased, reaching a low in 2020, constituting a 55 per cent decline over the period (Figure 33). Study permits made up 12 per cent of the admissions/permits granted to the seven populations over the period considered. The number of permits granted for education decreased by seven per cent in 2019 and a further 60 per cent in 2020. Work permits and sponsorship and other admission pathways, respectively, also represented up to 12 per cent of the admissions/permits granted. Both categories of permits/admissions showed a rise in 2019 of five per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. In 2019, for the

first time in a decade, more permits were delivered to nationals of the seven surveyed countries for work reasons (17%) than for study reasons. In 2019, the work permits issued to the seven nationalities amounted to four per cent of the total number of work permits delivered by OECD countries globally.

The top 10 destination countries account for 85 per cent of all the reported admissions through safe legal pathways

Overall, between 2017 and 2020, Germany, followed by Sweden, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia issued the largest numbers of residence permits for work, study, or family purposes to the seven populations considered and/or admitted them through sponsorship and other pathways (Figure 34). These five destination countries granted more than half of the permits.

Figure 34: Top 10 countries (OECD and Brazil) receiving nationals of Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela through safe legal pathways, 2017-2020 (cumulative)



GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES COUNTRY PROFILE: NIGER


Niger is a major transit and host country for refugees in mixed movements because of ongoing crises in Mali, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, and Burkina Faso. According to the World Bank, Niger has the lowest wealth per capita compared to its peers in the region. As of 30 June 2021, Niger was hosting a total population of 693,200 refugees (41%), IDPs (51%), and other displaced populations. Seventy-three per cent of refugees are from Nigeria, 21 per cent from Mali, and 6 per cent from other countries. Asylum-seekers from Chad living in Diffa represent 58 per cent of all asylum-seekers. Nationals from Sudan in the Central Mediterranean Situation account for 25 per cent of the asylum-seekers. Women account for 53 per cent of this population. The volatile security context has caused numerous additional refugee and IDP movements within the country, including secondary movements in search of safety. The COVID-19 pandemic has required the redesign of humanitarian interventions. The data ecosystem (especially regarding socio-economic data) remains fragile due to the security situation, lack of access to displaced populations, and weak capacities. Niger is a low-income country with an extreme poverty rate estimated at 42.9 per cent in 2020. The country has also been experiencing chronic food insecurity for decades.

Despite increasing needs due to the deteriorating situations in the Sahel and Nigeria, the volume of bilateral ODA for the refugee situation in Niger decreased by 27 per cent between 2018 and 2019. The Refugee Law allows refugees originating from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries to enjoy the same rights as nationals regarding access to the labour market (except the public sector) and to financial and business development services. However, the difficult job market constrains refugees' access to decent work. The situation has deteriorated with the pandemic. Freedom of movement is guaranteed in the Refugee Law. It is in practice limited, however, owing to the deteriorating security situation. Several refugee-hosting areas were closed, and a state of emergency was declared in several regions of the country. The Refugee Law enables refugee children and youth to access education on the same basis as nationals. The Government has been integrating refugee children into national education programmes since March 2012. However, enrolment of refugee children is lower than that of nationals, due to the volatile security situation; high mobility; and language, social, and cultural barriers. The enrolment rates for refugee children range from 17 to 25 per cent in rural areas, while in Niamey, 56 per cent of refugee children are enrolled. Between November 2017 and 30 June 2021, 4,300 refugees found third country solutions, mainly through the resettlement programme. Resettled refugees were admitted to Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Complementary pathways departures benefitted only 148 refugees, with the majority admitted to Italy. The COVID-19 pandemic has negatively affected the implementation of resettlement activities. In March 2020, resettlement departures were temporary suspended, but resumed gradually in August 2020. The outbreak of COVID-19, combined with increased insecurity in Diffa, and along the Mali-Niger border, limited the movement of staff as well as access to refugee camps. The introduction of remote processing therefore helped the operation to continue resettlement and complementary pathways case-processing.

PLEDGES TOWARDS GCR OBJECTIVE 3

A total of 152 pledges were made at the GRF towards resettlement and complementary pathways, contributing to expanded access to third country solutions (Figure 35). These pledges reflect approximately 10 per cent of all those made at the GRF. More than half of the respective pledging entities have reported significant progress, despite a number of key challenges and constraints.

Figure 35. Proportion of GRF Pledges towards Objective 3, August 2021



Sixty (40%) pledges categorized as advancing GCR objective 3 were reported to be “in progress”, five (3%) in the planning phase, and 14 (9%) fulfilled. The latter included pledges made by Portugal, Canada, Colombia, Norway, Peru, the Middle East Council of Churches, and several others. Updates were not received for 73 pledges (48%). Overall, some 55 per cent of these pledges were made by entities in Europe, followed by the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. Approximately 75 per cent of all pledges linked to GCR objective 3 were individual contributions.

Since the GRF, a high level of engagement by Member States and other actors was witnessed towards the Three-Year Strategy on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways. Notably, several States reported having advanced their pledges

to increase their **resettlement quotas**, including Finland, Belgium, Japan, and Uruguay, despite travel restrictions, border closures, and other COVID-19-related constraints affecting the number of resettlement departures.

Concerning **complementary pathways**, while promising initiatives to improve access, including for family reunification, were implemented as part of the GRF pledge process, a need remains to amend certain legislation and policies posing barriers. Additional initiatives to reduce travel costs and provide pro bono legal representation for refugees and their families would support progress in this area. Notable progress was made by Japan's International Christian University Foundation on scholarships and by Italy on the establishment of a humanitarian corridor; however, implementation more broadly was hindered by the pandemic. In terms of access to work, Talent Beyond Boundaries made progress on its pledge to secure work opportunities for refugees. Argentina's implementation of its pledge to expand its humanitarian visa programme and other complementary pathways was delayed by the pandemic.

The joint UNHCR-IOM Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initiative (CRISP) played a key role during the period, including for the funding of complementary pathways capacity-building initiatives. Portugal fulfilled its pledge to provide financial support and other capacity-building activities. Further funding is, however, required to expand implementation over the coming years.



RWANDA. First Burundian refugees return home after five years in exile.
© UNHCR/Eugene Sibomana

4.4 Global Compact on Refugees

Objective 4: Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity

The international community as a whole will contribute resources and expertise to support countries of origin, upon their request, to address root causes, to remove obstacles to return, and to enable conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation.

GCR, para. 88


OUTCOME 1:
Resources are made available to support the sustainable reintegration of returning refugees by an increasing number of donors

ODA provided in support of refugee returnees in countries of origin decreased

The GCR underlined that voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity remains the preferred solution in most refugee situations. It calls upon the international community as a whole

to stand ready to provide support, including to facilitate sustainability of return, while recognizing that enabling voluntary repatriation is first and foremost the responsibility of the country of origin towards its own people. According to the Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020, donors contributed a total of USD 1.37 billion in ODA to support refugee returnees in the country of origin between 2018 and 2019. From USD 784 million in 2018 to 584 million in 2019, the total amount of ODA decreased by 26 per cent (Figure 36). This decrease in available funding coincides with the global decrease in the number of refugee returnees recorded during the same period. From nearly 519,500 in 2018 to slightly over 317,000 in 2019, the number of voluntary repatriations decreased by 39 per cent. The amount of bilateral ODA for refugee returnees in their countries accounted for some six per cent of all bilateral ODA to refugee situations over the two years. The interpretation of this downward trend in bilateral ODA to countries of origin, however, should be treated with caution, especially as data are only available for two years. Moreover, the distinction between ODA for countries of origin versus asylum poses challenges in reporting for some donors.

