



UNHCR Country Portfolio Evaluation: Angola (2016-2019)

EVALUATION REPORT

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UNHCR Evaluation Service

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Evaluation information at a glance	
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This evaluation report has been prepared by Itad. Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this evaluation report are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily represent the views of UNHCR, its partners, the United Nations or its member states.

Commissioned by UNHCR Evaluation Service

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Executive Summary

Key findings of the evaluation

Provision of basic services:

1. *Kasai refugees*: UNHCR's response to the Kasai refugee influx was timely, enabling the transfer of over 22,000 refugees from overcrowded transit centres to settlements in challenging circumstances. UNHCR has subsequently assisted refugee families to upgrade their shelter through an owner-driven approach, which has ensured a flexible response. In terms of service provision for these refugees, progress is noted in education provision and health – with no excess morbidity – though livelihood provision was limited and water provision not well managed.

2. *Protracted refugees*: Dwindling funds and a restricted environment for refugees in the country in the past several years has led to a reduction in UNHCR's services for long-term refugees. Besides lacking basic services, urban refugees and their children face discrimination and protection challenges in accessing education, livelihoods and employment opportunities.

Protection: UNHCR has facilitated the creation of an inter-ministerial group on developing a statelessness plan, work on which is expected to pick up with ratification of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Convention by the Government of Angola (GoA). In the absence of registration, up-to-date documentation and implementation of the new Refugee Law, UNHCR's actions have had limited effect in protecting refugees and asylum seekers. Registration of Kasai refugees has been fraught, in a process without a thorough vetting system. Support on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) for urban refugees remains a challenge as law enforcement officials do not take incidents seriously. UNHCR has attempted to highlight protection issues around mixed migration but progress in this regard has been stymied as a legal and policy framework is not yet in place.

Government capacity building: UNHCR's training and capacity building support to GoA at central and provincial level on legal and refugee protection issues has created awareness of various tools and international standards. However, these have not led to changes in behaviour or actions on the ground, as the political commitment to implement key protection measures is lacking – at both the national and international level. The capacity of GoA officials to administer various mechanisms, procedures and administrative infrastructure relevant to refugee protection is weak at the field level.

Factors that have affected results: UNHCR's partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a positive relationship with GoA and local authorities enabled it to scale up the response after the Kasai crisis, which coincided with UNHCR winding down its operation in Angola. The phase down decision reflected weak risk analysis, and led to delayed deployment of qualified staff, frequent staff changes and lack of a proper handover process that created discontinuity and affected quality of interventions. Several aspects of internal systems and processes, and a lack of harmonization among partners on cross-cutting issues, such as accountability to affected populations (AAP), SGBV and gender equality, have affected the operation's timeliness and efficiency.

Learning and adaptive programming: Lessons and good practices are not systematically distilled and shared within the organization. UNHCR has been weak on tracking the outputs and outcomes of its operation, although some positive changes are beginning to emerge as UNHCR develops a new results framework.

Relevance and strategic positioning: UNHCR coordinated well with UN agencies and others in Angola on actions for refugees and asylum seekers. Having taken the lead on support to Kasai refugees, UNHCR was able to mobilize resources, which enabled it to meet the basic needs of the refugee population, though identification of women and men with disabilities, minority groups and LGBT has not been attempted and these do not comprise a specific target group. UNHCR has begun to take the initiative to apply the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Angola for the refugee response. This has been timely, as in line with the CRRF, UNHCR has ensured a close working relationship with local authorities and host communities in the Kasai response. For instance, UNHCR and partners demonstrated flexibility and adjusted their initial plans to respond to the changing needs in Lóvua settlement.

UNHCR Angola has increased its efforts in advocacy, some of which have paid off; however, on complex issues of registration and refugees'/asylum seekers' rights, UNHCR's advocacy interventions may have had limited impact on issues of refugee protection, largely due to a challenging national policy environment. Progress on AAP has been uneven, as different partners have used different routes, mostly informal, without a coherent approach. Operationalizing age, gender and disability policy (AGD) has had limited success. Localization is a challenging construct in the current context of Angola, and UNHCR's preference to partnering with international NGOs as opposed to local NGOs has been appropriate in the context of a weak civil society in the country.

Conclusions on UNHCR Angola operation results¹

Conclusion 1:

The provision of basic needs through a multi-sectoral response by UNHCR and partners for the Kasai refugees ensured that there was no increase in mortality and morbidity in the settlements. However, the situation of urban refugees has deteriorated in terms of their protection and access to services due to the slow implementation of the new national asylum policy.

Conclusion 2:

Capacity enhancement initiatives through training and exposure of Government officials to them, have created awareness of various tools and international standards; however, these have not necessarily led to changes in behaviour or actions that ensure adherence to minimum standards and best practice or the implementation of relevant law(s) vis-à-vis refugees, asylum seekers and other PoC. In addition, UNHCR's inability to situate the training /exposure activities in an overall long-term capacity building strategy or plan acted as limiting factors in realizing any change in actions on the ground, post-training.

¹ *Areas of Inquiry 1: What have been the results in the areas of assistance, protection and solutions as achieved by the UNHCR country operation in the past three to five years? Under what conditions has UNHCR achieved these results, and what have been the most important contextual and operational factors/decisions contributing to or impeding achievement of these results?*

Conclusion 3:

Besides the complex external environment, UNHCR's internal decision-making processes and organizational systems have also affected its results. For instance, UNHCR Angola's internal capacity has been stretched in several areas of programme delivery – namely, (a) inadequate staff capacity on addressing gender equality issues; (b) weak technical capacity on WASH programming; (c) a weak focus on vulnerability in livelihoods targeting; and (d) a lack of a coherent approach to promoting participation and AAP. Furthermore, a lack of an institutional learning culture in the organization impedes proactive lesson-learning and sharing among staff and partners. This is partly to do with the reactive nature of operations, as well as a predominant focus on activities.

Conclusions on strategic positioning²

Conclusion 4

UNHCR has positioned itself well within the UN system, and in its relationship with GoA, to lead on refugees and asylum issues in line with the CRRF and engaging with host communities and local authorities – especially on providing basic services to both the refugee population and host communities in Lóvua. UNHCR's leadership on humanitarian issues in general, and on its core focus on refugees, asylum seekers and other PoC in particular, is recognized by all stakeholders. A good start has been made with engagement with the MAFSAMU on social protection assistance for vulnerable refugees and on its partnership with the UNDP which could offer opportunities for engagement with donor agencies on nexus and resilience programming in the future.

Conclusion 5:

UNHCR has adapted its tools and response to ensure it has remained flexible in the country context. It has been able to respond to events as they unfold, though UNHCR's preparedness to anticipate and provide a response has been challenged by a fast-evolving crisis. This was evident in its early response to the Kasai crisis, as well as the recent spontaneous return of refugees to the DRC, all of which indicate that UNHCR has struggled to put in place contingency and scenario plans.

Conclusion 6:

On the complex issues of registration and refugees'/asylum seekers' rights, a lack of a consistent messaging and a joined-up approach involving multiple stakeholders (donors, partners, UN agencies) may have stymied UNHCR's efforts, which require engaging at high levels of Government. UNHCR needs to clearly articulate where it finds GoA's stance on issues related to protection of refugees and asylum seekers can be brought in line with its international commitments and domestic laws. This may be an issue that goes beyond the country operation and will require examining how UNHCR works with governments in environments where refugee rights are challenged, and determine the kind of support a country operation may need to effectively champion causes on behalf of its core PoC, including advocacy through regional forums and multilateral bodies.

² *Areas of Inquiry 2: How strategically has UNHCR been positioned within the country context, and what are the key factors driving strategic decision-making? To what extent do the strategy and country operation plan have coherence and/or alignment with the work of other humanitarian/development actors, private sector and civil society actors within the country? How well aligned is the existing UNHCR strategy and country operation plan with the current and/or evolving needs of the population and wider country context?*

Conclusion 7:

Progress on addressing gender equality and disability issues has been limited, partly because of inadequate staff resources dedicated to these areas. This has impacted on the operation's ability to respond to the most vulnerable PoC. In line with best practices, attempts have been made to promote accountability to affected populations, with mixed results, owing to a lack of a coherent approach among partners. Progress on localization, which would help facilitate this, is hamstrung by the limited capacity of local NGOs and restrictions imposed on them by national regulations.

Recommendations

1. Programme delivery for the Kasai refugees:

- Country Office**
- 1.1 Review selection criteria for beneficiaries of livelihoods activities and ensure vulnerability is given prominence in this.
 - 1.2 Deal with the issues related to lack of progress in the development of durable water sources at the earliest opportunity. This may require ensuring activities receive adequate and consistent technical guidance.
 - 1.3 For food provisioning, gradually move to a combination of cash transfer and in-kind food, in partnership with WFP. This will go towards addressing the refugees' complaints of lack of food diversity and may also contribute to diversifying livelihoods opportunities through development of local grocers and shops.
 - 1.4 Work with partners to develop a coherent and consistent approach to strengthening beneficiary participation and AAP among the refugee population.

2. Addressing SGBV among urban refugees and gender equality across the programme:

- Regional Bureau**
- 2.1 Ensure that at the regional level there is specialized expertise to support country operations in strengthening gender and vulnerability analysis across the programme in general, and on SGBV issues in particular.
- Country Office**
- 2.2 Working with JRS and MASFAMU, develop a mechanism for monitoring, reporting and follow up on SGBV cases among refugees and asylum seekers, especially in Luanda. In Lóvua, ensure all partners have a consistent approach to addressing and reporting on SGBV.

3. Advocacy and engagement with GoA on crucial issues of protection, registration and documentation:

- HQ and regional Bureau**
- 3.1 UNHCR needs to review how it supports and guides country operations in advocacy on complex issues where vital protection issues and standards of treatment of PoC go unaddressed for a long time, putting them at risk of arbitrary and unlawful actions.
- Country Office**
- 3.2 Drawing on GoA's commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, develop a multi-stakeholder approach involving the UN Resident Coordinator, UNCT, donor agencies, embassies and NGOs to engage with GoA on crucial protection issues, acting as a principled and persuasive advocate for the inclusion of refugees and stateless people in national development. The current work on nexus could be leveraged in this regard.

-
- 3.3 Explore a multi-pronged approach to ongoing capacity development using secondment of expert staff and advisers working alongside the various departments, instead of solely relying on training and exposure visits.

4. Follow up and implementation of ICGLR Convention on Statelessness:

- Regional Bureau** 4.1 Engage with the ICGLR Secretariat to facilitate support to individual countries in the region to follow up on and report on progress on implementation of the Convention.
- Country Office** 4.2 Working with the Ministry of Interior, develop and agree a process for identification of specific population groups that are already stateless, or are vulnerable to being thus rendered, and develop an action plan in this regard.

5. Lessons from phasing down of Southern Africa offices in 2016–2017:

- HQ** 5.1 Establish clear parameters for phasing down and closing an office, which ought to be based on more than budgetary reasons, and take into account the risks of probable humanitarian crises affecting PoC and local capacity.
- HQ and regional Bureau** 5.2 To supplement UNHCR's global roster, examine the feasibility of standby arrangements with other humanitarian agencies to ensure a core team of qualified senior managers/country representatives/technical experts, as necessary, who can be deployed at short notice in the event a country operation is unable to cope with a crisis situation.
- 5.3 Given the instability in the DRC, UNHCR needs to be prepared for a possible further influx of refugees any time. For this reason, emergency preparedness will remain an important component of the operation's focus in the coming years.

6. Organizational systems and processes:

- HQ and regional Bureau** 6.1 Ensure that, when new staff take over from outgoing staff, there is a proper and systematic handover process in place, especially in case of representatives and senior staff.
- 6.2 When the new results framework is rolled out, UNHCR may like to review its reporting framework to ensure the annual reporting process is used by country operations to reflect on and share lessons, besides reporting on outputs and outcomes.³
- Country operation** 6.3 Given the short-term nature of contracts with partners for delivery of activities, streamline grant decision-making and funds disbursement timeline.
- 6.4 Ensure that, when one partner takes over responsibility for particular programme from another partner, there is a managed transition and handover process.
- 6.5 Establish a system of annual workshops for partners focusing on sharing of lessons learnt across the programme. This must **not** be combined with a planning and budgeting exercise, which needs to be kept separate.

³ A good results framework is not simply a reporting tool but has the potential to bring about change in how operations are planned/delivered. Focus on behaviour change, for example, would be a desired outcome for training to SME and police officials, and this will begin by identifying and mutually agreeing the performance gaps before identifying the knowledge/skills gap (to be addressed by training). This would then provide a basis for dialogue with authorities on an ongoing basis for follow-up after training. An outcome-oriented results framework would enable staff and country teams to report/reflect on changes at different levels: change in state (poor/hungry/less hungry, etc.); change in relationship and status (refugee with valid documents; children registered; women in community leadership); change in behaviour and practice (hygiene practices in refugee communities, SMEs dealings with refugees and asylum-seekers); change in capacity (GoA policy, SME staff capacity)

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
AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ADPP	Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo
AGD	Age, Gender and Diversity
AoI	Area of Inquiry
CNR	National Refugee Council
COP	Country Operation Plan
COREDA	Committee for Recognition of the Right to Asylum
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ES	Evaluation Services
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GoA	Government of Angola
HQ	Headquarters (UNHCR)
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Services
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MASFAMU	Ministry of Social Welfare, Family and Promotion of Women
MdM	Médicos del Mundo
MOPAN	Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OL	Operating Level (budget)
PNA	Protection Needs Assessment
PoC	Persons of Concern
PPG	Population Planning Group
ROSA	Regional Office for Southern Africa

RSD	Refugee Status Determination
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SME	Ministry of Interior's Service for Migration and Foreigners
SQ	Sub-question
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International

Glossary







Country Office: Refers to UNHCR Angola, which in the UNHCR structure is technically a 'branch office'.

