

# Zimbabwe Country Strategy Evaluation (2019–2022)

Evaluation Report  
March 2023

Conducted by: Fiona Gatere, Damian Lilly and Tafadzwa Hove

## **UNHCR Evaluation Office**

UNHCR's Evaluation Policy confirms UNHCR's commitment to support accountability, learning and continual improvement through the systematic examination and analysis of organizational strategies, policies, and programmes. Evaluations are guided by the principles of independence, impartiality, credibility and utility, and are undertaken to enhance the organization's performance in addressing the protection, assistance and solution needs of refugees, stateless people and other people we serve.

**Evaluation Office**  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
Case Postale 2500  
1211 Genève  
Switzerland  
[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org)

Published by UNHCR

Evaluation Service Copyright © 2019 UNHCR

This document is issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for general distribution. All rights are reserved. Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, provided UNHCR is acknowledged.

Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this Evaluation Report are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily represent the views of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown on maps and included in lists, tables, and documents in this Evaluation Report are not warranted to be error free, nor do they necessarily imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNHCR or the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

## Acknowledgements

First and foremost, the evaluation team would like to thank all the people they met and interviewed to feed into this evaluation: UNHCR staff in Harare, the field office and the RBSA and its many partners, including the people we serve and their representatives, government counterparts, UN partners, implementing partners and donors. They all generously gave their time and shared their experiences and insights, including constructive suggestions for how UNHCR's operation in Zimbabwe could be strengthened.

Special thanks UNHCR's operation staff in Harare and the field office who ably and effectively facilitated the evaluation team's logistics and schedule, ensuring best use of the time available and making introductions to many key informants as well as to groups of refugees, and partners. The team is grateful to Patricia Murape and Arthur Musindo who efficiently organized meetings and interviews and coordinated the schedules and the various virtual / face to face workshops in Harare and in the field.

From the Evaluation Office, appreciate goes to the Associate Evaluation Officer, Silas Amo-Agyei, who provided invaluable support to the evaluation, through the data collection and analysis phase.

The team would particularly like to thank the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) for active participation in the evaluation and contributing meaningful insights to the evaluation process from start to finish. The ERG was chaired by UNHCR Zimbabwe Representative Mr Abdoulaye Barry and his Government counterpart Mr Totamirepi Tirivavi, the Commissioner for Refugees Zimbabwe. We would also like to thank ERG participants including Mickelle Hughes, the acting resident coordinator for UNDP, Jervas Musau, the senior operations officer in RBSA, Assan Golowa, the World Vision Country Director, Gilbert Mushangari, the programme officer World Vision, Christine Mendes, the deputy Director WFP Zimbabwe and Johanne Mhlanga, the camp coordinator at Tongogara Refugee Camp.

Last, but by no means least, the evaluation team would like to thank Fiona Gatere from UNHCR Evaluation Office for her astute and supportive management of the evaluation, and her flexibility in agreeing to adapt the approach as the context changed.

Evaluation information at a glance	
<b>Title of the evaluation:</b>	Zimbabwe Country Strategy Evaluation
<b>Time frame covered:</b>	2019 – 2022
<b>Duration:</b>	June 2022 – December 2022
<b>Type of evaluation:</b>	Centralized
<b>Countries covered:</b>	Zimbabwe
<b>Evaluation manager / contact in UNHCR:</b>	Fiona Gatere
<b>Support staff:</b>	Silas Amo-Agyei

Commissioned by UNHCR Evaluation Office

Evaluation Quality Assurance provided by UNHCR Evaluation Office

## List of Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
Agritex	Agricultural Extension Services
ARDU	African Regional Deployment Unit
CBI	Cash-based intervention
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CO	Country Operation
CRI	Core relief items
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSE	Country Strategy Evaluation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
(the) DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRS	UNHCR Division of Resilience and Solutions
DSD	Department of Social Development
DTM	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
ERT	Emergency response team
ES	Evaluation Service
ESC	Evaluation Service Centre
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus group discussion
GBV	Gender-based violence
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GDP	gross domestic product
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
GRF	Global Refugee Forum
HDI	Human Development Index
HQ	UNHCR Headquarters
ICT	Information and communication technology

IDP	Internally displaced person(s)
IFS	International financial institutions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISV-COM	AfDB innovative solutions to sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable communities
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
KII	key informant interview
MoHCC	Ministry of Health and Child Care
MoPSE	Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education
MYMPSP	multi-year, multi-partner strategic plan
MYS	multi-year strategy
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organisation for African Unity (succeeded by the African Union (AU))
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLWD	People living with disabilities
RBSA	Regional Bureau of Southern Africa
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RCM	Refugee Coordination Model
RSD	Refugee status determination
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SRH	Sexual and reproductive health
TDH	Terre Des Hommes
TOC	Theory of change
TRC	Tongogara Refugee Camp
UASC	Unaccompanied and separated children
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPG	Ultra-Poor Graduation Model
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WASH	Water, sanitation, and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WV	World Vision
ZRC	Zimbabwe Refugee Committee

## Table of Contents

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....</b>	<b>II</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>VI</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>VIII</b>
<b>1.0 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 BACKGROUND.....	1
1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES .....	1
1.3 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION .....	2
<b>2.0 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>2</b>
2.1 EVALUATION APPROACH .....	2
2.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS.....	4
2.3 ANALYTICAL APPROACH .....	6
2.4 LIMITATIONS.....	7
<b>3.0 CONTEXT .....</b>	<b>8</b>
3.1 ZIMBABWE COUNTRY CONTEXT .....	8
3.2 THE SITUATION OF PEOPLE WE SERVE .....	10
3.3 OVERVIEW OF UNHCR’S STRATEGIC APPROACH IN ZIMBABWE .....	14
3.3.1 UNHCR’S FUNDING SITUATION .....	17
3.3.2 UNHCR’S STAFFING LEVELS .....	18
<b>4.0 FINDINGS.....</b>	<b>18</b>
4.1 REFUGEES .....	19
4.2 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs).....	46
4.3 STATELESSNESS .....	49
<b>5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>ANNEXES .....</b>	<b>54</b>
ANNEX 1: EVALUATION MATRIX.....	54
ANNEX 2: THEORY OF CHANGE UNHCR ZIMBABWE COUNTRY OPERATION (2019–2022) .....	63
ANNEX 3: BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	65
ANNEX 4: DATA MANAGEMENT PLAN.....	68
ANNEX 5: TERMS OF REFERENCE (ATTACHED SEPARATELY) .....	69

## Figures

Figure 1: Evaluation framework.....	3
Figure 2: Map of the Republic of Zimbabwe .....	9
Figure 3: Refugee population – Annual trends 2016–2022.....	12
Figure 4: Funding for Zimbabwe CO based on financial data provided .....	18
Figure 5: Comparison of income and savings for refugees over the past year .....	28
Figure 6: Main challenges affecting business viability .....	30
Figure 7: Preferred mechanism for addressing protection concerns for TRC and urban refugees .....	32
Figure 8: Main source of income for non-camp-based refugees.....	34
Figure 9: Reasons for wanting to live and work outside the camp for TRC and urban refugees	40
Figure 10: TRC refugee interactions with host community .....	46

## Tables

Table 1: List and number of persons interviewed .....	5
Table 2: Demographic summary TRC household survey and urban refugee survey .....	6
Table 3: Summary of UNHCR Zimbabwe objectives derived from indicator achievement reports 2019 - 2022.....	15
Table 4: Number of staff in Zimbabwe operation .....	18
Table 5: Refugee needs by greatest priority.....	19
Table 6: Number of people receiving livelihood support .....	27



## Executive summary

### **Introduction, scope, and methods**

**Purpose** - The Country Strategy Evaluation (CSE) is a forward-looking formative evaluation that is intended to generate timely evidence for learning and accountability that will help in prioritizing interventions based on contextual realities. The objectives of the evaluation are to (i) evaluate the relevance of UNHCR's strategies and operation in Zimbabwe in relation to prioritized needs; (ii) the effectiveness of its performance; (iii) the coherence of its strategic engagement with partners to in pursuit of protection and solutions for all people we serve; and (iv) sustainability of the results achieved.

The intended target audience of this evaluation are the UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operation (CO), the Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (RBSA) and UNHCR headquarters staff. Secondary stakeholders include the people UNHCR serves, donors, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and other partners.

**Scope** - The CSE covers the entirety of UNHCR's portfolio in Zimbabwe from 2019 (post cyclone-Idai) to June 2022. The evaluation includes following up on the recommendations from the [evaluation of UNHCR's Level-3 emergency response to cyclone Idai](#). The evaluation focuses principally on the strategy and operations of UNHCR at the country level, particularly the Tongogara Refugee Camp (TRC), and to a lesser extent on persons at risk of statelessness, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and gaining insights about the urban refugee population. The evaluation also assesses how the CO worked with key partners including the GOZ, donors, implementing and operational partners, other UN agencies, RBSA and UNHCR Headquarters.

**Methods** - The evaluation adopts a mixed method non-experimental design incorporating qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. A Theory of Change (TOC) was developed retroactively to outline pathways of contribution to envisage how results were anticipated and change was intended to occur. Over 70 documents were reviewed; 73 interviews carried out with key informants who included UNHCR staff in Harare, the field office, RBSA and Geneva and non-UNHCR staff. Also taken into consideration were previous decisions and actions to implement the recommendations from previous evaluation and audit reports of UNHCR operations in Zimbabwe. Over 500 refugees were reached through different methods including a survey covering camp based and non-camp-based refugees. Focus Group Discussions were held with different refugee groups including women, the elderly, community leaders, persons living with disabilities and the youth. Findings were triangulated on an ongoing basis including contextual factors.

### **Zimbabwe context and UNHCR operation**

**Zimbabwe context** - Zimbabwe faces widespread food insecurity due to several factors including macro-economic challenges and climate change-induced disasters such as cyclones, droughts, and floods. The country is also a source, transit, and destination country of mixed population flows, through designated and undesignated ports of entry. The GOZ has consistently shown

hospitality and maintains a favourable protection environment for displaced persons, refugees, and asylum-seekers pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention with key provisions of these instruments set out in the Zimbabwe constitution and refugee act. Refugees and asylum seekers are included in the National Development Strategy (NDS) 2021-2025 and the refugee camp is included in the district disaster risk reduction plans even though the economic situation in Zimbabwe limits the capacity of the Government to allocate financial resources to the refugee programme beyond provision of infrastructure and general services.

Zimbabwe has a well-established Refugee Coordination Model which is anchored on a solid framework of refugee laws and policies. The Zimbabwe Refugee Committee (ZRC) which comprises relevant government departments conducts refugee status determination (RSD) with UNHCR participating as an observer. The Zimbabwe Refugee Act provides the legislative and administrative basis for RSD. The GOZ still has reservations on the right to work and freedom of movement for refugees and asylum seekers but in practice, GOZ supports refugees' rights to movement and access to territory if they can prove that they are economically self-reliant.

The primary cause of displacement in Zimbabwe has been climate induced – particularly cyclone Idai and displacement related to mining. However, the GOZ maintains that there are no Zimbabweans still displaced.

The historical risk of statelessness in Zimbabwe relates to the migrant population that came into the country from neighbouring and nearby countries (e.g., Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia) as farm and mine workers during the colonial period. This population group was negatively affected by multiple changes in nationality laws in Zimbabwe which denied migrants citizenship, especially in the period between 1963 and 2003. In 2013, the new constitution made provisions for statelessness and, in 2019, the GOZ made seven commitments during the High-Level Segment on Statelessness at the Global Refugee Forum (GRF). The GOZ maintains a Statelessness Task Force and, with UNHCR's support. There were however no reliable statistics for how many people are at risk of statelessness. UNHCR successfully lobbied for the inclusion of proxy questions through UNFPA on statelessness in the 2022 census.

**UNHCR operation** - The UNHCR Zimbabwe operation is relatively small with 22,642 refugees and asylum seekers. There are no reliable official statistics on numbers of persons at risk of stateless and internally displaced. UNHCR Zimbabwe's annual operational plans have focused on all persons UNHCR serves – refugees, internally displaced persons, persons at risk of statelessness and returnees – but in practice, work and funding has primarily been focused on camp-based refugees and asylum seekers.

Despite facing recurrent food security crisis, displacement and climatic shocks, Zimbabwe does not fit the typical characteristic of a humanitarian crisis and there is therefore an ongoing debate among aid agencies about whether a classic humanitarian architecture is necessary. The difference between humanitarian and development approaches to assisting people in need is indistinguishable in contexts such as Zimbabwe where there is long-term protracted displacement with assistance provided over several years. The 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) had only one project submitted (by UNHCR) in relation to general protection. This project was not adopted by the GOZ, and a plan for 2022 was not developed. Like UNHCR, most UN partners

engaged in the humanitarian sector in Zimbabwe are facing financial constraints due to the protracted nature of the needs in the humanitarian sector.

UNHCR's strategic approach in Zimbabwe, as elaborated in the annual operational plans between 2019 and 2022, has acknowledged the need for durable solutions but it has also recognized that these are currently unattainable for many refugees and asylum seekers. This is primarily because of the non-return policy for most refugees who are from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the limited though increasing opportunities for resettlement. Formal local integration is currently not possible for refugees, but socio-economic integration is seen as a possibility for refugees who are economically self-reliant. To support refugees' socio-economic integration and self-reliance, the CO, in collaboration with key partners have been working towards transforming the camp to a service centre. The service centre would be integrated into the district and serve both refugees and host communities. This is expected to increase the pace of refugees' integration by increasing the refugees' ability to contribute and be a meaningful part of the community while becoming more socially and economically integrated.

Zimbabwe was included as a priority country under UNHCR's #IBelongCampaign and the CO has been working in collaboration with GOZ to implement the UNHCR Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014–2024. However, the number of persons at risk of statelessness is still unknown and CO has had minimal engagement in addressing statelessness mainly due to lack of dedicated staff or resources to address these priorities. There were also significant gaps in the overall response to IDPs after cyclone Idai due to lack of funding and consequently no activities or resources directed at the IDP response.

The CO has had to implement its country strategy with funding of 6.1 million (2020), 6.7million (2021 and 2022). There has however been a growing gap between the budgeted amount and the income received. The CO has tried to diversify its funding base by attracting new donors such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank and other donors, with the RBSA central to resource mobilization efforts. However, despite diversifying the donor base, a more sustainable funding base has yet to materialize, with the short-term funding cycles of donors being a major operational challenge particularly for the livelihood projects.

The staffing and organizational structure of UNHCR Zimbabwe has been sufficient and effective in meeting the needs for refugees and asylum seekers but there was no dedicated funding for IDPs and statelessness since 2020. The staff numbers have remained constant around 27 with spikes in 2019 to 46 (21 from the Emergency Response Team) and in 2022 43 (14 to address the increased resettlement caseload). However, the staffing levels is not structured to effectively realize the ambition of transitioning the TRC from a camp to a service centre with enhanced self-reliance of refugees. There are gaps in some key technical skills livelihoods, irrigation, value chain and M&E though some of the expertise could be found among implementing partners or GOZ.

This is the first CSE of UNHCR's operations in Zimbabwe. It provides an assessment of the implementation of the CO's strategy since 2019 (post cyclone Idai) with a view to documenting the lessons learned and informing implementation or revision of the multi-year strategy 2023-2026.

## **Findings**

**Relevance and alignment with global and national policies** - Overall, the CO plans are in line with and reflect key UNHCR corporate strategies and priorities and refugees' priorities. This was confirmed by findings from the survey which showed that 80.3 percent of those interviewed agreed with the statement that "UNHCR assistance has focused on the areas that I need most". The CO actively integrates and advocates for inclusion through the AGD lens, ensures that the minimum requirements are considered, and actions outlined to promote equitable access to protection and solutions. This includes actively supporting integration of global UNHCR policies into partners plans and programmes for people we serve. The CO has also ensured climate smart plans and actively supported implementation of innovations that promoted climate friendly practices particularly in reconstruction after cyclone Idai and in the livelihood programs. At the sectoral level, education, health, nutrition, and WASH programmes were implemented in line with UNCHR policies and aligned with GOZ national and decentralized strategies.

The GOZ made seven pledges related to statelessness at the 2019 High Level Forum on Statelessness, including conducting a study on statelessness, developing an action plan to end statelessness, acceding to the Statelessness Convention, and strengthening civil registration to prevent statelessness. However, the evaluation noted that only partial progress had been made on implementing these pledges and the CO had not dedicated significant resources and capacity to the issue.

In terms of the protection and assistance afforded to IDPs, the CO has focused on strengthening preparedness and response to provide protection and assistance for displacements and to clarify its role in relation to other actors in line with UNHCR's policies and procedures in this area. However, since 2020, the CO has not engaged in direct assistance to IDPs but worked through its coordination responsibilities of the protection cluster. The data on IDPs was last updated by IOM in April 2021 with a figure of 41,535, although the GOZ maintains that there are currently no IDPs in Zimbabwe.

**Effectiveness** - The evaluation found that UNHCR was largely effective in achieving its strategic objectives on refugees but less effective on statelessness and IDPs post cyclone Idai. The targets outlined in relevant planning documents 2019–2022 were met and the CO delivered effective protection and solutions for refugees in partnership with GOZ and partners. The CO effectively supported GOZ in the implementation of the GCR and the pledges made at the GRF for refugees and asylum seekers but progress on statelessness was slow. This contributed to expanding of protection services for refugees with referral pathways working effectively, combined with prevention activities.

The CO effectively integrated refugees into GOZ service delivery mechanisms while providing additional technical support directly or through implementing partners in education, health, shelter, WASH protection. The refugees are integrated into GOZ plans at sectoral (health, education, national security, sanitation) and district levels. The level of service was at least equal to the level of service provided to the host population and there were no sectors with significant unmet needs. The main challenge facing the CO is diminishing funding by the CO and their partners which is putting a strain on the ability to perpetually continue paying for refugees to access services.

On IDPs, UNHCR's response in Zimbabwe highlights the challenges of implementing the IDP policy in small operations without significant resources. After the initial six-month emergency response, the CO has had no subsequent funds to provide any response to the IDPs in Zimbabwe, either those that remained displaced because of Cyclone Idai or those displaced for other reasons. Several proposals have been made for revising and merging the protection cluster with the UN-led human rights working group which is chaired by the Human Rights Advisor in the RC Office. In March 2022, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC) visited Zimbabwe and recommended that the protection cluster – along with the other clusters – be deactivated and transitioned into another human rights/protection coordination structure with UNHCR still engaged but not actively leading. The evaluation came to similar conclusions based on available evidence.

On statelessness, the evaluation noted that only partial progress had been made in implementing the pledges made at the High-Level Forum on Statelessness. The CO had been unable to dedicate significant resources and capacity to the issue. These findings were consistent with UNHCR's recent thematic evaluation on statelessness in terms of institutional attention.

**Strategic positioning, partnership, and coherence** - Given the protracted nature of the refugee displacement, the challenging socioeconomic context in Zimbabwe, and the decreasing level of funds at the disposal of the country office, UNHCR's strategy has focused on repositioning itself as coordinator for strategic partnerships and convener of stakeholders and multi-agency contributions, rather than direct provider of assistance primarily to refugees. The main partners that UNHCR has been coordinating with has been GOZ as co-chairs on management of refugee affairs in TRC and at national level. Other key partners were implementing partners and WFP on refugees and UN partners through the Resident Coordinator's office as part of the UN Country Team (UNCT). The CO acknowledges the need to expand partnership and coordination particularly with the UN in Zimbabwe under the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework. Partly in response to the evolving context, the CO was more extensively engaged in the development of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) than the previous UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This is particularly important as there will be an increasing need for UNHCR to work through other agencies in the context of diminishing funding and as the needs of refugees move towards development sectors where UNHCR will need to leverage strategic partnerships in the development sectors. To this end, UNHCR has played a more active role in the UN Country Team as recommended in the Cyclone Idai evaluation.

## **Conclusions and recommendations**

**Conclusion 1 - Supporting the strategic and evidence-based transformation of the refugee camp to a holistic and comprehensive service centre and enhancing refugees self-reliance should be the highest priority.**

UNHCR has worked effectively with, and in support of the GOZ to strengthen the refugee response, improve protection and assistance for refugees in the TRC and provide opportunities for livelihoods. The support has led to initial transformation of the TRC with the camp now operating more like a settlement than a refugee camp. The transformation to a service centre where the aim is for refugees to be more self-reliant and integrated into the community should remain the number one priority. On its part, the GOZ has provided more access to land so that allocations can meet international standards of 0.25 ha per household from the current 0.1 ha

allocation. The allocation of land by GOZ is with an expectation that UNHCR and partners will invest in making the land more productive primarily through irrigation infrastructure.

Despite the high levels of commitments, progress on the livelihood projects has mainly been on subsistence production which has contributed to dietary diversity and some extent of food security but has fallen short of meeting the self-reliance or graduation objectives. A coherent and long-term livelihood strategy, that is properly funded, has been lacking. There has been a fragmented and stop-start approach characterized by change of partners, introduction of new projects, and subsequent change in implementation methods. This approach has yielded low results and faced significant structural challenges. This stop-start approach has also led to a sense of disillusionment among some refugees and risks creating more dependency if livelihood opportunities do not translate into self-reliance. This further reinforces the need to shift programming towards self-reliance, avoiding the risk of livelihood programmes being seen as perpetual support.