Figure 36: Bilateral ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugee returnees in the country of origin, humanitarian and development assistance, 2018-2019 (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020, gross disbursement, 2019 constant prices, US dollars)




Top countries of return are among top recipients of bilateral ODA to countries of origin

Half of the top 10 countries of return between 2016 and 2020 were among the top 10 recipients of bilateral ODA (Figure 37) for countries of origin, as reported by donors in the OECD survey for 2018 and 2019. These five countries were Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and the Syrian Arab Republic. The countries in the top 10 countries of return, but not in the top 10 recipients were Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Except Côte d'Ivoire, these countries were, however, in the list of the top 20 recipients. Conversely, Chad, Cuba, Iraq, Myanmar, and the State of Palestine were among the top recipients of bilateral ODA to countries of origin, but not among the top countries of return.

When taking into account all bilateral ODA to refugee situations received by the top 10 countries of return (i.e., regardless of whether they are classified as countries of origin or asylum by donors), seven are among the top 20 recipients of ODA (see chapter on GCR objective 1): Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic. The top countries of return not included in the top 20 recipients are Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Côte d'Ivoire.¹¹⁸

Figure 37: Top 10 recipients of bilateral ODA to countries of origin, as reported by donors, 2018-2019 (cumulative)



Source: OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020


Countries of origin received proportionally more development assistance than countries of asylum

Compared to countries of asylum, bilateral ODA received by countries of origin has a larger development assistance component. In cumulative terms, it amounted to 57 per cent between 2018 and 2019 for countries of origin, while for countries of asylum it was 36 per cent. This preponderance of development assistance over humanitarian aid for countries of origin seems consistent with the GCR's emphasis on addressing root causes and enabling conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation.

Countries of origin have fewer donors than countries of asylum

The number of donors supporting countries of origin is lower than for countries of asylum. The number of donors reported by the OECD survey was 20 for countries of origin and 31 for countries of asylum in 2019 (Figure 38). While this is consistent with the lower volume of bilateral ODA received, it may also mean greater scope for broadening the base of support to countries of origin. It is worth noting, however, that the number of donors per country in the top 10 countries of return increases when accounting for bilateral ODA to refugee situations in general (i.e., regardless of whether they are classified as countries of origin or asylum by donors). For Afghanistan and the Syrian Arab Republic, for instance, the number of donors increased from nine to 13 and eight to 21, respectively.

Figure 38: Numbers of donors of bilateral ODA by country of origin, 2019



Source: OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020

OUTCOME 2: Refugees are able to return and reintegrate socially and economically

Voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity remains the preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations. The overriding priorities are to promote the enabling conditions for voluntary repatriation in full respect for the principle of non-refoulement, to ensure the exercise of a free and informed choice and to mobilize support to underpin safe and dignified repatriation.

GCR, para. 87


Although more refugees have returned, there is a downward trend after 2016

There were 14 per cent more returns of refugees between 2016 and 2020, than during the previous five years. More than 2 million refugees have returned to their country of origin since 2016

compared to 1.8 million between 2011 and 2015. Three-quarters of the solutions accessed by refugees were returns during the last five years. Voluntary return was at its highest in 2016, with 552,000 returnees. Since then and until 2020, there was an overall downward trend in the number of returns. The second increase, observed in 2018, was overshadowed by the declines recorded during the rest of the period. In 2020, only one per cent of refugees was able to return to their country of origin compared to three per cent in 2016 (Figure 39).

With more people becoming displaced and fewer able to return, an increasing number find themselves in protracted displacement situations. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the trend. Borders were closed and voluntary repatriations suspended. While the situation regarding the pandemic remains uncertain, obstacles in many countries of origin, including ongoing conflict, persistent insecurity, impunity for crimes and human rights violations and the absence of essential services continue to be significant factors influencing the decision of refugees about whether to return.

Figure 39: Number and proportion of refugee returnees, 2010-2020



Afghanistan was the first country of refugee returns between 2016 and 2020

The first country of return between 2016 and 2020 was Afghanistan (Figure 40). It was followed by the Syrian Arab Republic and South Sudan. Before the recent events in Afghanistan, which saw the Taliban regain control of the country, close to one-fifth of the population (38.9 million)¹⁹ was composed of former refugees (6.2 million) who had returned to their country of origin during the last two decades. The 2,300 Afghans who returned in 2020 accounted for the lowest level recorded since the 2000s. The number has steadily declined since 2016, when 384,000 Afghans returned.

Some 421,700 Syrians returned to their country between 2016 and 2020. In 2020, 38,000 Syrian refugees returned, 60 per cent fewer than in 2019. Returns have been spontaneous or organized by host countries or other actors. Spontaneous returns were also observed to South Sudan. Close to one-half (122,000) of the returns in 2020 were to South Sudan, mostly from Uganda (74,000), Sudan (22,500), and Ethiopia (14,500). Since 2017, returns

of Burundian refugees have been facilitated, with the majority returning from the United Republic of Tanzania, and smaller numbers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kenya. Following the conclusion of elections in Burundi in May 2020, increased interest in voluntary repatriation has been expressed by refugees living in several countries.

Data available only for a few countries show big differences regarding access to civil documentation for refugee returnees


Progress was made in Burundi. Data collected in 2021 revealed that nearly 72 per cent of returnee heads of household had relevant documents compared with only 33 per cent in 2020. Data available for refugee returnees to other countries provides only baselines that nonetheless reveal critical gaps and big differences in this area. For example, data from household-level assessments conducted in South Sudan amongst refugees who had returned spontaneously to different parts of the country show that the percentage possessing

individual documentation is very low. Over 16,000 households were interviewed between January 2019 and June 2021. Most of those interviewed reported returning from neighbouring countries to South Sudan during 2018 or thereafter. Findings also show that approximately five per cent of those returning from Sudan were in possession of an identity document. The proportion was even lower for returnees from Uganda (4.2%), Ethiopia (2.0%), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.8%). Concerning refugee returnees to Côte d'Ivoire, only 13 per cent were in possession of civil

documentation, according to data collected between 2018 and 2020.