Map of Angola and bordering regions of DRC showing UNHCR's operational area



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Create date: 22 Jan 2018 Sources: UNHCRS, UNCS, Angolan Government

-  Areas affected by outbreak of violence since August 2016
-  UNHCR Country Office
-  UNHCR Field Office
-  Refugee location
-  Refugee settlement
-  Congolese refugees

Timeline of Major Events and Decisions – UNHCR Angola Operation

2013–2014	Operation focused on facilitating return of Angolan refugees from DRC.
2014	UNHCR decides to phase down three offices in Southern Africa (Namibia, Botswana and Angola).
2015–2016	UNHCR Angola operation focused on protection issues for (urban) refugees and asylum seekers, while continuing a gradual winding down.
2016–2017	Angola office strength reduced to eight staff, with a P3 as head of office.
Feb–March 2017	Early warnings of refugees fleeing Kasai region and entering Angola sounded by Jesuit Refugee Services (UNHCR partner).
March–April 2017	Large influx of refugees into Angola. Government officially announces that it will host them. UNHCR, with its existing staff strength, launches an initial response in Dundo.
April–July 2017	Refugees housed in two transition centres in Dundo on arrival. UNHCR operation scaled up and new staff begin to arrive.
End July 2017	Government closes all registration and declares that no more refugees are to be taken in.
May–Sept 2017	UNHCR upgrades representative position to P5. A third incumbent appointed as representative by September.
August 2017	Government asks UNHCR to develop settlement in forested area of Lóvua municipality.
Sept 2017	UNHCR and partners begin to develop the settlement and relocate people to Lóvua in groups.
October 2017– Dec 2018	Further development of Lóvua settlement with basic infrastructure and capacity to provide shelter for 22,000 refugees.
November– Dec 2018	Government launches Operação Transparência, ostensibly to remove illegal immigrants working in diamond mining.
September– October 2018	Development of livelihood strategy and focus on household farming in Lóvua settlement starts as part of UNHCR’s livelihoods programme.

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- January 2019** Last group of refugees relocated from urban areas to Lóvua following Government directives after Operação Transparência. Election in DRC leads to appointment of a new president who hails from Kasai region.
- February–April 2019** Agreement with health and education authorities to partner with UNHCR; three schools built and formally recognized by Government, which provides twenty teachers.
- May 2019** Return intentions survey conducted by UNHCR in Lóvua camps. Over 85% of respondents want to go back to DRC. Evaluation Team arrives on an inception mission.
- May–June 2019** Incidents of some refugees creating disturbances and hostile behaviour in schools and communal events, expressing unhappiness that they are not being repatriated to DRC.
- 24–25 July 2019** A joint cross-border mission with UNHR DRC and Angola to the settlement to discuss with refugees on the process involved in managed voluntary return. Situation takes ugly turn with threatening behaviour by some aggressive refugees. Security situation out of control; this leads to withdrawal of all services from the settlement as staff cannot operate in a hostile environment. The Evaluation Team is also in the country on a two-week mission.
- 2 Aug 2019** Provision of services in Lóvua settlement resumes after assurance of staff safety by leaders.
- 18–31 August 2019** Reports emerge of refugees already starting to return on their own. Some 8,500 refugees are reportedly on the move.

1. Introduction, Scope and Methodology of the Evaluation

1.1. Introduction

This report relates to an independent evaluation of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) country operation in Angola for the period 2016–2019. This evaluation is part of a series of evaluations of a similar nature also being undertaken in three other countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and Egypt). The evaluation started with an inception phase during which the Evaluation Team (ET) undertook scoping interviews and a brief mission to the country, besides conducting preliminary desk reviews of key documents. Following these, an inception report with a detailed methodology for conducting the evaluation was produced and discussed with the UNHCR Evaluation Services (ES), which managed the evaluation. The inception phase was followed by desk research to map all available evidence from secondary sources before the ET undertook an extensive country visit to gather evidence from the field. This report brings together findings, conclusions and recommendations from the various processes of the evaluation.

1.2. Evaluation Purpose, Objectives, Scope and Approach

The purpose of the country portfolio evaluation is to generate timely evidence to inform UNHCR's future operational planning and strategy. The evaluation will inform decisions that strengthen partnerships and programme design in the pursuit of assistance, protection and solutions for UNHCR PoC and the communities that host them. In addition, the evaluation will seek to analyse and assess the effectiveness of UNHCR's plans and activities in light of the country context, and the evolving needs of the population, the GoA and its partners. Recent measures, such as the CRRF and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), should help support UNHCR country operations to be more agile and responsive to evolving contexts and emerging opportunities, as the organization works constructively with new and existing partners, and engages more deeply with UNCTs towards collective outcomes.

1.2.1. Evaluation Objectives and Scope

The objectives of the evaluation are framed around three key Aols outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR):⁴

- a) Results achieved to date and contributing factors;
- b) Strategic positioning and coherence;
- c) Future directions.

The scope of the Angola evaluation covered all aspects of UNHCR's operations in the country in support of UNHCR's PoC, support to GoA capacity building, overall coordination and leadership on areas of UNHCR's core mandate for the period 2016–2019.

⁴ Attached as Annex 1.

1.2.2. Primary Audience

The primary audience for this evaluation is the UNHCR country operation in Angola (technically a 'branch office') and the Regional Office for Southern Africa (ROSA). Other UNHCR Bureau and Divisions, GoA and UNHCR partners, including humanitarian and development actors, constitute a secondary audience. The ET undertook a detailed stakeholder analysis during the inception phase; this is attached as Annex 2.

1.2.3. Evaluation Process

The evaluation was carried out between May and August 2019. The broad outline of the process the ET followed constituted:

- a) Following submission of the inception report, a visit to Geneva by the ET to meet with UNHCR's ES to review the report and ensure consensus on the evaluation purposes, uses, objectives and methodology;
- b) A feedback session with the country operation at the end of the country visit where preliminary findings were presented and discussions held to encourage learning and ownership of the evaluation findings;
- c) Before commencing drafting of the report, a workshop conducted with participation of UNHCR ES to explore findings and test conclusions and recommendations.

1.3. Evaluation Framework and Methods

1.3.1. Evaluation Framework

The three broad Aols specified in the ToR (Box 1) provided the overall framework for the evaluation. The ToR also refers specifically to the criteria of relevance, coverage, effectiveness and coherence. The ET used these criteria to frame the evaluation sub-questions (SQs) under each Aol, though, as advised by UNHCR, the SQs were not used for presentation of findings or in analysis for drawing conclusions. The SQs against each Aol are shown in Annex 3.

Box 1: Areas of Inquiry (as per the ToR)

Key Areas of Inquiry 1: What have been the results in the areas of assistance, protection and solutions as achieved by the UNHCR country operation in the past three to five years? Under what conditions has UNHCR achieved these results, and what have been the most important contextual and operational factors/decisions contributing to or impeding achievement of these results?

Key Areas of Inquiry 2: How strategically has UNHCR been positioned within the country context, and what are the key factors driving strategic decision-making? To what extent do the strategy and country operation Plan (COP) have coherence and/or alignment with the work of other humanitarian/development actors, private sector and civil society actors within the country? How well aligned is the existing UNHCR strategy and COP with the current and/or evolving needs of the population and wider country context?

Key Areas of Inquiry 3: How can UNHCR build on results achieved to date, and further leverage UNHCR's strategic position and influence within the country and region, to optimize the potential impact of collective efforts towards protection and solutions for UNHCR PoC, and the communities that host them?

The findings of the evaluation are presented against the SQs and conclusions are presented against core questions under Aol 1 and 2. Under Aol 3, findings and conclusions on Aol 1 and 2 are analysed and recommendations emerging from the conclusions are presented.

1.3.2. Evaluation Methods

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach combining desk research, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs) and site observations, where possible, to collect data. A challenge of the evaluation was the absence of baseline and midline data on a range of issues the UNHCR programme supports, as was found during the inception phase. A mixture of various methods and sources enabled the ET to triangulate information and perspectives from multiple sources to ensure a comprehensive, robust and evidence-based understanding of the operations.

Based on a combination of random and purposive sampling, a total of 42 purposively selected key informants and 21 individual PoC/beneficiaries (selected randomly and purposively) were interviewed, and 17 FGDs were held with PoC communities in urban and rural areas. Annex 4 presents a full list of all key informants and community interview locations, and Table 1 presents a summary breakdown of numbers of interviews and group discussions conducted. Annex 5 contains an itinerary of the ET.

Table 1: Breakdown of key informants by category and group discussions

Stakeholder group	No. of interviewees/groups	Remarks
UNHCR staff	17	-
UNHCR NGO partners	10	-
GoA	6	-
Donors	3	-
Other UN agencies	6	-
Beneficiary/PoC interviews	21	12 men; 9 women
Group discussions with PoC communities	17 (4 women; 6 men; 7 mixed)	Group size varied from 2 participants to 8, with 1 outlier (18)

(Source: Compiled by Angola Country Operation Evaluation Team, 2019)

1.3.3. Validation of Evaluation Results

Rigorous data triangulation was undertaken to validate data gathered during the course of the evaluation. This was done mainly through comparing information gathered through multiple sources and methods. Where discrepancies occurred that could not be resolved, the ET did not use such data for drawing conclusions or lessons and recommendations. All data from the desk review, interview notes, group discussions and site observations, including outliers, were examined by the three members of the ET independently to check for their (i) representativeness – do the data/information represent the whole or a sizeable picture? (ii) relevance – to the questions in the evaluation matrix; and (iii) attributability – if the data convey a ‘state’, is it attributable to the intervention/cause being described? The team mapped all evidence emerging from desk review, KIIs, field observations (wherever feasible) and PoC interviews – including ‘considering’ each piece of evidence in terms of importance and validity – and assessed the findings for strength of evidence using the following scoring system:

- 4 – Very strong convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations and PoC communities);
- 3 – Strong convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations and PoC communities);
- 2 – Some degree of convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations and PoC communities);
- 1 – Weak convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations and communities) – ET was unable to establish any finding.

As can be seen in the summary evidence map (Table 2), for eight of the evaluation SQs, the evidence supporting the results of this evaluation was strong or very strong (between 3 and 4), in terms of convergence of data from different evaluation methods and sources. In the case of two SQs (Government capacity building; advocacy and communications), the strength of the evidence was moderate (2.8) and could be called satisfactory. Overall, the evaluation methodology based on KIIs, secondary data from documents, discussions with communities and visits to a sample of communities and project locations provided a robust evidence base for the evaluation. The method of triangulation and analysis the ET used, based on collating and comparing evidence from all methods, sources and individual evaluators of the team, was found to be necessary and sufficient for this evaluation.⁵

Table 2: Summary evidence score as per Evaluation Assessment⁶

Sub-questions	No. of pieces of evidence	Total score on the pieces of evidence	Average score
SQ1. To what extent has the UNHCR country operation in Angola achieved results for PoCs, including in the areas of protection, assistance, access to basic services and solutions?	25	76	3
SQ2. What contribution has UNHCR made in Angola towards building the capacity of Government institutions in discharging their respective mandates vis-à-vis protection of refugees, asylum seekers and mixed migrant population, in accordance with international and national law/conventions (GCR, CRRF, Refugee convention and laws)?	10	28	2.8
SQ3. What progress has UNHCR made in achieving the strategic objectives set out in the ICGLR Action Plan for the eradication of statelessness? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in	10	33	3.3

⁵ As can be seen from the 'Limitations' section there is a caveat to the strength of evidence that the ET was able to garner i.e. the security situation did not allow us to visit and gather primary data from stakeholders and beneficiaries in the Lóvua camps

⁶ Secondary data i.e. Operation documents, reviews and wider literature would not rate as highly in our assessment and would be used as a reference to supplement primary data (KIIs and FGDs)

Sub-questions	No. of pieces of evidence	Total score on the pieces of evidence	Average score
strategy, etc.) to strengthen links to interventions of other actors?			
SQ4. What contextual and operational factors have contributed to or hindered achievement or non-achievement of results for PoCs in Angola?	28	98	3.5
SQ5. To what extent has UNHCR's strategic and operational approach in Angola taken into account and responded to the changing/ evolving needs of PoCs and country context?	13	39	3
SQ6. To what extent has the UNHCR country operation achieved geographical coverage, and were its responses proportionate to the needs and UNHCR's expected role in preparedness, response and durable solutions for PoCs?	3	11	3.6
SQ7. How successful was UNHCR's advocacy and communication approach in influencing Government and other actors on key issues related to the rights and protection of refugees, asylum seekers, and the mixed migrant population in Angola?	7	20	2.8
SQ8. To what extent has UNHCR in Angola facilitated a coherent strategy and approach amongst donors, Government and key humanitarian institutions in addressing gaps, access and promoting international good practice in its work with PoCs, particularly with regard to: (a) strengthening accountability to and participation of communities, (b) GCR & CRRF, and (c) localization?	10	31	3.1
SQ9. To what extent has UNHCR in Angola attempted to leverage its influence within the country and region to strengthen collective efforts towards protection and durable solutions for UNHCR persons of concern, and the communities that host them?	7	22	3.1

Sub-questions	No. of pieces of evidence	Total score on the pieces of evidence	Average score
SQ10. What evidence exists to show that lessons are fed back into programming in real-time to adapt interventions or ways of working to changing context?	7	22	3.1

1.4. Evaluation Principles and Ethics

The ET was guided by internationally recognized ethical practices⁷ and codes of conduct for evaluators, particularly in humanitarian and conflict situations. The evaluation also used the Sphere Handbook and Standards for Monitoring and Evaluation.⁸ As a large portion of UNHCR’s operation is protection-related, the evaluation used a protection lens and scrupulous good practice principles around issues of access and ethics. All data-gathering and reporting was governed by ‘do no harm’ principles to avoid exposing people to any harm as a result of actions of the ET, ensuring conflict sensitivity in the planning, design and delivery of evaluation tasks. Primary data was collected only through processes that ensured that refugees, asylum seekers and other PoC were not further traumatized, put at risk of retribution or made to undergo discomfort. The ET adhered to the following protocol in all interactions with stakeholders:

- Informed consent – All participants voluntarily gave their consent to participate in any activity related to the evaluation.
- Confidentiality – All discussions with stakeholders and data provided by individuals and groups are presented and shared on a non-attribution basis.
- Respect of rights – All those involved in any evaluation process or activity were duly informed of the purpose so they could participate freely and equitably.
- Respect dignity – Interviews and data-gathering were conducted in a way that respected individuals’ dignity.
- Ensure inclusivity – All voices were heard, ensuring respect to privacy and confidentiality.

