

ANNEXES

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ANNEX 1 - UNHCR research and knowledge generation on climate change, disasters and forced displacement (2010 – 2019)

Evaluations and reviews	Research and policy briefs
2010 - Earth, wind and fire. A review of UNHCR's role in recent natural disasters	2015 – UNHCR, the environment and climate change
2013 - The world turned upside down. A review of protection risks and UNHCR's role in natural disasters	2015 - Agenda for the protection of cross border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change
2017 - Mapping of UNHCR Activities in Climate Change and Disaster Displacement	2015 - Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation
2017 – UNHCR. Climate change, disasters and displacement	2017 - UNHCR, Displacement and Disaster Risk Reduction. A Policy Brief (update)
2018 - Mapping of existing international and regional guidance and tools on averting, minimizing, addressing and facilitating durable solutions to displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change	2017 - UNHCR Engagement in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
	2017 - Climate change and disaster displacement: an overview of UNHCR's role
	2018 - Climate change and disaster displacement in the Global Compact on Refugees
	2018 - Recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement linked to the adverse effects of climate change (COP24)
	2018 - In Harm's Way: International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change.
	2018 - Cross-border displacement, climate change and disasters: Latin America and the Caribbean. Study prepared for UNHCR and PDD at request of governments participating in the 2014 Brazil declaration and plan of action
	2019 - Policy on UNHCR's engagement in situations of internal displacement & Initiative on internal displacement 2020 - 2021

ANNEX 2 - Relevant publications and evidence about climate change and displacement for the Idai evaluation

- There is little empirical evidence that demonstrates a causal path from climate to conflict to forced migration. Climatic shocks will not generate forced displacement everywhere, and the causal relationship is highly dependent on the specific country context. Climatic variations are more likely to generate asylum seeker flows in countries undergoing political transformation where conflict represents a form of population discontent towards inefficient response of the government to climate impacts. Policies to improve the adaptive capacity to deal with the effects of climate change in developing countries may have additional returns by reducing the likelihood of conflict and consequent refugee outflows¹.
- The sensitivity of human mobility to climate requires new investigation, including, importantly, systematic long-term monitoring of population changes. The effects of migration on the vulnerability and adaptation of migrants, migrant sending areas, and destination communities also warrants more research, to permit scope for targeted policy interventions to reduce vulnerability².
- Examples from the literature show that traditional practices are already under pressure from multiple sources, reducing the ability of such practices to enable effective responses to climate variability (Green et al., 2010). Empirical evidence suggests that the efficacy of traditional practices can be eroded when governments relocate communities (Hitchcock, 2009; McNeeley, 2012; Maldonado et al., 2013); if policy and disaster relief creates dependencies (Wenzel, 2009; Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012). The literature recommends further focus on indigenous perceptions of risk and traditional knowledge of change, hazards, and coping strategies and collective responses (Ellemor, 2005; Brown, 2009; Finucane, 2009; Turner and Clifton 2009; Sánchez-Cortés and Chavero, 2011; Maldonado et al., 2013).

There is high agreement among researchers that involvement of local people and their local, traditional, or indigenous forms of knowledge in decision making is critical for ensuring their security (Ellemor, 2005; Kesavan and Swaminathan, 2006; Burningham et al., 2008; Mercer et al., 2009; Pearce et al., 2009; Anik and Khan, 2012). The conclusion of many anthropological studies in this area is that there is robust evidence that mutual integration and co-production of local and traditional and scientific knowledge increase adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability. Traditional knowledge contributes to mitigating the impact of natural disasters (Rautela, 2005), maintaining domestic biodiversity (Emperaire and Peroni, 2007) and developing sustainable adaptation and mitigation strategies (Nyong et al., 2007; Adler et al., 2013).

Indigenous knowledge saves lives - Just before the Indian Ocean tsunami struck in 2004, numerous people were attracted to the shoreline by the unusual spectacle of fish flopping on the sea floor exposed by the sea's withdrawal. Not the Moken and Uruk Lawai peoples of Thailand's coasts and islands, the Ong of India's Andaman Islands and the Simeulue community of Indonesia; they all knew to head rapidly inland to avoid the destructive force of the sea. The small villages of the Moken and Ong were completely destroyed, but their inhabitants escaped unscathed. Even more striking was the displacement of more than 80 000 Simeulue people beyond the reach of the tsunami; only seven people died. This surprisingly efficient response, striking in its contrast with the frightening losses suffered elsewhere in Indonesia, was acknowledged by the granting of a United Nations Sasakawa Award for Disaster Reduction to the Simeulue people. Source: Elias, Rungmanee and Cruz, 2005.

¹ Guy J. Abel, Michael Brottrager, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, and Raya Muttarak. Abel et al. (2019) Climate, Conflict, and Forced Migration. *Global Environmental Change*, Volume 54 (2019), Pages 239-249. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.12.003>

² IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pp.

ANNEX 3 - Evaluation Matrix

Questions	Sub questions	Areas of exploration	Sources	Data collection tools
1) To what extent was UNHCR able to contribute to the goals set out in the HRP and other relevant policy frameworks, and which factors inhibited or facilitated this process? In particular, how well was UNHCR able to fulfil its protection objectives , and was the organizations' role towards IDPs clear?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To which extent was UNHCR able to achieve the HRP specific protection objectives and contribute to other HRP strategic objectives in each country? 2. To which extent the whole-of-UNHCR response (inherent to an Emergency Level 3³) was consistently applied to the Idai cyclone? For what reasons was the response to the Kenneth cyclone not covered under an L3 framework and what were the implications of this decision for PoCs and UNHCR? 3. To which extent was UNHCR able to effectively apply key organisational policies and frameworks (eg: Strategic directions, emergency preparedness and response, IDP, environment and climate change, displacement and DRR, relocations to protect from disasters)? And which organisational policies aided operations in their response decisions? 4. To which extent was UNHCR able to effectively apply relevant international orientations or contribute to the goals of relevant interagency frameworks⁴? 5. To what extent UNHCR was able to identify and protect the most vulnerable groups in need (e.g.: children, people with disabilities, elderly, albinism) of concern for the organisation? 6. To what extent UNHCR was able to provide durable solutions for refugees and IDPs in a natural disaster context (transition phase)? 7. To what extent UNHCR was involved in emergency preparedness in development contexts and participated in sector coordination mechanisms (led by UNDAF/UNCT)? What implications did this have for UNHCR (Access to funds, resource mobilisation and surge capacity deployment, leadership, and protection mainstreaming)? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR effective implementation of its mandate and principles and strategic positioning as a credible actor in situations of natural disasters ▪ UNHCR practical and effective application of policies, standards, procedures and tools in situations of natural disasters (organisational performance in key areas) ▪ UNHCR operational profile, previous country experience and local capacities in each country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR relevant policies, frameworks and guidelines ▪ UNHCR internal minutes, SITREPS, field and mission reports ▪ UNHCR dashboards and databases ▪ UNHCR Maputo workshop docs ▪ UNHCR organigrams (HQ and field levels) ▪ IASC policies and guidelines ▪ HRP, cluster strategies, action plans and minutes ▪ Humanitarian needs assessments (UN and key actors) ▪ UN conventions, treaties and initiatives on climate change, disasters and displacement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary review (internal and external docs) ▪ Interviews with UNHCR key staff (HQ, regional bureau and CO) ▪ Interviews with key stakeholders (international, national, local) ▪ UNHCR databases analysis ▪ National information systems or databases analysis ▪ Timelines ▪
2) To what extent did the scale-up efforts and coordination mechanisms contribute to a clear distribution of roles / complementarity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. To what extent UNHCR was able to mainstream protection in the overall humanitarian response, in a development context and under UNDAF frameworks? 9. To which extent did the activation of IASC Clusters ensure the coherence and complementarity of the response among UN agencies (central and local levels) and local partners? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree of UNHCR's engagement with States ▪ Performance of the IASC coordination mechanisms and role played by UNHCR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR relevant policies, frameworks and guidelines ▪ UNHCR internal minutes, SITREPS, field and mission reports ▪ UNHCR Maputo workshop docs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary review (internal and external docs) ▪ Interviews with UNHCR key staff (HQ, regional bureau and CO)

³ The declaration of an Emergency Level 3 automatically triggers the establishment of coordination mechanisms, deployment of staff and supplies, access to additional financial resources, real-time reporting and follow-up mechanisms.