In relation to the Syria situation, data on the possession of civil documentation have been gathered through Regional Perception and Intention Surveys conducted by UNHCR with refugees hosted in neighbouring countries, except for Turkey, since 2017. In 2021, the survey canvassed some 3,200 Syrian refugees, out of a total of 1.9 million in these countries. Ninety-five per cent indicated that they possess an official civil document issued by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Figure 40: Top 10 countries for refugee returns, 2016-2020



GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES COUNTRY PROFILE: ECUADOR

Due to severe internal conflicts in its neighbouring country, Ecuador has been hosting Colombian refugees since 1987. In 2021, more than 53,000 Colombian refugees are residing in Ecuador, which account for 97 per cent of the total refugee population in the country. Since 2017, the Americas region has been witnessing the largest refugee and migrant humanitarian crisis in its recent history. It is estimated that more than 450,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants are residing in Ecuador, making it the fourth largest host country in the region, behind Colombia, Peru, and Chile. After years of economic decline due to plummeting oil prices, the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened poverty at the national level, negatively affecting the situation of refugees and migrants transiting through or residing in Ecuador. In 2020, the national poverty rate increased to 32.4 per cent. According to UNHCR's presence in the country, the rate is likely to be higher for refugees and migrants.

According to OECD data, the volume of bilateral ODA to the refugee situation in Ecuador more than tripled between 2018 and 2019. No bilateral ODA channelled directly to national actors was reported in the survey. According to UNHCR's country presence, this may not capture all the funding provided by the international community to local governments and NGOs active in the refugee response. The law grants refugees access to work and social security on the same basis as nationals. The right to freedom of movement is absolute for all persons present in the territory, irrespective of migratory status. A total of 52,982 Venezuelan and 11,912 Colombian students were enrolled in the national education system for the period 2020-2021. This is an increase compared to the 2019-2020 period. However, data do not allow the calculation of the proportion of refugee or migrant children enrolled. Four countries received UNHCR resettlement submissions from Ecuador in 2021 — a decrease compared to preceding years.


PLEDGES TOWARDS GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES OBJECTIVE 4

Some 60 pledges were made at the GRF towards supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. This represents only four per cent of all GRF pledges, the smallest proportion across all four objectives (Figure 41).

Among the 60 pledges submitted, 26 updates were received, of which some 85 per cent were reported to be in progress. Two pledges were fulfilled, and two were reported to be in the planning phase. Cumulatively, more than 60 per cent of pledges linked to GCR objective 4 concern Africa and Asia and the Pacific. Nineteen pledges (30%) were global pledges. Some 60 per cent of pledges were submitted by States, while 30 per cent were made by international organizations and NGOs. A little over 20 per cent were bilateral or multilateral donor pledges, and more than 50 per cent were made by hosting countries.

While travel restrictions and complex political climates hindered large-scale **voluntary repatriation**, pledges for returns to Burundi, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Mali were implemented or remained in progress. Related

Figure 41: Proportion of GRF Pledges towards Objective 4



progress was made through GCR Support Platforms. The Federal Government of Somalia adopted a National Durable Solutions Strategy 2020-2024 to address the root causes of displacement and its consequences holistically. As part of Honduras' pledge to build the capacity of municipalities to deal with returnees, refugees, and migrants, 14 municipalities were trained in displacement-related matters, despite some delays due to the pandemic.



ECUADOR. Elderly refugee struggles to eat two meals a day.
© UNHCR/Jaime Giménez

CHAD. Lake Chad border region hosts refugees and internally displaced Chadians.
© UNHCR/Sylvain Cherkaoui



CHAPTER 5

Note on data sources and methodology

Reliable, comparable, and timely data is critical for evidence-based measures to: improve socio-economic conditions for refugees and host communities; assess and address the impact of large refugee populations on host countries in emergency and protracted situations; and identify and plan appropriate solutions.

GCR, para. 45

The GCR underlines the role of data and evidence for effecting burden- and responsibility-sharing. It calls for support for the inclusion of refugees and host populations in national data collection and strengthening national systems to enable the production of statistics on refugee situations. In addition to national ownership of data collection, overarching recommendations on GCR and other indicators on refugees and host populations relate to disaggregation by gender, age, and diversity; the promotion of harmonized and interoperable statistical methods; and alignment with international standards and statistical practices. While more

reliable and comparable data to measure GCR objective 2 on refugee self-reliance, such as poverty levels among refugees, is urgently needed, shortcomings in basic demographic characteristics should not be forgotten: sex- and age-disaggregated stock figures are currently lacking for 20 per cent of the global refugee population, a data gap that stands at 80 per cent for refugees in countries in the Americas and 34 per cent in Asia and the Pacific.

The table at the end of this report lists the GCR indicators, and the corresponding data sources and collection methods.

INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON REFUGEE STATISTICS

Until recently, there were no globally endorsed standards for the collection, compilation, and dissemination of official statistics on refugees. The lack of recognized guidelines and consistent definitions led to often incomplete data and difficulties in comparing statistics on refugees internationally. With the objective of filling this gap, the UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) established the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS) to develop [International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics \(IRRS\)](#) that were endorsed at the 49th session of the UNSC in 2018. The recommendations were developed through a collaborative process anchored in active participation from national authorities and regional and international agencies with relevant expertise in forced displacement statistics. For the first time, globally endorsed concrete guidance and standards are available for humanitarian and development actors on how to improve the overall quality and availability of official

statistics on refugees, asylum-seekers, and related populations.

EGRIS is currently investing in building capacities of national statistical offices for the implementation of the IRRS and the [International Recommendations on IDP Statistics \(IRIS\)](#). Some countries have already taken steps to implement the recommendations, providing good practices and lessons learned. This is the case of Kenya, which has included refugees in its 2019 national census. Morocco has also made progress, by including question modules to identify refugees in its thematic surveys, such as the labour force survey. Going forward, EGRIS is advocating for integration of forced displacement into National Strategies for the Development of Statistics (NSDS), investment in national statistical capacities, and increased funding for the forced displacement data area. Increased multi-stakeholder partnerships and coordination with national institutions will finally ensure awareness and understanding of the importance of evidence and statistics for effective policymaking and programme development.

Data for Global Compact on Refugees Objective 1

The OECD Financing for [Refugee Situations Survey 2020](#), which is a follow-up to the [“Survey on Financing Refugee Hosting Contexts \(2018\)”](#), collected data for five of the 15 GCR indicators, covering the period 2018-2020 mid-year. UNHCR expressed deep gratitude to the 28 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), one DAC participant, four multi-lateral development banks, and three other donor countries, that responded to the OECD refugee financing survey in 2020, notably Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union Institutions, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Estonia, Kuwait, Lithuania, Taiwan Province of China, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank.

Due to data availability issues, the data provided by several respondents for the first six months of 2020 could not be integrated in this report. A detailed description of the methodology and limitations of the survey is provided in *Financing for Refugee Situations 2018-19, OECD Refugee Financing Survey 2020, Forced Displacement Series*. There is now a critical need for the long-term sustainability and institutionalization of data collection on ODA to refugee situations. Specifically, the main elements of the 2020 OECD survey need to be integrated into the standard OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).¹²⁰ There is also a need to develop the use of the OECD [Total Official Support for Sustainable Development \(TOSSD\)](#) mechanism as an international statistical framework for monitoring official resources and private finance mobilized by official interventions, including funding relevant to refugee situations.