The team attempted to ensure the highest-quality standards in terms of the following factors: comprehensiveness (i.e. evaluation criteria); independence and objectivity (i.e. robustness and reliability of results); conduct without influence or pressure from any organization; full autonomy of the team in conducting and reporting its findings; transparency of judgement (i.e. based on data available and previously agreed judgement criteria as per the evaluation matrix); and evidence-based (i.e. collected and triangulated from different sources, with limitations addressed).

⁷ OECD-DAC Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2667294.pdf>; ALNAP Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide: <http://www.alnap.org/resource/23592.aspx>

⁸ <https://www.spherestandards.org/resources/sphere-for-monitoring-and-evaluation/>

1.5. Limitations

Owing to the sudden and unforeseen escalation in the security situation in the Lóvua refugee camps, coinciding with the timing of the evaluation mission, **the ET was not allowed to visit the refugee settlements in rural Lunda Norte**. This has meant that the ET was unable to gather primary data from communities directly, and through observations of various activities in the field.⁹ A few refugees/beneficiaries were met outside the settlements in Dundo town (interviewed 9 men individually and 2 together; 1 women interviewed individually, and 4 women interviewed in pairs; all interviews conducted in partners' offices), depending on their availability – most of them either had relatives in the town or were visiting the town market.

The evaluation took place at a time when events were beginning to move at a pace that could not have been foreseen even days before. At the time of the inception mission in May–June 2019, UNHCR and partners had completed the full set up of the refugee camps in Lóvua and were engaged in planning a long-term response, alongside conducting an intentions survey. By the end of July when the evaluation mission took place, refugees were demanding that they wanted to return home soon and 'not be held in camps' – at the time of drafting the report, news came that some 8,500 refugees had already started to move back to DRC, without even waiting for UNHCR's due process of voluntary repatriation. The evaluation has not examined the latest developments with regard to the Lóvua refugees as they are unfolding now, and all findings and conclusions relate to the situation as it was up to the month of July 2019.

⁹ *During the brief inception mission beforehand, two members of the ET had carried out a brief visit for approximately two hours to the camps to orient themselves to the site and logistics*

2. Operational Context UNHCR in Angola

2.1. Angola context with regard to UNHCR PoC

2.1.1. General

The Republic of Angola has vast natural resources and is the second largest producer in Africa of oil and the fourth largest producer of diamonds in the world. Since 1990, the country's economy has witnessed growth rates that are among the highest in the world,¹⁰ especially since the end of the civil war (2002). Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A post-war reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well.¹¹ This continued until 2013–2014, when the price of oil declined abruptly.¹² Despite these results, the country remains a Low Income Country, with low living standards: 30% of the population lives on less than US\$1.90 (the international poverty line) a day. Though the country aspires to becoming a Middle-Income Country, 55.7% of its people live below the lower-Middle Income Country poverty line.¹³

After 38 years in power, José Eduardo dos Santos stepped down in 2017. His rule was characterized by close control of the nation's oil wealth, to the benefit of the ruling elite, which necessitated a tight grip on civil society to prevent it exposing corruption and demanding a fairer distribution of wealth. As a result of these constraints, civil society is inherently weak in Angola, and the political and societal space for civil society is limited.¹⁴ The new Government has embarked on a process of comprehensive reform of various institutions in the country,¹⁵ and a stronger civil society is one of the areas being aimed for. The political and civil rights environment are becoming less restrictive, and the courts appear to operate without political interference, according to one independent report.¹⁶

Angola is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and of the ICGLR, which sets out, through its Regional Programme of Action on Humanitarian and Social Issues, an action plan (2017–2019) to eradicate statelessness in the region.

¹⁰ B. R. Sørensen and M. Vincent, 2001, *Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced*, p. 17

¹¹ https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/angola/angola_economy.html

¹² AfDB, 2019, *Angola Economic Outlook, Macroeconomic Performance*: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/angola/angola-economic-outlook>

¹³ World Bank, 2019, *Poverty & Equity Brief Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola, April*: https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_AGO.pdf

¹⁴ I. Amundsen and C. Abreu, 2006, *Civil Society in Angola – Inroads, Space and Accountability*, CMI Report,

¹⁵ *The Economist*, May 5, 2018. *Is Angola's new president serious about reform?*

¹⁶ Human Rights Watch. *Angola – Events of 2018*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/angola>

2.1.2 The PoC Population

The refugee population in Angola is largely from the DRC, with a small number from Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan and Somalia.¹⁷ As of November 2015, there were 45,658¹⁸ UNHCR PoC living in Angola, of whom 15,572 were refugees and 30,086 asylum seekers in 2016, according to Ministry of Interior data cited by UNHCR.¹⁹ The refugee caseload consisted mainly of refugees from DRC (Katangese) who had come some 30 years ago. In 2017, following violent conflict in the Kasai region of DRC, some 35,000 refugees came to Angola, adding to the existing caseload. The caseload for the internally displaced has reduced significantly in the country since the end of the conflict, and the current caseload comprises mostly the disaster-displaced. During 2018, about 11,000 people were displaced by disasters, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.²⁰

When the influx from Kasai began in March 2017, initially the Angolan authorities did not open the border, forcing many of those displaced to wait for up to two weeks on the Congolese side of the border in dire humanitarian conditions. When the authorities eventually opened the border, over 35,000 refugees were allowed into the country.²¹ GoA transported most of the refugees by air or road to two improvised reception centres around the town of Dundo.²² Subsequently, GoA identified land 95 km from Dundo town to which to relocate the refugees. UNHCR reports that 35,411 refugees from Kasai were biometrically registered in Lunda Norte as of April 2018. This includes 32,000 new arrivals registered by mid-2017, and others registered through continuous registration. Of the 35,411 biometrically registered refugees, 20,145 were receiving food assistance as of April 2019²³ and the rest were presumably living in urban areas of Dundo. The average family size is four persons, and the majority of the refugee population comprises women and children (nearly 75%).

2.1.3 Policy and Institutional Environment vis-à-vis UNHCR's PoC

Angola has been a refugee-hosting country since its independence in 1975,²⁴ and is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.²⁵ The Angolan Constitution guarantees 'the right of asylum in the event of persecution for political reasons, including serious threats or persecution, is guaranteed to every foreign citizen or stateless person as a result of his or her activity in favour of democracy, national independence, peace between peoples, freedom and the rights of the human person, in accordance with the laws in force and the international instruments'. The National Development Plan includes specific reference to the need to 'register and legalize extraordinarily for the integration of former refugees who wish to stay in Angola'. However, in 2015 GoA brought in a new Refugee and Asylum Law (Angolan Refugee Law 10/15),²⁶ which equates to a more restrictive asylum regime that allows for reception centres, in which newly arriving asylum seekers will be

¹⁷ UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

¹⁸ This data is different from that in another UNHCR source dated 2014, which reports that Angola hosted an estimated 24,000 refugees, mostly from the former Katanga province in DRC (UNHCR, 2014, Submission for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review of Angola, March)

¹⁹ This figure matches the data cited in another document, UNHCR, 2018, *The Democratic Republic of Congo Regional Refugee Response Plan, January 2019–December 2020*, which states that, prior to the 2017 influx, Angola hosted approximately 30,000 asylum-seekers and 15,000 refugees in Luanda, from DRC, Somalia, Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Guinea, Mauritania and other countries.

²⁰ <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/angola>

²¹ UNHCR, 2018, *The Democratic Republic of Congo Regional Refugee Response Plan January 2019–December 2020*

²² UNHCR Angola, 2019, *Interagency Operational Update, 1–30 April*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ UNHCR Angola Operation, 2018–2019 Protection Strategy, January

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Government of Angola: Law No. 10 of 2015, *Law on the Right of Asylum and the Refugee Status* <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4df8.html>, 17 June 2015

obliged to stay during the entire asylum procedure. The new law withdrew the provision in the old Asylum Law (Law 8/90) that gave asylum seekers the right to work, even though in practice it was already very difficult for asylum seekers to find employment, according to documents and all focus groups (7) conducted with urban refugees.

In the scope of implementation of the new law, the National Refugee Council (CNR) was created in late 2018, replacing the Committee for Recognition of the Right to Asylum (COREDA). This body is responsible for refugee status determination (RSD) and declaring the termination of refugee status. The CNR is designed as a multi-stakeholder consultative body responsible for examining cases and ruling on applications for asylum and loss of refugee status, as well as analysing complaints related to refusal of asylum and loss of refugee status. According to the official notification setting up the CNR, its meetings may include a representative of UNHCR, which has an observer role with no voting power. At the time of the evaluation, the CNR was still not fully functional.

Implementation of the new law has been slow and has led to deterioration in the registration of asylum applications and the management of data on recognized refugees. Difficulties in implementing the law have been due to a lack of legal instruments, which are, according to officials, now created and ready to be implemented. The upshot of this state of limbo is that currently there is no system in place to receive asylum requests, to determine pending registration cases, or to update documentation. This has profoundly limited the legal security and freedom of movement of PoC. This implies that profiling PoC is nearly impossible, and adds to the importance of UNHCR's Protection Needs Assessment (PNA) as the only tool to understand the PoC profile in Angola. Moreover, a lack of registration means poor documentation, hence extreme legal vulnerability for asylum seekers and refugees with expired refugee cards, who are at risk of arbitrary arrest and detention and even refoulement.²⁷ Approximately 50% of the refugee population in Angola is urban-based, and the halt in new registrations and renewals of expired documents has meant a considerable number of refugees are not able to access basic services or formal employment.²⁸

The new law coincided with the transfer of refugee and asylum matters from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, thus mixing up refugee issues with matters of internal security, law and order. Further, mining activities along the country's northern border with DRC have attracted migrant workers from various parts of Africa, including DRC. The dynamics related to mixed migration²⁹ and irregular migration have thus started to play an important part in GoA's attitude towards registration and RSD.³⁰ The tightening of the refugee and asylum regime in the country in the past few years comes against a backdrop of relentless rhetoric on refugees and asylum seekers, who are conflated with illegal economic migrants. Angola has not ratified the International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Statelessness is also a matter of major concern for UNHCR. Angola has not signed the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.³¹ However, it is a party to the ICGLR Convention on Statelessness and has recently taken steps towards ratifying this, which will put in place the legal measures necessary to eradicate statelessness.

²⁷ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

²⁸ UNHCR, 2019, Annex: Angola Country Operation Evaluation, January

²⁹ Mixed migration flows have been defined as 'complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants.' Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow. The principal characteristics of mixed migration flows include the irregular nature of and the multiplicity of factors driving such movements, and the differentiated needs and profiles of the persons involved (IOM).