⁴ GCR, IASC operational guidelines on the protection of persons in situations of natural disasters; IASP emergency response preparedness – ERP; Sendai framework; Nansen initiative and principles; UNFCCC task force on displacement; Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage - Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, others?

among humanitarian actors?	10. To what extent was UNHCR prepared for leading Protection clusters and which were the UNHCR contributions to other clusters (notably in terms of needs evaluation, camp coordination and management, emergency items distribution and logistics)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR protection leadership in situations of natural disasters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IASC policies and guidelines ▪ HRP, cluster strategies, action plans and minutes ▪ National legislations, strategies and plans on emergency preparedness and response ▪ National statistics and databases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews with key stakeholders (international, national, local) ▪ Timelines ▪ Site visits
3) What types of partnerships were established with international and local stakeholders (prior to and during the emergency), and how did these contribute to delivering assistance to affected people? How were local capacities supported and developed during the response?	<p>11. To which extent did the UNHCR participation in national emergency response mechanisms or support to public bodies⁵ reinforce the state's responsibility and response (central and local levels)?</p> <p>12. To what extent did UNHCR's international partners (long-term and ad-hoc) contribute and support the agency's response to the emergency? Which were the factors that allowed them to effectively support the UNHCR response to a natural hazard? In which ways (financially, operationally, logistically) did these partners contribute to the UNHCR response? And which were the systematic/structural challenges that impeded their ability to respond effectively (e.g. annual contract cycle, inability to plan beyond one year, limitations in procurement, etc.)?</p> <p>13. To what extent did local partners contribute to an effective and principled response?</p> <p>14. Which were the criteria for establishing partnerships during the emergency response (eg: complementarity of roles, geographical presence, logistical capacity, protection expertise, etc) and to which extent did these facilitated a proper UNHCR response?</p> <p>15. To which extent the UNHCR capacity building approach of local actors in protection of PoC during crisis and preparedness, including reinforcement of State responsibility, has been integrated and implemented during all phases of the response (emergency, early recovery, transition to authorities)? Did UNHCR have enough capacity to training local and implementing partner's staff?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Positioning and credibility of UNHCR in the humanitarian space to respond to natural disasters ▪ Quality and coherence of partnerships (strategic level) and national / local partners (operational level) ▪ Level of integration of UNHCR in local environments (in developmental contexts) and ability to respond to disasters in a coordinated and effective manner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR relevant policies, frameworks and guidelines ▪ UNHCR Maputo workshop docs ▪ UNHCR MoUs with international and national partners ▪ UNHCR Project Partnership Agreements with IPs ▪ IPs operational reports ▪ IASC policies and guidelines ▪ HRP, cluster strategies, action plans and minutes ▪ UN conventions, treaties and initiatives on climate change, disasters and displacement ▪ National legislations, strategies and plans on emergency preparedness and response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary review (internal and external docs) ▪ Interviews with UNHCR key staff (HQ, regional bureau and CO) ▪ Interviews with key stakeholders (international, national, local) ▪ Timelines

⁵ MOZ: Coordination Council for Disaster Management (CCGC) + Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC) chaired by INGC General Director + National Emergency Operations Centre (CENOE) a multi-sector coordination and decision-making structure with representatives from different Government sectors, HCT and key stakeholders. All these bodies are replicated at provincial and district levels. At provincial level, the Government has activated four coordination hubs.

MAL: National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee, guides the Department of Disaster Management Affairs + District / Urban Executive Committees and Civil Protection Committees + Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA)

ZIM: a standing Cabinet committee under the stewardship of the Minister for Local Government is tasked with overseeing the Government's response efforts and coordinates with the UN family through the office of the Resident Coordinator.

Questions	Subquestions	Areas of exploration	Sources	Data collection tools
4) How can UNHCR leverage strengths and mitigate weaknesses in similar situations (natural disaster related) in the future?	<p>16. To which extent has UNHCR been a learning organisation, able to systematically assess performance of previous responses to natural disaster, learn from others and translate knowledge into practice (systemically and operationally)? To which extent UNHCR response to Idai (and Kenneth) has capitalised on its previous interventions in natural disasters (eg: 2018 drought in Afghanistan, 2015 cyclone Nargis in Myanmar)?</p> <p>17. What best practices from previous IDP responses in situations of natural disaster have been taken into account in the IDAI/Kenneth response?</p> <p>18. What were the key UNHCR's strengths and weaknesses in the response?</p> <p>19. Which lessons can be learnt from UNHCR response to Idai and Kenneth and be applied to future strategic and programmatic orientations, including best practices for future IDP responses in situations of natural disaster?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UNHCR as a learning organisation, capitalising previous experience and existing knowledge in natural disaster response ■ UNHCR effective implementation of its mandate in situations of natural disasters and strategic positioning as a credible actor (internal capacities assessment, including funding) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UNHCR relevant policies, frameworks and guidelines ■ UNHCR operational reports or analysis of previous interventions in situations of natural disasters ■ UNHCR internal minutes, SITREPS, field and mission reports ■ UNHCR Maputo workshop docs ■ UNHCR organigrams (HQ and field levels) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Documentary review (internal and external docs) ■ Interviews with UNHCR key staff (HQ, regional bureau and CO) ■ Interviews with key stakeholders (international, national, local) ■ Strengths and weaknesses analysis (part of SWOT analysis)
5) What are the major threats and opportunities for UNHCR's involvement in situations of natural disasters, and what are the immediate, medium, and long-term gains/risks for the organization?	<p>20. To which extent UNHCR decisions on how to cope with cyclones Idai and Kenneth have reinforced its legitimacy and credibility to intervene in natural disasters affecting PoC or, on the opposite, have eroded its reputation?</p> <p>21. In what ways can UNHCR provide added value and be recognised as a key actor in natural disasters?</p> <p>22. What are the risks and gains for UNHCR to get involved in responses to natural disasters?</p> <p>23. What is the feasibility and desirability for UNHCR to adopt an "all hazards/multi hazards" approach⁶? What would be the added advantage for UNHCR to adopt such an approach? And what would be the shortcomings?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UNHCR effective implementation of its mandate in situations of natural disasters and strategic positioning as a credible actor ■ UNHCR as an evolving humanitarian organisation able to integrate the complexities of climate change and of the diverse and interrelated sources of hazards (natural, technological, societal) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UNHCR relevant policies, frameworks and guidelines ■ UNHCR operational reports or analysis of previous interventions in situations of natural disasters ■ UNHCR internal minutes, SITREPS, field and mission reports ■ UNHCR Maputo workshop docs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Documentary review (internal and external docs) ■ Interviews with UNHCR key staff (HQ, regional bureau and CO) ■ Interviews with key stakeholders (international, national, local) ■ Threats and opportunities analysis (part of SWOT analysis) ■ Mapping of key actors and initiatives concerning humanitarian responses to climate change and natural disasters

⁶ See for example the WHO « all-hazards-whole health" approach. <http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/from-disaster-preparedness-and-response/policy>