Instead of the original indicator GCR indicator 1.2.2 on the number of partners supporting national arrangements in the refugee-hosting country, UNHCR had to develop a proxy (or indirect) indicator on the number of partners listed per country in Refugee

Response Plans (RRPs). Definitional, methodological, and practical issues prevented the compilation of the original indicator. Among them was the lack of a common and operational definition of ‘national arrangements’ for reporting against the global indicator. The GCR does not prescribe the exact nature and design of such arrangements. It is presented as a concept to be contextualized in each refugee-hosting country – leading to arrangements which vary greatly in terms of their formality, design, and other elements. Further, the definition of ‘partners’ supporting such arrangements, and the extent to which these partners are listed in publicly available national plans, varies, posing additional definitional and practical challenges. Another key consideration relates to the data collection burden. In-depth research into the arrangements in each refugee-hosting context, and the partners engaged in these, would have required significant resources and generated a large amount of qualitative data, whereas the intent of the GCR indicators is to provide a succinct account of progress using simple and comparable data over time.

Despite its advantages in terms of definitional clarity and data availability, this proxy indicator also has some limitations: Multi-stakeholder (inter-agency) Refugee Response Plans only cover a portion of refugee-hosting countries. Whilst most countries hosting a significant number of refugees are covered by one or more RRP, several large refugee-hosting countries are not covered. Additionally, RRP list only partners who are appealing for financial requirements for the response activities. For example, Government entities that are in a leadership role but are not appealing for funds are not typically listed nor are local and community-based organizations that may partner with larger organizations listed in the plans. Finally, without extensive research, it is not possible to disaggregate partners listed in RRP beyond the categories of UN and non-UN (with the latter category being almost entirely made up of civil society organizations). Patterns in the contribution of specific stakeholders such as refugee-led organizations, women-led organizations, academia, or others are therefore not covered by this indicator.

Data for Global Compact on Refugees Objective 2

The proportion of refugees with access to decent work (2.1.1) and the proportion of refugees who can move freely within the host country (2.2.2) are both conceptualized as legal indicators.

The data were collected by UNHCR through a survey containing questions on the legal framework providing access to wage-earning employment, self-employment, workplace protection, the right to freedom of movement, and the right to choose one's place of residence. Given a number of data limitations mentioned in the report and the importance of the topics under refugee self-reliance, there is a need to strengthen the measurement of decent work, including by continuing the collaboration with the International Labour Organization and developing the measurement of de facto access to work (e.g., using household surveys).

At the end of 2019, data on primary and secondary education enrolment of refugee children (indicator 2.2.1) was only available for 12 host countries representing 51 per cent of the global refugee population ([UNHCR 2020, Coming together for Education](#)). This had improved to over 40 countries reporting for the 2021 report [Staying the Course](#). Data from national education management information systems (EMIS) is often not disaggregated by displacement status of school students.

To gain a better understanding of the inclusion of refugees in national education systems, UNHCR Regional Bureaux and country operations were contacted to seek information on national education policies, to understand whether refugee students were included in national education systems. The aim of this exercise was to obtain information from all countries, but emphasis was placed on major hosting countries, in order to cover at least 90 per cent of all refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad. In total, data were collected for 97 countries. Country operations were provided with several options and had to indicate whether national education policy or other relevant policies at the pre-primary, primary, and secondary levels indicate:

1. Refugees can access under the same conditions as nationals;¹²¹

2. Refugees can access but face limitations;¹²²
3. Refugees cannot access education;¹²³
4. No official policy for refugees;¹²⁴ or
5. Don't know.

Of all country operations contacted, 97 countries reported data on this proxy GCR question.

Indicator 2.2.2 measures the proportion of refugee and host community populations living below the national poverty line. Few household surveys on refugee populations collect the complex and costly consumption data required to calculate the proportion of refugees living below the national poverty line. Even fewer surveys are representative of all refugees in a host country, which could be used to derive national estimates of poverty levels among refugees (see the UNHCR report [Data disaggregation of SDG indicators by forced displacement](#)).

For the estimated 500 million poor globally, poverty data is either unavailable or outdated, limiting efforts to identify and address its causes.¹²⁵ Furthermore, where national household surveys do exist, forcibly displaced persons are often excluded, resulting in (until recently) a near complete absence of information on their levels of poverty. This lack of representative and comparable poverty data is recognized by the GCR and was a principal factor leading to the foundation of the [UNHCR-World Bank Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement](#).

To improve data on refugees' education and poverty levels in the long-term, inclusion of refugees in national statistical systems, as outlined in the International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS), is needed. This also goes for the continuing coordination and integration of data collection activities and databases by non-national actors, such as UNHCR's case management system, proGres, and a representative Flagship Refugee Survey Series currently under development with national systems. While they do not substitute improved primary data collection, statistical methods like survey imputation and simulation as well as rapid consumption modules are important techniques to estimate poverty levels in fragile contexts that do not allow for full expenditure and consumption modules.

Data for Global Compact on Refugees Objective 3

UNHCR systematically records and publishes reliable resettlement data from administrative records. However, resettlement submission and departure figures reported by UNHCR do not always match resettlement statistics published by States, as Government figures may include submissions received outside of UNHCR resettlement processes. A systematic review of the number of refugees admitted through private or community sponsorship programmes could help to resolve these inconsistencies.

The joint report [Safe Pathways for Refugees II](#) (UNHCR-OECD 2021) summarizes recommendations

to States to produce better data on complementary pathways for admission to third countries. These include collection of data on both citizenship and country of birth and on previous country of residence of migrants and refugees, to distinguish between people who were displaced directly from their country of origin and those who had previously sought international protection in a first country of asylum. Disaggregation of admission data between first-time permits, permit renewals, and status changes, for instance from education to work permits, will furthermore help improve evidence on complementary pathways.

Data for Global Compact on Refugees Objective 4

Data for resources to support the sustainable reintegration of returning refugees and measure ODA disbursed for refugee returnees in their countries of origin, as well as the number of donors who provide such funds, are compiled through the OECD survey on Financing for Refugee Situations 2020.

Data for GCR indicator 4.2.2 on the proportion of returnees with legally recognized documentation and credentials are sparse. Out of the top 10 return countries, some data were available only for Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, and South Sudan. The methodologies used as well as the data collected on documentation vary across countries, making the compilation of a global indicator currently unfeasible. Data collected through household surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster

Surveys (MICS), or those conducted for the World Bank Global Findex database do not typically include dedicated sub-samples of returnees and questions to measure this indicator. More work remains to be done to increase and systematize the availability of data on possession of documentation. Doing so will also require building the capacity of civil registries to facilitate timely access by refugees, returnees, and stateless persons, as appropriate, to civil and birth registration and documentation, including through digital technology and the provision of mobile services, subject to full respect for data protection and privacy principles. Another way forward to collect improved data for this indicator is to include questions in national household surveys targeted at identifying returned refugees in line with those questions outlined in the IRRS and asking for documents and credentials.