It is recommended that:

1. UNHCR Zimbabwe should, in collaboration with GOZ, **develop a medium-term strategy and costed work-plan to implement its commitment of transforming the Tongogara Refugee Camp into a holistic, comprehensive service centre for refugees and the communities that host them.** This should be informed by the UNHCR's strategic framework for climate action, the global framework for sustainable action, and other studies such as cost-benefit analyses.
2. UNHCR Zimbabwe should continue **advocacy towards the GOZ to provide the additional land required for the refugees to meet international standards on land allocation.** This should go hand in hand with the completion of the livelihood strategy that will inform on the best approach to **add value to the land (including irrigation, climate smart agriculture practices and value chain management)** to enable refugees achieve the levels of productivity required for self-reliance.
3. As the transition continues and refugees become more self-reliant, integrated into the community and GOZ delivery mechanisms, UNHCR Zimbabwe in close collaboration with RBSA should lead **periodic mapping and review (every two to four years) with partners the capacities and staffing of UNHCR and GOZ that will be required to deliver the transformation.** This should ensure that key capacities including irrigation / WASH, livelihood, M&E, development, and community engagement are included in the GOZ, implementing partners, operational partners or UNHCR capacities.
4. UNHCR Zimbabwe in close collaboration with RBSA and DRS should prioritize **fundraising independently and with partners for livelihood projects** in line with the requirements to transition from subsistence to economic self-reliance. The approach of sourcing local or regional financiers, accessing UNHCR global funds and increasing the allocation of livelihood funds in UNHCR Zimbabwe's portfolio should be maintained. Finding new sources of livelihoods funding for UNHCR and partners to meet the requirements to transform livelihoods from subsistence to surplus production should remain a priority.

**Conclusion 2 – Enhanced advocacy on implementation of commitments and legislation is required.**

UNHCR CO has advocated for greater involvement by GOZ at centralized and decentralized levels in addressing the needs of refugees. There has been progress in some areas of implementing global commitments, however, there remain key legislation barriers to improving the protection and assistance of refugees.

It is recommended that:

5. UNHCR Zimbabwe should, in conjunction with other UN agencies, **increase its advocacy, engagement and technical support for the implementation of commitments that GOZ has signed up to.** The main commitments that need to be prioritized include the GRF, 1951 and 1969 convention so that it further aligns its national laws and policies with international **standards** for refugees and persons at risk of statelessness.
6. UNHCR Zimbabwe should maintain **advocacy and work with the GOZ to undertake the planned study on statelessness** in Zimbabwe and the actions to implement the pledges made during the High-Level Forum on Statelessness and should identify an implementing partner to support this.

### **Conclusion 3 - Review of UNHCR's coordination role on IDPs.**

UNHCR's protection and assistance response to IDPs since Cyclone Idai has raised key policy implementation challenges with respect to UNHCR's approach to IDPs. This includes climate-induced displacement and how to fulfil its cluster responsibilities which have been compounded by the lack of funding.

It is recommended that:

7. UNHCR Zimbabwe should, as recommended by the Global Protection Cluster, **lead discussions with other partners with engagement from RBSA on the reformulation or deactivation of the protection cluster including the establishment of an alternative coordination structure** for protection and human rights issues in Zimbabwe. This would not be led by UNHCR, but it would remain an active member.

## 1.0 Introduction

This is the first country strategy evaluation (CSE) of UNHCR's operations in Zimbabwe. It provides an assessment of the country operations' (CO) including the implementation of its strategy since 2019, with a view to documenting the lessons learned and informing the next strategic multi-year strategy (MYS) 2023 to 2026. The evaluation was commissioned by the UNHCR Evaluation Service and carried out between June and December 2022 with the guidance and oversight of an Evaluation Reference Group (ERG). The ERG was co-chaired by UNHCR and the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and included implementing and operational partners, donors as well as the UNHCR staff from the Regional Bureau of Southern Africa (RBSA). The current draft evaluation report sets out the background to the CSE, the evaluation approach and methodology, findings presented in line with the evaluation criteria and questions, conclusions, and related recommendations.

### 1.1 Background

The UNHCR Zimbabwe operation is relatively small with 22,642 refugees and asylum seekers, who have limited durable solutions available to them. As of May 2022, there were 9,889 registered refugees, 5,304 asylum-seekers, 904 listed as others of concern and 6,546 Mozambicans whose asylum applications were never adjudicated as the GOZ adopted a prima facie recognition of status as asylum-seekers under the expectations that their stay in Zimbabwe would be short. In 2021 There were approximately 41,535 internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from natural and man-made disasters including Cyclone Idai, and an unknown number of persons at risk of statelessness. The prevailing context in Zimbabwe is characterized by economic crisis and erratic currency fluctuations. The country has also been affected by cyclical climate change-related disasters such as floods and droughts. Since 2019, UNHCR has increasingly directed strategic attention to supporting the GOZ in discharging its responsibilities for the protection and assistance of people we serve. Since 2014, UNHCR and the GOZ made the strategic decision to transition from UNHCR's provision of direct care and maintenance to refugees and instead to integrate refugees into GOZ plans and service delivery mechanisms. UNHCR also advocated for the inclusion of refugees in national plans and the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF). This was to go hand in hand with promoting self-reliance for refugees so that they are less dependent on direct UNHCR and partner assistance.

### 1.2 Purpose and objectives

The CSE is a forward-looking formative evaluation that is intended to generate timely evidence to inform UNHCR's future operational planning and multi-year strategy in Zimbabwe (2023–2026). This is, in turn, expected to lead to a more effective and impactful UNHCR strategy, partnerships and programming in pursuit of protection and solutions for all people we serve. The CSE analysed and provided evidence on the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and sustainability of UNHCR's strategy considering key contextual issues in Zimbabwe. The ultimate objective of the evaluation is to use this evidence to determine the extent to which UNHCR's interventions in Zimbabwe did, or did not, improve the lives of people we serve and to make recommendations that will help to achieve the desired results. The CSE's objectives were primarily focused on learning to assess



and draw lessons from UNHCR's operational experience in Zimbabwe but also includes elements of accountability to evaluate how successful the CO has been at implementing its strategy. In particular, the evaluation focuses on the following four objectives:

- assessing whether the UNHCR country operation was relevant to the needs of people we serve and effective in achieving planned results;
- the strategic positioning and coordination of the UNHCR country operation with the GOZ and other partners including whether its approach was coherent and connected with these different actors;
- the sustainability of the intervention given the constraints faced and the degree of capacity-strengthening with relevant stakeholders;
- the appropriateness and coverage of the intervention, and whether it was inclusive of the needs of people we serve and accountable to affected populations.

The intended target audience of this evaluation is the UNHCR Zimbabwe CO, RBSA and Headquarters staff. Second tier stakeholders include the GOZ and other implementing and operational partners, people we serve and donors.

### 1.3 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation covers UNHCR's operations in Zimbabwe from 2019 to June 2022. It focuses principally on the strategy and operations of UNHCR at the country level, particularly the Tongogara Refugee Camp (TRC), and to a lesser extent on gaining insights about the urban refugee population. The evaluation also assesses how the CO worked with key partners including the GOZ, donors, implementing and operational partners, other UN agencies, RBSA and UNHCR Headquarters. The main strategic approach referred to in the evaluation is outlined in the country's operational plans and reports for 2019–2022 and the 2023–2026 MYS. This was consolidated into a theory of change (TOC) for the evaluation which aimed to verify the extent to which the strategic approach was relevant, effective, sustainable and inclusive. The evaluation also reviewed whether the CO had implemented relevant UNHCR global policies and guidelines. Also taken into consideration were previous decisions and actions to implement the recommendations from previous evaluation and audit reports of UNHCR operations in Zimbabwe in 2020<sup>1</sup> and UNHCR's L3 response to Cyclone Idai.<sup>2</sup> Even though the evaluation focuses on all people we serve, less attention was paid to persons at risk of statelessness and returnees as these had not been such a principal focus of the CO's operations, compared to refugees.

## 2.0 Evaluation methodology

### 2.1 Evaluation approach

The evaluation adopts a mixed method non-experimental design incorporating qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. The CSE used a selection of the standard evaluation criteria defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for

---

<sup>1</sup> Audit of the Operations of the UNHCR Zimbabwe, Report 2020/48, Internal Audit Division, 1 December 2020. The audit covered the period from 1 October 2018 to 31 December 2019.

<sup>2</sup> Final Report, Evaluation of UNHCR's L3 Emergency Response to Cyclone Idai, February 2021.

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As set out in the terms of reference and inception report, the evaluation sought to answer the following key evaluation questions:

- i. **Results:** To what extent did UNHCR's Zimbabwe CO achieve its strategic objectives and was its response appropriate and/or addressed to the needs of people we serve?
- ii. **Strategic positioning and coordination:** To what extent did UNHCR Zimbabwe's strategy align with and enhance those of the GOZ and other UN and NGO partners?
- iii. **Sustainability and capacity-strengthening:** How did UNHCR enhance sustainability and capacities for delivery of results and leverage its influence within the country to optimize the potential impact of its collective efforts?
- iv. **Engagement and accountability to affected populations:** How effectively has UNHCR Zimbabwe ensured an inclusive approach to its programming and accountability to people we serve?

To answer the evaluation questions in a systematic manner, the evaluation team developed an evaluation matrix (see Annex 1). The overall analytical approach was also guided by the evaluation framework (see Figure 1) which outlines the approach to data collection and analysis.

Figure 1: Evaluation framework



The country strategy was outlined in the TOC (see Annex 2) developed by the evaluation team which guided the processes and assumptions of how change was intended to occur, based on the different interventions implemented. The TOC was used to further elaborate how the strategy outlined in the multi-year, multi-partner strategic plan (MYMPSP) was expected to bring about the changes and was the basis for outlining the evaluation criteria and questions. The evaluation matrix elaborated the evaluation criteria and questions by providing sub-questions that were used to guide the development of evaluation tools – survey, key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussion (FGD). The evaluation applied a realist approach guided by the evaluation framework to systematically assess evidence of the “what, how, for whom and with whom” of UNHCR’s CO from 2019 to 2022 as elaborated in Figure 1.

## 2.2 Data collection methods

The analytical framework was informed by the evaluation framework (see Figure 1), which outlined the areas of inquiry that would be used to answer the evaluation questions in the evaluation matrix (see Annex 1) primary data collection tools. The evaluation framework ensured that the evaluation addressed all areas of the evaluation questions. It also helped to ensure that the relevant time frame and changes over time were considered when responding to evaluation questions. Cross-cutting issues including Age, Gender, Diversity (AGD) and inclusion were integrated into all evaluation questions and in all the FGDs, KIIs and survey. Women, men, persons living with disabilities, older people and minority communities were included in the sample size. Data from UNHCR’s indicator achievement report and thematic surveys are disaggregated by gender, age and people with specific needs (PSN) whenever the data is available.

The specific evaluation tools used were as follows:

**Desk review:** An in-depth desk review was undertaken with more than 70 relevant documents provided by the CO (Annex 3), RBSA and Headquarters as well as from external sources reviewed. The classification of literature reviewed included UNHCR global policies and strategies, the CO operational and strategic plans and related documents including reports, indicator reports, statistics, programme documents, partnership agreements, financial and human resources documents, partner agency documents, UNHCR CO documents and relevant national plans and documents. The detailed list of literature reviewed during the evaluation is included in the bibliography in Annex 3.

**Key informant interviews:** A total of 73 key informants from UNHCR, UN agencies, the GOZ, NGOs including implementing and operational partners, and refugees were interviewed. Key informants were from multiple levels: global/HQ, regional (Southern Africa), national, sub-national, district and community levels. A total of 42 respondents (57.5 per cent) were UNHCR staff. While KIIs were held with only five refugees, more than 500 refugees were reached through other methods outlined below (FGDs and surveys). Interviews were guided by the KII guide, developed from the evaluation matrix and tailored to different groups<sup>3</sup> based on their respective roles. Key informants were as follows.

---

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR CO management, UNHCR CO technical staff, UNHCR regional bureau and HQ staff, implementing partners, donors, operational partners, GOZ representatives, refugee representatives.

Table 1: List and number of persons interviewed

Group	Descriptions	# of people
UNHCR staff	Headquarters (Geneva) (4), UNHCR RBSA (Pretoria) (19), UNHCR Harare Office, (9) UNHCR Tongogara Refugee Camp (10)	42
UN agencies	Resident Coordinator, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA	7
Implementing partners	TDH, World Vision	6
Operational partners	World Food Programme (WFP)	1
Donors and NGOs	African Development Bank (AfDB), USAID, Save the Children	3
Government partners	<b><u>National:</u></b> Commissioner of Refugees, Immigration  <b><u>District:</u></b> District Development Coordinator (DDC), CEO – Chipinge District Council, Agricultural Extension Services (Agritex), Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MoPSE), Department of Social Development (DSD, Ministry of Health, and Child Care (MoHCC)  <b><u>Tongogara Refugee Camp:</u></b> Camp Administrator (DSD)	9
Refugees	<b>Community leaders</b> , PLWD, women, minorities, new arrivals, youth	5
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>73</b>

**Focus group discussions:** The evaluation included primary data collection with refugees based in TRC. FGDs were used to get a detailed understanding of issues from the perspective of different beneficiary groups. With the aid of interpreters, a total of 10 diverse groups were convened as follows:

- **six FGDs involving different livelihood projects:** irrigation scheme, hydroponics, fisheries, poultry (egg-laying birds), income savings and lending (savings for 4 transformation) and insect-farming.
- one FGD with **community leaders**, including representatives of countries of origin, single women, minorities, youth, and older people.
- one FGD with representatives for **persons living with disabilities**.
- one FGD with **women’s representatives**, and one FGD with **youth representatives**.

**Quantitative data collection surveys:** Two surveys provided an overview of the perspectives and opinions of refugees and generated quantitative data to support the findings from the other data collection tools.

*Household Survey in Tongogara Refugee Camp:* A face-to-face survey was administered and reached a total of 290 households, which surpassed the sample target of 250 households. Stratified random sampling was used, with stratification across key demographic characteristics (sex, age, country of origin) within TRC. The survey lasted for 20 to 30 minutes each time it was administered. The following sampling frame was used:

<b>Sampling frame</b>	$n = \frac{z^2 \times \hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{\epsilon^2}$	<b>z</b> is the z score = 95% <b>ε</b> is the margin of error = 6% <b>N</b> is population size = Number of households <b>ĥ</b> is the population proportion = 50%
-----------------------	--	--

Calculation made by <https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator>

- *Urban refugee survey:* An urban refugee phone-based survey was conducted and all available contacts (765 urban refugees) from UNHCR Data Identity Management and Analysis DIMA Unit were called but only 140 non-camp-based refugees were available or responded. The interview sought to find out if and how urban refugees were receiving support from UNHCR and other organizations, and if so, what support they received. The survey lasted an average of five minutes, due to the scope of the questionnaire, which did not include satisfaction of services, and only a small number of urban refugees sought or received health and educational services or support with civil registration, protection and resettlement.

Table 2: Demographic summary TRC household survey and urban refugee survey

Demographic characteristics	Categories	Percentage representation	
		TRC survey	Urban survey
<b>Country of origin</b>	DRC	75.5%	81.43%
	Mozambique	11.4%	-
	Burundi	10.0%	0.71%
	Rwanda	3.1%	14.3%
<b>Sex</b>	Male	58.6%	76.43%
	Female	41.4%	23.57%
<b>Age</b>	Average age	42.64 years	43.75 years

TRC n=290; urban refugees n=140

**Observation visits:** The evaluation team visited the TRC project sites supported by UNHCR including administrative offices, health facilities, livelihoods, youth centre, food distribution centre, shelter, WASH facilities and grading sheds. The transit centre in Harare, including accommodation and WASH facilities, was also visited.

**Data analysis:** The evaluation team undertook detailed analysis of financial data of the UNHCR operation and of the reporting on the operational plan indicators summarized in the annual indicator achievement report to support the evaluation findings. The indicator achievement report<sup>4</sup> only reports on the indicators that were funded. For example, in 2021, shelter indicators are not tracked because there was no funding for shelter.

### 2.3 Analytical approach

**A thematic content analysis** in line with the evaluation objectives and questions was conducted to interpret qualitative data. At the start of the evaluation, questions were grouped according to

<sup>4</sup> The indicator achievement report tracks key indicators from the MYMPSP with baseline, mid-term and end-of-year progress and targets. It is updated twice a year through several primary data sources.

the themes they represented in line with the terms of reference provided by the Evaluation Service (ES). In so doing, findings were also grouped into the same themes.

A **contribution analysis** was also conducted based on the TOC that was developed at the start of the assignment. Using literature through project documents and inception mission interviews, pathways of contribution to envisaged results were anticipated. The cause-effect relationship of interventions and outcome results guided the data analysis.

**The quantitative analysis** made use of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) in frequenting, cross tabulations and statistical tests to enhance interpretation of quantitative data. Literature review findings will be compared against the baseline findings to track progress of the operation.

**Data triangulation** was also used in data analysis. Qualitative and quantitative data was triangulated to create verifiable evidence for the evaluation, as both were used to confirm the other's findings. Triangulation was also used across the multilevel and multisectoral nature of evaluation informants. Verification of information is across community, sub-national, national, regional and global levels; and across UNHCR, government, UN and NGOs, donors and communities. Triangulation also included verification between secondary and primary data.

**Validation and debrief:** An important step in the process of data analysis and drafting of the findings were debrief and validation meetings and recommendation formulation workshops planned with relevant staff and key stakeholders at the end of the data collection phase. Participants were given an opportunity to inform the conclusions and recommendations. The final validation workshop was held with the ERG in Harare on 15 November 2022.

## 2.4 Limitations

While the evaluation approach and methodology described were implemented to produce sufficiently credible findings, there were some key limitations of the evaluation process. These were:

- **Lack of an existing TOC:** The CO had not prepared a TOC envisioning the broad strategies and actions that UNHCR set out to undertake during the time frame of assessment from 2019 to 2022 because this was not a requirement during the period covered. The evaluation team, therefore, had to construct retroactively a TOC to guide the understanding of the CO operations and strategy. The TOC was shared, reviewed, and approved by the ERG as part of the inception report.
- **Timing of the evaluation:** The evaluation was undertaken in 2022 after the MYS (2023–2026) had already been prepared and approved. A critical window for informing the initial planning phase was missed. However, because the MYS is a live document, findings from the CSE are still expected to inform implementation or review of the plan.
- **Refugee surveys affected by availability:** The urban refugee survey was not sampled prior to the evaluation after assumptions were made that there was likely to be a huge number of defaulters. Consultants were given a list of all contacts for urban refugees at the disposal of UNHCR. The complete list comprised of 765 phone numbers. All phone numbers were called: the majority were out of service or were unanswered, while some refugees owned more than one number. At the end of the data collection exercise, 140

urban refugees were reached. The 140 respondents were determined to be an adequate sample to provide findings that could shed light on issues that are of interest, although the findings may not be generalizable to the urban refugees. The sample reached was 14 per cent of the 946 refugees recorded in proGres v4 as living outside TRC.

- **Inability to meet with host community representatives:** The planned FGD with host communities was not held, following feedback from the community leaders communicated through the government representatives. The leader of the host community had died a few days before the fieldwork and having the meetings would have appeared insensitive to the current context and may have caused offence. Views on how UNHCR and refugees engaged with the host community were, however, accessed through previous literature and from other informants.
- **Separate findings for refugees and other people we serve:** Given how the Zimbabwe operation is structured, the support provided to TRC-based refugees is clear and distinct from support provided to IDPs and other people we serve. It was therefore necessary to differentiate the findings for each people we serve and present these separately. The evaluation however ensured that the focus was on how the strategy was delivered with the differentiation only used because of the significant distinction and findings for the different people we serve. The evaluation focused on answering the evaluation questions from a strategic lens, with sensitivity to the needs of the different people we serve and the CO response.
- **No interviews with minors:** Even though there were findings that indicated that there were minors engaged in livelihood activities, the evaluation did not interview minors because there was no ethical clearance or specific methodology developed to interview minors. The number of child-headed households were, however, few and were under the guardianship of an adult (relative where possible).
- **Evaluation team leader doubled as the evaluation manager:** The evaluation team leader who is under a consultancy contract with UNHCR to provide evaluation support to the Southern Africa Region was also the team leader of the evaluation. There was no conflict of interest because the team leader had not been involved in any way in the implementation of the programme and was completely independent of the operation. Quality assurance of the deliverables was done by an external quality assurance team in line with UNHCR procedures.

## 3.0 Context


### 3.1 Zimbabwe country context

The Republic of Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe hereafter) is a landlocked country located in southern Africa between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. The country has a population of 15.1 million as per the 2022 national and population census, with a sex ratio of 92 males per 100 females.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> ZIMSTAT (2022) 2022, Population and Housing Census – Preliminary findings

Figure 2: Map of the Republic of Zimbabwe



Source: UNHCR

Zimbabwe is currently classified as a lower-middle income country. Zimbabwe's human development index (HDI) value for 2019 was 0.571 which put the country in the medium human development category; positioning it 150 out of 189 countries and territories.<sup>6</sup> Negative economic growth in recent years combined with the high cost of living due to currency fluctuations have pushed many households into poverty, with the percentage of people in extreme poverty almost doubling between 2011 and 2019, rising from 21 per cent to 39.5 per cent.<sup>7</sup> Real GDP contracted cumulatively by 11.7 per cent during 2019–2020 and rose by 6.3 per cent in 2021, driven by a bumper maize harvest, a strong uptick in mining, and buoyant construction.<sup>8</sup> According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe in 2019 stood at 4.9 per cent.<sup>9</sup>

The country has been experiencing serious economic challenges with inflation reaching 838 per cent in July 2020 although it fell to 60.7 per cent in December 2021.<sup>10</sup> The country is in a debt

<sup>6</sup> UNDP (2020) Human Development Report 2020 The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report

<sup>7</sup> World Bank Group (2021) Poverty and Equity Brief Zimbabwe

<sup>8</sup> IMF Executive Board Consultations with Zimbabwe – March 2022

<sup>9</sup> Zimbabwe Unemployment Rate – 2022 Data – 2023 Forecast (tradingeconomics.com)

<sup>10</sup> World Bank – Zimbabwe Overview – [Zimbabwe Overview: Development news, research, data | World Bank](#)



crisis with consolidated public sector debt accounting for 102 per cent of GDP in 2020.<sup>11</sup> Zimbabwe owes \$13.5 billion to multilateral financial institutions, bilateral partners and other creditors.<sup>12</sup> The country has taken drastic steps to address the debt problem and has since reduced the rate to 66.3 per cent of GDP in 2021. In 2010, a group of donors, in a bid to support priority recovery activities of the Government of Zimbabwe, decided to create the Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (the ZimFund), with AfDB designated to manage the fund.<sup>13</sup> The donors to the ZimFund are AfDB, Denmark, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, and these have contributed \$145.86 million to date. The ZimFund has been the primary source of development aid to the GOZ. Donors including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are precluded from providing financial support to Zimbabwe due to unsustainable debt and official external arrears.