<p>6) What changes need to take place in order for UNHCR to respond more effectively in situations of natural disasters, and what implications will these changes have on the following:</p> <p>a) strategic policy directions, b) resource mobilization and allocation c) partnerships and coordination d) technical support and communication</p>	<p>24. How can UNHCR better implement its own policies on IDPs, emergency preparedness and response, as well as other relevant interagency frameworks and guidelines (e.g.: GCR, IASC emergency response preparedness - ERP) during humanitarian responses to natural disasters?</p> <p>25. To which extent current organizational changes (regionalization and decentralisation process) may help or hinder the strategic positioning of UNHCR in natural disasters?</p> <p>26. Which were the critical gaps in technical support undermining the effectiveness of the three phases of the Idai operation on the field and would need to be reinforced? To which extent UNHCR are technical tools (e.g.: PPRE, HALEP, APASs MPAs, Preparedness Action Plans - PAP-, scenario-based contingency plans, Regional Refugee Response Plans) conceived and adapted to effectively respond to natural disasters?</p> <p>27. How can UNHCR improve the mobilisation of skilled and experienced staff in natural disasters and better support field teams during the different phases of emergency interventions?</p> <p>28. Which partnerships (existing or future) and coordination mechanisms can be reinforced or developed to better respond to natural disasters?</p> <p>29. To what extent is UNHCR well versed to implement responses along the humanitarian-development nexus? To what extent are guidelines for engagement with development partners in development contexts necessary?</p> <p>30. Which factors explain the low level of external funding raised for the Idai operation and how UNHCR can be more competitive in mobilising donors to support its operations in natural disasters? In what ways can UNHCR communicate needs more effectively, efficiently and in a timely manner, both within UNHCR and externally, in situations of natural disasters?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR effective implementation of its mandate and principles and strategic positioning as a credible actor in situations of natural disasters ▪ UNHCR practical and effective application of policies, standards, procedures and tools in situations of natural disasters (organisational performance in key areas) ▪ Effectiveness of the organisational support from regional and HQ levels to field operations. ▪ UNHCR fundraising and comms approach to mobilise funds and get support for situations of natural disasters ▪ Development of UNHCR partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR relevant policies, frameworks and guidelines (including fundraising, communication, HR and key areas of technical support) ▪ UNHCR internal minutes, SITREPS, field and mission reports ▪ UNHCR Maputo workshop docs ▪ UNHCR organigrams (HQ and field levels) ▪ IASC policies and guidelines ▪ UN conventions, treaties and initiatives on climate change, disasters and displacement ▪ UNHCR MoUs with international and national partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary review (internal and external docs) ▪ Interviews with UNHCR key staff (HQ, regional bureau and CO) ▪ Interviews with key stakeholders (international, national, local) ▪ UNHCR analysis and validation workshop
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ANNEX 4 - Data Collection Tools

EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS <ul style="list-style-type: none">• UN agencies and humanitarian actors• Implementing partners• Donors• National authorities (central and local levels)• Civil society organisations	EVALUATION OF UNHCR L3 RESPONSE TO CYCLONE IDAI	
Date:	Place:	Interviewer:
Organisation:	Name:	Position:

You have been contacted as part of the external evaluation of UNHCRs L3 response to cyclone Idai. The evaluation will emphasize both learning and accountability and will provide valuable lessons for future emergency responses involving natural disasters for the UNHCR. The evaluation will be formative in nature, providing recommendations for strengthening UNHCRs operational role and ability to fulfill its protection mandate in situations of natural disasters. In particular, the evaluation will focus on strategic policy directions, inter- agency partnerships and coordination, as well as resource mobilization.

INTRODUCTION

- Presentation of the evaluator (professional background) and evaluation objectives
- Interview principles: confidentiality and lessons learnt approach
- Brief project summary (objectives, beneficiary populations, dates)

KNOWING THE INTERVIEWEE AND THE ORGANIZATION

- Ask for a brief presentation of the interviewee and his / her position and roles.
- Summary of activities carried out or synergies in connection with the project.
 - Managerial and senior positions: strategic analysis and organizational point of view
 - Operational roles: sectorial or technical questions

A) EVALUATIVE COMPONENT

Perception about the UNHCR role and performance

- 1) Which was the overall perception of UNHCR intervention in Idai (natural disaster situation - prompt: coherence, pertinence, effectiveness) and during the three phases (emergency, recovery, disengagement)?
 - To which extent was UNHCR able to effectively apply relevant international orientations or contribute to the goals of relevant interagency frameworks⁷?
 - Which is the involvement of UNHCR in UNDRR and other relevant international initiatives (SENDAI Framework, Nansen Initiative, Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, others)?
- 2) To what extent was UNHCR-s response timely, particularly during the emergency phase?
- 3) Which role was played by UNHCR in addressing protection issues during the Idai (and Kenneth) response all along the three phases (emergency, recovery, disengagement)?
 - To what extent was UNHCR's leaderships' role of the Protection cluster effective? What were UNHCR's key strengths and weaknesses in playing this role?

⁷ GCR, IASC operational guidelines on the protection of persons in situations of natural disasters; IASP emergency response preparedness – ERP; Sendai framework; Nansen initiative and principles; UNFCCC task force on displacement; Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage - Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, others?

- To what extent were gaps or overlaps with other organisation identified in relation to the protection work?
- 4) To what extent do you think the most vulnerable groups were well identified by UNHCR and its implementing partners?
 - 5) How do you assess UNHCR's staff capacity and expertise during the intervention?
 - 6) To what extent has UNHCR been able to provide durable solutions for IDP and refugees in the Idai response?
 - 7) To what extent were capacity building activities and training on protection for local authorities and other local partners during the emergency phase relevant and timely? And prior to the cyclone? And during the disengagement phase?
 - 8) What was UNHCR's role in DRR and natural disasters response plans (preparedness) in the three countries? And in prevention?
 - 9) To what extent were UNHCR's communication activities timely, relevant and effective? And compared to other humanitarian actors?
 - 10) In your opinion, what were UNHCR's key shortcomings during the IDAI intervention (eg: leadership, humanitarian NFIs)?

Coordination mechanisms and partnerships

- 11) To what extent was UNHCR effective in mainstreaming protection over the humanitarian response and across other clusters- in a development context and under UNDAF frameworks?
What were the key successes, challenges and limitations in protection?
- 12) What were the key successes, challenges and limitations in protection?
- 13) To what extent the complementarity (clear distribution of roles) among UN agencies and other humanitarian actors was clear (national level and local level)? To which extent did the activation of IASC Clusters was effective?
- 14) To which extent UNHCR participation in the other clusters (notably in terms of needs assessments, camp coordination and management, emergency items distribution and logistics) was relevant and effective?
- 15) How was the coordination between UNHCR and local partners (public bodies and civil society)?
- 16) What types of partnerships were established with international and local stakeholders (prior to and during the emergency), and how did these contribute to delivering assistance to affected people?
How were local capacities supported and developed during the response?
 - What's your opinion about the collaboration between UNHCR and its implementing partners (in terms of relevance and quality of their interventions)? Which were the roles of the implementing partners? When national and international partners, were there relevant differences?
- 17) To which extent did the UNHCR participation in national emergency response mechanisms or support to public bodies⁸ reinforce the state's responsibility and response (central and local levels)?
- 18) To what extent did UNHCR's international partners (long-term and ad-hoc) contribute and support the agency's response to the emergency? Which were the factors that allowed them to effectively support the UNHCR response to a natural hazard? In which ways (financially, operationally, logistically) did these partners contribute to the UNHCR response? And which were the systematic/structural challenges that impeded their ability to respond effectively (e.g. annual contract

⁸ MOZ: Coordination Council for Disaster Management (CCGC) + Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC) chaired by INGC General Director + National Emergency Operations Centre (CENOE) a multi-sector coordination and decision-making structure with representatives from different Government sectors, HCT and key stakeholders. All these bodies are replicated at provincial and district levels. At provincial level, the Government has activated four coordination hubs.