Classification of Global Refugee Forum pledges

GCR objective 1 included financial, material, technical, as well as policy pledges made towards refugee-hosting countries by bilateral and multilateral actors such as donor States, multilateral development institutions, and other stakeholders, such as NGOs and the private sector. Although having an ‘easing the pressures’ dimensions, the pledges with a focus on resettlement and complementary pathways, as well as in support of conditions in countries of origin, by bilateral/multilateral actors and other stakeholders were excluded from reporting under GCR objective 1 and included only under objectives 3 and 4, respectively, to prevent duplication.¹²⁶

Under **GCR objective 2**, pledges were classified by applying two main criteria: (1) policy and financial pledges made directly by refugee-hosting

countries, with the following areas of focus: jobs and livelihoods, solutions (local integration), and education; and (2) policy and financial pledges made by private actors (NGOs, private sector, faith-based organizations, and other stakeholders, among others) and a submitting entity that is a bilateral/multilateral donor with the following areas of focus: jobs and livelihoods, energy and infrastructure (focused on health and WASH also when related to sustainability), education, and solutions (local integration).

The analysis of pledges under **GCR objective 3**, focused on solutions pledges related to resettlement and complementary pathways, including labour mobility, community sponsorship, and family reunification. **GCR objective 4** focused on policy and financial pledges relating to returns, including voluntary repatriation and reintegration.



GUYANA. Venezuelan refugees and migrants live in isolated area in Mabaruma.
© UNHCR/Diana Diaz

Data sources of Global Compact on Refugees indicators

OBJECTIVE	OUTCOME	INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	
1. Ease pressures on host countries.	1.1 Resources supporting additional instruments and programmes are made available for refugees and host communities by an increasing number of donors.	1.1.1 Volume of ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities in the refugee-hosting country	Administrative Records (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)	
		1.1.2. Number of donors providing ODA to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities in the refugee-hosting country	Administrative Records (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)	
	1.2 National arrangements and coordinated refugee responses are supported.	1.2.1 Proportion of ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities channeled to national actors in the refugee-hosting country	Administrative Records (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)	
		1.2.2 Number of partners supporting national arrangements in the refugee-hosting country	Administrative Records (UNHCR)	
	2. Enhance refugee self-reliance.	2.1 Refugees are able to actively participate in the social and economic life of host countries.	2.1.1 Proportion of refugees who have access to decent work	Administrative/legal Records (Survey conducted by UNHCR)
			2.1.2 Proportion of refugees who are able to move freely within the host country	Administrative/legal Records (Survey conducted by UNHCR)
2.2 Refugee and host community self-reliance is strengthened.		2.2.1. Proportion of refugee children enrolled in the national education system (primary and secondary)	Administrative Records (processed by UNHCR)	
		2.2.2. Proportion of refugee and host community populations living below the national poverty line of the host country	Household surveys (National statistical offices, World Bank, UNHCR and activities supported by the WB-UNHCR Joint Data Center)	

OBJECTIVE	OUTCOME	INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE
3. Expand access to third country solutions.	3.1 Refugees in need have access to resettlement opportunities in an increasing number of countries.	3.1.1. Number of refugees who departed on resettlement from the host country	Administrative Records (processed by UNHCR)
		3.1.2. Number of countries receiving UNHCR resettlement submissions from the host country	Administrative Records (processed by UNHCR)
	3.2 Refugees have access to complementary pathways for admission to third countries.	3.2.1. Number of refugees admitted through complementary pathways from the host country	Administrative Records (OECD and UNHCR)
4. Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.	4.1 Resources are made available to support the sustainable reintegration of returning refugees by an increasing number of donors.	4.1.1. Volume of ODA provided to, or for the benefit of, refugee returnees in the country of origin	Administrative Records (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)
		4.1.2. Number of donors providing ODA to, or for the benefit of, refugee returnees in the country of origin	Administrative Records (OECD Financing for Refugee Situations Survey 2020)
	4.2. Refugees are able to return and reintegrate socially and economically.	4.2.1. Number of refugees returning to their country of origin	Administrative Records (UNHCR)
		4.2.2. Proportion of returnees with legally recognized documentation and credentials	Household surveys / administrative records (UNHCR)

LEBANON. Resettlement of refugees has been suspended over COVID-19 restrictions.
© UNHCR/Diego Ibarra Sánchez