Public indebtedness worsened further as the government assumed Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe - RBZ's legacy debt, adding over \$2.5 billion to external arrears. External debt reached \$14.5 billion.<sup>14</sup> Zimbabwe's arrears on debt repayments to international financial institutions (IFS) triggered a moratorium on international funding and drastically reduced support from the international community and traditional donors. The moratorium further impacted growth in the private sector, including the two main drivers of economic growth, agriculture, and mining. It has made the country more reliant on humanitarian assistance provided by international aid agencies. The next general elections in Zimbabwe are due in June 2023.<sup>18</sup>

The decline in agricultural production, combined with climatic shocks and high food prices, has increased food insecurity, with more than a quarter of households facing food insecurity as of July 2020.<sup>15</sup> The GOZ has been working with development partners including AfDB and the IMF to address the areas and has taken important steps including lowering taxes on fuel and making changes to its land policy. The GOZ has also been implementing a range of social protection measures including an agriculture-based programme which has given relief to 2 million households, and a cash transfer programme, targeting children from poor families.<sup>16</sup> Zimbabwe's socioeconomic development has also been affected by severe exogenous shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, three consecutive years of drought and Cyclone Idai in 2019. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 3 January 2020 to 23 September 2022, there have been 257,156 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with 5,598 deaths. The country was also severely affected by the delta variant of COVID-19 in 2021.

### 3.2 The situation of people we serve.

UNHCR's operations in Zimbabwe have been organised around its four pillars which correspond to categories of people we serve namely: refugees and asylum-seekers, IDPs, persons at risk of

---

<sup>11</sup> IMF Press Release Number 22/88 accessed on 3 October 2022

<sup>12</sup> AfDB Newsletter 13 July 2022

<sup>13</sup> AfDB (2022) Zimbabwe Multi Donor Trust Fund <https://www.AfDB.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/zimbabwe-multi-donor-trust-fund> accessed on 3 October 2022

<sup>14</sup> [Zimbabwe Overview: Development news, research, data | World Bank](#)

<sup>15</sup> UNHCR RBSA (2021) Zimbabwe Country Development Profile 2021

<sup>16</sup> AfDB Zimbabwe Newsletter 7 April 2022 – accessed on 3 October 2022

statelessness, and returnees. The summary of the people we serve during the evaluation period was as follows.

### Refugees and asylum-seekers

Zimbabwe has hosted refugees and asylum-seekers from the region for several decades with the number fluctuating depending on developments in each country. As Figure 3 shows, the last significant influx of refugees and asylum-seekers occurred between 2016 and 2018 mainly from Mozambique. The number of refugees and asylum-seekers during the evaluation period has remained relatively stable as recorded on UNHCR's database proGress,<sup>17</sup> rising marginally from 21,451 in 2019 to 22,643 in 2022. Most refugees and asylum-seekers (75 per cent of the TRC population) come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with the deterioration of the security situation in that country leading to a steady flow of new arrivals. UNHCR facilitates voluntary repatriation to parts of the DRC where conditions allow and based on the voluntary interest of the refugees concerned. . It is also generally considered safe to return for a group of Rwandans for whom the cessation clause was activated as early as 2014–2015.


The next highest refugee and asylum-seeker populations are from Mozambique (11 per cent), Burundi (6 per cent) and Rwanda (4 per cent). Given the proximity of TRC to the Mozambique border, there is a constant movement of people across the border. The GOZ is now in dialogue with Mozambique authorities about their eventual return to Mozambique and UNHCR plans to carry out an intention survey among the Mozambican populations.

Most refugees and asylum-seekers reside in TRC, which as of 30 April 2022 had a population of 15,151. This included 9,112 refugees, 5,228 asylum-seekers and 811 classified as others of concern. There are also non-camp-based refugees living in Harare and other residential areas, which accounted for 946 of the total refugee population as of 31 May 2022. However, urban refugees do not receive all the services provided to TRC-based refugees. They have access to the Harare office two days a week for protection counselling and registration. Usually, individual case follow-up occurs as necessary. They have access to and utilize protection phone lines (toll-free and non-toll-free) to access support as and when needed and those who are eligible undergo resettlement processing in Harare. In case of arrests, UNHCR facilitates prison visits and advocacy for the release or support of those affected which includes referral to legal partners for pro bono legal aid. Urban refugees are self-reliant and provide for their own food, health care, primary, secondary, and tertiary education unless there are exceptional circumstances or if they are outside TRC on the recommendations of the GOZ / UNHCR, or due to specific reasons such as education or health care. Health care is provided by the GOZ through the Commissioner for Refugees' Office which issues assisted medical treatment orders for use of public health institutions by refugees in urban areas.

---

<sup>17</sup> UNHCR proGres is the main repository in UNHCR for storing individuals' data.

Figure 3: Refugee population – Annual trends 2016–2022



Source: Graph summarized from UNHCR internal reports

The GOZ has consistently shown hospitality and maintains a favourable protection environment for refugees and asylum-seekers pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention with key provisions of these instruments set out in the Zimbabwe Refugees Act. However, the GOZ entered two important reservations to their accession to the Refugee Convention related to the freedom of movement and the right to employment. In practice, the GOZ has an encampment policy for refugees but implements this with flexibility. Refugees are allowed to move within Zimbabwe or outside Zimbabwe if they have relevant documentation and justification. They are allowed to move within Chipinge district (which is the district that hosts TRC) without requiring movement passes. Refugees who show adequate reasons and means to support themselves live outside TRC and are recorded as non-camp-based refugees.

Zimbabwe remains a source, transit, and destination country of mixed population flows; some of these movements are through designated and undesignated ports of entry. Zimbabwe has a well-established Refugee Coordination Model (RCM), which is anchored on a solid framework of refugee laws and policies. The GOZ made several pledges on refugees and statelessness at the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) and at the High-Level Segment on Statelessness in 2019, including to review and update the legal and policy frameworks on refugees and asylum-seekers, (including amendment of the 1983 Refugee Act by 2021), to be consistent with international refugee and human rights law. However, this commitment is still in progress and has not yet been met.

#### Internally displaced persons

In addition to refugees and asylum-seekers, the other main people we serve that UNHCR focused though to a lesser extent were IDPs. Internal displacement in Zimbabwe was caused by climate-induced and natural disasters, human rights violations, development projects, and other concerns. In March 2019, Cyclone Idai affected more than 270,000 people in eastern Zimbabwe due to flooding; approximately 41,435 of this number were displaced. Approximately 6,000 refugees and

asylum-seekers living in Tongogara Refugee Camp were also severely affected.<sup>18</sup> The agency tracking IDPs in Zimbabwe is the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which through its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) has maintained a profile of internal displacement. In 2021, there were still approximately 41,535 IDPs in Zimbabwe, which includes a residual caseload from Cyclone Idai and those people displaced for other reasons in different parts of the country.<sup>19</sup> There are differences in the definition of IDPs between the GOZ and IOM. The GOZ maintains that there are no Zimbabweans still displaced and does not agree with the figures provided by IOM. There is need to engage further and get an agreement on official statistics for IDPs. With the upcoming elections there is concern that there might be further displacement if violence occurs.

In terms of the protection and assistance afforded to IDPs, Zimbabwe has ratified the African Union Convention on the protection and assistance of IDPs (Kampala Convention). However, Zimbabwe is yet to incorporate key provisions of the convention into domestic law despite requirements to do so in both the convention and the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013). The CO has focused on strengthening preparedness and response to provide protection and assistance for displacements and to clarify its role in relation to other actors in line with UNHCR's policies and procedures in this area. However, since 2020 the CO has not engaged in direct assistance to IDPs but only with respect to its coordination responsibilities, specifically regarding the protection cluster.

#### Persons at risk of statelessness

The historical risk of statelessness in Zimbabwe relates to the migrant population that came into the country from neighbouring countries (e.g., Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia) as farm and mine workers during the colonial period.<sup>20</sup> There were no reliable statistics for how many people are at risk of statelessness. This population group was negatively affected by multiple changes in nationality laws in Zimbabwe which denied migrants citizenship, especially in the period between 1963 and 2003. In 2013, the new constitution made provisions for statelessness and, in 2019, the GOZ made seven commitments during the High-Level Segment on Statelessness at the Global Refugee Forum. The GOZ maintains a Statelessness Task Force and, with UNHCR's support, successfully lobbied for the inclusion of proxy questions through UNFPA on statelessness in the 2022 census, although the results of this have not yet been published. UNHCR is collaborating with the Registrar's Office/Civil Registry on how best to deal with persons at risk of statelessness in terms of civil registration. UNHCR has also been collaborating with the Embassy of Malawi, with plans to collaborate with the embassies of Mozambique and Zambia on awareness-raising and facilitation of civil registration for persons at risk of statelessness. UNHCR is working with the GOZ and key stakeholders to pursue the reduction of the risk of statelessness by engaging the government on inter alia aligning the Citizenship Act, Births and Deaths Registration Acts with the new Constitution of Zimbabwe. UNHCR has been supporting GOZ efforts in the provision and issuance of birth and death certificates and identification cards to refugees, asylum-seekers and nationals alike.

---

<sup>18</sup> See Final Report, Evaluation of UNHCR's L3 Emergency Response to Cyclone Idai, February 2021

<sup>19</sup> IOM DTM Round 7 Baseline Survey of May 2021

<sup>20</sup> For an overview of the issue of statelessness in Zimbabwe see Amnesty International (2021) "We are like stray animals: Thousands living on the margins due to statelessness in Zimbabwe".

## Returns

There has been only one returnee programme supported by the CO. This concerned returnees who were formerly Zimbabwean refugees living in Botswana who required support from UNHCR to return back home to Zimbabwe. There are many migrants from Zimbabwe who went to neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa, where more than two million Zimbabweans are estimated to be working and residing, with some registered as refugees in South Africa. Due to new legislation in South Africa, the prospect of their right to stay could end in June 2023 which could lead to a mass return of people to Zimbabwe that may require assistance. The CO and the RBSA have been monitoring the situation and making sure that contingency plans are in place in the event of any large-scale movements. The extent of UNHCR Zimbabwe's role in these returns is not clear because most of them would not be refugees but would be seen as unemployed Zimbabwean citizens who are returning. However, UNHCR may be called upon by the GOZ or the UN Country Team (UNCT) to provide technical support and guidance in the event of mass returns from South Africa – as was the case in 2014 following xenophobic attacks on foreigners.

### 3.3 Overview of UNHCR's strategic approach in Zimbabwe

During the evaluation period (2019–2022), UNHCR Zimbabwe's annual operational plans focused on all four pillars – refugees, IDPs, persons at risk of statelessness and returnees, with implementation being primarily focused on refugees with some inconsistent focus on IDPs, limited focus on statelessness and returnees. In summary, UNHCR's strategic approach as elaborated in the annual operational plans between 2019 and 2022 – and assessed by the evaluation – focused mainly on protection and solutions for refugees and asylum seekers while maintaining some form of advocacy on statelessness and internal displacement.

The strategy acknowledges the need for durable solutions but acknowledges that these are currently unattainable for many refugees. The durable solutions are in part unattainable due to the non-return policy for most refugees from the DRC, although voluntary repatriation is possible for some refugees. The opportunities for formal local integration of refugees and resettlement are also limited. Given the protracted nature of the refugee displacement and the challenging socioeconomic context described above, as well as the decreasing level of funds at the disposal of the CO (see section 3.5), UNHCR's strategy was one that focused on repositioning itself as coordinator for strategic partnerships and convener of stakeholders and multi-agency contributions, rather than as direct provider of assistance to people we serve.<sup>21</sup>

This strategic repositioning was also guided by the needs and opportunities arising from commitments made by the GOZ at the GRF, the Zimbabwe Constitution and relevant legislation, as well as UNHCR policies and lessons learned from previous years of working with people we serve in Zimbabwe and other similar contexts. The transformation was expected to be achieved through a transition from an operation focused on providing care and maintenance to a model that is focused on partnership mainly with the Government and integrates the needs of refugees in national and decentralized policies, strategies, legislation and development plans. This was to be achieved by integrating basic service delivery into the national systems for health, education, shelter, security and WASH. UNHCR's strategy also had a primary objective of promoting economic self-reliance for refugees, advocating and supporting opportunities for a greater government responsibility for providing for their protection and assistance and equitable access to services. The strategy was guided by cross-cutting principles including gender equality,

---

<sup>21</sup> See UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operational Plan 2019

Leaving No One Behind and Doing No Harm. The strategy covered the areas summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of UNHCR Zimbabwe objectives derived from indicator achievement reports 2019 - 2022

Focus area	Strategic objective
<b>Basic needs and essential services</b>	<b>Population has sufficient basic and domestic items:</b> The strategic objective was meant to ensure access to basic and domestic items including soap and sanitary supplies for refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs from floods.
	<b>Food security improved:</b> The main area of intervention was food distributions in the form of actual food or cash-based support. It also included encouraging women's representation in distribution committees.
	<b>Health status of population improved:</b> Improvement of the health status of refugees includes offering primary (camp level) and secondary and tertiary health care (outside the camp). The other planned efforts were supporting reduction of measles within the refugee population.
	<b>Population has optimal access to education:</b> The provision of education (ECD, primary and secondary) to all refugees was to be through the national education system, utilizing professionally trained teachers.
	<b>Population has optimal access to reproductive health and HIV services:</b> UNHCR intended to support reduction of maternal deaths, through increase of births attended by skilled personnel. UNHCR also intended to improve access to comprehensive SRH and HIV services for refugees.
	<b>Population has sufficient access to energy:</b> UNHCR set out to improve access of sustainable energy to refugees at TRC.
	<b>Population lives in satisfactory conditions of sanitation and hygiene:</b> There was a need to improve bathing facilities and ensure access to drop-hole latrines/toilets.
	<b>Shelter and infrastructure established, improved and maintained:</b> UNHCR continued to plan for access to adequate dwellings for all refugees and also to ensure that female-headed households benefited from the same. UNHCR planned to maintain five people per shelter as per international standards.
	<b>Supply of potable water improved or maintained:</b> Within the strategic period, the country operation planned to improve the quality and quantity of water by offering chlorinated water at 15 litres per person. The plan also included ensuring that each refugee would travel at least 200 metres to the nearest water point.
<b>Community empowerment and self-reliance</b>	<b>Self-reliance and livelihoods improved:</b> Due to the protracted nature of refugees in Zimbabwe, there was a plan to shift the approach from care and maintenance to self-reliance. The plan for the strategic period included growing income and savings for refugees through livelihood programmes. The strategic approach included refugees owning their business or being self-employed and ensuring that women are fully included. UNHCR also intended to have youth enrolment in agricultural training as part of building self-reliance.
<b>Durable solutions</b>	<b>Potential for resettlement realized:</b> As part of durable solutions UNHCR continued to plan for realizing potential for refugees' resettlement and for ensuring their applications are submitted. In so doing 70 per cent of people realized for resettlement were expected to depart.
	<b>Potential of voluntary return realized:</b> UNHCR planned for improvement in voluntary return of refugees while maintaining their safety and dignity.
<b>Fair protection processes and documentation</b>	<b>Access to and quality of status determination procedures improved:</b> UNHCR intended to ensure that status determination procedures meet the minimum procedural standards advocated by UNHCR. The standard target of average days from first instance interview to notification was pegged at 60 days, as was the average days from registration to first instance interview.

Focus area	Strategic objective
	<p><b>Civil registration and civil status documentation strengthened:</b> The strategic objective was geared at issuing birth certificates to children of people we serve, especially those under the age of five, with more emphasis on ensuring birth registrations are done within the first 12 months of birth.</p> <p><b>Quality of registration and profiling improved or maintained:</b> Quality registration and profiling continued to be an important aspect of UNHCR's work, and that included ensuring data is disaggregated by sex, age, location, and diversity.</p> <p><b>Reception conditions improved:</b> UNHCR planned to ensure reception conditions continue to meet minimum standards.</p> <p><b>Identification of statelessness improved:</b> There was a need to identify persons at risk of statelessness as their situation is known.</p>
Favourable protection environment	<p><b>Access to the territory improved and risk of refoulement reduced:</b> Creation of an environment that ensures that border authorities refer asylum-seekers to competent authorities.</p> <p><b>International and regional instruments acceded to, ratified, or strengthened:</b> UNHCR planned to advocate and interest the state in taking steps to become party to the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness.</p> <p><b>Law and policy developed or strengthened:</b> Strategic interventions were to be put in place to have laws and policy consistent to international standards on prevention of statelessness and protection of stateless persons.</p>
Security from violence and exploitation	<p><b>Protection of children strengthened:</b> Child protection was one of the areas that UNHCR wanted to pursue. This included reduction of cases of child abuse, neglect, violence and exploitation. There was also intent to provide safe access to community spaces and ensuring that children with specific needs receive support. This also included specific support for unaccompanied and separated children (UASC).</p> <p><b>Risk of SGBV is reduced and quality of response improved:</b> UNHCR planned to reduce SGBV cases within the camp, by ensuring the community is active in SGBV prevention and survivor-centred protection. There was an intention to ensure all known SGBV survivors receive appropriate support.</p> <p><b>Risks related to detention reduced and freedom of movement increased:</b> The strategic approach for UNHCR included reduction of detention for illegal entry and ensuring the people we serve enjoy freedom of movement.</p>
Logistics and operations support	<p><b>Logistics and supply optimized to serve operational needs:</b> Capacitation and maintenance of logistics management mechanisms to work effectively.</p> <p><b>Operations management, coordination and support strengthened and optimized:</b> UNHCR planned to extend logistics management mechanisms and ensure that logistics were working effectively.</p>

The theory of change (TOC – see Annex 2) was designed to link with the planned operations of UNHCR CO, which are summarized in Table 3. To deliver on the strategy and priorities outlined in Table 3, UNHCR has been developing strategic partnerships particularly with GOZ for sharing responsibility and ensuring the most effective and efficient approach based on partners' comparative advantages, with UNHCR and the GOZ jointly providing leadership. Financing of the strategy was through traditional donors and by finding new or innovative finances for existing and emerging needs especially among development actors. This included resource mobilization at national, regional, and global levels through UNHCR, the GOZ and other partners.

UNHCR Zimbabwe did not have a TOC associated with its strategy and planning documents from 2019 to 2022, as this was not required as part of the UNHCR's annual programming. During the inception phase and as requested in the terms of reference for the evaluation, a TOC was developed that summarized the intended strategic approach. The TOC was presented, validated,

and revised accordingly during the first ERG meeting in August 2022. The TOC developed during the evaluation was found to be valid for the current priorities of the CO and should be further refined and customized to inform the implementation of the MYS 2023–2026.

### 3.3.1 UNHCR's funding situation

The Zimbabwe CO, the GOZ and partners face a fragile funding situation compounded by currency devaluation and hyperinflation. The funding for UNHCR's operation in Zimbabwe has had a critical impact on the implementation of the country strategy throughout the period being evaluated. As shown in Figure 4, the CO's funding (or income) has fallen from \$9.3 million in 2019 to \$5.4 million in 2022 as at 30 September 2022. While part of this decrease in funding can be explained by the high level of funding received in 2019 as part of the IDP response to Cyclone Idai, the allocation of funding for all pillars has fallen since 2019. The real value of the funding was further eroded by the fluctuating exchange rate and hyperinflation. The CO has therefore had to prioritize its scarce resources and decide to which people we serve group and strategic priority the resources should be used.


Moreover, the coverage of funding (i.e the proportion of UNHCR's budget that has been funded) has reduced. There has only been funding with respect to the IDP response in 2019 in response to Cyclone Idai. Most of the funding has been dedicated to the refugee response with a small proportion allocated to statelessness. Most of the funding (78 per cent) has come from bilateral donor governments, with international organizations providing an important amount (11 per cent), alongside private foundations (9 per cent) and other UN agencies (3 per cent). The CO with support from the RBSA and Headquarters has been able to diversify and secure project and earmarked funding including from the AfDB - "Innovative solutions to sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable communities" (ISV-COM)<sup>22</sup> project. Additional funding was also secured from the UNHCR Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRS) and climate innovation funding for water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) for refugees and host communities in TRC. The supplementary UNHCR DRS funding played a critical role in filling gaps left when the AfDB funding ended and address continuing needs to sustain promising initiatives particularly in WASH and livelihoods.

---

<sup>22</sup> [Zimbabwe – AfDB innovative solutions to sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable communities \(ISV-COM\) 2018–2021](#). Accessed on 30 September 2022



Figure 4: Funding for Zimbabwe CO based on financial data provided



Note: OP – budget; OL – available funding / expenditure

### 3.3.2 UNHCR's staffing levels.

Despite the fall in funding for the Zimbabwe operations described above, staffing has been maintained at similar levels in the subsequent years as reflected in Table 4. The higher number of staff in 2019 is explained by the deployment of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) for the response to Cyclone Idai (21 people deployed: 9 in Harare and 12 in TRC). In fact, the number of staff increased in 2022, which is accounted for by the increased number of staff on loan or seconded from other organizations who are involved in processing resettlement applications following increased quotas from the United States and on refugee registration – which are both labour-intensive and time-sensitive positions.