³⁰ UNHCR, 2019, Annex: Angola Country Operation Evaluation, January

³¹ UNHCR Angola internal document

Overall, while Angola gives the appearance of being a country that has long welcomed refugees and asylum seekers, in practice ensuring the protection and wellbeing of refugees in the prevailing environment is increasingly becoming a challenge. Despite Law 10/15 recognizing the right of refugees to work (as per Article 39), refugees are prohibited from undertaking managerial functions and are not allowed to own any commercial activity. Law enforcement officials and private companies are not generally aware of the provisions for refugees in terms of access to employment.³² This situation was aggravated by the launch of Operação Transparência in September 2018, with the aim of fighting illegal immigration and the illicit exploitation and trafficking of diamonds. This led to the forced repatriation of thousands of foreigners without adequate documentation, most of them from DRC. During this exercise, over 400,000 Congolese nationals were expelled from Angola by the end of October 2018,³³ including some 1,500 refugees who were caught up in the process.³⁴

The situation with regard to the Kasai refugees has moved fast during 2019. Spurred by presidential elections in DRC and an improvement in the security situation back home, as well as what Kasai refugees perceive to be a generally hostile environment (arbitrary detention, Operação Transparência, lack of freedom of movement, employment opportunities and livelihoods) in Angola, 'an estimated 8,500 refugees have spontaneously left the Lóvua settlement at the end of August with the intention of returning home to the DRC'.³⁵

2.2. UNHCR's Role and key Actions during 2016–2019

The Angola operation has two population planning groups (PPGs): asylum seekers and refugees living mostly in urban areas of Luanda; and DRC refugees from Kasai living in Lunda Norte.³⁶ Until April 2017, UNHCR's main focus in Angola was the urban caseload in Luanda³⁷. For the urban refugee caseload, provision of assistance for basic needs and essential services has been limited: to a large extent, refugees and asylum seekers rely on public services (health, education), though, given the issues related to lack of or expired documentation, this remains a challenge. UNHCR does provide limited assistance through its partner, JRS, in particularly vulnerable cases.³⁸

Before the 2017 emergency, the UNHCR Representation in Angola had started winding down its presence, with a budget of US\$1.3 million and only eight staff left. At that point, the focus was on advocacy for the Asylum Law and dealing with a protracted urban caseload.³⁹ Some of the major issues – besides assisting the urban refugees in Luanda with limited services for the most vulnerable – which UNHCR focused on prior to the 2017 were:⁴⁰

- Capacity building of the Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women⁴¹ on implementation of the law on Domestic Violence (Law 25/11), which criminalizes the perpetration of violence against women and children regardless of their nationality;

³² UNHCR Angola internal document

³³ Human Rights Watch, quoting UN and Government of Angola sources). <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/15/angola-stop-abusive-expulsions-migrants>

³⁴ UNHCR Angola, 2019, Interagency Operational Update, 1–30 April <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/15/angola-stop-abusive-expulsions-migrants>

³⁵ UNHCR, 2019, Thousands of DR Congo Refugees Head Home to Kasai Region from Angola, News Release, 23 August

³⁶ UNHCR Angola, 2018 COP

³⁷ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ UNHCR, 2018, Detailed Report of an Audit of the Operations in Angola for the UNHCR, IAD:OIOS-2018-00884, 30 May

⁴⁰ The main sources for these are the UNHCR Angola COPs for 2016 and 2017

⁴¹ Since renamed the Ministry of Social Welfare, Family and Promotion of Women (MASFAMU)

- Advocacy and advice to GoA on drafting the Asylum Law;
- Vocational training and employment promotion for urban refugees; this work was discontinued from 2016 as it was expected that available opportunities within the country would meet the need;
- Dissemination of knowledge on refugees' rights and duties among the relevant authorities, at both national and provincial levels, as well as to refugees;
- Monitoring visits to detention centres for refugees and asylum seekers;
- Advocacy for durable solutions for refugees from Katanga province of DRC who have been in Angola for more than 30 years;
- Technical support to GoA in view of the invocation of the cessation clause for Rwandan, Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees;
- Ongoing advocacy on birth registration for children born to refugees and asylum seekers to decrease the risk of statelessness.

Since the influx of Kasai refugees, the main focus of actions has been on providing multi-sectoral basic services like shelter, food, water, healthcare and livelihoods support to the nearly 20,000 refugees living in Lóvua settlement, besides ensuring their protection. The COP planning budget grew almost ten-fold between 2016 when it was winding down and 2017, the year of the Kasai refugee influx. The operating level (OL) budget currently stands in the order of US\$11.2 million, as Table 3 shows.

Table 3: Operation planning and operating level budget, Angola, 2016–2019 (US\$)


	2016 total	2017 total	2018 total	2019 total	2020 total
Operating level	1,919,093.72	20,624,880.82	17,174,515.08	11,288,781.70	10,631,926.00
OPS	646,123.90	14,917,741.18	11,131,704.11	5,708,205.05	5,382,926.00
Project	58,532.90	9,183,298.36	2,631,735.11	1,082,255.69	1,422,926.00
Partner	587,591.00	5,734,442.82	8,499,969.00	4,625,949.36	3,960,000.00
Staff	778,647.65	1,761,117.17	4,390,857.19	4,311,035.65	4,171,609.29
Admin	494,322.17	3,946,022.47	1,651,953.78	1,269,541.00	1,077,390.71

Note: OL (Operating level) = OPS + Staffing + ABOD; OPS = Project + Partner
(Source: Finance Unit, UNHCR Angola, 29 July 2019)

The UNHCR financial requirement for 2019 is US\$29 million. The main donors are Germany, the EU, Japan, the Stichting IKEA Foundation, the Central Emergency Response Fund, Sweden and the African Development Bank.⁴² The overall budget of the operation has evolved in response to the needs generated by the 2017 refugee crisis. Annually, only about 40–50% of the budget is assured (OL, granted by headquarters), meaning the UNHCR operation in Angola has to mobilize funds to cover the share of the budget not covered by headquarters (OL). During 2017–2019, the OL budget has shown a steady decline (Figure 1).

⁴² UNHCR Angola, 2019, *Funding Update*, 2 April


Figure 1: OL budget, UNHCR Angola, 2016–2020 (US\$)



(Source: Angola Operation ET, using data in Table 2)

With declining OL, the country operation is now expected to mobilize nearly three-quarters of the cost of its operations, over 60% of its administrative costs and over 90% of all project costs, as Figure 2 shows.

Figure 2: Evolution budget share mobilized by the country operation



(Source: Angola Operation ET, using data in Table 2)

In terms of the two major PPGs the operation works with – the Kasai refugees and long-term refugees and asylum seekers – the skewed nature of the operation is evident from the budget and expenditure data during the past three years (2017–2019) as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Budget and expenditure on PPGs, 2017–2019 (US\$ millions)

Year	Kasai refugee response		Refugees and asylum seekers	
	Budget	Expenditure	Budget	Expenditure
2017	14.34	12.95	0.58	0.55
2018	10.5	10.10	0.63	0.63
2019*	6.27	4.35	0.32	0.28

* Expenditure data for 2019 as of end August.

(Source: UNHCR Angola Finance, 18 September 2019)

On behalf of the UNCT, UNHCR leads the work on its core mandate and engagement with GoA on refugees, asylum seekers and the mixed migrant population (Angola does not have any significant number of internally displaced persons). Of the international *humanitarian* agencies working in the country, UNHCR has the largest humanitarian budget since the Kasai crisis; the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has a significant development and humanitarian programme.⁴³ The other main agencies are the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for youth mobilization and SGBV prevention and response; the WFP for food security; UNICEF for child protection, education and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); the World Health Organization for health; and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS for HIV prevention and response. Currently, UNHCR Angola has seven partners with which it has concluded Programme Partnership Agreements: JRS, World Vision International, Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian Church Aid, Médicos del Mundo (MdM), Mines Advisory Group and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).⁴⁴

⁴³ WFP has had a presence in the country since 2017 but before that it had wound down its activities in the country and maintained only one liaison focal point in Luanda

⁴⁴ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

3. Findings of the Evaluation

3.1. Country Operation Results⁴⁵

As UNHCR operation covers a range of interventions, including provision of basic services to PoC, protection, advocacy, policy support and capacity building, this section presents findings on each of these areas.

3.1.1. Provision of Basic Services for Refugees and other PoC

Main findings

- UNHCR's services for long-term refugees have reduced significantly, as funding has dwindled over the years with little support evident in terms of determining refugee status or vocational training. Urban refugees and their children face discrimination and protection challenges in accessing education, livelihoods and employment opportunities.
- On the whole, UNHCR and GoA have been able to avert any escalation in morbidity and mortality among the Kasai refugee population.
- Despite initial challenges the creation of infrastructure and transfer of over 22,000 refugees from overcrowded transit centres to settlements was well managed by UNHCR, and timely. The shelters are now being upgraded through an owner-driven approach, which ensured a flexible response.
- Food provided to refugees has been adequate in quantity, though not in terms of food diversity. UNHCR has responded to needs by assisting refugee families to livelihood activities (farming only), though the scope and scale of the livelihoods programme was limited and vulnerability was not a core criterion in selection of beneficiaries.
- UNHCR has successfully partnered with GoA in obtaining the latter's support in running schools and in approval of the school curriculum. However, UNHCR does not have the resources for a school feeding programme or provision of text books, which acts as a disincentive for some parents sending children to schools.
- Basic healthcare facilities are provided in the settlement by UNHCR partners, which neighbouring host communities are also able to access; however, drug procurement for health centres is often delayed by several months owing to UNHCR's centralized procurement process.
- The sanitation and hygiene component of WASH has ensured that there was no public health crisis in the camps; however, costly water trucking has continued for the past two years as UNHCR has been unable to develop an appropriate strategy for water.

Detailed findings

Urban refugees

FGDs with urban refugees in Luanda showed a lack of support from UNHCR and other organizations on documentation issues, livelihoods and education. Urban refugees have very limited access to education

⁴⁵ *Areas of Inquiry 1: What have been the results in the areas of assistance, protection and solutions as achieved by the UNHCR country operation in the past three to five years? Under what conditions has UNHCR achieved these results, and what have been the most important contextual and operational factors/decisions contributing to or impeding achievement of these results?*

beyond primary schools; for admission to high school and higher education an Angolan identity card is needed, which refugees do not have (5 of 7 FGDs; 2 interviews, Luanda). Although legally refugee children are entitled to education, discrimination and bullying of refugee children in schools is reported to be rampant, discouraging many children from attending schools, even at primary level. Urban refugees also face discrimination in finding employment or accessing livelihoods – their lack of determined status and access/support to the registration process further compounds this. Employers do not hire refugees, and credit facilities are not available for those holding refugee identification. KIIs with UNHCR staff indicated that UNHCR had taken this up with GoA several times, to no effect.

Funding challenges aside, since 2017 UNHCR’s focus has shifted from urban areas to providing assistance to the Kasai refugees. Until 2015–2016, UNHCR provided assistance in vocational activities, but all support to livelihoods and vocational training was subsequently stopped owing to lack of resources, and vocational training was to be mainstreamed into the national opportunities available in the country. This has been unrealistic, as opportunities are limited and refugees are discriminated against. UNHCR partner, JRS, supports some especially vulnerable people with a rent subsidy, but often the payment comes late, causing inconvenience to families.⁴⁶ Luanda refugees theoretically have access to public healthcare, but the quality of such services generally remains poor, according to all Luanda focus groups (7) and local partner staff. Sometimes, when JRS is approached for assistance in especially vulnerable cases, medicines arrive months late and very little direct assistance is received from UNHCR in this regard.

Kasai refugees

On the whole, UNHCR and GoA have been able to avert any escalation in morbidity and mortality among the Kasai refugee population. Interviews with UNHCR staff, health partners and health officials indicated that there had not been any disease outbreak in the refugee population, and morbidity and mortality patterns remain the same as in the local population, though no precise data on this was available. There was a risk of high morbidity when refugees were sheltered in transit camps, which were overcrowded, but timely action by all humanitarian agencies helped overcome this risk.

UNHCR has successfully undertaken the complex task of creating a new settlement in a short time in difficult circumstances and moved over 22,000 refugees from overcrowded transit centres where GoA initially accommodated the refugees. In September 2017, GoA allocated forest land in remote areas of Lóvua municipality, 95 km from Dundo, the provincial capital of Lunda Norte. UNHCR cleared the land and, with its partners, set up temporary shelters, and by October 2017 had started relocating refugees from the transit centres. The process of transfer of the refugees from transit centres to the settlement was complex, both because the settlement was built in a thick forested area without any infrastructure and also because of challenges⁴⁷ in hiring some of the services to support construction of the settlement.

⁴⁶ The ET interrogated this further with the Operation. Their response was that they have had discussions with the partner and are looking to synchronise disbursements in anticipation of future rental payments

⁴⁷ UNHCR had difficulty hiring bulldozers to clear the land as, according to a number of UNHCR staff, some officials warned bulldozer operators against working with UNHCR in Lóvua. According to these key informants, GoA allocated land as it was coming under pressure from international organizations to ensure proper infrastructure for refugee settlements

Responding to needs, UNHCR has assisted refugee families to upgrade their shelter through an owner-driven approach, which has ensured a flexible response. In the past year, as shelters (which were temporary, initially) began to wear out, UNHCR has provided shelter materials for households to build /upgrade their own shelters/houses according to their own choice of design. UNHCR aims to support 2,200 shelters (nearly 50 percent of total shelters) this year; so far, 600 have been built and 135 families have been assisted with UNHCR Refugee Housing Units.⁴⁸ While the owner-driven approach has ensured that people had the flexibility to use the shelter material provided according to a design of their choice, KIIs with partners and UNHCR indicated that there were no clear criteria for targeting or prioritizing people for this support; it is left to individual households to approach UNHCR. For highly vulnerable people, UNHCR has also - since early this year - introduced Refugee Housing Units (RHU) which are prefabricated units that were being installed at the time of the evaluation.