Endnotes

- 1 A/RES/73/151.
- 2 A/73/12 (Part II), para 102.
- 3 GCR, para. 17.
- 4 A/RES/71/1, Annex I.
- 5 ODA is flows to countries and territories on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of ODA recipients and to multilateral development institutions that are: (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii) concessional (i.e., grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective (see definition of ODA on [OECD website](#)).
- 6 See OECD, In-donor refugee costs in ODA, and in Development aid drops in 2018, especially to neediest countries, OECD (10/04/2019).
- 7 In 2016, the proportion of refugees in countries with developing economies was 84 per cent according to UN classification (see <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> for a list of countries included under each region)
- 8 See <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>
- 9 All references to “people displaced across borders” in this report refer to refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad.
- 10 See World Bank’s data on aggregated [Gross Domestic Products](#).
- 11 A per cent point is the unit for the arithmetic difference of two percentages.
- 12 Figure 4 is an extension of charts published in UNHCR’s annual [Global Trends – Forced Displacement](#).
- 13 Using the same data and to support measurement of the overall burden- and responsibility-sharing, UNHCR statisticians started piloting the calculation of the Gini coefficient on the number of hosted refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad compared to the population size and Gross National Income (GNI) of the host countries. Based on the host population’s size, by the end of 2020, the Gini coefficient was 0.61. With the GNI per capita, it was 0.87. The coefficients, which are closer to one than to zero (a coefficient of zero means a situation of perfect equality and one a situation of perfect inequality), tend to confirm the persistence of unequal burden-sharing, particularly in terms of host country income.
- 14 When the 480,000 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA living in Lebanon are included, this proportion increases to one in five.
- 15 Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate.
- 16 As disaggregated data, sex and age is available for approximately 80 per cent of refugees. UNHCR uses statistical modelling to estimate missing data. Using a 90 per cent posterior prediction interval, the lower and upper bounds are estimated to be 42 and 54 per cent.
- 17 Using a 90 per cent posterior prediction interval, the lower and upper bounds are 38 and 47 per cent.
- 18 According to the World Health Organisation, 15 per cent of the world’s population are estimated to live with some form of disability. It is likely that there are several million refugees with disabilities and that their numbers have increased since 2016. A survey conducted in Lebanon found that 9 per cent of Syrian refugees have a disability, and one-third of all Syrian refugee households had at least one member with a disability (2020 Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon conducted jointly by UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF). The “Washington Group Short Set on Functioning” questionnaire was used to measure the prevalence of disabilities. The first domain of disability reported by Syrian refugees concerned mental health. Thirty-three per cent of refugees with disabilities (and above 5-year-old) declared suffering from anxiety (at least once a month) and 26 per cent from depression.
- 19 Article 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees states that “the Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.”
- 20 See <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/role-global-compact-refugees-international-response-covid-19-pandemic>.
- 21 The complementary and proxy indicator on naturalization compiled in this report is limited by the uneven availability of data. In some countries, it is, for instance, difficult to distinguish between the naturalization of refugees and non-refugees. In general, the data might underestimate the extent to which refugees are naturalized. In 2020, only 28 countries reported these statistics.
- 22 The top countries providing naturalization to refugees were Canada, Turkey, the Netherlands, France, and Guinea-Bissau.
- 23 Hesemann, J., H. Desai, and Y. Rockenfeller (2021), Financing for refugee situations 2018-19, OECD Publishing, Paris.
- 24 The list of official donors which responded to the OECD survey is provided in the Note on data sources and methodology. The data collected is limited to ODA. Therefore, it does not include other flows and donors, who either chose not to participate in the OECD refugee financing survey, were not reached, or whose financing does not constitute ODA. While private actors also play an important role, they are not captured by the data collected in this survey.
- 25 Figures from 2018-2019 represent gross disbursement in constant prices, with 2019 as year of reference.
- 26 The 2018 OECD survey on financing to refugee situations covered the period 2015-2017. Financing Refugee-Hosting Contexts - an analysis of the DAC’s contribution to burden- and responsibility-sharing in supporting refugees and their host communities, Kathleen Forichon, OECD Development Co-operation Working Paper 48, 2018.
- 27 This percentage is based on disbursements in constant prices. The data were provided by the OECD to UNHCR for the purpose of this report.
- 28 Distinguishing funding for refugees in countries of asylum (GCR indicator 1.1a) versus for refugees returning to their countries of origin (GCR indicator 4.1) has proved difficult for some donors. The fact that countries are sometimes both a country of asylum and origin also makes the distinction challenging.
- 29 About one-third of bilateral ODA reported by donors did not have a specific country or regional category assigned to it. Programmes are often global in nature and do not align with UNHCR’s regional categories. The findings in this section should thus be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, even if we were to observe country-allocable ODA only, the ranking of regions is aligned with the rankings reported in this paragraph.
- 30 In cumulative terms, the Syrian Arab Republic appears among the top recipients of ODA flows recorded by the 2020 OECD survey. However, it is possible that the funds to Syria as well as other countries relate to ODA provided to categories of displaced populations other than refugees (e.g., internally displaced people). For some donors, it proved difficult, in the context of this data collection, to distinguish ODA for refugees from that of other forcibly displaced groups.
- 31 Ordered by the size of refugee population and Venezuelans displaced abroad. End-2020, Colombia (1.7 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), the Islamic Republic of Iran (800,000), Peru (519,000), Ecuador (506,000), and Cameroon (436,000).
- 32 GCR indicator 1.1.1 on the volume of ODA for refugees and host communities in the refugee-hosting country is broken down in part (a), ODA disbursement for the benefit of refugees and host communities in countries with lower incomes, and part (b), ODA disbursement from DAC donors for the benefit of refugees in developed countries, commonly referred to as ‘in-donor refugee costs’. They are official sector expenditures for the sustenance of refugees in donor countries that are counted as ODA during the first twelve months of their stay. In 2017, the DAC clarified the reporting directives for what may be included in ODA as in-donor refugee costs. The rationale for counting these costs as ODA underlines that refugee protection is a legal obligation and that providing assistance to refugees may be considered a form of humanitarian assistance. Eligible categories of refugees must be based on international legal definitions. Costs for integrating refugees into the economy of the donor country are not eligible.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Data collected outside the 2020 OECD survey, as part of DAC members’ standardized statistical reporting to the OECD ([Common Reporting Standard](#), CRS). Data extracted on 9.06.2021 from [OECD database](#) that contained in-donor refugee costs from DAC countries.
- 35 This corresponds to seven out of the 15 donors that provided this information in the OECD survey.
- 36 A similar preponderance was identified in the 2018 OECD survey.
- 37 The same countries remain in the top 10 when adding core contributions to international refugee-mandated agencies, which represented 6 per cent of the total ODA to refugee situations in 2019.
- 38 Based on data provided by OECD to UNHCR, 31.8.2021.
- 39 See budget, funding, and expenditure data on UNHCR’s [Global Focus](#) website.
- 40 According to the OECD survey data, the top 10 donors of core contributions in 2019 included Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Norway, Germany, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland and Canada.
- 41 World Bank-UNHCR, The Global Cost of Inclusive Refugee Education, January 2021.
- 42 This estimate lies in the range of USD 4.44 and USD 5.11 billion. An additional USD 443 million is the estimated annual cost of delivering education to Palestinian refugee children under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA).
- 43 Save the Children. 2018. [Time to act: a costed plan to deliver quality education to every last refugee child](#).
- 44 The report stipulated that the share of the total cost of refugee education absorbed by host governments would typically depend on their income level, the number of refugees residing in the country, and the political environment.
- 45 The estimate provided in the joint World Bank-UNHCR report is based on analysis and data collated in [Global Education Monitoring Report](#). 2019. Migration, displacement and education: building bridges, not walls. Paris: UNESCO.
- 46 See also UNHCR press release, [Education for all refugee children is within reach – finds World Bank-UNHCR report](#), 25 February 2021.
- 47 MIRPS: Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (Marco Integral Regional de Protección y Soluciones).
- 48 [MIRPS Quantification 2019](#), Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework.
- 49 [UNHCR Global Focus - Financials](#).