Table 4: Number of staff in Zimbabwe operation

Year	# staff in Harare CO	# staff in TRC Field Office	# staff total
2019	23 (9 ERT)	23 (12 ERT)	46 (21 ERT)
2020	14	13	27
2021	15	12	27
2022	18	21	43 (14 Resettlement surge)

Source – UNHCR Zimbabwe organigrams 2019 - 2022

## 4.0 Findings

The section below summarizes the key findings from the evaluation which are organized as per the UNHCR four main pillars and in response to the overall evaluation questions outlined in the TOR and in the evaluation matrix. The approach to answering the questions is in line with the evaluation framework and checks the extent to which the logic sequence and assumptions outlined in the TOC held true. As such each section outlines the 'what, who and why' of all findings within the document in line with the evaluation framework. Because most of UNHCR resources and attention have been focused on TRC-based refugees, this group of people we serve are covered in most of the findings, although UNHCR's other people we serve are also covered in dedicated sections. There is a dedicated section that outlines findings on urban refugees and

where appropriate, findings from urban refugees are compared to those of camp-based refugees. There is a separate section on statelessness and IDPs that provides the specific findings. There were no significant findings related to returnees during the evaluation period and therefore no dedicated section on returnees – this is elaborated in the limitations section (2.4).

#### 4.1 Refugees

### Evaluation Question 1 (Results) – To what extent did UNHCR achieve its strategic objectives and was its response appropriate to the needs of people we serve?

#### Relevance

*Main finding: The evaluation found that UNHCR’s country strategy has been relevant to the needs and priorities of refugees and asylum-seekers and aligned with GOZ priorities and UNHCR’s global commitments, while the CO adapted well to changes to the context, including COVID-19 and the challenging economic and political situation in the country.*

#### Relevance to refugees’ needs.

**UNHCR’s support to refugees was largely relevant to their needs and was adaptive to the evolving context and opportunities.** The response has mainly been needs and evidence-based which has been achieved by undertaking periodic assessments and structured consultations with refugees, the GOZ, UN partners and donors. Most programmatic interventions provided by UNHCR at TRC were informed by a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)<sup>23</sup> which was a comprehensive and participatory needs assessment undertaken in 2019, led by the GOZ, WFP and UNHCR, and included engagement from diverse stakeholders. The participatory needs assessment articulated the needs of refugees which informed the development of the CO’s operational plans.

The evaluation confirmed through FGDs, KIIs and observation that UNHCR’s strategic approach and priorities were relevant mainly to the needs of refugees, and interventions were delivered in a timely manner. This was echoed by findings from the survey which showed that 80.3 per cent of those interviewed agreed with the statement that “UNHCR assistance has focused on the areas that I need most”. Areas of greatest need are outlined in Table 5. Urban refugees who are generally expected to have a high degree of self-reliance showed that livelihoods (62.14 per cent) were their most important priority.

*Table 5: Refugee needs by greatest priority.*

TRC refugees’ priorities	%	Urban refugees’ priorities	%
Food	75.9%	Capital to start business	62.14%
Education	52.1%	Basic needs (education and health)	42.86%
Health	50.0%	Food	28.57%
Shelter	22.1%	Protection	26.43%
Protection	21.7%	Civil registration	15%
WASH	15.5%	WASH	2.86%

Source: TRC based refugees survey conducted by evaluation team

<sup>23</sup> Joint Assessment Missions have been organized by UNHCR and WFP since 1994 to determine the food and related needs of refugees and other populations of concern to both organizations. See GOZ, UNHCR, WFO Tongogara refugee camp Zimbabwe, Joint Assessment Mission report 2019

### Relevance to government priorities

**UNHCR's strategy has shown meaningful alignment with the GOZ's development plans and priorities and vice versa.** UNHCR's main partner in Zimbabwe is the GOZ with whom the primary responsibility to protect and assist refugees' rests. UNHCR Zimbabwe's strategic and operational plans have been prepared with extensive collaboration and participation of the GOZ at centralized and decentralized levels with the GOZ participating as co-chair for most of the strategic planning meetings. Some important indications of the collaboration include the result of advocacy that led to specific people we serve needs being integrated in the GOZ National Development Plan 2021 to 2025 and the consequent district and sectoral development plans.<sup>24</sup> This ensured that refugees' needs were aligned to, budgeted for, and prioritized at all levels of GOZ service delivery. The GOZ regularly reiterated to the evaluation team their primary responsibility was for the protection and assistance of refugees with no discrimination compared to other citizens of Zimbabwe. This was affirmed through KIIs, the survey and the FGDs where refugees also shared a sense that they rely on the GOZ and UNHCR jointly for protection, security, and service delivery.

Meaningful alignment and relevance were achieved by co-chairing relevant processes between the GOZ and UNHCR at national, regional and district levels and the convening of different implementing and operational partners during planning as well as implementation. One of the important outcomes of the joint processes that increased GOZ responsibility for the refugee response was when the GOZ made staffing adjustments. Before 2019 the 14 GOZ staff involved in refugee matters were primarily from the Department of Social Development (DSD). However, from 2019, a restructuring in line with evolving needs of people we serve was undertaken. This reflected the commitment to ensure that the GOZ remained relevant and could offer the appropriate support at the appropriate level. The restructuring primarily consisted of a shift from mainly DSD staff towards an all-of-government approach with more staff from different ministries including health, education, agriculture, access to markets and DSD. These staff are based in the camp and work directly on refugees' operations as envisaged in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).

### Alignment with global commitments

**UNHCR Zimbabwe has actively aligned the design and implementation of its operations to the global commitments made by the GOZ and UNHCR, while contextualizing these to the realities of Zimbabwe.** UNHCR has been advocating for the lifting of the GOZ's reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention noted earlier, which is considered critical to the promotion of refugee self-reliance. In 2019, the GOZ submitted 14 pledges during the GRF and the High-Level Segment on Statelessness. Seven pledges related to improving the situation of refugees in the country while seven were on the topic of statelessness. The Camp Administrator in TRC noted how the GCR had been an impetus for the GOZ to integrate refugees further in national systems and promote the self-reliance of refugees, which was one of the pledges made to the GRF. The evaluation team noted that steady progress has been made by the GOZ to implement (independently and with UNHCR's support) the GRF pledges as documented throughout this evaluation. However, many areas are still 'in progress' with further action required to report that they have been completed by the time of the next GRF in 2023.<sup>25</sup> In terms of UNHCR's own global

---

<sup>24</sup> See Republic of Zimbabwe, National Development Strategy, 2021 to 2025, 16 November 2020

<sup>25</sup> See progress report of GRF South Africa Pledges Update 2022

commitments there is clear alignment to UNHCR's strategic directions for the period 2017 to 2021 and 2022 to 2026.

## Effectiveness

*Main finding: The evaluation found that UNHCR was largely effective in achieving its strategic objectives and targets outlined in relevant planning documents for 2019–2022 and delivered effective protection and solutions for refugees in partnership particularly with GOZ, implementing partners and some donors.*

UNHCR has been effective in its strategy implementation that focused on providing protection and solutions for refugees in partnership with GOZ, implementing partners, donors and a few UN partners. This was affirmed by TRC-based refugees with the majority (92 per cent) of those surveyed reported that their overall living conditions had improved or stayed the same, with only 5.8 per cent reporting that their situation had worsened. This contrasted with urban refugees surveyed, where 37.7 per cent reported that their situation had worsened. The urban refugees are receiving needs-based support, especially on resettlement, protection and civil registration through twice-weekly sessions open to all urban refugees.

The following sections provide more details on the effectiveness of key CO focus areas:

### Food security

**Food security remains a high priority need for refugees. Basic food security needs were met for all refugees who were eligible and availed themselves for food collection during monthly food distributions and cash-based assistance in TRC, with additional support provided to vulnerable households.** Food security was reported as the highest priority for 75 per cent of camp-based refugees while 41 per cent of non-camp-based refugees reported food security as their main challenge while living outside the camp. UNHCR, in partnership with the GOZ, has been responsive to this priority by transitioning from food to cash assistance. This has been in line with UNHCR fulfilling its Grand Bargain commitment to provide greater levels of cash assistance. However, there had previously been concerns for providing cash because of the instability of food prices due to the hyper-inflationary situation in the country. In response to several factors including devaluation of the currency, and increased cost of living, WFP increased the amount available per person per day from \$13 per person per month in 2019 to \$15 per person per month from 2021. This is also in part because refugees live in a zone with very high prevalence of insufficient food consumption in the country at above 40 per cent.<sup>20</sup>

The GOZ has provided short-term and long-term support for food security in the camp. The GOZ occasionally provided support with maize grain to address any gaps or delays in the pipeline. This includes an ongoing pledge for long-term support through donations of maize grain that would last two years, which WFP could mill and fortify for food distribution to refugees at TRC. This was reported to be timely given the constraints of food supply faced by WFP. However, this would lead to another transition back to part food distribution and part cash assistance. With 83.7 per cent of refugees interviewed during the survey saying that they preferred cash instead of food assistance, this move could cause some reversal in the gains on meeting other basic needs that refugees have achieved through the cash-based interventions (CBI). On the other hand, the donations have in the past eased pressure on WFP funding, which has become increasingly constrained, due to their expanding food security needs across the country. In addition to cash transfers, pregnant and lactating mothers, persons living with disabilities, older and chronically ill people

were occasionally provided with food hand-outs and other relevant food supplements. Food security was further augmented by the subsistence production achieved through the livelihood projects including kitchen gardens which also contribute to dietary diversity.

Although the population of refugees was 15,151 by 31 May 2022 within the camp and was scheduled to receive food distributions per month, according to UNHCR and WFP, only around 12,000 refugees received the monthly distributions. The disparity of around 3,000 refugees needs to be explored by the CO. However, through consultations, it was found that this could be related to the mobility of refugees and a sign that some refugees live outside the camp. UNHCR and partners were using an electronic biometric system to conduct cash transfers and they had devised a mechanism for de-registering ration cards for those who default on support for more than three months. However, some refugees, mindful of that, make sure they come to collect their rations before the three-month de-registration deadline. UNHCR reported that a verification exercise is scheduled for 2023 to address the gaps in the registration of refugees.

Working with WFP, UNHCR has managed to address some of the food security needs for refugees. There is no Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) for TRC. However, according to the 2019 UNHCR–WFP Joint Assessment Mission report, about 51 per cent of the households in TRC experienced moderate hunger, an indication that households were facing challenges in accessing adequate food. Households reported that monthly food rations would last on average 18 days, leaving challenges in accessing food for the rest of the month.<sup>26</sup> This was partly attributable to the fact that the cash distribution was also used for other household needs. The CO through partners has been pursuing other options including livelihood programmes to supplement income for refugees and contribute to the food security part of the pathway to self-reliance. Planning is under way for the next JAM which will shed light on the food security status for refugees after the increase from \$13 to \$15 and the additional livelihood opportunities that seem to have addressed some of the food security and nutrition needs.

## Health

**Refugees are integrated in national health systems and receive appropriate primary, secondary and tertiary medical care with UNHCR support through Terre Des Hommes Italy (TDH). Health services were also accessible to host communities.** The TRC primary health care centre is integrated in the GOZ National Health Strategy. The clinic is performing well in the circumstances of a critically underfunded and under-resourced public health system warranting additional UNHCR intervention for support to refugees. UNHCR also occasionally provides medical supplies to GOZ clinics to facilitate meeting needs throughout the referral system. Given the population size, and financial resources permitting, the clinic has been identified as one of the clinics in the district that should be upgraded to secondary-level care and become a referral polyclinic for local health clinics in areas closest to the TRC. This plan is constrained by competing needs in the district and in the country in the National Health Strategy. Before transition of the clinic takes place, the GOZ and UNHCR have established an effective referral for secondary and tertiary needs as well as periodic specialist sessions at the clinic.

The GOZ in partnership with TDH and UNHCR have successfully ensured that the primary health centre is well-staffed and stocked with medical supplies to cover the needs of the refugees and host community. Consultations have proven that the TRC primary health care centre is providing

---

<sup>26</sup> UNHCR RBSA (2021) Zimbabwe Country Development Profile 2021

high standards and quality of service for refugees and host communities. Overall, refugees felt that health (including public health) needs were met, and that they had access to quality health services. The indicator achievement reports for 2019–2021 indicate that all refugees have access to primary, secondary and tertiary health care. This was confirmed through interviews and FGDs with refugees and other key informants.

The rate of measles vaccines is reported to have reduced from 100 per cent to 72 per cent. This was, however, explained not as a reduction in actual numbers, rather an inability to account for approximately 3,000 people who are assumed to have left the camp. In August 2021, there was a temporary exodus of several refugees in search of resettlement options in neighbouring countries.

One of the persistent challenges that was identified concerned sexual reproductive health (SRH) with issues related to behaviour and cultural practices including child marriages, largely among the Mozambican population, and teenage pregnancy, which has also led to school dropouts and exacerbates the likelihood of HIV and sexually transmitted infections (STI). There are regular interventions targeting this challenge including specific youth-friendly infrastructure, guidance, and counselling in each school, which includes taught SRH courses and counselling, training of teachers and caregivers, extensive awareness-raising, peer counselling and community-based programming. Despite all these efforts, the challenge persists and continues to need to be addressed.

Based on needs identified during joint assessment missions between the GOZ health department, UNHCR and partners, mental health was identified as a prioritized need for refugees. In response to this, discussions were held with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) which were facilitated to establish a centre in TRC in 2021 to address refugees' mental health needs on a longer-term perspective. This has been effective in supporting mental health challenges, due to the traumatic conditions that refugees have been subjected to.

During COVID-19, an isolation centre was constructed in TRC to address the needs for isolation. The isolation centre played a huge role in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Despite the mobility, crowding and congestion characterized in refugee settlements, by September 2022, UNHCR had recorded 164 cases of COVID-19 among the refugee population, with only one fatality recorded to date. The isolation centre has since been used to curb the spread of other diseases and outbreaks and has reduced the incidence and spread of communicable diseases in the camp.

## Education

**Despite overcrowding in schools, UNHCR has ensured an appropriate level of education services to children in TRC who are integrated in national education systems.** Education for refugees has been mainstreamed into the GOZ education plan through the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MoPSE). Education services have been responsive to emerging needs particularly congestion due to growing refugee population, needs for people living with disability (PLWD) and early childhood development (ECD), with upgrades to infrastructure, training and staffing between 2019 and 2022. Despite the progress, infrastructure is still inadequate. All the schools are publicly run by the MoPSE as part of the district and national education plan. UNHCR has supported learners with school fees, exam fees, school uniforms and stationery. In 2017, UNHCR supported the building of eight permanent classrooms (four blocks) at the primary school. The GOZ provided qualified teachers who are supported by refugee

teaching assistants provided by TDH. Teachers are paid by the GOZ and the teaching assistants receive an allowance from UNHCR's partner TDH. Host communities have access to and have enrolled in the schools within TRC with no restrictions.

As outlined in the indicator achievement report, enrolment rates for ECD have remained well below the target of 70 per cent, reaching 38.2 per cent at the end of 2021; this was an increase from 21 per cent at the beginning of 2019. This was mainly attributed to the fact that three-year-old children should have been enrolled in ECD, but the infrastructure can only accommodate 70 per cent of the population of ECD-age children. A decision was therefore reached to prioritize four-year-olds over three-year-olds for ECD enrolment. There are inadequate classrooms and teachers for primary schools leading to a student teacher ratio of 60:1 which is higher than the standard 45:1. This challenge is however reflected in the rest of the country. There is only one class for PLWD, which is so far adequate. Enrolment in secondary school recorded in the indicator achievement report reduced sharply in 2021 from 55.1 per cent in 2020 to 36.6 per cent in 2021, from 31 per cent at the beginning of 2019. There has also been a reduction in secondary school enrolment with more than 250 secondary school children not registering for the new school year at the TRC secondary school. It was assumed that they enrolled in schools outside TRC due to low performance in 2021 but this could not be verified. Despite the constraints in education access and retention, responses from FGDs and KIIs indicate that the level of education services and standards at TRC are the same or better than other schools in the district.

Tertiary education opportunities have reduced by half for refugees eligible for and seeking university education. UNHCR through the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative (DAFI) scholarship has been offering support for refugees to undertake tertiary education in public universities. There was a reduction in available opportunities from 10 to 5 DAFI scholarships per year. There is therefore an unmet need, with 20 A-level students applying for this support in the same year. The majority of refugee youth in the FGD identified vocational training as an ongoing unmet priority. The GOZ made a specific pledge at the GRF to increase access to tertiary education and the operationalization of the vocational training centre which has only been partially met, with negotiations on vocational training still at initial stages. This remains a priority for the growing number of unemployed youths in the camp although other partners would be required to support the GOZ to meet this need.

#### Water, hygiene, and sanitation (WASH)

**Since Cyclone Idai, UNHCR has worked with its GOZ counterparts and implementing partners to significantly upgrade the WASH facilities and services in TRC.** There was significant investment in WASH through the AfDB ISV-COM project. The water and sanitation situation at TRC is considerably better than the public water and sanitation situation in the country, with urban and rural councils suffering perennial water shortages and poor sanitation. Working with its WASH implementing partner, World Vision (WV), UNHCR surpassed UNHCR's WASH targets of 15 litres/person/day and achieved 22.4 litres/person/day. They also reduced distances that refugees including women, children and girls walk to access water to the global standard of 200 metres. All the water quality tests at non-chlorinated water collection locations are compliant with GOZ and UNHCR water quality standards. After a hydraulic assessment following Cyclone Idai, UNHCR defined its WASH Strategy for 2019–2021 which has supported significant upgrades to the water and sanitation system in TRC.<sup>27</sup> A total of six boreholes within TRC and three in host

---

<sup>27</sup> Masesa, M. (2019) Zimbabwe WASH Strategy 2019-2021, June 2019

community sites were drilled along with water taps and storage tanks, which were equipped with solar-powered pumps. With the expanded infrastructure, access increased from two hours per section to five hours per section. There was a reduction of time needed for water collection which was reported to reduce possibly the likelihood of domestic violence associated with absence from the household and which had been a common domestic violence risk factor in previous years due to shortage of water.<sup>28</sup> Wastage was reduced through installation of real-time monitoring tools at water points and tanks thereby increasing available quantities and addressing problems in real time. The host community also has improved access to the water points providing clean water to their communities.

WASH projects have been using green energy to power the pumps and reduce interruptions that were previously caused by power outages or lack of funds to run the diesel pumps. The placement of RBSA's roving WASH officer and a dedicated Associate WASH Officer for Zimbabwe between 2020 and 2022 contributed to a dedicated focus on WASH that included resource mobilization through UNHCR's Innovation Fund that allowed the Zimbabwe CO to improve the quality of WASH services and convert from electricity to solar energy.

### Shelter

**Shared responsibility for the provision of shelter between the refugees, UNHCR and the GOZ has ensured that every refugee or asylum-seeker residing in the camp has housing that to a large extent complies with UNHCR standards – although there are gaps particularly in adequacy for female-headed households.** The UNHCR emergency handbook<sup>29</sup> on shelter states that shelter solutions must provide protection from the elements, privacy, emotional security, and a space to live and store belongings in a dignified manner. The evaluation found that basic standards have been applied and met for refugees living in TRC by maximizing available funds. This was particularly so during the response to Cyclone Idai where there was complete destruction or partial damage to houses affecting approximately 6,000 refugees. These Cyclone Idai funds provided a major boost to shelter including funding for construction of new houses, procurement of emergency shelter materials, construction of additional disability-friendly latrines and refurbishment of the emergency evacuation centre. UNHCR also capitalized on the expertise available for Cyclone Idai response to make improvements on shelter to reduce future risks of flooding and destruction of houses during heavy rains. There are still challenges in the provision of shelter because there was inadequate funding to address all the shelter needs, and this is addressed on a needs' basis.

The GOZ has provided adequate land for shelter for refugees and has provided a few model houses that are accessible to vulnerable households. The main challenge facing the development of shelter is the unavailability of funding. It was noted that shelter is generally not funded and has not been allocated any resources in UNHCR's funds for 2021 and 2022 due to the constrained budget.

According to the indicator evaluation matrix, the camp has consistently achieved 100 per cent of the target of five persons per shelter since 2019. The standards have included addressing the needs of persons living with disability in shelter and sanitation construction. According to reports from the indicator achievement report, 22 per cent of female-headed households live in adequate

---

<sup>28</sup> AfDB ISV-COM Report

<sup>29</sup> Shelter solutions. UNHCR emergency handbook



dwellings compared to an average of 52 per cent of the general population. This is a slight increase from 18 per cent in 2019 compared to 64 per cent of the general population. The indicator was not reported on in 2021 because it was not funded. After further probing in the KIIs and FGDs, the evaluation team could not establish the specific gaps in the shelter solutions that could be used to explain inadequate shelter, although 22 per cent of respondents listed shelter as their highest priority during the survey.

### Livelihoods

**UNHCR, with support from partners, prioritized support of livelihoods as a means of enhancing the self-reliance of refugees. But most projects have been small-scale and have only contributed to food security and nutrition rather than achieving the level of profitability necessary for improving economic self-reliance.** In the spirit of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and based on the GOZ's commitment at the GRF, the CO has made improving livelihood opportunities a strategic priority. The CO developed a Livelihood Strategy (2016–2020), but this was out of date at the time of the evaluation and was in the process of being updated. The RBSA has developed a Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Strategy (2021–2024) which serves as a guideline for the Zimbabwe CO, which has been seen as a case study.