Food provided to refugees has been adequate in quantity,⁴⁹ though not in terms of food diversity. The WFP, who UNHCR partners, provides regular food to all registered and 'active' refugees through a monthly food basket consisting of maize meal, pulses, oil and salt. Supplementary feeding (Super Cereal Plus) is distributed to all children aged 6–23 months and all pregnant and lactating women for the prevention of acute malnutrition.⁵⁰ All FGDs and interviews (3 FGD, 10 individual interviews) with Kasai refugees and partner interviews suggested that refugees had been dissatisfied by the lack of diversity and access to food availability. To address this issue – and the wider issue of employment – in September 2018 UNHCR and WFP commissioned a livelihood assessment, jointly with World Vision, Lutheran World Federation and the local Government in Lóvua municipality, covering the refugee settlement and the neighbouring communities. Farming was identified as the primary means for improving the livelihoods of refugees in Lunda Norte. Around 5,000 refugee households were allocated 25 m x 25 m plots of land in Lóvua refugee settlement, of which 500 have been selected by UNHCR for assistance (training and inputs like seeds and fertilizers) to develop and grow crops like cassava, sweet potato, pumpkin and corn. So far, 200 families have been covered, according to UNHCR staff. The beneficiaries include 30 host families. It is reported that, apart from the families allotted farming land, each household has a small piece of kitchen garden adjoining their house/shelter where they can grow vegetables.

The scope and scale of the livelihoods programme has been limited and vulnerability was not a criterion in selection of beneficiaries. The ET was unable to visit the camps or talk to the beneficiaries of this programme. As mentioned above, of the estimated 5,000 households, only 200 have been assisted so far. Several (6 of 10) individual interviews with community members and 2 FGDs showed a lack of clarity on selection criteria for the livelihood activities; according to UNHCR and partner staff, selection of beneficiaries was carried out on the basis of whether initiative and interest in the programme was shown by the potential beneficiaries. During a brief visit at inception stage, the ET noted the feasibility of bee-keeping in the area; this was confirmed in a number of interviews during the main mission. Local business development through setting up groceries and shops was another activity that came up in most of the community FGDs; both refugee and host communities strongly articulated the benefit of having competition among shops to bring down prices, which are generally very high in the area owing to lack of market infrastructure. It is unclear why, apart from farming, UNHCR did not consider diversified activities, as this would have enabled inclusion of those who do not have much interest in farming. Although availability of funding may be an issue here, this may also owe in no small part to capacity issues among

⁴⁸ UNHCR, Norwegian Church Aid, World Vision, 2019, *Shelter in Lóvua Settlement*

⁴⁹ A daily ration equivalent to 2,100 kcal per person per day is provided, which is in accordance with Sphere standards

⁵⁰ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

partners and staff, as KIIs indicated. A global study of UNHCR's livelihoods programming notes similar issues in other countries, affecting the effectiveness, sustainability and reach of interventions.⁵¹

On education, UNHCR has successfully partnered with GoA in obtaining the latter's support in running schools and approval of the use of the national school curriculum. Initially, the education facilities provided by UNHCR and partners in settlements were informal schools. With sustained advocacy by UNHCR and its partner, ADPP, the Ministry of Education (MoE) recognized these as approved primary schools (three), using the Angolan curriculum. The provincial education authorities provided 20 teachers and the partner hires 16 trainee teachers. The three schools cater to 4,200 students. The schools also hire 22 refugees as assistant teachers to support translation into local languages. Besides formal schools, the partner runs a literacy programme in Lóvua settlement for adults. In future, the plan is to start pre-schools as well. FGDs with teachers pointed to an increase in dropout rates in the past few months. Teachers (7 participants in 1 FGD), education officials (2) and partner interviews suggested that not having a school feeding programme or provision of text books, which parents find it difficult to buy, acts as a disincentive for parents sending children to schools. Resource constraints, however, did not allow UNHCR and its partner to address this well-accepted need.

Refugees have access to basic healthcare in the camps, which is also accessible to host communities; however, medicine shortages have arisen as a result of UNHCR's centralized procurement procedure. UNHCR's partner, MdM, provides primary and basic healthcare in the settlements through two clinics. Most patients can be treated in the clinics; those who cannot are referred to the district hospital. Delivery cases are also handled at the clinics. Interviews with host communities indicated that the latter were able to access the health clinics, though distance is a factor; usually, host communities attend one clinic, which is located close to them. Interviews (6 of 10) with refugees indicated that the services could not cope with demand; patients have to wait several hours to be attended.⁵² At the clinics, medicines are in short supply, as drug procurement is mostly delayed by several months owing to UNHCR's centralized procurement process, according to the partner managing the clinics; all drugs must be procured by UNHCR headquarters to ensure quality control.

The sanitation and hygiene components of WASH interventions have been effective; however, provision of water in the settlements has been a challenge. A knowledge, attitudes and practice survey was conducted in November 2017 to develop a hygiene promotion strategy and define the messages to use during sensitization. In each village, eight communal latrines, eight communal showers and two garbage pits have been constructed. The average is 45 persons per latrine and shower. To maintain these communal facilities, daily workers are recruited and paid. WASH committees have been created and trained to support the construction of family latrines and the maintenance of communal facilities which would have contributed to the success of the programme to a large extent. All these hygiene efforts will have contributed to good management of public health issues as reflected in the low morbidity pattern reported by the health partner and Government health officials. On water provisioning, reports show that the average volume of water delivered has been consistently low, between 10 and 15 litres per person per day, far below Sphere standards of 20 litres per person in refugee settings. People have to walk several kilometres to get water from the river to meet their daily needs, and often the water is not potable. Interviews with partner staff, a number of UNHCR staff and group discussions with community members (5 KII and 3 FGDs)

⁵¹ UNHCR and TANGO International, 2018, *Global Report December 2018, Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches*

⁵² It is understood that health staff commute every day between Dundo and Lóvua and, for security reasons, they are required to leave the camps early afternoon to return to Dundo

interviews confirmed that UNHCR's response on water provisioning had been *ad hoc*, without a long-term strategy. Water trucking has continued for the past two years at huge cost as UNHCR has failed to develop an appropriate strategy for water, partly because of lack of effective coordination with UNICEF and partly because of poor technical capacity. There have not been adequate efforts to explore with partners various feasible options, for example small community bore wells and piping water from surface water sources. UNHCR developed a water strategy in 2017 which was found to be inappropriate⁵³, and subsequently an attempt was made to partner with UNICEF, which did not come to fruition.

3.1.2. Protection

Main findings

- For long-term refugees, the key challenge is the lack of implementation of the 2015 Refugee Law, denying them basic rights they are otherwise entitled to. In the absence of registration and up-to-date documentation, UNHCR's actions have had limited effect in terms of the protection of refugees and asylum seekers.
- Registration of Kasai refugees has been fraught, as the process did not have a thorough vetting system.
- Access to support on SGBV remains a challenge, especially for urban refugees as law enforcement officials do not take these incidents seriously.
- Limited progress has been made with regard to mixed migration issues, as legal and policy framework not yet in place.

Detailed findings

For the long-term refugees, the key challenge is the lack of implementation of the 2015 Refugee Law, denying them basic rights they are otherwise entitled to. As there is no registration or status determination process, no renewal of documents for recognized refugees, and no issuance of new documents for asylum seekers, refugees are at serious risk of refoulement and/or detention, as well as denied refugee rights, including access to health services, employment and education. UNHCR has attempted to support GoA on implementation of the 2015 law, and specifically to undertake a registration exercise for refugees and asylum seekers in Luanda. In 2018, GoA confirmed that it would collaborate with UNHCR on refugee registration using ProGres V4/PRIMES.⁵⁴ Identity cards would then be issued. UNHCR provided V4 training for GoA officials.⁵⁵ However, movement of this stalled thereafter as officials were occupied with Operação Transparência, and there is now shrinking protection space owing to arbitrary detentions, forced return, etc. The legal vacuum on Refugee Law means that the legal status of 35,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Lunda Norte is uncertain.⁵⁶

In the absence of registration and up-to-date documentation, UNHCR's actions have had limited effect in terms of the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. The protection scenario in Angola is complex. As mentioned earlier, the GoA stopped all forms of registration, including renewal of expired documents, in 2014–2015, except for the *Kasai* refugees, for whom registration was allowed during April–July in 2017. This has left thousands of refugees, asylum seekers and children born to them without any legally valid documents. Refugees are under constant threat and are not allowed to move freely or to have their own businesses. All the 17 group

⁵³ Staff informed the ET that borehole drilling was initially undertaken – this was later found out to not be the most effective option.

⁵⁴ It is UNHCR's information tool for management of PoC database.

⁵⁵ UNHCR Angola, 2018 COP

⁵⁶ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

discussions with PoC communities conducted by the ET and most of the KIIs confirmed the hardship and suffering of the former owing to the absence of an ongoing registration process. Law enforcement officials arbitrarily detain urban refugees in Luanda, and banks or schools do not honour documents (expired refugee cards, asylum application cards) they may have. The same goes for urban refugees in the border province of Dundo. Even the camp population in Lóvua who hold valid refugee cards (proof of registration documents issued by UNHCR with GoA logo) issued by GoA face regular harassment and detention when they move out of the camps. At least in the camps, people have some support from UNHCR, which assisted its partner (JRS) in setting up protection hubs to report problems; previously, there were four such hubs, but budget constraints mean these have now been discontinued, though a JRS lawyer visits camps two to three times every week. In Luanda, four of the six FGDs revealed dissatisfaction with JRS legal assistance, which is often late and inadequate.

Registration of Kasai refugees in 2017 has been fraught, as the process lacked a thorough vetting system.

Some Congolese nationals who were in the country as economic migrants, mostly working illegally in diamond mines, also found their way into the transit camps and subsequently Lóvua settlement, and were able to get themselves registered as refugees. As the registration process was handled by GoA and UNHCR jointly, an overwhelmingly large section of stakeholders interviewed by the ET lay a greater share of blame on UNHCR for not putting in place a rigorous verification system; GoA's capacity was known to be limited all along, and UNHCR was seen as the expert. UNHCR states that the process of verification was complicated by the fact that there were children and women arriving separately as many had been separated from their families while making the journey; the latter were genuine refugees who needed protection but may have arrived after GoA closed registration in July 2017. As protection of the vulnerable was the main focus, a small number of migrants may have taken advantage of the registration opportunity. KIIs indicated a strong perception within GoA and NGO partners that UNHCR had conflated refugee protection with protection of other vulnerable Congolese (migrants in particular). The evaluation found that though the number may be relatively small (there are no precise numbers of such cases, but NGOs working in camps suggest it could be a few hundred), in a context where refugee issues are politically sensitive, and this may have contributed to, or been used as a pretext for, GoA's reluctance to open the registration process.

Besides the issues related to registration which impinge on the protection and rights of refugees and asylum seekers, SGBV is a key issue both in the Lóvua camps and among urban refugees in Luanda.

In Lunda Norte, as of January 2019,⁵⁷ an average of 25 cases of sexual abuse and violence were reported per month against refugee women and girls, while child protection-related incidences were rampant, with between 10 and 20 cases reported on a weekly basis, mostly related to neglect and physical abuse, and occasionally early marriage and sexual abuse. FGDs suggested that forced sex, sex for survival and domestic violence were rampant among the Luanda refugee population – four of the six FGDS conducted in Luanda had at least one or more women who had been victims of SGBV, and claimed to have had very little support in their cases. UNHCR has been providing awareness sessions in communities on SGBV and UNHCR partner, JRS, has a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in place to follow up on each reported case. Access to support on SGBV by UNHCR partners may be improving now and since late 2017, MdM has been working with JRS and UNFPA to provide psychosocial support to victims of SGBV.⁵⁸ The latest data provided by UNHCR at the time of the evaluation show that during the first quarter of 2019, the SGBV team provided counselling to 187 cases identified, among which were 83 cases of rape, 4 sexual assault, 41 physical aggressions and 6 forced marriages.

⁵⁷ UNHCR, 2018, *The Democratic Republic of Congo Regional Refugee Response Plan January 2019–December 2020*

⁵⁸ UNHCR, MdM, JRS, *Leaflet on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Lóvua Settlement*

Limited progress has been made with regard to mixed migration issues. As discussed in the context section (Section 2.1), mixed migration flow has been a key concern for GoA. In 2015, the SADC, of which Angola is a member, adopted the regional mixed migration action plan; however, engagement on this front by GoA as well as UNHCR and IOM has been limited.⁵⁹ It was reported⁶⁰ in 2018 that GoA was drafting a new migration policy; KILs with GoA officials indicated that the policy is still not in place and a coherent strategy or legal framework to deal with the growing phenomenon of mixed migration is yet to evolve.

3.1.3. Enhancing Government Capacity vis-à-vis Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Mixed Migrants

Main findings

- Despite strong international commitments and national policies, implementation of these lag behind. Capacity of GoA officials to administer various mechanisms, procedures and administrative infrastructure relevant to refugee protection is weak at field level.
- UNHCR has facilitated the creation of an inter-ministerial group on developing a statelessness plan, which will work with the ICGLR team, but lack of staff in the ICGLR Secretariat means not much progress has been made yet. GoA is now in the process of ratifying the ICGLR Convention which offers scope to work with them in identifying population groups at risk of statelessness and developing action plans.
- UNHCR and partners have provided training and capacity building support to GoA at central and provincial level on legal and refugee protection issues which have created awareness of various tools and international standards. However, these have not led to changes in behaviour or actions on the ground due to a lack of political commitment.