MAL: National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee, guides the Department of Disaster Management Affairs + District / Urban Executive Committees and Civil Protection Committees + Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA)

ZIM: a standing Cabinet committee under the stewardship of the Minister for Local Government is tasked with overseeing the Government's response efforts and coordinates with the UN family through the office of the Resident Coordinator.

cycle, inability to plan beyond one year, limitations in procurement, etc.)? To what extent did local partners contribute to an effective and principled response?

- 19) To what extent did local partners contribute to an effective and principled response?
- 20) Which were the criteria for establishing partnerships during the emergency response (eg: complementarity of roles, geographical presence, logistical capacity, protection expertise, etc) and to which extent did these facilitated a proper UNHCR response?
- 21) To which extent the UNHCR capacity building approach of local actors in protection of PoC during crisis and preparedness, including reinforcement of State responsibility, has been integrated and implemented during all phases of the response (emergency, early recovery, transition to authorities)? Did UNHCR have enough capacity to training local and implementing partner's staff?

B) FORWARD-LOOKING COMPONENT

- 22) What were the key UNHCR's strengths and weaknesses in this response?
- 23) In your opinion, what are the risks and gains for UNHCR to get involved in responses to natural disasters (staff, funding mechanisms, mixed with conflicts)?
- To what extent have the UNHCR Idai and Kenneth interventions reinforced its legitimacy and its credibility in situations of natural disasters? If positive, in which ways? If negative, which has been the impact?
- 24) In what ways can UNHCR provide added value and be recognised as a key humanitarian actor in natural disasters?

C) RECOMMENDATIONS?

- In terms of strategic positioning towards natural disasters (prevention, preparedness, emergency and disengagement)
- In terms of fundraising and communication?
- In terms of partnerships and coordination?
- In terms of local actors capacities strengthening (related to protection, DRR and preparedness?)

OTHER COMMENTS

- Do you have any other comments or suggestions or concerns about the programme and/or the evaluation that you would like to share with us? Do you have any questions?

Thank you for your collaboration.

UNHCR STAFF <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HQ, Regional office Pretoria, Country Offices in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique 	EVALUATION OF UNHCR L3 RESPONSE TO CYCLONE IDAI	
Date:	Place:	Interviewer:
Organisation:	Name:	Position:

You have been contacted as part of the external evaluation of UNHCR's L3 response to cyclone Idai. The evaluation will emphasize both learning and accountability and will provide valuable lessons for future emergency responses involving natural disasters for the UNHCR. The evaluation will be formative in nature, providing recommendations for strengthening UNHCR's operational role and ability to fulfil its protection mandate in situations of natural disasters. In particular, the evaluation will focus on strategic policy directions, inter-agency partnerships and coordination, as well as resource mobilization.

INTRODUCTION

- Presentation of the evaluator (professional background) and evaluation objectives
- Interview principles: confidentiality and lessons learnt approach
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KNOWING THE INTERVIEWEE AND THE ORGANIZATION

- Ask for a brief presentation of the interviewee and his / her position and roles.
- Summary of activities carried out or synergies in connection with the project.
 - Managerial and senior positions: strategic analysis and organizational point of view
 - Operational roles: sectorial or technical questions

A) EVALUATIVE COMPONENT

UNHCR role and performance

- 1) Which is the overall perception of UNHCR intervention in Idai (natural disaster situation - prompt: coherence, pertinence, effectiveness) and during the three phases (emergency, recovery, disengagement)?
 - Which factors explain the different decisions made by the UNHCR concerning Idai and Kenneth?
 - To which extent was UNHCR able to effectively apply relevant international orientations or contribute to the goals of relevant interagency frameworks⁹?
 - Which is the involvement of UNHCR in UNDRR and other relevant international initiatives (Sendai Framework, Nansen Initiative, Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, others)?
 - Why is not UNHCR participating in CADRI (Capacity Assessment and Planning Tool for Disaster Risk Management) -> see other UN agencies
- 2) To which extent was UNHCR able to effectively apply key organisational policies and frameworks (PROMPT: Strategic directions, emergency preparedness and response, IDP, environment and climate change, displacement and DRR, relocations to protect from disasters)?
 - To which extent the "whole-of-UNHCR" response (inherent to an Emergency Level 3) was consistently applied to Idai cyclone?

⁹ GCR, IASC operational guidelines on the protection of persons in situations of natural disasters; IASP emergency response preparedness – ERP; Sendai framework; Nansen initiative and principles; UNFCCC task force on displacement; Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage - Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, others?

PROMPT: Check implementation of principles and measures defined in the UNHCR POLICY ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 2019. EG: To which extent measures related to a L3 declaration were timely and effectively implemented: Emergency L3 was declared within 72 hours of the initial event? Establishment of coordination mechanisms, deployment of staff and supplies, access to additional financial resources, real-time reporting and follow-up mechanisms). Designate a Regional Refugee Coordinator (RRC)? Refugee Coordination Model (RCM) and its Updated Guidance Note? Senior Level Working Group? An Emergency Cell (EC) shall be activated? EC may decide to establish specialist or subject-specific cells? Within the first two weeks following the declaration of a Level 2 or 3 Emergency, a Joint Senior Level Mission (JSLM)?

- Which were the roles and support received from HQ (different services / units involved) and the RO?

- 3) To which extent preparedness actions had been undertaken at country level / regional office prior to Idai? Which was the degree of application of UNHCR (and interagency – IASC) policies and technical tools?

UNHCR THE PREPAREDNESS PACKAGE FOR REFUGEE EMERGENCIES (PPRE) (2018 policy) → to be applied also to IDPs ?? and in natural disasters??

- 4) To what extent was UNHCR response timely, particularly during the emergency phase?
- 5) Which role was played by UNHCR in addressing protection issues during the Idai (and Kenneth) response all along the three phases (emergency, recovery, disengagement)?
 - To what extent was UNHCR's leadership's role of the Protection cluster effective? What were UNHCR's key strengths and weaknesses in playing this role?
 - To what extent were gaps or overlaps with other organisation identified in relation to the protection work?
- 6) To what extent do you think the most vulnerable groups were well identified by UNHCR and its implementing partners?
- 7) How do you assess UNHCR's staff capacity and expertise during the intervention?
- 8) To what extent has UNHCR been able to provide durable solutions for IDP and refugees in the Idai response?
- 9) To what extent were capacity building activities and training on protection for local authorities and other local partners during the emergency phase relevant and timely? And prior to the cyclone? And during the disengagement phase?
- 10) What was UNHCR's role in DRR and natural disasters response plans (preparedness) in the three countries? And in prevention?
- 11) To what extent were UNHCR's communication activities timely, relevant and effective? And compared to other humanitarian actors?
- 12) In your opinion, what were UNHCR's key shortcomings during the IDAI intervention (eg: leadership, humanitarian NFIs)?

Coordination mechanisms and partnerships

- 13) To what extent was UNHCR effective in mainstreaming protection over the humanitarian response and across other clusters- in a development context and under UNDAF frameworks?
What were the key successes, challenges and limitations in protection?
- 14) To what extent the complementarity (clear distribution of roles) among UN agencies and other humanitarian actors was clear (national level and local level)? To which extent did the activation of IASC Clusters was effective?
- 15) To which extent UNHCR participation in the other clusters (notably in terms of needs assessments, camp coordination and management, emergency items distribution and logistics) was relevant and effective?