Through a strategic partnership between the GOZ, AfDB and UNHCR, a multi-year livelihood project for refugees and host communities was established and implemented between 2019 and 2021.<sup>30</sup> A wide range of livelihood options (irrigation, poultry, piggery, fisheries, hydroponics, insect-farming, and internal savings, and lending) are conducted in the camp through an implementing partner, World Vision. The different projects have directly targeted 1,994 out of 4,837 households (more than 40 per cent)<sup>31</sup> in TRC, while 969 (48.5 per cent) are female-headed.<sup>32</sup> Not only are livelihood projects important for TRC refugees, but also for urban refugees who, although not receiving livelihoods support, consider it their most important need. Some 62.1 per cent of urban refugees said in the survey that they needed support in the form of capital to start a business while 67.9 per cent said they did not have adequate income to stay outside the camp and support themselves.

The figures of TRC refugees receiving livelihoods support in Table 6 reflect the initial enrolment and do not factor in drop-out rates which were reported to the evaluation team as high for most of the projects. Of these, 89 households were child-headed households who are unaccompanied minors. To avoid the risk of child exploitation and labour, UNHCR in partnership with the refugee community have set up systems where the child-headed households are assisted by the

---

<sup>30</sup> AfDB - ISV-COM

<sup>31</sup> There is also a possibility of double counting because it was reported that some refugees are in more than one project.

<sup>32</sup> The evaluation noted that there was a challenge in getting up-to-date data (that is, three to six months old) on the progress in the livelihood projects, for example on drop-out rates, although the staff seem to know the figures through day-to-day interactions with beneficiaries. The absence of up-to-date records and monitoring data was seen as a need that can easily be addressed. If it is not addressed, it could have negative effects on the achievement of results.

communities and children do not directly provide labour but get to benefit from the livelihood initiatives.


Table 6: Number of people receiving livelihood support

Name of group	Male	Female	Boys (13–17 years)	Girls (13–17 years)	Total	Group / Individual
Piggery	57	11	4	0	72	Individuals
Irrigation scheme	532	259	6	3	800	Individuals
Fishery	33	17	0	0	50	Group
Chick Chicken poultry project	4	19	0	0	23	Group
One Love poultry project	23	16	2	3	44	Group
Neema poultry project	9	19	1	1	30	Group
Savings for transformation	177	323	6	30	536	Groups
Apiculture	8	14	7	3	32	Group
Nutrition garden	27	40	0	0	67	Individuals
Maranatha fishery project	1	1	4	10	16	Group
Hydroponic	71	99	16	24	210	Group
Insect-farming	11	4	0	0	15	Group
Graduation approach	20	65	0	0	85	Individuals
Peanut butter-making	6	6	0	2	14	Group
<b>Total</b>	<b>979</b>	<b>893</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>1994</b>	

Source: UNHCR Zimbabwe livelihood programme department report

Expanding livelihood opportunities as an important means of food security and self-reliance has been a priority and continues to be a priority in the MYS. In addition to this, drawing lessons from the Zimbabwe experience, AfDB initiated a similar programme in Mozambique and hopes to extend the Zimbabwe partnership to value chain development through a partnership between the GOZ and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The ultimate expectation of the livelihood project is that beneficiaries will be able to contribute to their individual incomes while also contributing to the local economy, including the host community. However, although incomes of refugees increased slightly, savings were lower. During the survey, only 39.8 per cent reported that their income had increased, which is a slight increase from 34 per cent in 2019 before most of the current initiatives began. There was a slight reduction in those who reported their savings had increased. The proportion of those who felt that their savings had increased fell from 24.3 percent in 2019 23.4 per cent in 2022 who felt their savings had increased. Even though more analysis would be required to assess indirect income such as the value of own consumption (quantifying the value of what is consumed by the household), these findings indicate the need for closer monitoring and more evidence to inform implementation of the programme. Figure 5 shows the comparisons of income and savings among refugees.

Figure 5: Comparison of income and savings for refugees over the past year



Source: TRC based refugees survey conducted by evaluation team

UNHCR has supported several partners in the past on livelihoods. The most recent partner is World Vision who took over from GOAL. WV livelihood programmes included an Ultra Poor Graduation Approach (UPGA)<sup>33</sup> guided by the WV Ultra Poor Graduation Handbook.<sup>34</sup> The UPGA selected 125 refugees in 2019 for the UPGA programme. Members under the UPGA are given a one-off initial capital, training, and mentorship, and they are included in multiple enterprises. Due to various reasons including COVID-19 related disruptions, fluctuation productivity, aspirations for resettlement, and relocation to cities, the number of active members was 85 and none had yet graduated to self-reliance. The first group was expected to do so in March 2023 against the prior plan of March 2022. This group is well monitored and lessons from this monitoring could be used to inform monitoring of other livelihood activities.

The CO successfully advocated for refugees to be provided with more land from the GOZ for livelihood activities, increasing from 25 hectares (ha) (0.05 ha per household) before 2019 to an additional 26 ha (0.1 ha per household) in 2019. The land size fell well below the FAO recommendations of 0.25 ha per household with little or no surplus production for markets. The expansion of the irrigation project was made possible through the AfDB ISV-COM funding which was used to establish a flood irrigation system with solar-powered back-up boreholes. Based on lessons from the first phase of this project, UNHCR and the GOZ are seeking additional funds to expand the irrigation scheme from the current 51 ha to a total of 151 ha, with the GOZ providing 100 ha of land. This will help to increase the plot size per household from 0.1 ha to 0.25 ha as per the FAO standard. Adherence to FAO standards is considered an important factor in ensuring production at a level that can put beneficiaries on a path from unreliable subsistence production to more consistent production that can lead to self-reliance. Refugees have also established independent self-start-up livelihood activities in the camp, predominantly in the form of grocery shops, restaurants and bars, tailoring, fruit and vegetable markets, butcheries and so on. Observations in TRC gives a picture of vibrancy within the economy, with most of those running businesses included in Internal Saving and Lending Groups (ISALs). They are also supported by

<sup>33</sup> UNHCR Graduation Approach Update 2021


<sup>34</sup> BRAC & WV Graduation Approach Handbook, 2018

UNHCR and partners through licensing, training, access to markets and improving access and infrastructure.

Despite livelihood projects being reported as the most important intervention in response to the context of refugees, these projects have also been the most challenging to implement. This has mainly been due to low funding that undermined the concept of sustainable livelihoods. There has been focus and attention by UNHCR, its partners and district government (Agricultural Marketing Authority and Women's Affairs Department) to provide access to markets for refugee produce but production quantities have not been adequate to be brought to scale to advance marketing strategies. Even though the ultimate market for refugees would be outside the refugee camp and Chipinge district, it was reported that refugees have not exhausted the internal or district market to which they have full access. There are several refugees who independently access markets within Chipinge district and beyond, and Zimbabwean traders also have access to the camp to purchase or sell their produce. The respondents confirmed that the current challenge is not market access, but rather limited and inconsistent production, which is not at levels that could be profitably marketed outside the camp. Partners have established purchasing agreements with supermarket chains and periodically sell to the supermarkets but have reported that quantities are inadequate to get longer-term contracts. For meat production, Chipinge district is part of the country's red zone, where meat products are prohibited from entering other regions. This has therefore posed a challenge for expanding meat produce markets beyond the refugee camp. The market in the camp has so far been adequate, but with increased production, more market access (beyond the refugee camp) will need to be addressed.

Refugees' business enterprises were also affected by COVID-related market disruptions, licence and regulatory challenges, high production costs due to economic instability and hyperinflation, and currency unpredictability. Other challenges included technical requirements for some of the activities, limited market for some products within the camp, and a low-income base within the camp and the economy in general. These factors reduced the feasibility, viability, and effectiveness of the livelihood projects as a means for economic self-reliance through market-led production. Most group projects have a high number of participants leading to an extremely high subdivision of profits, limiting the re-investment of profits. UNHCR's strategy has been to try to reach as many people as possible but has led to unsustainable livelihood projects and contributed to high drop-out rates. The survey noted the following as the main challenges affecting business viability (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Main challenges affecting business viability



Source: TRC based refugees survey conducted by evaluation team

The evaluation identified several other challenges that were affecting the economic viability of the livelihood opportunities being pursued:

*Negative mindset and attitudes on livelihood support:* During the evaluation there was a commonly expressed view of refugees who felt that taking up more responsibility for livelihood projects could give the impression that they are doing well and reduce their likelihood of receiving support from UNHCR and reduce their chances for being considered for resettlement. Resettlement remains the goal of most refugees and therefore self-reliance becomes less important for them. Refugees have an expectation of receiving perpetual assistance to manage livelihood projects, and this is in part due to the design of the project where re-investment and graduation are not yet (clear) parts of the livelihood strategy.

*Some projects are highly technically complex:* The hydroponics project helps to reduce the carbon footprint and should use less space but has had a significant investment to build the greenhouses, with a huge capital injection (\$170,000).<sup>35</sup> The project was considered highly technical considering the capacity of refugees. This is evidenced by a high drop-out rate with initial beneficiaries moving from 210 down to 7 after the first production cycle and later going up to 43. For such projects, the remaining participants requested a different approach of identifying participants and of extensive training including visits to similar projects. It was also felt that more marketing would be required because produce from this project required a specialized market to which refugees had limited access.

The livelihood activities selected by the programme match those identified by refugees as their priorities during the survey and FGDs. Value chain assessments have been undertaken but other assessments are required that can inform selection of livelihood activities which could benefit more groups, specifically youth, PLWD and extremely poor people. Effective targeting and

<sup>35</sup> UNHCR Budgets 2020

effective management of livelihood opportunities and market assessments are required. Regular monitoring of progress is needed against key indicators including yields, quantities marketed, value of marketed products, drop-out and graduation to another level. The last livelihood assessment that the evaluation team is aware of was conducted in 2017 by GOAL. A value chain analysis was also conducted in 2020;<sup>36</sup> however, a profile of the different livelihoods and gaps and baseline against which progress could be measured seemed to be missing.

Although transition to self-reliance has not been realized, refugees consistently reported gaining nutritional diversity in the form of products that they would not otherwise have had access to, including grain (maize), protein – meat and egg products (chicken, goat, pork, fish, and beans), sugar beans and vitamins (vegetables and bananas). The CBI were seen as particularly important for expanding the market base in TRC and sustaining the livelihood projects, thereby providing the initial market base required to move towards more production. Progress was also made in capacity building of beneficiaries for agricultural production, financial management and marketing their produce. These are seen by some as the first steps towards economic self-reliance after basic food security needs are met.

### COVID-19 response

**During the COVID-19 pandemic, UNHCR staff remained available at TRC and Harare, and ensured that there was no major disruption to the provision of basic services. In collaboration with the GOZ, UNHCR and partners ensured that there was an adequate response focused on training and containment of the spread of COVID-19 among and from refugees.** Progress was made with low infection rates and only one reported death. However, there was very low uptake of vaccination: only 9.4 per cent of refugees were reported to be vaccinated, which is much lower than the district average of 72 per cent reported by the district health staff and UNHCR. This was despite the Chipinge district ministry of health department organizing more community mobilization campaigns, targeted information campaigns and specific vaccination services for refugees than in the general population. The main reasons were cultural beliefs and myths, and misconceptions that are deeply rooted in the community, and that therefore prevented uptake of the vaccines. The vaccination campaigns are still ongoing but making very little progress, even more with the slowing down of COVID-19 infections worldwide.

The evaluation found that there was no major disruption or interruption of service and that UNHCR provided targeted prevention and response trainings to camp-based refugees. This included the installation of 16 water tanks with a capacity of 5,000 litres each, totalling 80,000-litre storage capacity in TRC through the AfDB project. A COVID-19 isolation and quarantine centre was also established that played a key role in reducing the spread of the virus.

### Protection

**UNHCR and the GOZ have been effective in expanding protection services in TRC with referral pathways working effectively, combined with prevention activities.** Refugees and asylum-seekers report that they feel secure in TRC with only 4.14 per cent of refugees surveyed reporting that in their view, protection had deteriorated in the past 12 months. The sense of security was confirmed with other refugees through FGDs and interviews. Refugees feel that they

---


<sup>36</sup> Market Assessment of the Value Chain, emKambo, December 2020

can access different options to address protection concerns including the police, UNHCR, community leadership, host government structures and a hotline.

The survey showed that most prevalent protection concerns in the camp are gender-based violence (GBV) and child protection concerns including violence, neglect, and abuse. There have been deliberate actions to address these concerns for the whole population of refugees with a focus on specific groups including women, PLWD, girls, children, youth, and older people. The interventions include the AfDB ISV-COM which included objectives to build knowledge on how to combat GBV and contributed to the establishment of case referral pathways to relevant services including medical care, psychosocial support, and others, which appeared to be working well. The most acute GBV or security cases are referred to the Department of Social Development (DSD) in Chipinge if they cannot be resolved in the camp. Several prevention and awareness-raising activities were conducted to address the structural causes of GBV problems in the camp. Other indirect but important interventions included improving street lighting and improving access to water which reduces the risk of domestic conflicts.

A police post was established to provide security for both refugees and staff in 2010. The police post had one staff house provided by government. In 2018 the police post was refurbished and two staff houses and holding cells constructed using UNHCR resources. The refugees have access to and have confidence in the police and report cases to them. In fact, 71.4 per cent of refugees surveyed felt that the police were the preferred system for addressing protection concerns. In contrast to the situation in TRC, urban refugees considered the greatest protection concerns to be unlawful detention (59.3 per cent), with civil documentation (36.8 per cent) also featuring high. Urban refugees face heightened risk; including security and protection related risks UNHCR provides individual counselling and referral, access to protection phone lines (toll-free and non-toll-free), prison visits and advocacy for release for those detained as appropriate and referral to legal partners for pro bono legal aid as needed. Most urban refugees consider UNHCR as their preferred mechanism of addressing protection concerns (71.4 per cent).

Figure 7: Preferred mechanism for addressing protection concerns for TRC and urban refugees



### Asylum systems

**UNHCR has helped to strengthen the GOZ asylum procedures which are working well although there are ongoing requests to strengthen data management and for a clearer process for rejected cases.** The Zimbabwe Refugee Committee (ZRC) which comprises relevant government departments conducts refugee status determination (RSD) with UNHCR participating as an observer. The Zimbabwe Refugee Act (Chapter 4:03) provides the legislative and administrative basis for RSD. UNHCR provides Country of Origin Information (COI) and may make comments/observations on individual claims by refugees before the ZRC. Between 2019 and 2022, there were 1,196 RSD cases processed with 406 being granted, 172 rejected, 38 appeals, 28 second rejections, 613 deferred.

In line with the pledges made at the GRF, the CO has worked with the GOZ to strengthen the asylum system process including establishing a national data management system and constructing a reception centre at a major entry point with Mozambique-Nyamapanda border post. The evaluation team noted that the asylum procedures are working well although there are ongoing requests to strengthen data management and have a clearer process for rejected cases. The GOZ is currently also in dialogue with the Government of Rwanda given the cessation of the refugee status of Rwandan refugees in Zimbabwe.

### Climate change adaptation

**UNHCR has taken some initial steps to adapt its operations to climate change within its own activities and support provided to refugees.** As a result of climate change, droughts, heatwaves, heavy rains accompanied by flash floods, strong winds and hailstorms have become common in Zimbabwe. In addition to Cyclone Idai in 2019, the country has experienced recurrent climate change-related disasters. Climate extremes not only produce intermittent emergencies but are also a major impediment to the promotion of self-resilience and improved livelihoods. In line with the UNHCR Strategic Framework for Climate Action the CO has taken steps to address the interaction between refugees' response and climate change both in terms of the assistance it provides to refugees and within its own operations to reduce its environmental footprint.<sup>37</sup> RBSA has also recently developed a Climate Action Plan for the Southern Africa Region 2021–23 which will further inform the CO's approach in this area.<sup>38</sup>

At the GRF, the GOZ pledged to work with UNHCR and its partners to organize a regional symposium on the impact of climate change on protection and assistance of refugees in Zimbabwe and the region, which took place on 22 to 24 November 2021 albeit on a more limited scale given the constraints of COVID-19. In TRC, UNHCR and its partners have made progress in advancing green initiatives in WASH, agriculture, lighting, and energy consumption including a household waste/gas project. For example, through partnership with AfDB, there have been significant investments in solar electricity with the proportion of households with access to sustainable energy increasing from none in 2019 to 55.6 per cent at the end of 2020 and 60 per cent at the end of 2021. In addition to this, the solarization of WASH facilities through the AfDB ISV-COM project increases the volume of water in the community as compared to the electricity

---

<sup>37</sup> UNHCR Strategic Framework for Climate Action

<sup>38</sup> UNHCR Climate Action Plan for Southern Africa Region 2021–2023




system which previously powered the boreholes (the electricity-powered boreholes were constantly affected by prolonged load shedding). A partnership with UNDP was also used to convert the UNHCR office to full solar power in 2020. The Zimbabwe CO has successfully applied for global innovation funding on climate change in WASH and climate-smart agriculture and was identified as an ideal context for such innovations. The support by the RBSA, the GOZ and partners has enhanced the CO's capacity to maximize on such opportunities through innovation finance.

Urban refugees

As noted earlier, there is caseload of around 900 urban refugees in Harare and other cities and towns despite the GOZ stated encampment policy. No comprehensive assessment of the situation of these refugees has taken place although according to the survey conducted during the evaluation, they have a similar demographic profile to those in TRC with the main places of origin being the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. Like TRC-based refugees, they are in a long-term protracted situation. The majority (79.3 per cent) have been displaced for more than five years which confirms the protracted nature of refugees in Zimbabwe. Interestingly, 71.4 per cent of urban refugees who were interviewed as part of the survey said that they had initially been camp-based in TRC and did not seek refuge directly in an urban setting. This suggests that a process of transitioning from the camp to an urban area and consequent socioeconomic integration is possible.

No targeted livelihood and basic needs assistance exists for urban refugees from UNHCR. One of the conditions to live outside the camp is for the refugees to be economically self-reliant. Their main sources of income are outlined in Figure 8. Only 31.4 per cent of surveyed urban refugees said that they had received assistance from a UN agency or NGO. For its part, UNHCR provides protection counselling, registration and referral to legal aid providers for urban refugees on an individual basis or through hotlines, and it conducts prison visits for those detained or at risk of detention or deportation.

Figure 8: Main source of income for non-camp-based refugees



Source: Non-camp-based refugees survey conducted by evaluation team

## Evaluation Question 2 (Strategic positioning and coordination) – To what extent did UNHCR Zimbabwe’s strategy align with and enhance those of the GOZ and other UN and NGO partners?

### Coherence and connectedness

*Main finding: UNHCR has clearly aligned its strategy with that of the GOZ and ensured that refugees are integrated in national systems. The GOZ has increasingly taken a lead role on refugee protection and assistance, while UNHCR has also effectively mobilized and coordinated with the UN, donor and other partner organizations towards shared objectives and responsibility-sharing.*

#### Working with the government

**UNHCR has established a strong coordination and collaboration mechanism with the GOZ in response to refugees needs at national, provincial and district levels. This has been realized at all stages of the response from policy formulation, strategic planning, implementation, resource mobilization, accountability, and monitoring.** The GOZ’s approach to refugees has been guided by the constitution of Zimbabwe, the Refugee Act and global commitments as mentioned above. These have created the framework for an effective partnership with UNHCR which has led to a coherent approach to the protection and assistance of refugees. This has been strengthened by the coordination structures in place including the Committee on Refugees at the national level and the inclusion of refugee issues on the District Development Committees. TRC is a constituent and is represented in the District Development Coordination Meeting of Chipinge district and in district-level coordination.

The GOZ has increasingly taken ownership for its primary responsibility to protect and provide access to quality basic services particularly for refugees in Zimbabwe. In particular, the GOZ has shown leadership in ensuring coordinated and coherent service delivery by integrating people we serve into national and decentralized plans, coordinating the implementation of international commitments and ensuring engagement at senior and operational levels. This coordination and service delivery has been effective, and refugees reported a high level of satisfaction with government services. The GOZ has clearly outlined and socialized the shared objectives outlined in the GRF and other commitments that stakeholders have been working towards. Improvements have also been observed in integrating refugees into national and decentralized statistics with inclusion in key studies including the census.

This shift in approach was in response to the evolving needs of refugees and in line with the GOZ delivery structures in Chipinge district and elsewhere. This was also in line with the GCR’s ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approach by ensuring that all relevant sectors can effectively understand and respond to the diverse needs of refugees, which are adequately addressed through the relevant line ministry. However, there is a significant disparity in resources between UNHCR and the GOZ in the camp, with UNHCR acting as a go-between for resources that could be going directly to the GOZ.

#### Working with the UN and other partners

**UNHCR Zimbabwe has effectively engaged primarily with UNHCR implementing partners, WFP and development partners /donors in the refugee response, with whom it has developed effective partnerships around its strategic objectives.** UNHCR worked with the Resident Coordinator’s office and other UN partners to ensure that refugees were highlighted as

a vulnerable group within the UN Development Assistance Framework (2016–2021) and further in the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2022–2026).<sup>39</sup> Refugees make up a relatively small proportion of people targeted by the UNSDCF. Nevertheless, UNHCR has been effective in including refugees in this plan and under the Refugee Coordination Model (RCM), UNHCR has led and coordinated the refugee response in Zimbabwe through an inter-agency Refugee Coordination Group (RCG) comprised of various agencies involved. These include WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, GOAL, Terre Des Hommes (TDH), and World Vision (WV), in addition to various GOZ departments.

UNHCR has only two NGO ‘implementing partners’ – TDH and WV – that it funds directly to provide assistance in TRC. There are other ‘operational partners’ that UNHCR coordinates with but without giving financial resources. While there has been a rotation of agencies operating in TRC, a growing number of different organizations have become involved, each within their specialized areas. There is effective coordination by the GOZ through the camp administrator. through regular monthly meetings in TRC with rotational chairing by any of the partners.