Detailed findings

Despite strong international commitments, national policies and implementation of these lag behind.

Besides being a signatory to the 1951 Convention and Related Protocol, Angola has in recent years signed up to the GCR and the ICGLR Convention on Statelessness, thus providing a strong legal framework for the country. However, the consequences of the revocation of Law 8/90 and the delay in implementation of the new Law 10/15⁶¹ on registration of asylum applications and management of data on recognized refugees have already been mentioned. The old law afforded asylum seekers the right to work; under the new law asylum seekers are not allowed to work. Children of refugees and asylum seekers are unable to access secondary education because the national education system requires them to have an Angolan identity card. Previously, COREDA would issue a declaration that was accepted as an endorsing document; since the new body set up in 2018 is still not fully functional, children cannot obtain such a declaration and consequently face many obstacles to enrolling in school, according to FGDs.

One of UNHCR country operation's emphasis has been on ongoing engagement with GoA and assisting it in developing capacity in relevant areas related to national and international laws and conventions, as well as in implementation of these in line with international best practices. In this regard, UNHCR has built a partnership

⁵⁹ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

⁶⁰ UNHCR Angola, 2018 COP

⁶¹ UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Family and Promotion of Women (MASFAMU) and the Service for Migration and Foreigners (SME), as well as the Ministry of External Affairs at central and provincial levels. UNHCR is also actively engaged with the Ministry of Justice on prevention of statelessness, and the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health at provincial level in Lunda Norte,⁶² all of which enabled UNHCR's successful advocacy on statelessness, support for schools and health programmes discussed above and registration of refugee children which the Government has agreed to restart. At the operational level, the capacity of officials to administer various mechanisms and procedures relevant to refugee protection is weak. During Operação Transparência, officials were not familiar with the validity of refugee cards and other documents, which led to unlawful actions against *bona fide* refugees, according to key informants (partners and UNHCR staff). As GoA had not previously experienced a mass influx of refugees, despite its political commitment to allow Kasai refugees in, it lacked the practical capacity to deal with those it welcomed in 2017.⁶³ For instance, at the field level, law enforcement officials lack the basic infrastructural support to do their job: in Lóvua, for instance, police officials have limited mobility owing to lack of transport; UNHCR has provided three motorcycles (and fuel) to enable them to do their jobs in refugee camps.

UNHCR's engagement with GoA facilitated ratification of the ICGLR Action Plan on statelessness.

Considering the difficulties faced by foreigners in general and refugees in particular in registering their children born in Angola, the potential for *de facto* statelessness exists, according to UNHCR specialist key informants. This was also noted in the UNHCR COP 2016.⁶⁴ UNHCR has been actively engaging with different ministries (the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on taking forward the ICGLR Convention on Statelessness and, according to key informants, UNHCR's advocacy through workshops and meetings contributed to GoA beginning the process of ratification of the same in 2019. The ICGLR Convention lays out a common regional approach with a view to ratifying and implementing the UN Conventions on Statelessness; harmonizing corresponding national legislation and norms; and providing identity documents to refugees and internally displaced persons, enabling them to access basic services and enjoy their human rights in the Great Lakes Region. Member states have committed to ending statelessness in their countries by 2024. The ICGLR, in collaboration with UNHCR and the African Union, will assist Member States in preparation for their adoption of the aforementioned UN Conventions on Statelessness and their domestication into national legislation.⁶⁵ In Angola, the ICGLR Action Plan has already been approved by the Council of Ministers, and will have to be approved in the Assembly of the Republic before being promulgated by the president. UNHCR has also facilitated development of a National Statelessness Plan, and an inter-ministerial group has been created. The focal points in various ministries were to be trained by the ICGLR team but a lack of staff in the ICGLR Secretariat means UNHCR intends to do this in the coming months. Once approved by the president, a detailed action plan identifying different vulnerable groups in the country will need to be drawn up. This offers scope to work with the GoA in identifying population groups at risk of statelessness and develop action plans.

Training and technical capacity building have created awareness of various tools and international standards. However, these have not led to changes in behaviour or actions on the ground. UNHCR and partners have provided training and capacity building support to GoA at central and provincial level (Lunda Norte) on legal and refugee protection issues. This has ranged from training of law enforcement bodies, the SME, the detention police and private security companies on domestic violence law; training of SME staff in Luanda on

⁶² UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

⁶³ UNHCR, 2017, *UNHCR's Emergency Response in Angola: A Real-Time Review*, September

⁶⁴ UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

⁶⁵ ICGLR Secretariat, *Action Plan of the ICGLR on the Eradication of Statelessness, 2017–2019*

refugee protection; orientation of journalists, Government communication staff on refugee protection; training of police officers on RSD and document recognition (jointly with JRS); and a conference for parliamentarians and the Ministry of Justice on statelessness. To familiarize GoA officials with UNHCR registration tools, a number of senior GoA staff were sent on an orientation visit to Pretoria. A workshop was also organized for SME staff in Dundo to train them in the use of UNHCR registration tools. Working with IOM, UNHCR provided training to SME staff on border management and Refugee Law.⁶⁶ However, a lack of political will means all these technical capacities have not been translated into action. The GoA has been reluctant to undertake systematic RSD and registration, including registration of births of refugee children and asylum seekers, according to over two-thirds of key informants, community interviews and FGDs with refugee communities. As discussed earlier, despite training of SME and law enforcement officials on refugee rights and registration methods, treatment of refugees has remained the same. With the refugee file shifted to the Ministry of Interior after enactment of the 2015 Refugee Law, refugee and asylum issues are treated as matters of internal security. Although a new RSD body (replacing COREDA) was formed in late 2018, nearly three years since the new Refugee Law was enacted this is still not functioning properly and registration has not commenced; however, at the time of the evaluation mission, it was reported that GoA had, as mentioned above, decided to restart registration of children born to refugees and asylum seekers, possibly with an eye to facilitating their return in the coming weeks.

⁶⁶ UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

3.1.4. Contextual and Operational Factors Affecting Results

Main findings

- Ensuring the protection and wellbeing of PoC is hamstrung by the policy and political environment in the country and a difference of opinion between GoA over UNHCR's registration process. UNHCR's conventional engagement with GoA on the rights of PoC at technical level is having limited effect.
- As UNHCR was closing down its office when the Kasai crisis erupted, it took the organization off-guard, and time was required to re-capacitate the country operation, with focus shifted from the protracted urban refugees' situation.
- Delayed deployment of qualified staff, frequent staff changes and lack of a proper handover process led to discontinuity and affected the quality of interventions.
- The phase down decision reflected weak risk analysis, especially in the context of UNHCR's limited staff deployment capacity for rapid response.
- Several aspects of internal systems and processes, and a lack of harmonization among partners on cross-cutting issues, such as AAP, SGBV and gender equality, especially as partners use different approaches, has affected the operation's timeliness and efficiency. Evidence from KIIs showed that communication with operational partners has been top-down and funds transfer often delayed.

Detailed findings

Contextual factors

Ensuring the protection and wellbeing of PoC is hamstrung by the policy and political environment in the country. Irregular migration related to illegal diamond mining has shaped GoA's approach to how it deals with mixed migration, refugees and asylum seekers, which are all conflated in the public debate and in GoA actions.⁶⁷ The GoA rhetoric often frames refugees and asylum seekers as illegal economic migrants, causing tension between the local population and the PoC. As discussed previously, the lack of registration means poor documentation, hence extreme legal vulnerability of the asylum seekers and of refugees with expired refugee cards. The GoA believes that, during the refugee registration process in 2017, the UNHCR system was permeable to the entry of illegal migrants, and since then its stance on refugee and PoC documentation has hardened to freeze all registration until the present, according to external key informants and UNHCR internal documents.

Amid growing xenophobic trends, UNHCR's conventional engagement with GoA on the rights of PoC at technical level is having limited effect. Several key informants observed broader social dynamics of growing xenophobia in social and political discourse,⁶⁸ akin to what has been gripping Europe and North America, in a number of African countries, which have themselves been refugee-producing countries until recently.⁶⁹ KIIs indicated that UNHCR and the different partners were doing very limited work to influence this growing social trend and political thinking. The new Government has been attempting to change this but the system is still very

⁶⁷ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

⁶⁸ ODI research (H. Dempster and K. Hargrave, 2017, *Understanding Public Attitudes Towards Refugees and Migrants, Working Paper 512, 2017*) cites a 2016 Ipsos MORI poll covering 22 countries that found a substantial proportion of respondents uncomfortable with current levels of immigration. Overall, approximately half of respondents agreed with the proposition 'there are too many immigrants in our country'. Just one in five respondents agreed that immigration had a positive impact on their country, while almost half agreed it was causing their country to change in ways they did not like. Just under half disagreed with closing their country's borders entirely to refugees, but a sizeable proportion – over one-third – agreed with the proposition

⁶⁹ World Bank, 2017, *Forcibly Displaced: Towards a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts*

bureaucratic, with most decisions highly centralized at the level of the president. Advocacy engagements at technical and even ministerial level do not often go far, according to KIIs, and UNHCR's engagement at the highest level remains limited.

In terms of service provision, the local authorities have limited capacity to provide quality services and assistance to the population, both to its own nationals and PoC. A sharp fall in oil prices on the international market since 2015 has sharply reduced the state budget, affecting expenditure on social sectors.⁷⁰ In Lóvua UNHCR has been able to give limited assistance to local authorities to support basic services like education and healthcare, however resources constraints are not able to fully fill the gap.

Operational factors

With a substantially scaled-down presence owing to phase down, the Kasai crisis forced UNHCR to shift its focus from urban refugees to dealing with the new refugee influx, affecting the protection of long-term refugees. During 2014–2015, one major component of the country operation was focused on repatriation of Angolan refugees from DRC, Republic of Congo and Zambia, and in 2016, the country operation was in a winding down mode. The decision to dismantle the operation in the country was, according to most respondents and the conclusions of previous internal reviews, rushed and failed to take due account of the lack of capacity of GoA and local authorities. The GoA and partners were also concerned about UNHCR's move to transfer representational responsibilities to the regional office.⁷¹ This decision left the country operation with a residual operational capacity to deal with a very significant caseload of urban refugees and unable to respond in a timely way to the 2017 refugee crisis. There was no business continuity plan to ensure current activities – focused principally on advocacy and the urban caseload – were unimpeded.⁷² With Lóvua becoming the focus, the emerging strategy focused on refugees in settlements in Dundo and Lóvua 'to the detriment of urban refugee protection'.⁷³

Delayed deployment of qualified staff has been a challenge in 'rebuilding' the staff team. UNHCR did have early warning of the Kasai crisis and the possibility of refugees arriving, but at the time of the crisis UNHCR Angola's capacity was limited to running only one protection project through JRS in Luanda.⁷⁴ Different UN agencies, including UNFPA, WFP and UNICEF, activated the L3 emergency level in response to the crisis. The GoA provided the initial response and then UNHCR mobilized and deployed staff beginning May 2017. Deployment of senior staff, including for representation and protection, took weeks, and inadequately qualified staff were sent to play crucial roles: the first representative sent on a short-term deployment had no Portuguese language skills and could not engage with GoA. During the first eight weeks after the arrival of the refugees, UNHCR had three different representatives.

Frequent UNHCR staff changes owing to short-term contracts have affected partners' ability to deliver programmes as each staff change has brought about a change in approach, creating uncertainties for partners in sustained delivery and monitoring of activities on the ground. KIIs with UNHCR and partner staff pointed to a lack of

⁷⁰ UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

⁷¹ F. Groot and S. Deardorff Miller, 2018, *Evaluation of UNHCR's Country Operations in Angola, Botswana and Namibia: Assessment of Phasing Down UNHCR Presence During the Period 2012–2016, Full Report, June*

⁷² UNHCR, 2018, *Detailed Report of an Audit of the Operations in Angola for the UNHCR, IAD:OIOS-2018-00884, 30 May*

⁷³ UNHCR, 2017, *UNHCR's Emergency Response in Angola: A Real-Time Review, September*

⁷⁴ F. Groot and S. Deardorff Miller, 2018, *Evaluation of UNHCR's Country Operations in Angola, Botswana and Namibia: Assessment of Phasing Down UNHCR Presence During the Period 2012–2016, Full Report, June*

a consistent handover process during staff changes, leading to the loss of valuable institutional memory. This has affected quality, for example in the construction of schools or WASH facilities. WASH programming has particularly been affected by a lack of sustained technical support and lack of consistent leadership in this area. This has also affected relationship-building with GoA.⁷⁵

The phase down decision reflected weak risk analysis, especially in the context of UNHCR's limited staff deployment capacity for rapid response. UNHCR does not have a focal point for emergency preparedness and response in the region. Technical expertise on disaster management is located in the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply at headquarters, which has a support service and advisory function, also with limited deployment capacity. This may be an important issue to bear in mind, especially in countries like Angola, which (beside being wound down) did not have any experience of handling an emergency response at least in the previous 10–15 years. This lack of preparedness in countries that may not be directly crisis-prone also raises a question about UNHCR's risk analysis approach: a proactive risk management would have considered the fact that, even though Angola has been a country at peace, multiple crises have been looming across its borders for many years. All KIIs and documents show that the rationale for winding down Angola was not based on any risk analysis, and was simply an attempt to cut costs.⁷⁶ There appear to be no clear criteria for closing down an office, or, should an emergency arise, how this will be dealt with. Although regionalization is still a work in progress, concerns were raised at both country and regional level as to how the process pans out, as there appears to be a lack of clarity whether or not regionalization will be accompanied by decentralization and a delegation of authority.