- 50 The OECD survey captured only limited ODA amounts for 2020 (USD 1.3 billion), as it was based on voluntary reporting by donors for the first six months of 2020.
- 51 Referring to all ODA, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría noted in April 2021 that “Governments globally have provided 16 trillion dollars’ worth of COVID stimulus measures yet we have only mobilised 1% of this amount to help developing countries cope with a crisis that is unprecedented in our lifetimes” ([OECD’s data and analysis released in April 2021](#)).
- 52 The following definition of ‘national actors’ was applied in the context of the 2020 OECD survey: national actors refer to (a) central government, (b) local government, (c) national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and national civil society organizations (CSOs). With reference to category (c), “national” refers to NGOs and CSOs operating in the ODA-recipient country in which they are headquartered, working in multiple sub-national regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO.
- 53 Definitional, methodological and practical issues prevented the compilation of the original indicator. For detailed explanations see the data chapter at the end of the report.
- 54 Among those countries, some implemented more than one country plan in connection to a regional refugee response plan for a specific refugee population. This includes the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with country plans for the Burundi and South Sudan regional situations, Rwanda with country plans for the Burundi and DRC regional situations, the United Republic of Tanzania with country plans for the Burundi and DRC regional situations, and Uganda with country plans for Burundi, DRC and South Sudan regional situations. This brings the total number of inter-agency country plans developed to the response of a specific refugee population to 42.
- 55 Internal evidence from within UNHCR demonstrates a similar rise in support for refugee responses from the private sector – although this may or may not reflect a system-wide trend.
- 56 See <https://globalcffi.org/>
- 57 See <https://ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida19-replenishment/windows-host-communities-refugees>
- 58 In the desk review refugee-hosting countries are defined as countries that host at least 25,000 refugees, or where refugees amount to at least 0.1 per cent of the country’s population. UNSDCFs cover a 4-5-year period and are signed off by Governments.
- 59 The classification and analysis of the GRF pledges by the GCR objectives were applied based on the pledges received as of August 2021, which totalled 1,477. Based on the self-reporting system developed in the GCR digital platform, updates to pledge implementation were received from pledging entities through several rounds of update requests organized following the GRF in 2019. Consequently, statistical analyses under each GCR objective were carried out based on the official updates received and data provided on more than 600 pledges or 40 per cent of the total GRF pledges to date.
- 60 Whilst determined to be in support of refugee-hosting countries, 64 pledges remain unspecified as to receiving regions/countries.
- 61 In order to provide a strategic focus and maximize the impact of the first Global Refugee Forum in 2019, pledges and contributions were encouraged in the follow six areas of focus: 1) Arrangements for burden- and responsibility-sharing; 2) Education; 3) Jobs and livelihoods; 4) Energy and infrastructure; 5) Solutions; and 6) Protection capacity. UNHCR - Global Refugee Forum - Guidance on Contributions and Good Practices: 157- protection capacity; 146 - education; 132 - Statelessness; 93 - Jobs and livelihoods; 81 - responsibility-sharing arrangements; 64 - solutions; 55 - energy and infrastructure; 21 - Other.
- 62 248 pledges - NGOs; 121 - States; 110 - International organizations; 78 - Private sector; 31 - Academics; 38 - Faith-based organizations; 28 - Other; 25 - Sport; 9- Parliament; 8 - Refugees, host communities, and diaspora.
- 63 Matching is the process of pairing GRF pledges made by host countries to facilitate greater inclusion, protection, and support for people forced to flee with pledges made by donors to provide the financial, material, or technical support necessary for their implementation.
- 64 The Poverty Alleviation Coalition (PAC) pledged to graduate 160,000 households in 26 countries out of extreme poverty using the well-proven “Graduation Approach”. USD 31 million out of USD 176 million has been secured, to initiate a programme with 21,000 households (13% of pledge). Financial support is needed for the PAC in the amount of USD 145 million. The funds can be allocated through direct agreement with the implementing NGOs in one of the 26 countries. These countries are Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
- 65 Among good progress made in pledge implementation in jobs and livelihoods is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)’s pledge to support their 45 million-member companies in hiring refugees. The ICC facilitated collaborations with member companies and organizations to meet the needs of specific refugee communities, through a first pilot project to supply solar-powered electricity to part of the Cox’s Bazaar refugee camp in Bangladesh. In 2020, Germany also continued the Partnership for Prospects Initiative (P4P) and increased its budget for large-scale development-oriented cash-for-work programmes in the Middle East. Support continued during the COVID-19 pandemic and small loans were granted to entrepreneurs who manufactured protective and hygiene articles. Digital learning facilities were also supported.
- 66 Since the ACSG’s launch in December 2019, and despite the 2020 challenges linked to the pandemic, pilot projects through matching within the ACSG framework have been confirmed between France and Niger, EASO and Niger, France and Chad, Canada, and Mexico, and more recently New Zealand and the Philippines. These pilots relate to different areas of the asylum system, including reception, country-of-origin information, diversified case-processing modalities, file-management, RSD appeal, and the revision of the legislative framework. Discussions with States and other stakeholders involving another seven matches are still ongoing.
- 67 Chad (1), Djibouti (1), DRC (1) Ethiopia (2) and Uganda (4). The overall project value of the nine projects totals some USD 1.6 billion, of which USD 590.5 million were allocated from the WHR (all in grant form). There is a solid WHR-project pipeline, including Uganda, Burundi, Chad, and Niger. The Replenishment cycle has been shortened to accommodate the fast spending of the window due to COVID-19. COVID-19 projects under the WHR have included forcibly displaced populations.
- 68 Amongst the notable pledges making progress by the private sector, Vodafone Foundation will contribute €19.8 million in cash and in-kind towards a €42 million partnership with UNHCR to deploy up to 300 Instant Network Schools by 2025. The objective of the Instant Network Schools (INS) programme is to support host governments’ inclusion strategy by strengthening national educational systems and improving learning outcomes for 510,000 secondary-school refugee and host communities’ students and empower 10,000 teachers, reaching 1 million people including parents and wider communities in 6 countries.
- 69 1951 Convention relating the the Status of Refugees, Articles 17, 18, 19 and 24(1) and (2). See also: [UNHCR Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Decent Work for Refugees](#), July 2021.
- 70 This survey consisted of a review of existing legislative frameworks by UNHCR’s specialist services. The countries included are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and the United States of America.
- 71 Data is not available on refugees of working age and of the 25 countries surveyed, for 5 countries only partial data was made available.
- 72 This includes refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad.
- 73 UNHCR. (2021). [UNHCR Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2020](#).
- 74 UNHCR. (2021). [Staying the Course: The challenges facing refugee education](#).
- 75 In 2019, the Gender Parity Index (GPI) of gross enrolment reported globally was 0.98 and 0.99 for primary and secondary levels, respectively (UNESCO-UIS, 2021).
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 UNHCR & World Bank. (2021). [The Global Cost of Inclusive Refugee Education](#).
- 78 Azevedo, J., Hassan, A., Goldemberger, D., Iqbal, S., & Geven, K. (2020). [Simulating the Potential Impacts of Covid-19 School Closures and Learning Outcomes](#). World Bank.
- 79 UNESCO. (2020). [How Many Students Are At Risk of Not Returning to School?](#) (UNESCO COVID-19 Education Response).
- 80 United Nations. (2021). [The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021](#).
- 81 Bakrania, S., Chavez, C., Ipince, A., Rocca, M., Oliver, S., Stansfield, C., & Subrahmanian, R. (2020). *Pandemics, Epidemics and Child Protection Outcomes: A rapid review*. UNICEF Office of Research - Innocenti.
- 82 Nyamweya, N. (2020, June 26). [Displacement, Girls’ Education and COVID-19](#). Education for All.
- 83 Ibid.
- 84 UNHCR. (2021b). UNHCR COVID-19 Multisectoral Monitoring.
- 85 INEE. (2020). 20 Years of INEE: Achievements and challenges in education in emergencies. Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies.
- 86 European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. (2021). [EU humanitarian aid for education: Helps children in need, but should be longer-term and reach more girls](#) (January 2021); Global Education Monitoring Report. (2017). [Aid to education is stagnating and not going to countries most in need](#) (No. 31; Policy Paper). UNESCO; UN OCHA. (2018). World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2018. Humanitarian Data Exchange. <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/world-humanitarian-data-and-trends>
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 UNHCR. (forthcoming). *Transition to Secondary Education: Synthesis report*.
- 89 A large proportion of countries reporting data have education policies explicitly indicating that refugees can access primary education under the same conditions as nationals. Countries that mention access to education for all children regardless of their legal status have also been included in this category, even if they do not explicitly mention refugees.
- 90 World Bank. (2019). [Learning Poverty](#).
- 91 Piper, B., Dryden-Peterson, S., Chopra, V., Reddick, C., & Oyanga, A. (2019). Are Refugee Children Learning? Early grade literacy in a refugee camp in Kenya. *Journal of Education in Emergencies*, 5(2), 71–107.
- 92 Uwezo. (2018). [Are our Children Learning? Uwezo learning assessment in refugee contexts in Uganda](#).
- 93 World Bank. (2021). [Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune](#).