#### UNHCR internal coherence

**There has been an internally coherent approach to strategy implementation between actions taken at the national, regional, and global levels which have been mutually supportive as envisaged under decentralization.** Delivery has been guided by a shared goal and vision, clear roles, and responsibilities, which have generally led to additionality and avoided duplication and gaps in delivery. At the country level, UNHCR has clearly provided technical and strategic leadership in the refugee response in support of the GOZ. The division of tasks between the country and field office has been clear, although more staff could be deployed to TRC given that this is where the majority of needs are and where implementation takes place. This would be particularly important to support the ambition of transitioning from a camp to a service centre and to ensure greater self-reliance where even more technical skills would be required by both UNHCR and the GOZ in TRC and surrounding districts.

The CO appreciated the support provided by RBSA which clearly had significant added value. This includes the AfDB resources mobilization, the provision of a WASH roving officer, and on resettlement and statelessness where RBSA had clearly taken the lead with clear benefit to the field operations. At the global level, UNHCR has provided additional backstopping and leveraged resource mobilization to address gaps. The CO has made effective use of the UNHCR Innovation Funds to strengthen priorities such as climate change adaptation and sustaining progress on livelihood initiatives that would otherwise not be available at the regional level.

**Evaluation Question 3 (Sustainability and capacity-strengthening) – How did UNHCR enhance sustainability and capacities for delivery of results and leverage its influence within the country to optimize the potential impact of its collective efforts?**

#### Sustainability

*Main finding: UNHCR has established strategic partnerships particularly with GOZ and leveraged its influence, leading to enhanced overall capacity for delivery of results for refugees. This was achieved in the context of shifting from an approach of care and maintenance to a*

---

<sup>39</sup> See Zimbabwe UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2022–2026, p.12

*greater emphasis on the promotion of self-reliance. UNHCR's operations have however not become more sustainable, with refugees still significantly dependent on UNHCR for assistance.*

### Self-reliance

**UNHCR has made investments in enhancing refugees' self-reliance through increasing their livelihood opportunities and other interventions, but these have not been at the levels required to translate to self-reliance for refugees.** As part of the broader GCR and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) agenda, UNHCR completed a legal mapping exercise in 2017 that has been used to advocate for the lifting of the GOZ's reservations to the 1951 Refugee Convention on freedom of movement and the right to work. The GOZ made a pledge at the GRF in 2019 to align its national legislation on refugees with human rights standards which would also address the reservations on employment and freedom of movement. Even though reservations have not been lifted, in practice, the GOZ has become more flexible in terms of providing land for refugees to expand livelihood opportunities and being flexible about freedom of movement with refugees also showing compliance to requirements in this regard.

As part of the practical to promoting self-reliance and in line with the GCR and the CRRF which both seek to have a unified approach to dealing with the burden posed by refugees and populations on host countries the AfDB ISV-COM project was designed. This approach was with the expectation that expanding refugees' livelihood activities and integrating refugees into the local service delivery system, economy and community would expand the capacity of the GOZ and host communities to sustainably welcome refugees through an inclusive approach that would benefit all, including members of the host community.

The GOZ has indicated that more land – up to 200 hectares – would be available for TRC if refugees through UNHCR and other partners were able to invest in the land to increase productivity, given that TRC is in a geographical zone that requires irrigation. Provision of more land for refugees is part of the bigger plan of increasing the spaces that will contribute to a form of local integration and a move towards self-reliance for those who establish sustainable opportunities within or outside the camp.

The objective of the self-reliance initiatives has been to decrease refugees' dependence on assistance and increase their economic activities as a prelude to the achievement of durable solutions.<sup>40</sup> Despite significant investment in livelihood projects funded by UNHCR and partners, with funding amounts increasing from \$168,576 in 2019 to \$504,460 in 2021, progress among beneficiaries has mainly been in production and consumption but not in beneficiary households or group revenues.<sup>41</sup> The investment has however provided the starting point for refugees with a low income base, limited technical capacity and skills in running businesses.

Feedback from KIIs and FGDs showed that the main challenges to self-reliance were a lack of adequate means of sustenance (livelihood), limitations on employment and freedom of movement. There was also a concern or belief that becoming self-reliant could negatively affect refugees' chances of getting further support (food and access to free services) or of qualifying for resettlement. Only 5.5 per cent of the total refugee population are considered self-reliant and therefore qualify to officially live outside the camp, with only 14.5 per cent of TRC-based survey

---

<sup>40</sup> See UNHCR Zimbabwe Strategic Directions 2023–2026

<sup>41</sup> Financial analysis conducted by the evaluation team.

respondents saying they had become more self-reliant and less dependent on UNHCR assistance in the past four years. There was no clear strategy identified about how UNHCR would start graduating those who show capabilities towards becoming more self-reliant, and support was still being offered in a blanket manner. These factors highlight the need for more evidence-based decision making on how best to invest in livelihood projects to ensure these translate to graduation and consequently self-reliance.

### Durable solutions

**The evaluation found that there had been limited opportunities and focus on the promotion of durable solutions for refugees.** While part of this can be explained by the limited prospects for achieving such solutions for the refugees, the evaluation considered that more could be done to shift the framing of the challenges facing refugees in this way. There was need for continued advocacy and engagement with the GOZ and other partners on these issues and on addressing the barriers. The different durable solutions available to people we serve are outlined below:

#### *Voluntary repatriation*

Most refugees in TRC do not consider returning to their place of origin to be a viable durable solution. Indeed, 89.7 per cent of survey respondents said that they had “no prospect to return to their place of origin”, which was slightly less (72 per cent) for urban refugees. UNHCR currently has a “no return” policy for certain areas in the DRC, particularly the eastern parts such as North and South Kivu, Ituri and adjacent areas where the prevailing security situation is not conducive for voluntary repatriation. Based on a global UN position, the cessation clause is considered applicable to the Rwandan refugees in TRC, although many of them still do not consider it possible to return to their country of origin. In general, however, there has been limited demand for and limited attention paid to voluntary repatriation given the few opportunities available.

#### *Resettlement*

Resettlement is seen as a high priority for many refugees who feel that this is the only durable solution that could work for them. At the start of the current strategic planning cycle in 2019 there were no opportunities for resettlement of refugees from TRC. Resettlement from Zimbabwe was stalled from late 2019 to mid-2021, due to the lack of allocated quotas and dedicated resettlement staff. However, through a positive unforeseen development, in 2021 the United States Government (USG) announced that it was willing to take up to 500 applications for resettlement from Zimbabwe for 2021, which rose to 750 in 2022. During the resettlement planning exercise for 2022, Zimbabwe identified 6,000 persons as being in need of resettlement and has been processing cases for resettlement since 2021.

The evaluation team considered that the CO had responded in a comprehensive and timely fashion to the increased opportunities for resettlement despite operational challenges, including having limited staff who also have short-term unstable contracts. The CO has strengthened its capacity for preparing resettlement applications with the support of stand-by partner deployments – the African Regional Deployment Unit (ARDU) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) – which have deployed three staff. In 2021, the CO prepared applications for 108 individuals, whereas by September 2022, the CO had already prepared applications for 374 individuals. If the target for 2022 is met, this will represent approximately 5 per cent of the total refugee and asylum-seeker population in the country. Most of those refugees interviewed and assessed for resettlement are considered eligible, and completed applications are currently being forwarded to the USG.

Refugees in Zimbabwe have not benefited from complementary pathways opportunities in great numbers. UNHCR Zimbabwe is exploring more options related to complementary pathways for legal stays abroad, such as educational pathways (UNICORE), family reunification programmes and labour mobility (CANADA). The RBSA plans to advocate for additional resources to support complementary pathways in Zimbabwe through the Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initiative (CRISP), which is a joint UNHCR-IOM capacity-building mechanism which aims to support states and other stakeholders to grow third-country solutions.

### *Local integration*


There is almost no consideration of formal local integration as a possible durable solution for refugees by the GOZ. The evaluation team found that this is hardly discussed among stakeholders including the GOZ, refugees or UNHCR with the informal arrangement perceived to be meeting existing needs by the GOZ. There is no possibility for refugees to relinquish their legal refugee status and to become a citizen of Zimbabwe as a recognized durable solution. However, given their protracted displacement, the integration of refugees into the local community is very pertinent to their situation. The GOZ encampment policy is flexibly implemented and if refugees have justification and relevant permits, they can make efforts to live outside the camp with an increasing number opting to live outside the camp.

At the community level (Chipinge district), refugees reported that interactions with the host community are helpful. For example, only 1 per cent of survey respondents felt that collaboration with the host community on the livelihood projects was not useful. Many refugees (65.2 per cent of survey respondents) said that if they had the choice they would want to live and work outside the camp while 31.4 per cent reported that they would like to remain in the camp and continue being supported by UNHCR. The reasons why refugees would like to live outside the camp are summarized in Figure 9. The main reasons relate to employment (55.6 per cent) and livelihood opportunities (45 per cent) and freedom of movement (28 per cent).

One of the preconditions to living outside the camp is that refugees must be able to provide their own livelihood particularly food, shelter, education, and WASH needs. Given the low chances of getting gainful employment which would enable refugees to provide all their basic needs, the strategy of pursuing livelihood opportunities as a vehicle to self-reliance remains a high priority for refugees, the GOZ, UNHCR and partners. In follow-up FGDs with refugees, most of them also said that they don't want to forego receiving assistance such as food, shelter, and non-food items which they would have to forego if they were to live outside the camp. More engagement with refugees to prepare them for additional responsibilities associated with self-reliance would also be required.

TRC is itself now increasingly resembling a settlement rather than a camp. This is how GOZ officials from the state minister for social services, the Commissioner for Refugees in Harare and camp administrator are viewing it and working towards. However, some interlocutors in the camp still view it as a camp. With the GOZ playing a more active role in TRC and with refugees now fully integrated into government services, and a consistent push towards self-reliance, it will be important to have a discussion on local integration as a potential durable solution for refugees and to assess readiness. To achieve this, UNHCR's organizational structure will need to be reviewed to ensure that it can respond to the emerging requirements for a successful transition. This would require further engagement with RBSA and HQ.

Figure 9: Reasons for wanting to live and work outside the camp for TRC and urban refugees



Source: TRC and urban refugees survey conducted by evaluation team

### Humanitarian-development-peace nexus

**The humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus is very relevant to the protracted refugee displacement in Zimbabwe. It is being applied implicitly by UNHCR although without actual reference to the concept.** The country has faced recurrent humanitarian challenges while at the same time trying to move to a more sustainable path for economic development. Although there is no dedicated strategy, working group or pilot initiative as occurs in other crisis settings, the nexus is being discussed within the broader aid system in Zimbabwe. Globally, UNHCR has undertaken a thematic evaluation of its engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation and linked the HDP nexus to the GRC and the CRRF. However, there is no specific policy guidance that country operations such as Zimbabwe are required to follow.<sup>42</sup>

Apart from the emergency response to Cyclone Idai and other climate-induced disasters, the ongoing support to the refugees in TRC highlights the importance of the nexus approach as the CO has attempted to shift from a care-and-maintenance approach to one emphasizing self-reliance. The difference between humanitarian and development approaches to assisting people in need is indistinguishable in contexts such as Zimbabwe where there is long-term protracted displacement with assistance provided over several years. The nexus approach requires agencies to address needs in the short term, while reducing the vulnerability of affected populations to those needs over the long term. This has been the clear programmatic approach that UNHCR Zimbabwe has taken which in that sense has been applying the nexus approach without using such terminology (or having the need to do so). While principally reliant on humanitarian funding, the CO and RBSA have been successful in securing funding from development actors, namely, the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

<sup>42</sup> Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation, UNHCR, September 2021

As noted above however, there are several structural challenges to increasing refugees' self-reliance, putting them on a path towards development and overcoming their dependence on humanitarian assistance. While some of the challenges are structural and linked to government policies, some of them are related to barriers within the aid system. For example, while the CO managed to secure development funding, this was still only over a one- to two-year cycle which makes long-term planning challenging. The funding has also come to an end with no clear future funding available. Furthermore, despite UNHCR not having a multi-year planning time frame, the budget received from UNHCR is similarly done annually and project agreements with partners are only one year. Efforts to improve refugees' self-reliance will take several years and it would be better if planning could be undertaken with a long-term perspective.

## Capacity-strengthening

*Main finding: UNHCR has strengthened capacities relevant to the implementation of its country strategy both in relation to the GOZ, and its development partners including UN agencies, NGOs and internally.*

Given the limited and diminishing financial resources available to UNHCR, the development of partnerships with the GOZ and UN agencies and NGOs has been used as a means for capacity-strengthening and mobilizing support for the implementation of the country strategy.

### Capacity-building through strengthening partnerships

**UNHCR has focused on and managed implementing partners with adequate financial and technical capacity to deliver with minimal support from UNHCR.** UNHCR's partners have during the evaluation period co-financed the projects they are supporting. The availability of funding for the partners for 2023 and beyond is however unclear. Since 2019, UNHCR has had three implementing partners in the camp: (i) the Department of Social Development (DSD); (ii) World Vision (WV); and (iii) Terre des Hommes (TDH). The partners have consequently been able to strengthen the capacity of refugee structures and projects with direct training, institutional support to refugee systems and financial backing for projects. The partners have, however, been affected by global crises including COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, which have reduced the funding available for 2023. They are still mobilizing resources for their programmes, but with a global decline in funding for all partners, the outlook remains uncertain. Pooling together and sharing responsibilities is becoming a more important strategy to ensure adequate capacity to deliver on the refugee response in TRC.

### Strengthened partnership with the GOZ.

**UNHCR's approach to working in close partnership with the GOZ has played an important role in strengthening their joint capacities.** UNHCR works with government primarily through the DSD which in turn engages other relevant line ministries. As mentioned in sections above, UNHCR and the GOZ have worked together to address capacity gaps and restructure GOZ teams towards optimal capacity with significant advances, though this remains a work in progress. UNHCR has also supported the GOZ in transitioning its institutional capacity to be more responsive to the needs of people we serve by having more relevant staff at both national and decentralized levels. In total, DSD has 21 staff working directly on people we serve matters with reporting lines to the Commissioner for Refugees and their respective line ministries. Of these, 12 are based in Harare and nine in TRC. While all of their salaries are supported by UNHCR, their ongoing engagement ensures a high-quality response for refugees.



## Capacities of the UNHCR CO

### **The UNHCR CO has managed its capacities adequately even with diminished resources.**

As noted earlier, the CO has had to implement its country strategy with a progressive drop in available funds each year and a growing gap between the budgeted amount and the income received. With the protracted displacement and an increasing number of people we serve, it has therefore been required to “do more, with less”. The CO has tried to diversify its funding base by attracting new donors such as the AfDB, World Bank and other donors, with the RBSA playing a critical role in raising extra monies. However, despite diversifying the donor base, this has not led to more sustainable funding over the long run, with the short-term funding cycles of donors being a major operational challenge. CO staff noted that as government funding is only offset against core funding from UNHCR (OL) it does not lead to an increase in the available amount of funds, which is a disincentive for fundraising. There is in general the feeling that the uncertain forecast for funding is only going to make it more difficult to maintain the same level of services for refugees. Despite the reduced levels of funding, the number of staff in the country operations remained about the same and is probably at a minimum for what might be required in a small operation. Some concerns emerged about the duplication of roles between staff in Harare and TRC, and between the TRC field office and those staff in the implementing partners and GOZ district offices. But many stakeholders felt that all key technical capacities were required, whereas many staff are “double-hatting” – taking on different functional areas and being a focal point for these.

## Emergency preparedness and response

**UNHCR has taken steps to strengthen its emergency preparedness since Cyclone Idai although there are still gaps in its state of readiness for future disasters.** The L3 Evaluation and 2020 Audit found that UNHCR Zimbabwe was ill-prepared for Cyclone Idai with a lack of clear policy implementation on UNHCR’s role in response to climate-induced internal displacement.<sup>43</sup> The Emergency Response Team (ERT) deployed for a period of six months, but UNHCR was slow to position itself in the response with some resulting gaps. UNHCR responded effectively to the surges during the response in close collaboration with HQ and the RBSA. UNHCR and the GOZ also worked with refugees to provide emergency response support to IDPs, based on the technical capacity of refugees in some sectors, particularly emergency shelter. However, there are still challenges in the provision of adequate shelter in 2022. There has been no direct funding for shelter since Cyclone Idai and the stocks that were available during the response to the cyclone have been depleted.

Since December 2019, UNHCR has been party to the Chipinge District Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan prepared by the District Civil Protection Committee while also maintaining its own Disaster Preparedness Plan for TRC. UNHCR had been establishing partnerships with other UN agencies, primarily UNDP and WFP in pursuit of stronger capacity to strengthen emergency preparedness and deliver climate-smart programmes for refugees. Due to inadequate funding, UNHCR was unable to maintain a standing stockpile in the event of other emergencies. However, non-emergency UNHCR operations do not ordinarily maintain stockpiles. In the event of an emergency, UNHCR has hubs that stockpile and dispatch core relief items through airlifts as was the case in 2019.

---

<sup>43</sup> See UNHCR L3 Evaluation to Cyclone Idai and 2020 Audit

In addition, UNHCR has played a more active role in the UN Country Team (UNCT) as recommended in the Cyclone Idai evaluation. This has expanded the scope for joint action in the event of an emergency with more clarity on UNHCR's roles. RBSA has also been working towards the regional strategic framework on climate action that will help to ensure a more effective response to disasters, funding permitting. In addition, the office deployed an external relations officer in November 2021, in line with the recommendations from the Cyclone Idai evaluation that would play a critical role in resource mobilization during an emergency.

### Risk management

The 2020 Audit found that the CO's risk register was not sufficiently up to date. However, the RBSA and CO informed that this is now adequately reviewed, and the CO also undertakes six-monthly risk reviews to discuss the identified risk and decide if there are any corrective measures required. This was another area where RBSA provided scheduled support to the CO to develop the necessary corporate approach of UNHCR; and it supported the latest risk review process mid-2022.

### **Evaluation Question 4 (Engagement and accountability to affected populations) – How effectively has UNHCR Zimbabwe ensured an inclusive approach to its programming and accountability to people we serve?**

#### Appropriateness

*Main finding: Despite efforts to ensure coverage of all refugee needs based on their specific vulnerabilities and without discrimination, there was a mixed sense of inclusion felt by refugees.*

#### Targeting of assistance

**UNHCR and partners have used general targeting for providing food and other basic services combined with targeted assistance for vulnerable groups, although the evaluation found that there were gaps for some groups including child and women-headed households.** UNHCR, in collaboration with the GOZ and other partners, has ensured an adequate response for all refugees as stated in the sections above. There has also been additional focus on those considered to be more vulnerable. In food distribution, for example, vulnerable groups receive additional rations in addition to the food, voucher or cash transfer through WFP and GOZ support. Shelter and schools have been adjusted to accommodate PLWD including sections of schools established for PLWD, and teachers have received additional training. There are specific livelihood projects that are targeted at extremely vulnerable refugee households.

Progress was made in Best Interest Application for unaccompanied minors with 405 out of 445 (91 per cent) BIA processes completed by December 2021. Only 22 per cent of women-headed households reported living in adequate dwelling compared to 52 per cent of the general population. Despite this, shelter was reported as being adequate considering the constraints and there was significant progress in adhering to standards.

On livelihood programmes, the initial targeting was aimed at ensuring that as many refugees as possible could get access to livelihood opportunities. This was further refined to allow refugees to use a self-selection approach where advertisements are posted across the camp and refugees

express interest in the opportunities that appeal to them. A separate project was formulated targeting only the most vulnerable through the Ultra Poor Graduation (UPG) Model. The current targeting risks excluding the most vulnerable due to the self-selection and interview methods. The effectiveness of the current targeting method would need to be reviewed considering the high drop-out rate. A balance is needed when targeting for the livelihood programme and self-selection to ensure that there is clear progress but that no one is left behind. Feedback mechanisms and monitoring would be required to inform gaps and opportunities that would be needed to adjust the targeting model. This is reinforced by feedback from refugees which indicated that they do not fully understand why some who express interest get the opportunities and others do not, yet they feel that they have similar circumstances.

#### Accountability to affected populations (AAP)

**UNHCR, directly and through its partners, has provided formal and informal processes to enhance accountability to affected populations, focusing on feedback mechanisms more than participation.** In line with UNHCR's operational guidance on Accountability to Affected Populations,<sup>44</sup> refugees confirmed that they generally participated and were included in processes and decisions that affect them, that there was feedback and response, and that they were well-informed of their rights and entitlements. Most survey respondents (72 per cent) felt that they were involved (either actively or moderately) and participated in the design and implementation of assistance provided by UNHCR. Refugees however, felt that more engagement is still needed when selecting the projects to prioritize. Despite these sentiments, refugees except for the youth still felt largely content with the projects that were currently selected. There was transparency and effective sharing of information and most of the refugees surveyed felt that their complaints or feedback would be acted upon (61 per cent); only 7 per cent of refugees rated the complaints and feedback mechanisms as not good. Through KIs and FGDs, refugees affirmed that they could provide feedback to UNHCR without fear.

Refugees have access to all relevant GOZ, UNHCR and partner staff based in the camp through ad hoc requests, through their representatives or regularly scheduled monthly meetings. The quality of engagement was an area where community leaders expressed concern. The feedback from some of the FGDs indicated that some staff were more of a mouthpiece to relay information than representatives to share views. Further probing indicated that this does not indicate that refugees are discontent with the current projects, but they would like to be more engaged particularly in selecting the priorities, planning and implementation of interventions. More could be done to incorporate them in the decision-making process, in planning and monitoring, as partners and not just beneficiaries. At the same time refugees reported that they do not feel there is any issue which they cannot raise with UNHCR or the GOZ. In addition, refugees reported that they feel their feedback was adequately addressed and confidentiality was ensured through any of the available engagement and feedback systems available to them. According to the survey, 61 per cent of refugees in TRC felt that their protection issues were adequately addressed and 57.14 per cent for urban refugees.