Several issues around internal systems and processes have also affected the operation's timeliness and efficiency. UNHCR's system for procurement of drugs, which is centralized in headquarters, delays the supply of medicines for health interventions. It is understood that MdM, the health interventions partner, is not included in UNHCR's register of partners allowed to undertake direct procurement. The handover process between partners was also mentioned as a limitation of the operation, with miscommunication between UNHCR and the implementing partners. According to some partners interviewed, the transfer of responsibilities between programmes (annually) is not always optimally managed, leaving room for discontinuity and an associated loss of effectiveness. UNHCR systems are often not aligned with programme objectives and timelines: programme duration is usually for one year: proposals are submitted in December; outcomes are communicated in February–March, when implementation can commence; mid-year review is in June–July but decisions on adjustment of the budget are communicated by September; and all project activities are to be completed by December.

Evidence from KIIs showed that communication with operational partners has been top-down and funds transfer often delayed. Though UNHCR formally conveys its decision on partners' proposals, these are often terse, according to two of the seven partners; partners expect more open feedback, especially where they have been involved in implementing a specific programme of activities in the immediate past. Fund transfers to partners have also not always been timely, creating difficulties in terms of planning and implementation of activities.

Partner interviews pointed to a lack of harmonization among partners in cross-cutting issues, such as AAP, SGBV and gender equality, especially as partners use different approaches. Human and financial

⁷⁵ UNHCR, 2018, *Detailed Report of an Audit of the Operations in Angola for the UNHCR*, IAD:OIOS-2018-00884, 30 May; UNHCR, 2017, *UNHCR's Emergency Response in Angola: A Real-Time Review*, September

⁷⁶ F. Groot and S. Deardorff Miller, 2018, *Evaluation of UNHCR's Country Operations in Angola, Botswana and Namibia: Assessment of Phasing Down UNHCR Presence During the Period 2012–2016*, Full Report, June

resources dedicated to gender are also very limited, with staffing of just one full-time post, and a very small budget for gender mainstreaming.⁷⁷

3.1.5. Evidence, Learning and Adaptive Programming

Main findings

- UNHCR has been weak on tracking the outputs and outcomes of its operation, although some positive changes are beginning to emerge.
- Lessons and good practices are not systematically distilled and shared.

Detailed findings

A study of key documents and progress reports shows that UNHCR has been weak on tracking the outputs and outcomes of its operation. Secondary data on progress on various activities appears to be limited and focused on performance indicators listed in the UNHCR Results Framework.⁷⁸ Partner reporting is activity-oriented, using these indicators, without a coherent analysis of results or outcome. KIIs with UNHCR staff in Angola confirmed that their reporting and monitoring system is all geared to tracking activities, and only rarely are outputs and outcomes brought into discussions. The ET observed that in discussions with staff or in progress reports, what are labelled outputs (number of workshops, number of publications) are in fact activities. Commenting on this, a Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report earlier this year observed that UNHCR has a short-term approach to programming, and lacks linkages between results and strategic vision.⁷⁹ KIIs in UNHCR headquarters indicated that UNHCR had been working on this and a new results framework, which will emphasize outputs, outcomes and impact.

Field staff and partner interviews showed that lessons and good practices are not systematically distilled and shared. UNHCR's meetings with partners, which are regular, generally focus on updates and information exchange, and seldom on sharing lessons. Interviews with senior country staff suggest that regional planning meetings are more geared for exchange of information, rather than comparing notes to learn from each country's experience. The only space for discussion on lessons may be in the COP, but the primary emphasis remains on action plan and budgeting. The MOPAN assessment referred to earlier notes a limited use of lessons learnt from previous evaluations to inform programme designs – this may be changing in recent years as attempts are made to ensure evaluation findings are used to amend or adapt interventions. For example, at the country level during 2019, UNHCR encouraged partners to focus on their areas of specialization, based on experience from the past two years, which has led to some reshuffling of partners working on different thematic areas.

⁷⁷ MOPAN, 2019, 2017–18 Assessments, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February

⁷⁸ UNHCR Results Framework (undated)

⁷⁹ MOPAN, 2019, 2017–18 Assessments, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February

3.2. Strategic Positioning⁸⁰

3.2.1. Strategic Approach and Relevance

Main findings

- UNHCR coordinated well with UN agencies and others in Angola on their actions for refugees and asylum seekers, and is attempting to apply the CRRF approach for the refugee response.
- The financial limitations of the Angola operation mean the core operation remains small and sketchy and the strategic priorities identified by the office are only partially covered within the OL.
- Having taken the lead on support to Kasai refugees, UNHCR was able to mobilize resources, which enabled it to meet the minimum basic needs of the refugee population.
- UNHCR ensured that its response is based on systematic needs assessments from time to time, though disaggregation of data presents a mixed picture: while there are age- and gender-disaggregated data for the Kasai refugees, identification of women and men with disabilities, minority groups and LGBT have not been attempted and these do not comprise a specific target group.
- UNHCR and partners demonstrated flexibility adjusting their initial plans to respond to the changing needs in the Lóvua settlement.
- In a fast-evolving crisis, UNHCR has not demonstrated its preparedness to anticipate scenarios and plan ahead before events unfold.

Detailed findings

UNHCR's distinctive role, coverage and proportionality

UNHCR coordinated well with UN agencies and others in Angola on their actions for refugees and asylum seekers. UNHCR is fully engaged with UN processes and participates in the UNCT,⁸¹ including taking a lead role for the UNCT in emergency preparedness and contingency planning for the DRC situation, and works closely with the Disaster Management Team to respond to possible emergencies, according to key informants. Before the Kasai crisis, UNHCR chaired the working group on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework objective on governance and human rights. The UN Cluster system is not activated in the country, but thematic/sectoral groups are functional. Throughout the emergency, UNHCR co-chaired with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Reinsertion interagency meetings at capital level and in Dundo. Since April 2017, a system similar to the Refugee Coordination Model has been in place. Interagency and sectoral meetings are organized at Dundo on a weekly or bi-weekly basis as needed, and a monthly interagency meeting is held in Luanda to discuss implementation challenges and updates.

Having taken the lead as per its mandate on support to Kasai refugees, UNHCR has been able to mobilize resources, which has enabled it to meet the minimum basic needs of the refugee population for the past two years. Despite persistent complaints of lack diversity of food provided and children's education being in Portuguese, FGDs (3) with refugees showed that overall assistance had been reasonable in terms of food, health,

⁸⁰ *Areas of Inquiry 2: How strategically has UNHCR been positioned within the country context, and what are the key factors driving strategic decision-making? To what extent do the strategy and country operation plan have coherence and/or alignment with the work of other humanitarian/development actors, private sector and civil society actors within the country? How well aligned is the existing UNHCR strategy and country operation plan with the current and/or evolving needs of the population and wider country context?*

⁸¹ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

WASH and education. All stakeholders interviewed by the ET affirmed UNHCR's lead role and gave it credit for the overall assistance to Kasai refugees, though lack of freedom of movement and employment and harassment by law enforcement officials do affect the Kasai refugees.

The financial limitations of the Angola operation mean that the core operation remains small and sketchy and the strategic priorities identified by the office are only partially covered within the OL.⁸² None of the NGO partners has funding for humanitarian activities, other than the support received from UNHCR. After 2015, UNHCR's assistance for urban refugees reduced significantly because of lack of funding, and JRS (the only partner to work on urban refugees) receives very small support to work on legal assistance. Gaps identified during the PNA in November 2016 were not fully included within the OL: although the operation continued to use ProGres to register PoC during PNAs and protection interviews, the COP 2018 noted that the country operation had no financial capacity to support (technically or otherwise) a potential registration or issue of quality documentation campaign by the GoA. Staff interviews showed that funding limitations often constrain strategic actions. For instance, during the current year, the office had planned to recruit, as part of joint programming with the Mozambique office, specialist staff to work on the issue of statelessness; however, the plan – and the idea of joint programming – had to be shelved due to a lack of funding.

Strengthening collective efforts towards protection and durable solutions

UNHCR has begun to take the initiative to apply the CRRF approach in Angola for the refugee response,⁸³ and in search of long-term solutions, UNHCR has begun to roll out elements of nexus between development and humanitarian interventions in the country. In line with the CRRF, a new initiative has been launched on nexus between humanitarian and development interventions, focusing on refugee needs. Following adoption of the CRRF, at the corporate level the UNDP and UNHCR heads of agencies signed a memorandum of understanding on both agencies working closely on nexus in 2018. As a follow up to this, for the Southern Africa/Great Lakes region, and as part of a plan of action for Kasai refugees on operationalizing nexus, a joint project for 2019–2020 has been developed in Angola.⁸⁴ UNDP has so far raised US\$300,000, against the plan target of US\$2 million, and has begun implementing the following activities: entrepreneurship training for Kasai refugees (120); training of police officials on Refugee Law and rights; and peace-building with host communities.⁸⁵ UNHCR has also been actively engaged in a World Bank initiative on social protection to ensure the needs of poor and vulnerable refugees are included in the mechanism when it is set up. UNHCR has also developed a five-year livelihoods strategy⁸⁶ in partnership with WFP. These are all in line with UNHCR's Regional Refugee Response Plan⁸⁷ for the Congolese refugees.⁸⁸

⁸² UNHCR Angola, 2018 COP

⁸³ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

⁸⁴ UNHCR and UNDP, 2019, *Strengthening Local Governance, Social Cohesion and Resilience in Refugee-Hosting Communities in Lunda Norte*, Joint Project Document, February

⁸⁵ The UNDP/UNHCR joint project (January 2019–December 2020) aims to achieve three outputs: (a) refugees are included in local development planning and service provision; (b) refugees and residents in Lóvua are equipped with skills and resources for livelihood development and income generation; and (c) refugees and residents in Lóvua can live peacefully and better integrate into new society

⁸⁶ UNHCR and WFP, *Joint UNHCR and WFP Livelihood and Economic Inclusion Strategy, Angola Operation in Lunda Norte, January 2019–January 2024*

⁸⁷ UNHCR, 2018, *The Democratic Republic of Congo Regional Refugee Response Plan January 2019–December 2020*

⁸⁸ The plan provides an overarching analysis and framework for the response covering Congolese refugees in seven countries of asylum (Angola, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia). One of the objectives is to foster economic self-reliance and durable solutions for refugees, and host communities, by expanding the use of cash assistance, reducing dependency on humanitarian aid and promoting socio-economic growth in line with national and development plans.

UNHCR has ensured that its response is based on systematic needs assessments from time to time. The absence of a registration and verification process for over five years has meant that assessing the scale and extent of needs for UNHCR operations has been a challenge. UNHCR carried out a PNA in 2016, which informed its current approach to urban refugees, mostly living in Luanda. Refugees from countries that have been subject to refugee status cessation (Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda) found themselves in particular difficulty as neither GoA nor UNHCR prioritized them. For the Kasai refugees, UNHCR undertook two participatory assessments, the latest one in partnership with GoA in February 2019.⁸⁹ Besides these, sectoral assessments – namely, a joint assessment on livelihoods with WFP⁹⁰ – were undertaken, allowing UNHCR to adjust the intervention according to the evolving needs and expectations of the refugees. The data collected during this process helped both agencies structure the five-year strategy⁹¹ to improve the livelihoods and promote the financial inclusion of the refugees, aiming at graduating them from complete dependency on food assistance to increased self-reliance. This assessment involved host communities and led the livelihoods programme to develop a specific training programme for the farmers.

Disaggregation of data presents a mixed picture: while there are age- and gender-disaggregated data for the Kasai refugees, identification of women and men with disabilities, minority groups and LGBT has not been attempted and these do not comprise a specific target group and thus there is no data related to them.⁹² In UNHCR (and partners') planning documents and reports, beneficiary data is disaggregated by AGD. However, there appears to be limited awareness among partner staff on AGD policy, specifically with respect to disability which remains unaddressed in the response. The ethnicity of the refugees was not included in the data collected during the biometric registration in July, which means that UNHCR and partners do not necessarily know the ethnicity of individual households.⁹³ It is most likely that the majority of the refugees who arrived in Lunda Norte from April 2017 are of Luba ethnicity. This poses a question regarding peaceful co-existence, as the settlement of Lóvuá is located in a municipality that is predominantly inhabited by people of the Chokwe ethnicity.⁹⁴ Though ethnic conflict has not come out in the open, it should be noted that ethnic tensions between Luba and Chokwe communities represented one of the main causes of the violence in Kasai in March–April 2017. The ET has not been able to examine the issue in depth as it had no access to communities during the evaluation mission, but UNHCR's 2018 COP rightly pointed out that the risk could not be ignored, as some triggers had already been identified on the sharing and use of natural resources in the area.⁹⁵ FGDs during the evaluation pointed to allegations of one particular ethnicity dominating the number of people hired (in paid jobs in the camps, such as security guards or school assistants) by UNHCR and its partners. The inter-ethnic dynamics may be important when planning return and reintegration back home.