- 16) How was the coordination between UNHCR and local partners (public bodies and civil society)?
- 17) What types of partnerships were established with international and local stakeholders (prior to and during the emergency), and how did these contribute to delivering assistance to affected people? How were local capacities supported and developed during the response?
 - What's your opinion about the collaboration between UNHCR and its implementing partners (in terms of relevance and quality of their interventions)? Which were the roles of the implementing partners? When national and international partners, were there relevant differences?
- 18) To which extent did the UNHCR participation in national emergency response mechanisms or support to public bodies¹⁰ reinforce the state's responsibility and response (central and local levels)?
- 19) To what extent did UNHCR's international partners (long-term and ad-hoc) contribute and support the agency's response to the emergency? Were any partners reluctant in supporting natural disasters responses? In which ways (financially, operationally, logistically) did these partners contribute to the UNHCR response?
 - Within the broad range of UNHCR international partners¹¹ (existing and adhoc), which were supportive, and which were reluctant, to support the UNHCR response to a natural hazard and why?
- 20) To what extent did local partners contribute to an effective and principled response?
- 21) Which were the criteria for establishing partnerships during the emergency response (eg: complementarity of roles, geographical presence, logistical capacity, protection expertise, etc) and to which extent did these facilitated a proper UNHCR response?
- 22) To which extent the UNHCR capacity building approach of local actors in protection of PoC during crisis and preparedness, including reinforcement of State responsibility, has been integrated and implemented during all phases of the response (emergency, early recovery, transition to authorities)? Did UNHCR have enough capacity to training local and implementing partner's staff?
- 23) The IASC Emergency Response Preparedness Approach was adopted by UNHCR (and to some extent implemented → IASC Emergency Response Plans)¹²?

B) FORWARD-LOOKING COMPONENT

- 24) To which extent has UNHCR been a learning organisation, able to systematically assess performance of previous responses to natural disaster, learn from others and translate knowledge into practice (systemically and operationally)? To which extent UNHCR response to Idai (and Kenneth) has capitalised on its previous interventions in natural disasters (eg: 2018 drought in Afghanistan, 2015 cyclone Nargis in Myanmar)?
- 25) What best practices from previous IDP responses in situations of natural disaster have been considered in the IDAI/Kenneth response?
- 26) What were the key UNHCR's strengths and weaknesses in the response?

¹⁰ MOZ: Coordination Council for Disaster Management (CCGC) + Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC) chaired by INGC General Director + National Emergency Operations Centre (CENOE) a multi-sector coordination and decision-making structure with representatives from different Government sectors, HCT and key stakeholders. All these bodies are replicated at provincial and district levels. At provincial level, the Government has activated four coordination hubs.

MAL: National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee, guides the Department of Disaster Management Affairs + District / Urban Executive Committees and Civil Protection Committees + Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA)

ZIM: a standing Cabinet committee under the stewardship of the Minister for Local Government is tasked with overseeing the Government's response efforts and coordinates with the UN family through the office of the Resident Coordinator.

¹¹ Corporations, foundations and philanthropists, UN agencies, international and intergovernmental organizations, INGO, implementing partners, local partners

¹² 1) see The IASC Emergency Response Preparedness Approach – At a Glance July 2016 It's mentioned in UNHCR Emergency policy. See also IASC OPERATIONAL PEER REVIEW Mozambique: Cyclone Idai Response

- 27) Which lessons can be learnt from UNHCR response to Idai and Kenneth and be applied to future strategic and programmatic orientations, including best practices for future IDP responses in situations of natural disaster?
- 28) To which extent UNHCR decisions on how to cope with cyclones Idai and Kenneth have reinforced its legitimacy and credibility to intervene in natural disasters affecting PoC or, on the opposite, have eroded its reputation?
- 29) In what ways can UNHCR provide added value and be recognised as a key actor in natural disasters?
- 30) What are the risks and gains for UNHCR to get involved in responses to natural disasters?
- 31) What is the feasibility and desirability for UNHCR to adopt an “all hazards/multi hazards” approach? What would be the added advantage for UNHCR to adopt such an approach? And what would be the shortcomings?
- 32) How can UNHCR better implement its own policies on IDPs, emergency preparedness and response, as well as other relevant interagency frameworks and guidelines (e.g.: GCR, IASC emergency response preparedness - ERP) during humanitarian responses to natural disasters?
- 33) To which extent current organizational changes (regionalization and decentralisation process) may help or hinder the strategic positioning of UNHCR in natural disasters?
- 34) Which were the critical gaps in technical support undermining the effectiveness of the three phases of the Idai operation on the field and would need to be reinforced? To which extent UNHCR are technical tools (e.g.: PPRE, HALEP, APASs MPAs, Preparedness Action Plans - PAP-, scenario-based contingency plans, Regional Refugee Response Plans) conceived and adapted to effectively respond to natural disasters?
- 35) How can UNHCR improve the mobilisation of skilled and experienced staff in natural disasters and better support field teams during the different phases of emergency interventions?
- 36) Which partnerships (existing or future) and coordination mechanisms can be reinforced or developed to better respond to natural disasters?
- 37) To what extent is UNHCR well versed to implement responses along the humanitarian-development nexus? To what extent are guidelines for engagement with development partners in development contexts necessary?
- 38) Which factors explain the low level of external funding raised for the Idai operation and how UNHCR can be more competitive in mobilising donors to support its operations in natural disasters? In what ways can UNHCR communicate needs more effectively, efficiently and in a timely manner, both within UNHCR and externally, in situations of natural disasters?

C) RECOMMENDATIONS?

- In terms of strategic positioning towards natural disasters (prevention, preparedness, emergency and disengagement)
- In terms of internal policies, guidelines, procedures and technical tools?
- In terms of fundraising and communication?
- In terms of partnerships and coordination?
- In terms of local authorities capacities strengthening (related to DRR and preparedness?)

OTHER COMMENTS

- Do you have any other comments or suggestions or concerns about the programme and/or the evaluation that you would like to share with us? Do you have any questions?

Thank you for your collaboration.

ANNEX 5 – External organizations interviewed

MOZAMBIQUE

Public bodies	National Disaster Response Agency -INGC / National Institute for Disaster Management
	Provincial Directorate for Social Action (DPGCAS) - Beira
	Coordination Council for Disaster Management (CCGC)
International organisations	UNICEF
	OCHA
	World Vision
	Light for the world - PROT cluster
	IFRC
	ASATE - PROT cluster
	Kulima - UNHCR NGO partner
	FAMOD
	HelpAge International
	Mahlahle
	Muleide

MALAWI

Public bodies	Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DODMA) - National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee
	Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare
International organisations	UNFPA (GBV)
	UNICEF (child protection)
	UN Women
	Plan International - existing UNHCR's partner
	Save the Children

ZIMBABWE

Public bodies	Department of Social Welfare
	Director Family and Social Protection & Commissioner for Refugees / Min public service, labour and social welfare
	Camp administration
International organisations	UNFPA
	GOAL Harare

HEADQUARTERS

International organisations	IOM
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The following table summarizes the number of interviews; external informants represent 29% of the total number of interviews conducted during the evaluation.

Total number of interviews			
Interviewed	TOTAL		Externals
MOZ	27	29%	14
ZIM	21	23%	6
MAL	18	19%	7
ROSA	7	8%	
HQ and ERTs	19	20%	
INTL AGENCIES- HQs	1	1%	
	93	100%	27 (29%)

Annex 6 - Threats, Challenges, and opportunities for UNHCR's involvement in situations of climate-related disaster displacement

Threats and challenges

A) Available evidence shows the complex and multi-causal character of climate change and human mobility, with many different interacting drivers of displacement, and high variability among local contexts.^{13,14} A broad consensus exists about the critical need to develop further research,¹⁵ particularly for slow-onset events and processes. This highlights the need to rely on available scientific knowledge (and future findings) to conceive and update sound and effective humanitarian, protection and development interventions on climate and disaster-related displacement. Complexity, multi-causality and diversity in situations of displacement caused by climate change and natural hazards may represent a risk of diversion from UNHCR's mandate and may produce disparate responses.