- 94 Countries such as Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda have started to consider refugees as part of their regular household surveys. Of the completed surveys measuring consumption to date, the Uganda Refugee and Host Communities Household Survey (2018) was conducted in a collaboration between the World Bank and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), while those in Ethiopia and Kenya were led by the World Bank and/or UNHCR, in consultation with the respective national governments and/or statistical offices. Cross survey imputation techniques are an alternative approach to fill the gap in available poverty data. Early work by the World Bank and UNHCR shows its promise to deliver robust and efficient results where survey consumption data is unavailable ([Beltramo et. al, 2021](#)).
- 95 Sources: Kakuma Socioeconomic Survey, 2019 (World Bank and UNHCR); Uganda Refugee and Host Communities Household Survey, 2018 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics and World Bank).
- 96 World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement. (2021). [Answering the Call: Forcibly Displaced during the Pandemic](#).
- 97 UNHCR and World Bank. (2021). [Monitoring Social and Economic Impacts of COVID-19 on Refugees in Uganda: Results from the High-Frequency Phone Survey - First Round](#).
- 98 UNHCR, World Bank, WFP and WB-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement. (2021) [Compounding Misfortunes](#).
- 99 UNHCR. (2021). [Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance: Main Outcomes from Post Distribution Monitoring](#).
- 100 WFP. (2018). [Evaluation of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net \(ESSN\) in Turkey](#).
- 101 World Bank. (2016). [The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon](#).
- 102 UNHCR. (2020). Evaluation of the effects of UNHCR cash-based interventions on protection outcomes in Rwanda. <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/research/evalreports/5fb4dd724/evaluation-effects-unhcr-cash-based-interventions-protection-outcomes-rwanda.html>; UNHCR. (2018). [Evaluation of the Effects of Cash-based Interventions on Protection Outcomes in Greece](#).
- 103 Whilst determined to be in support of refugee-hosting countries, 64 pledges remain unspecified as to receiving regions/countries.
- 104 See [the role of the Global Compact on Refugees in the international response to the COVID-19 pandemic](#), UNHCR, 2020.
- 105 By, for example, providing shelter, health care, food, and cash assistance, or halting forced evictions through moratoriums. See also “UN Stocktaking Event May 2021”
- 106 The 14 fulfilled pledges include the enrolment of 124,792 Venezuelan students in the education system by the Government of Peru, a commitment to fund girl’s education,
- and support for continuous and higher education scholarships as, for example, with the Japan ICU Foundation. Notable progress has also been made on a pledge implemented by BMZ and sponsored by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, by providing an additional 16m Euros of funding for Education Cannot Wait as well as a pledge implemented by the Turkish Ministry of Education with support from the EU (DG ECHO) that provided 535,612 refugee and socio-economically disadvantaged children with conditional cash transfers for education.
- 107 Additional information is available in [Global Refugee Forum – Education Co-sponsorship Alliance Brief 2020](#), UNHCR, 2020.
- 108 This effort is consistent with the central pledge of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to leave no one behind and human rights norms and principles applying to data disaggregation [A human rights-based approach to data](#).
- 109 See [AGD analysis of GRF Pledges](#)
- 110 For further analysis, see data from the UNHCR GRF Dashboard to May 31st, 2020 Authors J. Sharmin, E. Pittaway and L. Bartolomei, (2020) Research Report. Forced Migration Research Network, UNSW, Australia.
- 111 Internationally recognized tools for AGD analysis and disaggregation, such as the [Gender with Age Marker](#) and the [Washington Group Questions on Disability](#), can be applied to multiple indicators.
- 112 See [tools and tips to successfully operationalize AGD](#).
- 113 As per the GCR Indicators Framework, resettlement data for this report is based on statistics published monthly in UNHCR’s Resettlement Data Portal and refers to UNHCR-assisted resettlement departures only.
- 114 For disaggregated data by resettlement state, country of origin and country of asylum, please refer to UNHCR’s Resettlement Data Finder (rsq.unhcr.org).
- 115 Since 2017, UNHCR and the OECD have worked in partnership to produce the first systematic attempts at gathering and analyzing data on the use of safe legal pathways by refugees in the OECD region and globally. Acknowledging the limitations of the available data and in the absence of other comparable data, the Three-Year Strategy used the findings of the first “[Safe pathways for refugees](#)” report, first published in 2018 by OECD and UNHCR, to establish a global target on complementary pathways of two million refugees admitted through complementary pathways by the end of 2028.
- 116 To be able to reflect admissions through complementary pathways in the spirit of the GCR, one would need to count individuals in need of international protection admitted to a country under each pathway (i.e., family reunification, employment, education, or humanitarian grounds) following an initial stay in a first country of asylum where they sought protection. However, it is generally not possible to distinguish in the data available whether the recipients of permits reflected

in the report arrived directly from their countries of origin or fled via another country. Furthermore, lack of comparable data prevented inclusion of humanitarian pathway data in the report.

- 117 [OECD-UNHCR Safe Pathways for Refugees dashboard](#), [UNHCR Refugee Data Finder](#) and [UNHCR Resettlement Data Finder](#)
- 118 Distinguishing funding for refugees in countries of asylum versus refugees returning to countries of origin proved to be difficult for some donors. The fact that countries are sometimes both a host country and a country of return also contributes to the difficulty of the task. Total bilateral ODA for refugee situations received by a country (regardless of its status as a country of origin or asylum) may be therefore another useful indicator.
- 119 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.
- 120 A [proposal](#) in this regard was submitted in November 2020 to the OECD DAC Working Party on Development Statistics for discussion and eventual approval.
- 121 Policy or legislation expressly states that all children - regardless of their legal status - can access a given level of education; or policy or legislation expressly recognizes the right to education for refugee children on par with nationals.
- 122 Policy or legislation grant access within available resources or on par with foreigners; or policy or legislation does not expressly state that refugees can access education but in practice they can and do, though they face multiple barriers in doing so (e.g., documentation, location [encampment], curriculum alignment with host country, etc.).
- 123 Policy or legislation expressly states that refugees cannot access education.
- 124 There is no official policy or legislation for refugee children and/or refugee children who are not accessing education. This often applies to the pre-primary level – in countries where there is no policy on pre-primary education for nationals, there is likewise no policy for refugees.
- 125 World Bank. (2020). [Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight against Poverty](#).
- 126 Pledges which did not specify receiving regions/countries (“unspecified”) were included in GCR objective 1 when determined to be in support of refugee host countries based on their descriptions. While distinctive criteria were applied in classifying the pledges in the four GCR objectives, there were cross-cutting pledges which were accounted for in more than one objective, particularly in objectives 1 and 2. It concerned pledges in support of refugee-hosting countries and contributing to enhancement of refugee self-reliance (e.g., education and jobs and livelihoods).
- 127 As per the GCR indicator framework, non-UNHCR assisted resettlement admissions are not considered under GCR indicator 3.1.1.



GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES INDICATOR REPORT 2021

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FRONT COVER

SUDAN. *Berhane Tilaho, 48, escaped with very little when he fled the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region. He arrived in Sudan's Tunaybah camp nearly two months ago and looked for a way to make a living. Without the means to start a business, he found a job at a small mill where he makes enough to support his family. Sudan has welcomed refugees and asylum-seekers for decades and many host communities often share what little they have with newly arrived families like Berhane's.*

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BACK COVER

BRAZIL. *World Refugee Day activities with Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Boa Vista, Roraima.*

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