#### Age, gender and diversity

**Women, older people, youth, PLWD and minority groups are regularly engaged and consulted in the design, development and implementation of the assistance provided to**

---

<sup>44</sup> UNHCR operational guidance on accountability to affected people, accessed on 2 February 2022

**them.** UNHCR referred to and was guided by the AGD policy<sup>45</sup> throughout the operational plans and in the day-to-day operations. Data is collected, analysed and reported based on relevant disaggregation. There are specific initiatives aimed at enhancing the engagement and access to those identified as more vulnerable under the AGD policy. This commitment reflects refugees' surveyed responses where only 8.2 per cent felt that UNHCR's assistance had not focused sufficiently on vulnerable groups. According to the indicator achievement report the target of women's representation in refugee management organs was achieved. Women's representation ranges in the 40th percentile against a target of 50 per cent from a baseline of 30.8 per cent in 2019. There is representation and inclusion at all levels with specific committees (women, youth, older people, minority groups and PLWD) to ensure that there is adequate diversity of views and decisions. Representation is also evident in leadership and decision-making positions which is mainly achieved through camp management structures.

#### Engagement of host community


**Even though responsibility for the host community generally falls under the GOZ, UNHCR has included them in planning for specific services to increase integration and cohesion.**

The host community generally falls under the responsibility of the GOZ with UNHCR meeting some of their needs by including them in the provision of services available at the camp such as health, education, WASH, livelihood, and security. UNHCR and the GOZ, however, make allocations for host community when planning for delivery of programmes. The refugees have also established their independent means of collaborating with the host community. Only 9.7 per cent of refugees reported that they had never interacted with the host community while only 1 per cent of those who had interacted felt that interactions with host communities were not useful. Host communities have free access to TRC and engage with the refugees primarily in the livelihood programmes. There is generally good co-existence between the refugees and host communities who are customers and suppliers to refugees. They also work hand in hand on projects and support refugees in providing access to markets. Figure 10 shows the interaction of refugees with the host community.

---

<sup>45</sup> [UNHCR policy on Age, Gender and Diversity](#)

Figure 10: TRC refugee interactions with host community



Source: TRC based refugees survey conducted by evaluation team

## 4.2 Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

### Evaluation Question 1 (Results) – To what extent did UNHCR achieve its strategic objectives and was its response appropriate to the needs of IDPs?

*Main finding: UNHCR’s response to IDPs during Cyclone Idai was mainly in TRC but also included core relief items and documentation in other affected locations in the country. UNHCR was not involved significantly in the recovery phase.*

UNHCR Zimbabwe’s response to internal displacement has been in relation to the 41,535 IDPs from Cyclone Idai. According to UNHCR’s 2019 IDP Policy and subsequent IDP initiative, the organization is committed to being more decisive, predictable and effective in situations of internal displacement.<sup>46</sup> This commitment also relates to internal displacement caused by climate-induced disasters for which guidelines have also been promulgated.<sup>47</sup> However, as the L3 Evaluation on UNHCR’s response to Cyclone Idai already concluded, UNHCR’s response revealed a critical “policy-implementation gap” concerning its engagement in climate-related disaster displacement in non-conflict situations and the organization was not able to fully implement its own policies concerning emergency and IDP responses.<sup>48</sup>

In Zimbabwe, UNHCR’s response to Cyclone Idai was predominantly for the refugees in TRC but also included those affected in host local populations in Chipinge and Chimanimani districts, including those in displacement camps. In TRC, infrastructure was severely affected as flooding destroyed latrines, boreholes, and shelters. UNHCR provided core relief items (CRIs), emergency shelter, WASH and other assistance within TRC and distributed CRIs to other affected

<sup>46</sup> Policy on UNHCR’s Engagement of Situations of Internal Displacement, UNHCR/HCP/2019/1, 19 September 2019

<sup>47</sup> Practical Guidance for UNHCR Staff on IDP Protection in the Context of Disaster and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change, October 2021

<sup>48</sup> L3 Evaluation to Cyclone Idai

communities in Chimanimani and Chipinge. UNHCR was the only UN agency that prioritized the issuance of civil registration documentation to 24,000 IDPs to ensure continued access to basic social services for people displaced by the floods.

A six-month ERT was deployed and worked effectively to provide assistance in TRC, although UNHCR was not part of the consortium of agencies that responded in the other affected areas. As the UNHCR IDP Policy indicates “UNHCR will also contribute to any inter-agency response to disaster-induced internal displacement, taking the lead on protection, whenever the three criteria of field presence, a government request and inter-agency agreement are met”. Notwithstanding whether these conditions were met due to a lack of field presence and funds, there were significant gaps in the overall response and in UNHCR’s response which highlights the challenges of implementing the IDP policy in small operations without significant resources. After the initial six-month emergency response, the CO has had no subsequent funds to provide any response to the IDPs in Zimbabwe, either those that remained displaced because of Cyclone Idai or for other reasons.

**Evaluation Question 2 (Strategic positioning and coordination) – To what extent did UNHCR Zimbabwe’s strategy align with and enhance those of the GOZ and other UN and NGO partners?**

*Main finding: While coordinating effectively with the GOZ, UNHCR struggled to position itself as cluster coordinator as part of the response to Cyclone Idai. Subsequently it has had a ‘stop-start’ approach to the protection cluster coordination.*

UNHCR worked closely with the GOZ and other UN and NGO partners as part of the response to Cyclone Idai, however, it struggled to fulfil its cluster coordination responsibilities, especially in relation to the protection cluster.<sup>49</sup> The Cluster Approach was activated in Zimbabwe in March 2019 following Cyclone Idai. At no time did UNHCR lead the shelter and Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) clusters, but rather it focused on its protection cluster responsibilities. According to its IDP policy, UNHCR is committed to taking the lead on protection in disaster-induced internal displacement settings whenever it has sufficient in-country presence (including scaling up, where needed), a government request and inter-agency agreement. UNHCR led the National Protection Cluster until December 2019. However, in January 2020, at the request of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, the leadership role was temporarily handed over to UNFPA. In April 2021, UNHCR resumed leadership and deployed a National Protection Cluster Coordinator to Zimbabwe from June to August 2021 (although due to COVID, he only spent six days in country). From August 2021, UNHCR was unable to fill the position of National Protection Coordinator and decided instead that the Senior Protection Officer (which was upgraded) would perform the function but “double-hatted” with their existing responsibilities,<sup>50</sup> with the support of one dedicated information management officer.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> This is not a specific problem to Zimbabwe but one that UNHCR has faced in other contexts where it is cluster lead. See IASC Protection Policy Review April 2022, (<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/operational-response/independent-review-implementation-iasc-protection-policy>)

<sup>50</sup> UNFPA and UNICEF also have double-hatted their GBV and Child Protection AoR responsibilities.

<sup>51</sup> See Handover Report, Douglas Jennings, National Protection Cluster Coordinator, June 2021-August 2021, Harare, Zimbabwe

Without any funded projects related to IDPs, UNHCR coordination with respect to protection has amounted to convening a monthly meeting involving the more active gender-based violence (GBV) working group run by UNFPA and the child protection working group run by UNICEF, and other agencies working in the general protection domain. The protection cluster counts about 20 protection partners. While providing information-sharing on protection issues and activities, most stakeholders consulted during the evaluation felt that there was not any significant “added value” of the group in its current form. Notwithstanding GBV and child protection, there is no common protection analysis of other concerns and limited other protection activities given the restricted civic space for organizations to work on issues such as evictions, housing land and property and related concerns. The 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) had only one project submitted (by UNHCR) in relation to general protection and in any case, this was not adopted by the GOZ, and a plan for 2022 was not even developed. Given the lack of an active protection cluster, the NGO community has initiated their own protection working group.

Zimbabwe currently faces widespread food insecurity due to several factors including macro-economic challenges and climate change-induced disasters such as cyclones, droughts and floods. However, it does not fit the typical characteristic of a humanitarian crisis and therefore there is an ongoing debate among aid agencies about whether a classic humanitarian architecture is necessary.<sup>52</sup> The potential deactivation of the cluster system has been discussed in the Humanitarian Country Team since October 2021 with a decision still pending given concerns about a potential upsurge in violence around the national elections in 2023 and the potential for humanitarian needs. Even if the clusters are deactivated, sectoral working groups are likely to continue to coordinate the humanitarian/development assistance, including with government counterparts. UNHCR has had to contend with how best to respond to such a context.

**Evaluation Question 3 (Sustainability and capacity-strengthening) – How did UNHCR enhance sustainability and capacities for delivery of results and leverage its influence within the country to optimize the potential impact of its collective efforts?**

*Main finding: The current arrangement of the protection cluster is providing limited added value and arguably not a suitable coordination structure, given the current protection situation in Zimbabwe. Despite various recommendations, the arrangement has not been reformed.*

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) have requested that the protection cluster be maintained because of potential electoral-related human rights concerns. However, the protection cluster arrangement that has been in place since 2021 is not sustainable for such a context. UNHCR is not well-placed to coordinate the cluster given that – unlike, for instance, IOM – it has no IDP or non-refugee-related protection funded projects – and has struggled to staff this coordination function. Without sufficient funds, even for the refugee response, it has been impossible to allocate or raise funds for the IDP response. Despite a strong commitment from UNHCR Headquarters and RBSA to respond to IDP situations caused by climate-induced disasters, it has been impossible to fulfil this policy commitment in small operations such as Zimbabwe. Rather than continue to struggle in terms of policy implementation, which is frustrating for all

---

<sup>52</sup> See for example the Zimbabwe Humanitarian Response Plan for 2021 which was developed but not endorsed by the GOZ ([https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/zim\\_2021\\_hrp\\_draft.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/zim_2021_hrp_draft.pdf))

stakeholders, it would be better to find other, more sustainable, arrangements with other partners in coordination protection and human rights issues.

Several proposals have been made for revising the protection coordination mechanisms in Zimbabwe. Proposals have been made to merge the protection cluster with the UN-led human rights working group which is chaired by the Human Rights Advisor in the RC Office.<sup>53</sup> In March 2022, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC) visited Zimbabwe and recommended that the protection cluster – along with the other clusters – be deactivated and transitioned into another human rights/protection coordination structure with UNHCR still engaged but not actively leading.<sup>54</sup> At the same time there would still need to be a proper protection/human rights analysis conducted, contingency planning/emergency preparedness undertaken in view of the upcoming elections, and advocacy on key concerns such as IDP protection and assistance such as the domestication into national law of the Kampala Convention. However, the protection cluster in its current form is not suitable to carry out these tasks.

#### **Evaluation Question 4 (Engagement and accountability to affected populations) – How effectively has UNHCR Zimbabwe ensured an inclusive approach to its programming and accountability to people we serve?**

Given that UNHCR does not have any IDP activities, it was not considered necessary to respond to this evaluation question.

#### **4.3 Statelessness**

Zimbabwe was included as a priority country under UNHCR's #IBelongCampaign and the CO has been working to implement the UNHCR Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014–2024. The GOZ made seven pledges related to statelessness at the GRF including conducting a study on statelessness, developing an action plan to end statelessness, acceding to the Statelessness Convention, and strengthening civil registration to prevent statelessness.<sup>55</sup> However, the evaluation noted that only partial progress had been made in implementing these pledges and the CO had been unable to dedicate significant resources and capacity to the issue. These findings were consistent with UNHCR's recent thematic evaluation on statelessness in terms of institutional attention.<sup>56</sup>

Questions related to statelessness were included in the census conducted by the GOZ in 2022, but the results of this exercise had not been released at the time of writing. The GOZ had also conducted a desk review on statelessness, but the planned statelessness study had not been launched; nor was there progress in relation to the planned legislative changes on the issue outlined in the GRF pledges. Given the limited resources of the CO, compounded by the fact that there are no dedicated staff working on statelessness and it does not have an implementing partner, the CO continues to advocate to the GOZ on the issue and provides technical support where possible, but otherwise it was not able to dedicate more attention to the issue.

---

<sup>53</sup> See Handover Report, Douglas Jennings, National Protection Cluster Coordinator, June 2021-August 2021, Harare, Zimbabwe

<sup>54</sup> Global Protection Cluster Mission Report Zimbabwe, March 2022

<sup>55</sup> See GRF progress report

<sup>56</sup> Evaluation of UNHCR Led Initiatives to End Statelessness, Final Report, May 2021



## 5.0 Conclusions and recommendations

### **Conclusion 1 - Supporting the strategic and evidence-based transformation of the refugee camp to a holistic and comprehensive service centre and enhancing refugees' self-reliance should be the highest priority.**

UNHCR has worked effectively with, and in support of the GOZ to strengthen the refugee response, improve protection and assistance for refugees in the TRC and provide opportunities for livelihoods. The support has led to initial transformation of the TRC with the camp now operating more like a settlement than a refugee camp. The transformation to a service centre where the aim is for refugees to be more self-reliant and integrated into the community should remain the number one priority. On its part, the GOZ has provided more access to land so that allocations can meet international standards of 0.25 ha per household from the current 0.1 ha allocation. The allocation of land by GOZ is with an expectation that UNHCR and partners will invest in making the land more productive primarily through irrigation infrastructure.

Despite the high levels of commitments, progress on the livelihood projects has mainly been on subsistence production which has contributed to dietary diversity and some extent of food security but has fallen short of meeting the self-reliance or graduation objectives. A coherent and long-term livelihood strategy, that is properly funded, has been lacking. There has been a fragmented and stop-start approach characterized by change of partners, introduction of new projects, and subsequent change in implementation methods. This approach has yielded low results and faced significant structural challenges. This stop-start approach has also led to a sense of disillusionment among some refugees and risks creating more dependency if livelihood opportunities do not translate into self-reliance. This further reinforces the need to shift programming towards self-reliance, avoiding the risk of livelihood programmes being seen as perpetual support.

Given the protracted nature of the refugees' situation and the limited funding, ensuring that refugees' livelihood opportunities translate into greater economic self-reliance has been a high priority. The objective of transforming the camp into a service centre is widely shared but there is no documented strategy or workplan guiding implementation of this objective. There has been commitment and investment in enhancing self-reliance by UNHCR and its partners including the GOZ which has provided more access to land though the allocation fell short of the FAO standard per household (0.1 ha per household instead of 0.25 ha per household). Through UNHCR's partnerships with the GOZ, AfDB, WV and WFP, several projects have injected funds and innovative approaches towards boosting refugees' self-reliance. The objective has been to improve livelihood opportunities for refugees as a means of fast-tracking progress towards self-reliance. Despite these efforts, the investments are yet to see a transition from subsistence livelihoods into economic self-reliance.

The staffing and organization structure of UNHCR is not set up to effectively support the ambition of transitioning TRC into a settlement or service centre, or prioritizing self-reliance of refugees where even more technical skills would be required by both UNHCR and the GOZ in TRC and surrounding districts. There is need for new or continued technical expertise in livelihoods, irrigation, value chain, development, M&E at the right level to support the project. Some of the expertise is available from GOZ and partners and UNHCR has been using the expertise from GOZ and partners, but there are some areas including the ones listed above where more expertise would be required.

There has been inadequate monitoring of progress and critical issues such as drop-offs are missed, and records do not reflect the current reality. This has led to missed opportunities in addressing the cause of the dropouts or transitioning refugees who are capable towards higher levels of self-reliance. Camp-based refugees are still fully reliant on UNHCR, the GOZ and partners to meet their basic needs while urban refugees report food insecurity as their major concern, although they are considered or required to be self-reliant to reside in urban areas.

UNHCR's and partners' funding available for improving self-reliance has increased from what it was in 2019 but is still too low and could only provide livelihood opportunities at subsistence level. Additional funding is required to move from subsistence to profitable livelihood opportunities that can lead to economic self-reliance for refugees. A coherent and long-term livelihood strategy that is properly funded, has been lacking and the fragmented and stop-start approach has yielded few results and faced significant structural challenges. This approach has also led to a sense of disillusionment among refugees and risks creating more dependency by refugees if livelihood opportunities do not translate to self-reliance and continue to go hand in hand with provision of basic needs. It is therefore important to prepare refugees for the expectation of self-reliance and include graduation for refugees who are able to meet some of their needs. This will avoid the risk of livelihood programmes being seen as perpetual support.

In terms of protection and assistance provided to refugees in and out of TRC with UNHCR support, this has met most established targets and has been delivered in line with key UNHCR policies, strategies, guidelines, and global commitments as well as GOZ national and district plans. Partners and the refugee community leaders expressed a general sense of reliability and trust in UNHCR's role and clarity on what its strategic objectives are on protection and solutions. The main priority that has not been met is that of providing sustainable livelihoods that would translate to refugees' self-reliance and clarity on how the camp would transition to a service centre.

It is recommended that:

1. UNHCR Zimbabwe should, in collaboration with GOZ, **develop a medium-term strategy and costed work-plan to implement its commitment of transforming the Tongogara Refugee Camp into a holistic, comprehensive service centre for refugees and the communities that host them.** This should be informed by the UNHCR's strategic framework for climate action, the global framework for sustainable action, and other studies such as cost-benefit analyses. (Within six months)
2. UNHCR Zimbabwe should continue **advocacy towards the GOZ to provide the additional land required for the refugees to meet international standards on land allocation.** This should go hand in hand with the completion of the livelihood strategy that will inform on the best approach to **add value to the land (including irrigation, climate smart agriculture practices and value chain management)** to enable refugees achieve the levels of productivity required for self-reliance. (ongoing /immediate)
3. As the transition continues and refugees become more self-reliant, integrated into the community and GOZ delivery mechanisms, UNHCR Zimbabwe in close collaboration with RBSA should lead **periodic mapping and review (every two to four years) with partners the capacities and staffing of UNHCR and GOZ that will be required to deliver the transformation.** This should ensure that key capacities including irrigation / WASH, livelihood, M&E, development and community engagement are included in the GOZ, implementing partners, operational partners or UNHCR capacities. (Within six months)

4. UNHCR Zimbabwe in close collaboration with RBSA and DRS should prioritize **fundraising independently and with partners for livelihood projects** in line with the requirements to transition from subsistence to economic self-reliance. The approach of sourcing local or regional financiers, accessing UNHCR global funds and increasing the allocation of livelihood funds in UNHCR Zimbabwe's portfolio should be maintained. Finding new sources of livelihoods funding for UNHCR and partners to meet the requirements to transform livelihoods from subsistence to surplus production should remain a priority. (Immediate and ongoing)

**Conclusion 2 – Enhanced advocacy on implementation of commitments and legislation is required:** UNHCR has advocated for greater involvement by GOZ at centralized and decentralized levels in addressing the needs of refugees. There has been progress in some areas of implementing global commitments, however, there remain key legislation barriers to improving the protection and assistance of refugees.

There has been a demonstrable shift during the period under evaluation with the GOZ playing an increasing role in the refugee response with the deployment of relevant GOZ staff to TRC and integration of refugees in national systems, with improved results for refugees. With UNHCR's support, the GOZ has shown a strong commitment to refugee protection and assistance and has become a trusted by refugees to provide protection and services. GOZ has also dedicated high level staff who have the required capacity to continue delivering protection and solutions for refugees. Progress has also been made in implementing the GRF pledges with commitments reiterated by the state minister responsible for refugees. However, there are still some gaps in actions to adapt national policies, legislation, and programmes in line with global commitments and international refugees' standards.

It is recommended that:

5. UNHCR Zimbabwe should, in conjunction with other UN agencies, **increase its advocacy, engagement and technical support for the implementation of commitments that GOZ has signed up to.** The main commitments that need to be prioritized include the GRF, 1951 and 1969 convention so that it further aligns its national laws and policies with international **standards** for refugees and persons at risk of statelessness. (immediate / ongoing)
6. UNHCR Zimbabwe should maintain **advocacy and work with the GOZ to undertake the planned study on statelessness** in Zimbabwe and the actions to implement the pledges made during the High-Level Forum on Statelessness and should identify an implementing partner to support this. (Immediate and ongoing)

**Conclusion 3 - Review of UNHCR's coordination role on IDPs:** UNHCR's protection and assistance response to IDPs since Cyclone Idai has raised key policy implementation challenges with respect to UNHCR's approach to IDPs. This includes climate-induced displacement and how to fulfil its cluster responsibilities which have been compounded by the lack of funding.

Since 2020 after Cyclone Idai the CO has struggled to fulfil UNHCR's IDP policy commitments. The CO adopted a stop-start and piecemeal approach to the issue without making difficult operational decisions given the well-understood constraints including the lack of funding. In addition to these internal challenges, given the current context in Zimbabwe, the CO would be well placed to extract itself from addressing IDP issues unless there is a serious deterioration that would merit re-engagement.