Annex 2 contains a summary of the main findings from recent international publications that are relevant in the context of this evaluation. Key highlights are as follows:

- There is little empirical evidence that demonstrates a causal path from climate to conflict to forced migration. Climatic shocks will not generate forced displacement everywhere, and the causal relationship is highly dependent on the specific country context. Climatic variations are more likely to generate asylum-seeker flows in countries undergoing political transformation where conflict represents a form of population discontent towards the government's inefficient response to climate impacts.¹⁶
- According to Abel et al., "Traditional practices (e.g. ecosystems knowledge, socio-cultural patterns, interactions with natural environment) of indigenous (and local communities) to cope with climate variability and hazards are under pressure and can be eroded when governments relocate communities and if policy and disaster relief creates dependencies".¹⁷ The reference to local traditional knowledge systems and practices to cope with natural hazards is particularly relevant in the context of this evaluation. By way of example, along their 1,560 km-long border, Mozambique

¹³ IPCC (2014) *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects*. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds)]. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press: p.1132 "High levels of complexity mean that no conceptual model or theory captures the full extent of the interactions between all of climate change, livelihoods, culture, migration, and violent conflict."

¹⁴ The Nansen Initiative (2015) *Disaster-related cross-border displacement*. "Disaster displacement is multi-causal; climate change will be an important but not the only contributing factor. Population growth, under development, weak governance, armed conflict and violence, as well as poor urban planning in rapidly expanding cities, are important drivers of displacement and migration as they further weaken resilience and increased vulnerability, and exacerbate the impacts of natural hazards and climate change."

¹⁵ IPCC (2014) op. cit., p.1132. "There is a need for more comprehensive evidence, collected across multiple locations, and over long durations, to build and test theories about relationships between climate change and livelihoods, culture, migration, and conflict."

¹⁶ Abel, G.J., Brottrager, M., Crespo Cuaresma, J. and Mutarak, R. (2019) "Climate, Conflict, and Forced Migration". *Global Environmental Change*, vol. 54 (2019), pp. 239-249. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.12.003>

¹⁷ Ibid.

and Malawi have many linguistic, social and cultural characteristics in common,¹⁸ together with a long history of informal cross-border movements. Data collected suggests that Mozambican communities bordering with Malawi have traditionally fled to Malawian territory (to higher and safer areas) during rainy seasons and in situations of weather-related hazards, where social and family links allow many Mozambicans to find temporary shelter or land for informal settlements. Traditional knowledge of seasons, ecosystems and agriculture has allowed Mozambicans to decide when to return to their area of origin, depending on the level of floods and waters, river conditions, crop prospects and general conditions in their communities of origin. Although the data collected are anecdotal, the distribution of UNHCR's "return package" for Mozambicans in Malawi has been acknowledged as a key support for farming households that have lost their primary income in Mozambique. However, traditional patterns of household decision-making processes about the return seem to have been affected; for instance, families stayed longer in Malawi expecting to receive additional humanitarian support, and the distribution of traditional roles among family members changed slightly (for example, young teenagers, who normally would have remained with their parents were sent to explore conditions for return). Interestingly, the existence of cross-border cultural, social and family ties has been reported as useful in identifying and following up on cases of unaccompanied minors and reinforcing child protection issues.

Climate change is making extreme weather events more frequent and more intense. Pandemics like COVID-19 may also become more frequent due to a changing climate; many of the root causes of climate change also increase the risk of pandemics – such as deforestation or loss of animal habitats¹⁹. At the time of writing this report, one of the worst locust swarms in years is affecting East Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has warned that nearly 45 million people in 13 countries in southern Africa are food-insecure as a result of drought, floods and the impact of coronavirus. In addition, the Beirut port explosion affected more than 100,000 people, including hundreds of refugee families who were severely impacted by the blast.

Humanitarian organizations will probably be confronted with simultaneous global or regional large-scale natural, biological and technological hazards, making operations extremely complex. Multiple hazards might interact regionally or locally in different settings and, as the COVID-19 pandemic shows, responding to a climate-related disaster during a pandemic (or vice versa) is challenging and may eventually outstrip the capacities of a single organization. It is illustrative that almost one-third – 31 per cent – of displaced people (24.9 million) were in countries classified as being at high risk from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Of the 20 countries with the biggest populations

¹⁸ See: <https://www.peoplegroups.org/explore/PeopleDetails.aspx?rop3=108831#topmenu>

¹⁹ Manzanedo, R. D., & Manning, P. (2020). COVID-19: Lessons for the climate change emergency. *The Science of the total environment*, 742, 140563. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140563>
Mohammad M. Hassan, Mohamed E. El Zowalaty, Shahneaz A. Khan, Ariful Islam, Md. Raihan K. Nayem, Josef D. Järhult. (2020) Role of Environmental Temperature on the Attack rate and Case fatality rate of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic. *Infection Ecology & Epidemiology* 10:1.

of displaced people, 14 were classified as being at high or very high risk from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic²⁰.

- B) The constant and projected increase in the number of IDPs as a result of disasters (in addition to the growing number of other PoC and protracted refugee situations) may put UNHCR under additional strain, create operational dilemmas, and compel the organization make difficult choices or prioritize operations.

The Global Report on Internal Displacement²¹ 2020 report estimates that there were a total of 5.1 million IDPs as a result of disasters (the first-ever estimate) at the end of 2019, representing 10 per cent of the total number of IDPs worldwide (50.8 million). Nearly 2,000 disasters triggered 24.9 million new displacements across 140 countries and territories in 2019 (representing 75 per cent of the total number of new displacements worldwide). This is the highest figure recorded since 2012 and three times the number of displacements caused by conflict and violence.

Concerning IDPs worldwide, the increase is substantial; up by approximately 16 per cent in the past five years, and almost tripled since 2010. UNHCR figures on the Venezuelan crisis, statelessness and other PoC are also constantly growing. Overall, the historical trend clearly shows a sharp increase on the evolution of PoC and, as some reports suggest, internal displacement figures could even grow faster as a result of climate change and disaster-related displacement.

With regard to the refugee population,²² the number of refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide shows a 30 per cent increase from 2015 to 2019. Compared to 2010, the number has more than doubled. In 2017, 39 per cent of refugees worldwide were not assisted by UNHCR, showing the difficulties in financially and operationally covering this population. It is not only a matter of new refugee situations; it is the persistence of protracted situations. Around 78 per cent of all refugees are housed for years or decades in stagnant, segregated refugee camps or settlements that restrict their mobility and ensure only abridged human rights. Around 5.8 million refugees have been living in these protracted situations for more than 20 years. The estimated average duration of protracted refugee situations is between 18 and 26 years (described as “an unconscionable length of time in which refugees are warehoused pending alternative, durable solutions”²³). Currently, opportunities for third-country solutions (resettlements) remain inadequate and are not proportionate to the needs. For 2020, the total resettlement needs are estimated to be almost 20 per cent higher than those of 2018, and US decisions to substantially reduce the number of admitted refugees will further limit the capacity to provide durable solutions for particularly vulnerable refugees.

²⁰ Development Initiatives (2020) *Global humanitarian assistance report 2020*.

²¹ IDMC NRC (2020) *Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID)*

²² UNHCR Global focus: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/>

²³ U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2019) “Lives in Storage: Refugee Warehousing and the Overlooked Humanitarian Crisis”

The operational situation in 2019 is an example of compounding operational challenges for UNHCR; when Idai struck, Venezuela was experiencing its highest peak in internal and cross-border displacement in recent years, while the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to cause extremely high levels of displacement and suffering. Without a clear definition of UNHCR's operational engagement in climate change and disaster-related internal displacement, one may see a dilution of resources and capacities, a dispersion of operations, and inconsistencies in the quality (and credibility) of operations.

- C) Funding UNHCR involvement in climate change and responses to internal displacement caused by natural hazards in non-conflict situations, appears to be challenging in a context of stagnating humanitarian assistance funding and official development assistance (ODA). From a financial perspective, UNHCR annual figures show chronic high-level underfunding, with an annual average gap between budget and expenditure lines of around 45 per cent. UNHCR's response to growing disaster-related displacement and involvement in the vast domain of climate change (encompassing a large variety of areas such as risks assessments, disaster risk reduction, early warning, planned relocation, national contingency plans) will require significant additional funding (and human resources) in probably unfavourable circumstances.

On the one hand, international humanitarian assistance overall dropped by 5 per cent from 2018 to 2019, following a period of sustained growth in the preceding four years – the first fall in total assistance since 2012. Concerning UN-coordinated appeals, unmet requirements remained at 36 per cent on average.²⁴ On the other hand, ODA for DRR has remained a persistently small fraction of the total international aid financing landscape, and disaster expenditure is predominantly ex-post. ODA for DRR represents 3.8 per cent of the spending in the 2005–2017 period, which is a marginal fraction of the total amount. Most of the finance (89 per cent) flows to emergency response, whereas the rest goes to reconstruction relief and rehabilitation. Paradoxically, investing in risk reduction and building resilience saves more than lives and livelihoods, and also provides a good return on investment.²⁵

Finally, it is worth noting that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will probably have an impact on funding for humanitarian assistance and ODA. Forecasts suggest the economic fallout from the COVID-19 crisis will lead to a significant contraction of the global economy. This will put pressure on national budgets across the entire donor community, including on budgets dedicated to development and aid. Already, donors including Germany, Australia, and the European Union are drawing on funds from their existing development budgets to finance the international response to COVID-19.²⁶

²⁴ Development Initiatives (2020) *Global humanitarian assistance report 2020*

²⁵ According to UNDRR, every \$1 invested in risk reduction and prevention can save up to \$15 in post-disaster recovery. Every \$1 invested in making infrastructure disaster-resilient saves \$4 in reconstruction.

²⁶ See: <https://donortracker.org/insights/how-are-donor-countries-responding-covid-19-early-analyses-and-trends-watch>

All in all, if properly balancing resources with operations (both protracted crisis and emergencies) seems to have been challenging so far, then broadening UNHCR's response to disaster-related internal displacement in non-conflict situations may lead to additional tensions for UNHCR resources and operations. The way in which UNHCR decides to engage should properly balance challenges, needs, ambitions and resources, without compromising the quality and coherence of operations.

- D) Humanitarian responses to large-scale disasters in low-income countries are often massive, with an immediate surge of humanitarian actors responding to urgent needs. Many of these actors might be potential partners of UNHCR, or have different protection priorities. In disaster situations, timeliness of aid is crucial to saving lives, and speed of delivery can be prioritized over other actions. In addition, the way in which States, as the primary responsible parties for the protection of IDPs in disaster situations, understand and apply sovereignty and protection principles demarcates the scope of UNHCR action. Despite relevant and positive coordination mechanisms put in place by the humanitarian community, concerns about overlapping, efficiency, added value or prioritization of protection may arise under these circumstances. In the response to Idai, the System-Wide Scale-Up on 22 March 2019 saw an increase in humanitarian operations in Beira, in Mozambique, with the response going from 20 organizations when the HRP was revised to more than 200 one month into the response.²⁷ Complementarity and differentiation among humanitarian actors might be challenging. Moreover, different organizations may have different protection approaches leading to difficulties in agreeing on common positions, mainstreaming protection, or advocating and working with national authorities.²⁸
- E) In the Idai response, humanitarian organizations were confronted with certain government decisions driven by short-term motivations rather than consistent political approaches to implementing effective durable solutions aligned with international principles. Government decisions to close IDP settings were unexpected and rapidly applied, leaving no room for agencies to advocate or elaborate alternative plans. As previously mentioned, a more consistent application of the humanitarian-development nexus is also essential, not only to support decent recovery opportunities for IDPs but also to provide the continuum of protection across the spectrum of the response.

²⁷ IASC (2019) "Operational peer review Mozambique: Cyclone Idai Response", June 2019.

²⁸ Entwistle, H. (2013) "The world turned upside down: a review of protection risks and UNHCR's role in natural hazards": "In its role as Protection Cluster lead, UNHCR is meant to face challenges in that the speed of delivery is commonly prioritized over ensuring the most vulnerable groups are identified, resulting in additional protection risks that emerge from the way in which humanitarian actors provide assistance. With a tenuous acceptance of the concept of protection within disaster response efforts, responses to "protection" language and activities varied between denial, hesitancy, and acceptance, fuelling the misconception that there are less protection concerns in disasters particularly with regards to internally displaced persons (IDPs). This, often in combination with state sovereignty concerns, leads to what is likely to be the greatest challenge for UNHCR as a protection actor in disaster situations: simply establishing UNHCR as a credible actor within the natural hazard response framework of institutional actors and processes."

Responsible disengagement in disaster situations should be grounded on the effective implementation of durable solutions for IDPs,²⁹ which is strongly conditioned by three major factors that are challenging to put together in the short periods allocated to recovery phases by humanitarian agencies. Those factors are: i) progress made in rebuilding basic infrastructures and services, which often requires time; ii) successful land tenure³⁰ and livelihood programmes; iii) consistent application of international principles (voluntary, safe and dignified return – or relocation). Mechanisms for processes to address housing, land and property issues and to protect the right to restitution are also important to ensure the sustainability of return or integration.

Opportunities

- F) The progressive setting up of UN initiatives and mechanisms to promote and coordinate inter-agency actions on climate change, DRR and disaster-related displacement allows UNHCR to remain at the forefront of international discussions that shape the strategies and the way forward of the international community in tackling climate and displacement-related global challenges. Moreover, under the wider UN umbrella, contributions to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are intrinsically linked to climate action.

In terms of strategizing, global initiatives on climate change, natural hazards, or forced displacement have increasingly received attention and been sponsored by the United Nations, philanthropists, global funds, governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) during the past two decades. Within the UN system, the UNFCCC secretariat (UN Climate Change) is the entity tasked with supporting the global response to the threat of climate change, although new initiatives have made the climate change and disaster landscape much more diverse and complex (initiatives such as UNDRR, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Platform on Disaster Displacement). In this context, “UNHCR’s early work on climate change, disasters, and displacement was visionary, if premature, in creating a global roadmap for action, particularly in identifying normative and leadership gaps in the protection response”.³¹ UNHCR has also progressively been involved in key global forums and partnered with all relevant actors in the field. As a result of UNHCR leadership, the UN General Assembly affirmed the GCR in 2018. The GCR represented a turning point and recognizes that “climate, environmental degradation and natural hazards increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements”. UNHCR’s involvement in existing (and new) high-level forums and the development of partnerships with major actors are essential for advocating and keeping protection as a central element of present and future responses to climate change and disaster-related displacement. The recent invitation to take part in the 5th annual meeting of the UN Senior Leadership Group (UNSLG) on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience, the potential collaborations with the Internal Displacement Monitoring

²⁹ IDP Policy: UNHCR will disengage responsibly when local and national actors can meaningfully take over operational delivery, coordination and monitoring in relation to protection and solutions for IDPs.

³⁰ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2019) “Strengthening IFRC Responses to Internal Displacement in Disasters: Challenges and Opportunities”. Geneva: IFRC

³¹ Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and McAdam, J. (2017) “UNHCR, climate change, disasters and displacement.”

Centre (IDMC)³² and the Food and Agriculture Organization's Early Warning Early Action (EWEA)³³ are all representative examples of UNHCR's role and contributions to defining the way forward globally.

- G) Climate change and disasters are increasingly receiving political and financial attention worldwide; there is for instance, clear growth in climate finance and an emergence of DRR funds. Although the climate finance growth is essentially driven by private sector investments (such as renewable energy, low-carbon transport or commercially viable sustainable projects), there can be room to explore further UNHCR partnerships and fundraising actions with multilateral or bilateral donors, the private sector and philanthropy.