It is recommended that:

7. UNHCR Zimbabwe should, as recommended by the Global Protection Cluster, **lead discussions with other partners with engagement from RBSA on the reformulation or deactivation of the protection cluster including the establishment of an alternative coordination structure** for protection and human rights issues in Zimbabwe. This would not be led by UNHCR, but it would remain an active member. (Within six months)

## Annexes

### Annex 1: Evaluation matrix

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
<b>1.Results - To what extent did UNHCR achieve its strategic objectives and was its response appropriate to the needs of people we serve?</b>				
<b>Relevance and effectiveness</b>	1 What were the most important <b>contextual and operational factors</b> /decisions contributing to or impeding the achievement of results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What were the main factors guiding the objectives, approach, and engagement of the operation?</li> <li>• How did UNHCR Zimbabwe identify and address the prioritized needs of each of the categories of people we serve and the government?</li> <li>• To what extent was the strategic approach relevant and/or contributed to the achievement of planned results including joint results with the GOZ and other partners?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socioeconomic, humanitarian and development data</li> <li>• Adjustments made in UNHCR's portfolio and response</li> <li>• Review of annual strategic plans</li> <li>• Analysis of UNHCR's policy, strategic and programming work in relation to IDPs</li> <li>• Analysis of the main changes and drivers of change</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CO people we serve statistics</li> <li>• Context reports and analysis</li> <li>• UNHCR global frameworks</li> <li>• UNHCR strategy and planning documents</li> <li>• Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) plans and strategies on refugees</li> <li>• UNHCR's Strategic Framework for Climate Action</li> <li>• Relevant GOZ policies, plans and strategies</li> <li>• KIIs with a) UNHCR senior management, in-country, regionally and at HQ; b) GOZ officers; c) SADC officials; (d) donors</li> <li>• KIIs and FGDs with IDP refugees (disaggregated</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
	<p>1.2 What major contextual and emerging factors needed to be considered in the immediate, intermediate, and longer-term planning for the operation to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of UNHCR Zimbabwe within the <b>Humanitarian-Development and Peace Nexus</b>?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How is the country office adapting to the changes in resource availability and the shift towards financing for longer-term developmental needs?</li> <li>• How has the country office made the shift in the balance between care and maintenance in the longer-term?</li> <li>• To what extent has UNHCR Zimbabwe effectively delivered on its role in operationalizing the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus approach based on evolving contextual needs in Zimbabwe?</li> <li>• Was this approach strategic and systematic or opportunistic?</li> <li>• What were the results of this or what were the lost opportunities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country programme budget and resources</li> <li>• Trends in # of people we serve (refugees, asylum-seekers, persons at risk of statelessness, IDPs)</li> <li>• Evidence that UNHCR is paying attention to the three components of the HDP nexus</li> <li>• Evidence of coherence between UNHCR's mandate, strategies and policies for Zimbabwe, SADC and GCR</li> <li>• Comparative analysis of UNHCR's main strategies and operational design with national policies/priorities and government plans, including SDGs</li> <li>• Analysis of UNHCR's engagement in protection cluster with focus on leadership, coordination and coherence</li> </ul>	<p>by age, gender, and other key factors of diversity)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country office operational plan, strategy, and contingency plans</li> <li>• National development plans (including all stakeholders)</li> <li>• UNHCR's strategy documents related to the HDP nexus</li> <li>• UNHCR's strategy documents and data regarding its commitments to IDPs</li> <li>• KIIs with those leading 'collective outcomes' in Zimbabwe</li> <li>• KIIs with other agencies and with government officers engaged in durable solutions programming</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
	<p>1.3 How does the UNHCR / GOZ <b>livelihood programme</b> contribute to supporting local integration and self-reliance for refugees? How were other partners engaged to ensure complementarity with other UN programmes and reduce the risk of duplication?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How and to what extent did the livelihood programme contribute to the overall strategic transformation?</li> <li>• How has UNHCR contributed to sustainability and scalability of the achievements of the livelihood programme?</li> <li>• How effective was the targeting of beneficiaries?</li> <li>• How effective and sustainable was the resource mobilization strategy for the livelihood programme?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of beneficiaries and coverage of livelihood assistance by the type of livelihood assistance<sup>1</sup></li> <li>• Evidence of the level of self-reliance realized through livelihood support</li> <li>• Evidence of effectiveness of current model of support and collaboration with partner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feedback from individual programme beneficiaries</li> <li>• African Development Bank (AfDB) project documents</li> <li>• KII with UNHCR and implementing partners (including AfDB)</li> <li>• KII with GOZ partners</li> </ul>
	<p>1.4 How were key lessons / recommendations from previous evaluations and studies (including the evaluation of the Cyclone Idai response) applied to improve <b>preparedness, response</b>, and achievement of results for people we serve? The evaluation should provide findings and recommendations that will inform the Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (RBSA) and CO in Zimbabwe on key areas including strategic planning, integrating regional dynamics into multi-year strategic planning, and identifying key areas of the CO operation that need support from the regional bureau.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What steps have been taken to improve emergency preparedness since Cyclone Idai?</li> <li>• What is the country office's preparedness strategy and state of readiness to address climate-induced and/or natural disaster displacement?</li> <li>• What is UNHCR's most effective role in the context of preparedness in Zimbabwe and how effective has UNHCR been?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of the actions taken to implement recommendations of previous evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergency preparedness plans</li> <li>• Report on management response plan on Cyclone Idai evaluation</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
<b>2. Strategic positioning and coordination - To what extent did UNHCR Zimbabwe's strategy align with and enhance those of the Government of Zimbabwe and other UN and NGO partners?</b>				
<b>Coherence and connectedness</b>	2.1 How strategically was UNHCR positioned within the country, regional and global contexts, and how coherently did their engagement contribute to important <b>coordination mechanisms</b> including UNSDCF in general and, specifically, in response, preparedness actions? The extent to which UNHCR Zimbabwe's strategic priorities and country operational plans were coherent and/or <b>aligned with the work of the government</b> , other UN agencies and other humanitarian/development actors. This will include an assessment of how well aligned the existing UNHCR strategy and country operational plan were to the GCR, UNHCR's Strategic Objectives, current and/or evolving needs of the population and changes in the wider country context.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent were UNHCR Zimbabwe's main strategies, policies and frameworks aligned with the GOZ's national development plans, strategies and goals including its pledges to the GCR and the Sustainable Development Goals?</li> <li>To what extent has the country office been able to integrate UNHCR mandated concerns within inter-agency planning frameworks including the UNSDCF, HRP, etc.?</li> <li>To what extent was UNHCR's role in various coordination mechanisms appropriate and contributing to enhanced results?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documented proof of inclusion of refugees in relevant strategies and plans. # of GRF commitments implemented</li> <li>Evidence of UNHCR involvement in key national policy and strategic formulation, implementation, and monitoring on refugee and people we serve issues</li> <li>Evidence of adaptive management practices and flexibility in programming as the context changed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Development Strategy</li> <li>UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)</li> <li>Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)</li> <li>UNHCR's strategies and annual operational plans</li> <li>KIIs with senior management to explore adaptive management practices and enabling/constraining factors to adaptation</li> <li>KIIs with UNHCR donors and with other external stakeholders working closely with UNHCR</li> <li>KIIs with top government officials</li> </ul>



Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
	2.2 How has UNHCR broadened its relations / connectedness with <b>relevant public bodies and other (potential) partners</b> towards mainstreaming protection across the humanitarian-peace-development nexus?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How effective has UNHCR been in its objective of repositioning itself as coordinator for strategic partnerships and convener of stakeholders and multi-agency contributions rather than direct provider for refugees, IDPs and persons at risk of statelessness?</li> <li>• To what extent has UNHCR facilitated / collaborated with the GOZ and its Refugee Committee towards greater national ownership for refugee issues?</li> <li>• To what extent has UNHCR Zimbabwe strategically engaged private sector partners and enhanced opportunities for sustainable partnerships?</li> <li>• To what extent has UNHCR Zimbabwe strategically engaged donors and enhanced opportunities for sustainable partnerships?</li> <li>• To what extent has UNHCR pursued an all-of-society approach as envisaged under the GCR?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National budget relevant to refugees</li> <li>• Evidence of coherent and integrated approach to UNHCR's partnership with the GOZ</li> <li>• Evidence that UNHCR's partnership approach has been designed and implemented in collaboration and coordination with other UN agencies</li> <li>• Evidence of strategic thinking underpinning UNHCR's collaboration with the private sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National laws and policies</li> <li>• GRF reports</li> <li>• KIs with Refugee Commissioners Office and other GOZ officials</li> <li>• KIs with private sector, donors, banks and other civil society organizations</li> <li>• Mapping of UNHCR partnerships at national and decentralized levels</li> <li>• Letters of Agreement between UNHCR and partners</li> </ul>
<b>3. Sustainability and capacity-strengthening - How did UNHCR enhance sustainability and capacities for delivery or results and leverage its strategic position and influence within the country to optimize the potential impact of its collective efforts?</b>				
<b>Sustainability and capacity-strengthening</b>	3.1 To what extent were UNHCR's own <b>capacity, strategy, structures and processes</b> aligned and fit-for-purpose to carry out the strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent did the country office's management and organizational structures facilitate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trends in country office budget and resources</li> <li>• # of staff and vacancies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNHCR Zimbabwe Audit report and progress on implementation of recommendations</li> </ul>


Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
	and contribute to national / UN development / humanitarian objectives.	<p>the implementation of its strategy and operational plan?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has UNHCR organizational reform and change a) at corporate level and b) within Zimbabwe helped to advance internal coherence and affected UNHCR's ability to deliver?</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country office organigram</li> </ul>
	3.2 How did UNHCR support capacity-strengthening of the <b>GOZ's asylum system</b> as well as inclusion and solutions for refugees and asylum-seekers?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has UNHCR supported the GOZ in implementing its GCR pledges?</li> <li>What were the main bottlenecks and lessons related to the support for the GOZ asylum system?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country office people we serve statistics</li> <li>Evidence of progress made by the GOZ made at the 2019 GRF</li> <li>Evidence of clear, coherent, and joined-up strategy guiding UNHCR's approach to technical and capacity support to government</li> <li>Evidence of results of UNHCR's technical and capacity support across the GOZ and at different levels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Asylum system reports and procedures</li> <li>Progress report on GOZ GCR pledges</li> <li>KIIs with national government officers and with UNHCR senior management staff</li> <li>Assessing implementation of pledges at field level through KIIs with refugees, UNHCR field staff and local government officers</li> <li>Capacity-building and training reports</li> </ul>
	3.3 How has UNHCR (during the evaluation period) <b>enhanced sustainability and enhanced capacities</b> (internal and of relevant partners) for delivery or results, and how can it do so in future; how can it further leverage its strategic position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How has UNHCR played its role in influencing stakeholders and increasing political buy-in for the prioritized needs of people we serve?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of the balance between direct implementation and a facilitative / coordination / strategic advisory role</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capacity development materials and results</li> <li>UNHCR's strategies and programmes with particular reference to durable solutions, and of exit strategies (where appropriate)</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
	<p>and influence within the country to optimize the potential impact of collective efforts towards protection and solutions for people we serve, and the communities that host them?</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of systematic capacity-building to key stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KIIs with implementing partners and government officials</li> <li>KIIs and FGDs at community level, especially with host communities</li> </ul>
	<p>3.4 What <b>systems and approaches</b> have been put in place to ensure sustainability and provide recommendations on how the results can be scaled up and/or sustained considering the finite funds and resources?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What approaches have been put in place to enhance scalability of results?</li> <li>How were the main challenges addressed?</li> <li>How has the country office addressed limited funding while ensuring sustainability of results?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trends in country office budget and resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resource mobilization strategy</li> <li>External engagement plans at country, regional and global levels</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
<b>4. Engagement and accountability to affected populations - How effectively has UNHCR Zimbabwe ensured an inclusive approach to its programming and accountability to people we serve?</b>				
<b><i>Appropriateness and coverage</i></b>	4.1 How were people we serve (systematically) included in <b>decision-making</b> processes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In what ways did UNHCR apply its policies to Accountability for Affected Populations (AAP)?</li> <li>• What challenges were faced and how can this approach be strengthened?</li> <li>• To what extent was systematic attention given to the UNHCR Age Gender and Diversity policy in all aspects of UNHCR Zimbabwe’s planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of refugee committees</li> <li>• # of feedback mechanisms</li> <li>• Evidence of inclusivity of diverse groups, according to age, gender, disability and diversity and other intersectional criteria</li> <li>• Evidence that UNHCR’s strategies and operational design are based on consultation with people we serve and assessment of their needs</li> <li>• Evidence of community-based approaches and participation of people we serve in operational design and implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feedback from individual programme beneficiaries through a mini survey</li> <li>• Review of UNHCR’s needs assessment documents</li> <li>• FGDs and KIIs with people we serve and host communities, representing different groups (age, gender, disability, different experiences of displacement etc.)</li> <li>• KIIs with UNHCR’s implementing partners</li> <li>• KIIs with UNHCR staff, especially at sub-office and field levels</li> <li>• KIIs with government at central and decentralized levels</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions in ToR	Sub-evaluation questions	Indicators and metrics	Data sources
	<p>4.2 How effective were UNHCR efforts for promoting <b>Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP)</b>, protection against <b>sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)</b> and ensuring effective inclusion of the most marginalized populations? What lessons can be drawn from UNHCR Zimbabwe's approach to AAP, gender mainstreaming and protection against SGBV?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In what ways did the country office apply the UNHCR AAP and SGBV policies/strategies and Child Protection Framework?</li> <li>• What are the key challenges and lessons and best practices?</li> <li>• How did UNHCR ensure inclusion of key groups including persons with disability, women, host community and other relevant groups?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # and increase in GBV survivors and child protection cases assisted</li> <li>• Evidence of reasons for increase/decrease in SGBV cases assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feedback from individual programme beneficiaries</li> <li>• UNHCR GBV Policy and Child Protection Framework</li> <li>• Partner project documents and reports</li> <li>• KIIs with government officials working on SGBV issues</li> </ul>
	<p>4.3 What lessons can be drawn from UNHCR's response during the evaluation period (including stay and deliver) considering the <b>COVID-19 pandemic</b>?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the country office adapt its programming to the COVID response and ensure business continuity?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of beneficiaries related to the COVID response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner project documents and reports</li> </ul>

Annex 2: Theory of Change UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operation (2019–2022)



**Assumptions of the UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Strategy (2019–2022) Theory of Change**

- The Government of Zimbabwe continues to maintain a favourable protection environment and its hospitality towards refugees and asylum-seekers (1951 Convention).
- The Government of Zimbabwe will continue to rely on UNHCR to fund the refugee programme with minimum investment thus hampering the effective implementation of the pledges from the GCR and High-level Forums on Statelessness.
- Regional displacements to continue (from Eastern DRC, Mozambique).
- Zimbabwe will continue to experience mixed migration flows.
- Zimbabwe's economy continues to suffer hyper-inflationary pressures, with key sectors such as health, education and social services continuing to face challenges.
- Humanitarian and development aid continues to be channelled through the development and humanitarian agencies.
- UNHCR anticipates continued collaboration with implementing partners and donors – WFP (cash and/or in-kind assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers), World Vision, TDH, US administration (resettlement processing and departures).
- During 2023, a politically volatile operational environment is likely as election preparations and campaigns by various political parties take centre-stage.

**UNHCR Zimbabwe and RBSA documents**

1. UNHCR Zimbabwe Strategic Directions 2017–2021
2. UNHCR Zimbabwe Strategic Directions 2022–2026
3. UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operational Plan 2019
4. UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operational Plan 2020
5. UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operational Plan 2021
6. UNHCR Zimbabwe Country Operational Plan 2022
7. UNHCR Zimbabwe Multi-Year Strategy 2023–2026
8. UNHCR Zimbabwe Indicator achievement report 2019
9. UNHCR Zimbabwe Indicator achievement report 2020
10. UNHCR Zimbabwe Indicator achievement report 2021
11. UNHCR RBSA Multi-Year Strategy
12. UNHCR PROGRESS dashboards refugee statistics – 2019–2022
13. UNHCR Zimbabwe ABC funding overview 2017–2022
14. Zimbabwe budget (OP) versus funding (OL) 2019–2022
15. UNHCR Zimbabwe organigram 2019
16. UNHCR Zimbabwe organigram 2020
17. UNHCR Zimbabwe organigram 2021
18. UNHCR Zimbabwe organigram 2022
19. Global Focus UNHCR Zimbabwe Factsheet 2021
20. UNHCR Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 2021 Audit report
21. UNHCR L3 Cyclone Idai evaluation report 2019 – Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi
22. UNHCR RBSA organigram 2022
23. UNHCR Zimbabwe CO organigram 2019–2022
24. Draft Zimbabwe Humanitarian Response Plan 2021
25. 2022 IOM UNHCR Framework Agreement. Serving and Protecting Together
26. IOM Tropical Cyclone Response IDP baseline assessment round 7 Manicaland and Masvingo province (April – May 2021)
27. Mission report – UNHCR and protection cluster monitoring mission in Chimanimani (20 – 26 Feb 2022)
28. UNHCR Tropical Cyclone Idai response situation update 24 July – 6 August 2019
29. RBSA Regional IDP Stocktaking, 25 February 2022
30. UNHCR UNFPA MOU on Sharing Protection Related Data, May 2022
31. UNHCR Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of the operation in Zimbabwe
32. Zimbabwe GRF and Statelessness Pledges – update 2022
33. Global Protection Cluster mission report March 2022
34. UNHCR Zimbabwe 2022 risk register
35. UNHCR Geneva Zimbabwe Sanitation mission report 2021
36. UNHCR TRC Livelihood Strategy (2019)
37. UNHCR Internal Audit Report Zimbabwe 2020/48
38. Final Report- Evaluation of UNHCR’s L3 Emergency Response to Cyclone Idai, February 2021

**UNHCR Global documents**

1. Global Compact on Refugees
2. Global Compact on Refugees 2021 indicator report



3. 2020 UNHCR Policy on the Prevention of, Risk Mitigation and Responses to Gender-Based Violence (GBV)
4. UNHCR Global action plan to end statelessness 2014–2024
5. UNHCR Strategic Directions 2017–2021
6. UNHCR Strategic Directions 2022–2026
7. UNHCR Policy on Age, Gender, and Diversity
8. UNHCR age gender and diversity accountability report 2021 – Advancing participation and inclusion
9. Policy on UNHCR's Engagement of Situations of Internal Displacement, UNHCR/HCP/2019/1, 19 September 2019
10. UNHCR Policy on emergency preparedness and response 2019
11. UNHCR strategic framework for climate action
12. UNHCR RBSA (2021) Zimbabwe Country Development Profile 2021
13. UNHCR RBSA Regional Livelihood Strategy
14. UNHCR 2022 progress report update- GRF South Africa Pledges
15. Shelter solutions. UNHCR emergency handbook
16. UNHCR Graduation Approach Update 2021
17. UNHCR Zimbabwe Budgets 2019
18. UNHCR Zimbabwe Budgets 2020
19. UNHCR Zimbabwe Budgets 2021
20. UNHCR Zimbabwe Budgets 2022
21. UNCR Climate Action Plan for Southern Africa Region 2021–2023
22. Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation, UNHCR, September 2021
23. UNHCR operational guidance on accountability to affected people
24. Practical Guidance for UNHCR Staff on IDP Protection in the Context of Disaster and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change, October 2021
25. IASC Protection Policy Review April 2022
26. Handover Report, Douglas Jennings, National Protection Cluster Coordinator, June 2021-August 2021, Harare, Zimbabwe
27. Zimbabwe Humanitarian Response Plan for 2021
28. Global Protection Cluster Mission Report Zimbabwe, March 2022
29. GRF progress report
30. Evaluation of UNHCR Led Initiatives to End Statelessness, Final Report, May 2021

### **Government of Zimbabwe and partner documents**

1. Zimbabwe UNSCDF 2022–2026
2. Zimbabwe UNDAF 2016–2020
3. AfDB Livelihood Project Completion Report – 26 Nov 2021
4. Government of Zimbabwe National Development Strategy 1
5. Government of Zimbabwe Zimstat 2022 Q1 Labour force survey results
6. Government of Zimbabwe Zimstat 2022 Population and Housing Census – Preliminary report
7. Government of Zimbabwe Monetary Policy 2022
8. AfDB Zimbabwe Newsletter 07 April 2022 – accessed on 3 October 2022
9. AfDB Zimbabwe ISV-COM project completion report June 2022
10. AfDB Newsletter 13 July 2022

11. WHO (2022) Coronavirus Disease Dashboard
12. UNDP (2020) Human Development Report 2020 The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report
13. WFP UNHCR GOZ 2019 Joint Assessment Mission TOR
14. WFP UNHCR GOZ 2019 Joint Assessment Mission report
15. WFP UNHCR GOZ 2022 Joint Assessment Mission TOR
16. IOM DTM Round 7 Baseline Survey of May 2021
17. Zimbabwe – AFDB innovative solutions to sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable communities (ISV-COM) 2018–2021.

### **Other documents**

1. Trading Economics website (2020) Zimbabwe Country Fact sheet
2. World Vision (2021) WASH KAP Survey
3. IMF Executive Board Consultations with Zimbabwe – March 2022
4. World Bank – Zimbabwe Overview
5. World Bank Group (2021) Poverty and Equity Brief Zimbabwe
6. IMF Press Release Number 22/88 accessed on 3 October 2022
7. Market Assessment of the Value Chain, emKambo, December 2020
8. BRAC & WV Graduation Approach Handbook, 2018
9. Masesa, M. (2019) Zimbabwe WASH Strategy 2019-2021, June 2019

## Annex 4: Data Management Plan

The evaluation team set up several data management protocols and tools to organize data and to ensure a systematic process for analysis. These included:

- A list with key informants and FGDs linked to each evaluation question as outlined in the evaluation matrix was updated on a continuous basis. The list was organized by category of key informant group and evaluation criteria to ensure that all the evaluation criteria were adequately addressed with information from diverse key informants.
- A list with documents and other secondary literature was also organized by category of literature, sources (internal and external) and corresponding evaluation criteria. This helped to ensure that all the evaluation criteria were adequately answered with information from diverse sources. The list was updated on a continuous basis.
- A repository of findings from all data sources (KIIs, FGDs and household surveys) linked with each evaluation question. This enhanced the triangulation and comparability of data. This repository was based on the evaluation matrix and was the tool for the team to track progress in responding to the evaluation questions. It also provided a quick overview of gaps in the evaluation matrix or questions that had reached a point of saturation based on responses received.
- Quantitative data was managed through the KoBo Collect Platform and cleaned into SPSS, with which the data was also stored within the repository of findings. Research assistants are not able to access the server or the data findings in SPSS.
- All documents were stored safely on SharePoint accessible only by the team members and relevant Evaluation Service (ES) staff. Notes and recordings of interviews were not shared outside the evaluation team.

Annex 5: Terms of Reference (attached separately)