The World Bank is the largest multilateral funder of climate investments. The private sector is becoming progressively concerned about, and involved in, environmental degradation-related risks and economic greening. For the first time, environmental concerns (including extreme weather events, climate action failure, disasters, biodiversity loss and human-made environmental disasters) dominated the top five long-term global risks for business leaders, investors and policymakers surveyed in the 2020 World Economic Forum (WEF).³⁴

Private investment for collaborative approaches to DRR are emerging. For instance, the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance³⁵ is a long-term collaboration that brings together the IFRC, NGOs, academic and private sector experts in risk and resilience, working initially in nine countries. The first phase of the programme (2013–2017) received around \$37.4 million in support, and the second phase (2018–2023) received a further \$20.2 million investment.

Climate finance has been constantly increasing since the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement; annual tracked climate finance in 2017 and 2018 crossed the half-trillion-dollar mark for the first time. Annual flows rose to \$579 billion, on average, over the two-year period of 2017/2018, representing a \$116 billion (25 per cent) increase from 2015/2016. The rise reflects steady increases in financing across nearly all types of investors. Private finance, which reached \$326 billion on average annually in 2017/2018, continues to account for most climate finance, at around 56 per cent.³⁶

³² For the first time, the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 (GRID) breaks down data differentiating disaster and violence-related internal displacement across 145 countries.

³³ See Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/eweae/en/#:~:text=FAO's%20Early%20Warning%20Early%20Action,a%20warning%20is%20at%20hand>.

³⁴ The World Economic Forum's 2020 Global Risks Perception Survey ranked extreme weather events, climate action failure, natural hazards, biodiversity loss and human-made environmental disasters as the top five most likely risks for the global economy this year – ahead of data fraud, cyberattacks, water crises, global governance failure and asset bubbles (see: <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/01/15/climate-change-tops-risks-for-world-in-2020-davos-report>).

³⁵ Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance: <https://floodresilience.net/about-us/who-we-are>

³⁶ Climate Policy Initiative (2019) "Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019", <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2019>

The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) may broaden its focus beyond insurance to other avenues of finance, establishing a Loss and Damage finance facility. WIM finance mechanisms could be directed towards social protection schemes, livelihood diversification, relocation of communities and industries if necessary, and support for displaced persons.³⁷

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), a grant-funding mechanism (multi-donor trust fund (MDTF)) managed by the World Bank and financed by the EU, is supporting developing countries to better understand and reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change. Although the GFDRR does not explicitly address human mobility challenges, and grants seem to be awarded to States, the GFDRR's technical assistance, capacity-building and analytical work may be of interest to UNHCR.

- H) National adaptation plans (NAPs),³⁸ GCR national action plans, and the agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters are internationally agreed frameworks that can serve as entry points for UNHCR's support to States in addressing the issue of human mobility in the context of climate change. The high-level panel on internal displacement is also tasked to come up with recommendations in relation to disasters and climate change. A large number of policy briefs³⁹ and recommendations emanating from the Conference of the Parties (COP),⁴⁰ the works of the Advisory Group on Human Mobility and Climate Change, and the Task Force on Displacement of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, in which UNHCR has played a crucial role, highlight the importance of addressing human mobility across the whole UNFCCC spectrum (adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, finance, and capacity-building). The Advisory Group strongly encouraged States to take measures, including in their NAPs, in close consultation with communities at risk of displacement, to prevent and mitigate forced internal and cross-border displacement in the context of climate change. The Advisory Group has identified both NAPs and the

³⁷ Byrnes, R. and Surminski, S. (2019) "Addressing the impacts of climate change through an effective Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage: Submission to the second review of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage under the UNFCCC". London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science.

³⁸ The national adaptation plan (NAP) process was established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF). It enables Parties to formulate and implement NAPs as a means of identifying medium- and long-term adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and programmes to address those needs. National governments are primarily responsible for protecting those who are displaced within their countries of residence, and they should prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement. They should assess how climate change will impact human mobility and plan accordingly to ensure that individuals, households and communities can remain in their original settlements for as long as possible in a manner fully consistent with their rights. The outcomes of the Nansen Initiative consultative process on human mobility in the context of disasters and climate change have emphasized the need for and the importance of integrating human mobility considerations into NAPs.

³⁹ Warner, K. et al. (2014) "Integrating Human Mobility Issues within National Adaptation Plans", United Nations University – Nansen Initiative Joint Policy Brief #2. UNU-EHS Publication Series.

⁴⁰ The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). All States that are Parties to the Convention are represented at the COP, at which they review the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and make decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention, including institutional and administrative arrangements.

Nairobi Work programme as entry points for the issue of climate change-related human mobility.⁴¹

The GCR (and also the GCM⁴²) effectively acknowledges and addresses the reality of increasing displacement in the context of disasters, environmental degradation and climate change, and provides a basis for measures to tackle the many challenges arising in this area. Following the adoption of the GCR by the UN General Assembly, States can develop national action plans to integrate disaster-related displacement more effectively into national policies or programmes, which opens the way for UNHCR support.

- I) The collaboration between IOM and UNHCR offers positive examples of working together and joining efforts on climate change, mixed migration and forced displacement, topics on which collective actions are crucial (such as through COP, the WIM task force, use of the Displacement Tracking Matrix, joint screening and assistance programmes, adoption of the GCR and GCM, joint research papers and policy briefs). These experiences constitute a good basis for fostering joint efforts to tackle climate change-related displacement in non-conflict situations (internal and cross-border), given that this is a global challenge exceeding the individual capabilities of a single organization.
- J) The humanitarian-development nexus – an essential approach to comprehensively addressing climate change and disaster-related displacement – was identified by most stakeholders as a top priority at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). Moreover, the New Way of Working (NWOW), the IASC Common Framework for Preparedness,⁴³ the GCR and the comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF) are clear examples of frameworks to put this into practice, encouraging humanitarian and development actors to work together collaboratively, based on their comparative advantages. The response to Idai shows the critical need for much closer interaction between humanitarian and development actors. The humanitarian-development nexus should not be interpreted as a linear evolution moving only from emergency to development, but rather should be seen as a bi-directional and comprehensive approach. Efforts to strengthen the “humanitarian-development nexus” have been recognized as important aspects of achieving the pledge to “leave no one behind” (Agenda 2030). These frameworks provide UNHCR an opportunity to evolve, all the while influencing humanitarian and protection responses to disasters both at practical and at policy level.

In addressing forced displacement, the GCR and its CRRF, establish a “multi-stakeholder and partnership approach”. As the NWOW states, “building stronger national and local resilience would require development and humanitarian actors to work together and would take time”. The One Humanity report notes that “humanitarian actors need to move

⁴¹ UNHCR, IOM, UNU-EHS, UNDP, ILO, NRC/IDMC, Sciences Po–CERI and Refugees International (2014) “Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change: Recommendations for the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility COP20 Lima, Peru”.

⁴² See: <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/environment-and-climate-change-gcm>

⁴³ The IASC Common Framework for Preparedness has been endorsed by IASC Principals (including UNHCR), the International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ISDR), and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).

beyond repeatedly carrying out short-term interventions year after year towards contributing to the achievement of longer-term development results. Development actors will need to plan and act with greater urgency to tackle people's vulnerability, inequality and risk as they pursue the Sustainable Development Goals".⁴⁴ Moreover, in 2019, of the 42 countries with the largest populations in need of humanitarian assistance, 21 experienced disasters caused by natural hazards; therefore, it is critical to make humanitarian and developmental investments in broader resilience, as well as in DRR.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ UN General Assembly (2016) "One Humanity, Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit", A/70/709 (February 2, 2016), para. 125.

⁴⁵ Development Initiatives (2020) *Global humanitarian assistance report 2020*.