There is evidence to show that UNHCR and partners have adjusted their initial plans to respond to changing needs in the Lóvuá settlement. In the health sector, for instance, UNHCR and its partner have developed facilities for dealing with maternity cases. These were initially supposed to be handled at Government health centres, which refugees found difficult (and expensive) to access owing to their long distance from the

⁸⁹ UNHCR, 2016, *Global Trends Report on Forced Displacement*, p. 28

⁹⁰ UNHCR and WFP, *Joint UNHCR and WFP Livelihood and Economic Inclusion Strategy, Angola Operation in Lunda Norte, January 2019–January 2024*

⁹¹ *Contributing to Sustainable Development Goal 2 and the GCR, the strategy encompasses a five-year approach of graduating the refugees from complete dependency on food assistance to increased self-reliance.*

⁹² UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

⁹³ UNHCR took a deliberate decision not to register ethnicity at the time of arrival.

⁹⁴ UNHCR Angola, 2019 COP

⁹⁵ UNHCR Angola, 2018 COP

settlements. Now, the majority of births among the refugee community occur in the Mdm clinics. The shelter strategy had to be readjusted when UNHCR and the implementation partner faced constraints related to the supply of construction materials – and realized that refugees had begun cutting down trees in the forests surrounding the settlement. According to partner interviews the shelter partner introduced brick blocks into the construction and bought brick-making machines, which allowed refugees to produce bricks to build their houses and earn an income by selling bricks. The ET has not seen the work; nor was it able to corroborate the partner’s claims in community FGDs.

UNHCR’s preparedness to anticipate and provide a response has been challenged by a fast-evolving crisis.

As mentioned before, the Kasai crisis took place at a time when UNHCR was scaling down, and it had to ‘rebuild’ itself in Angola to respond to the crisis. Since then, it has provided a multi-sectoral response to meet refugees’ needs. UNHCR finished relocation of refugees to Lóvua in January 2019 and invested in developing a full-fledged education programme from February–April. Suddenly, the situation evolved very fast during the first half of 2019, partly because of GoA’s actions (Operação Transparência, constant threats and fear of unlawful detentions, closure of informal schools in settlements) and partly because of perceived improvements in the situation within DRC. UNHCR made attempts to engage with the GoA and DRC to organize a tripartite meeting on the issues of return. Under pressure from the refugee communities, in May UNHCR carried out an intentions survey, as refugees were keen to return. This created huge expectations for refugees, on the timing of their return to DRC and the terms of the financial support they would get from UNHCR. Communications around the survey were not clear and the process was rushed, setting up unrealistic expectations, aided by rumours of DRC’s newly elected president (who is from Kasai) building settlements for them in Kinshasa. In July, when UNHCR Angola was able to organize a joint mission with UNHCR Congo to the refugee camps, a riot-like situation erupted, as UNHCR could not commit to a precise date when repatriation could start. UNHCR and partners had to withdraw from the camps, suspending all operations, because of the hostile security situation. By the second half of August,⁹⁶ people had already started to return, even without UNHCR support. UNHCR now has to rework its strategy.

3.2.2. Advocacy and Communications

Main findings

- The phasing down of the operation in 2015–2016 had a detrimental effect on UNHCR’s ability to effectively engage with GoA.
- UNHCR Angola has increased its efforts in advocacy, some of which have paid off; however, on complex issues of registration and refugees’/asylum seekers’ rights, UNHCR’s advocacy interventions may have had limited impact on issues of refugee protection, for both external and internal reasons.

⁹⁶ UNHCR, 2019, *Thousands of DR Congo Refugees Head Home to Kasai Region from Angola*, Press Release, 23 August

Detailed findings

The phasing down of the operation in 2015–2016 had a detrimental effect on UNHCR’s ability to effectively engage with the GoA and conveyed a lack of commitment on the part of UNHCR,⁹⁷ which may have cost UNHCR some credibility, especially with GoA. There was no high-level representation when the Kasai refugee crisis began; the regional office also struggled to identify qualified candidates with the required profile or language skills.⁹⁸ Since then UNHCR has been trying to regain the lost footing, according to UNHCR senior officials.

UNHCR Angola has increased its efforts in advocacy, some of which is delivering results. UNHCR’s budget commitments in advocacy activities showed a significant increase in real terms from 2016 to 2017 and this was sustained in 2018.⁹⁹ Advocacy efforts and persistent engagement with GoA has had some success; as mentioned earlier, GoA has agreed this year to open registration of birth for children of refugees and asylum seekers, albeit to ensure refugees have the right documents to facilitate their return (which GoA is pushing for). UNHCR has also successfully advocated with MASFAMU to include vulnerable refugees in a social assistance project funded by the World Bank, which is being rolled out in the next few months. UNHCR is working with the Catholic University and other partners (JRS, Cepami) to create public awareness and education about asylum, statelessness and mixed migration issues. This is especially relevant with regard to the protection of protracted urban refugees, who regularly experience discrimination and stigma (this was particularly evident in our FGDs with this group).¹⁰⁰

UNHCR’s advocacy interventions may have had limited impact on complex issues of refugee protection for both external and internal reasons. A lack of political will which is a legacy of the previous regime was cited frequently (14 key informants, including donors, partners and UNHCR staff). Added to this, on major protection issues, UNHCR’s voice was seen to be muted and ‘soft’, according to several staff and partners. For instance, during Operação Transparência and on several issues of refugees’/asylum seekers’ rights, UNHCR has not been seen to be a strong advocate: engagement has been limited at a technical level, with high-level advocacy being sporadic. Partner interviews pointed to UNHCR not taking advantage of the evidence and information provided by it to develop advocacy messages, or to attempt to involve the former in advocacy. On registration, UNHCR’s own influence on GoA has been limited, yet there is little evidence that it attempted to use embassies and donors in engaging with GoA on this issue. At least two donor representatives interviewed by the ET were not aware that registration was a major issue, or how lack of it affected the overall protection environment – though in response the operation contested this stating that they did engage other donors. UNHCR’s engagement with donors appears to have focused on project funding. There is strong sense among the key informants that UNHCR often tries to be excessively over-cautious in its advocacy, so as not to be seen to be questioning the GoA stance. The real-time review¹⁰¹ in 2017 observed this as well.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ F. Groot and S. Deardorff Miller, 2018, *Evaluation of UNHCR’s Country Operations in Angola, Botswana and Namibia: Assessment of Phasing Down UNHCR Presence During the Period 2012-2016, Full Report, June*

⁹⁸ UNHCR, 2017, *UNHCR’s Emergency Response in Angola: A Real-Time Review, September*

⁹⁹ UNHCR Angola, 2016, 2018, 2019 COPs

¹⁰⁰ UNHCR Angola, 2018 COP

¹⁰¹ UNHCR, 2017, *UNHCR’s Emergency Response in Angola: A Real-Time Review, September*

¹⁰² The review explained this as emerging from unequal power relations and noted, ‘UNHCR feels compelled to accommodate the government’s unilaterally defined positions which may not fully comply with international standards nor represent the best use of resources entrusted to UNHCR for the emergency response.’

3.2.3. International best practices, accountability to affected population and localization

Main findings

- In line with the CRRF, UNHCR has ensured a close working relationship with local authorities and host communities in the Kasai response.
- Progress on AAP has been uneven, as different partners have used different routes, mostly informal, without a coherent approach.
- Localization is a challenging construct in the current context of Angola, and hence UNHCR's approach of partnering with international NGOs has been right.

Detailed findings

In line with the CRRF, UNHCR has ensured a close working relationship with local authorities and host communities in the Kasai response. Relations between host communities and refugees have been cordial, as they live side by side and develop a mutually beneficial relationship based on local trade and exchange. UNHCR has been working closely with host communities and local Government to ensure that, wherever possible, vulnerable host communities have access to minimum basic services in Lóvua. Focus groups (4) with host communities in Lóvua were near-unanimous that, since the arrival of refugees in this under-developed part of Lunda Norte, the local market has flourished, and some in the host communities now have better access to healthcare, water and schools, which they did not have prior to 2017. Host communities expressed their apprehension that, as and when the refugees leave, they stand to lose these benefits. Similar views were echoed by local administration officials, who appreciated UNHCR's support, albeit limited, in supplementing some of their efforts on provision of health, education and water. The main challenge in moving forward on a 'comprehensive offer' in line with the CRRF has been around refugee protection, registration and integration in urban areas.

Progress on AAP has been uneven, as different partners have used different routes, mostly informal, without a coherent approach. UNHCR co-chairs (with ActionAid) the Interagency Standing Committee Task Team on AAP,¹⁰³ including its Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. In the Kasai refugee response, the main strategy of UNHCR and partners with regard to AAP has been to use monthly meetings of community leaders to obtain feedback. FGDs showed that most community leaders were men, and their interactions with members of communities were irregular; some FGDs suggested that leaders were not 'representative' and people had little voice in community meetings, which were dominated by the leaders. Women are leaders among their gender groups and some women have administrative roles within general refugee coordination, but generally communities do not choose women as leaders. Though this was identified by UNHCR as a challenge in 2016,¹⁰⁴ progress in this regard has been slow. This has all limited community members' ability to raise complaints. All partners have what they call 'hotlines', but these are usually personal mobile phones of individual staff which could make systematic monitoring more difficult.

Localization is a challenging construct in the current context of Angola, and UNHCR's approach to partner with international NGOs has been right. UNHCR's programme partners are for the most part international NGOs

¹⁰³ MOPAN, 2019, 2017–18 Assessments, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February

¹⁰⁴ UNHCR Angola, 2016 COP

– bar its partnership with ADPP – as local NGOs are known to be weak because of a weak civil society context in Angola.¹⁰⁵ As discussed in the context section, GoA imposes a number of restrictions on the work of local NGOs. Though there are disadvantages in relying on international NGOs (language barrier, lack of local knowledge), UNHCR has not been able to make much progress towards promoting localization as per the Grand Bargain commitments as the conditions in the country are not ripe.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*

4. Conclusions of the evaluation

4.1. Conclusions on UNHCR Angola Operation Results¹⁰⁶

Conclusion 1:

Kasai Refugees

The provision of basic needs through a multi-sectoral response by UNHCR and partners for the Kasai refugees ensured that there was no increase in mortality and morbidity in the settlements. However, the situation of urban refugees has deteriorated in terms of their protection and access to services due to the slow implementation of the new national asylum policy by GoA. For the refugees from Kasai the initial response by both GoA and UNHCR was successful in averting a humanitarian crisis when the mass population movement took place. Furthermore, the partnership with GoA on education has been a significant accomplishment; shelter response has adopted an innovative approach; whilst the health interventions have been meeting the basic needs of refugees as well as neighbouring host communities – along with local authorities, UNHCR has also been able to nurture a mutually beneficial relationship with host communities in Lóvua. However, on the WASH response, while the sanitation needs have been well met, water provisioning has been inadequate as UNHCR has been unable to develop an appropriate strategy, partly due to not having adequate expertise within the team at critical points in time. Although a new initiative, livelihoods programming also needs more careful analysis and targeting (which staff need to develop capacity in).

Urban Refugees

Results on protection, which has been a major concern among urban refugees, have been sub-optimal due largely to the weak capacity and policy frameworks of Government agencies, whilst SGBV in urban areas has not received systematic attention from UNHCR and partners. Refugee registration and access to up-to-date documentation is a key issue for the protection of both Kasai and longer-term refugees. With the registration process stalled and fundamental differences between UNHCR and GoA still remaining an issue, UNHCR is struggling to fulfil its protection mandate in a complex protection scenario.

In addition, the lack of implementation of the new Asylum Law has led to a further deterioration in the registration of asylum applications and the management of data on recognized refugees. This has put PoCs at risk of refoulement and/or detention, as well as a lack of refugee rights, including access to health services, employment and education for long-term refugees and asylum seekers. The low level of service provision has been compounded by the lack of funding for UNHCR and partners to give support in this area.

¹⁰⁶ *Areas of Inquiry 1: What have been the results in the areas of assistance, protection and solutions as achieved by the UNHCR country operation in the past three to five years? Under what conditions has UNHCR achieved these results, and what have been the most important contextual and operational factors/decisions contributing to or impeding achievement of these results?*

Conclusion 2:

Capacity enhancement initiatives through training and the exposure of Government officials to best practice have created awareness of various tools and international standards; however, these have not necessarily led to changes in behaviour or actions that ensure adherence to minimum standards and best practice in implementation of the relevant laws vis-à-vis refugees, asylum seekers and other PoC. Besides weak political commitment for implementing practices conforming to international standards, UNHCR's inability to situate the training /exposure activities in an overall long-term capacity building strategy or plan acted as limiting factors in realizing any change in actions on the ground post-training. A comprehensive capacity building strategy would have enabled identification (and mutual agreement) of the behaviour/performance gaps and their causes, before identifying the knowledge /skills gap to be addressed by training or secondment of expert staff to work alongside the Government departments. This then would also have provided a basis for dialogue with the authorities on an ongoing basis for follow up after the training was delivered. UNHCR's support to the GoA on adopting the ICGLR Convention on Statelessness has been successful as this was backed by strong advocacy on the regional framework which had UNHCR's advisory input during development. Once ratified, implementation will require identification of the groups vulnerable to becoming stateless and action plans drawn up in partnership with the ICGLR Secretariat.

Conclusion 3:

Besides the complex external environment, UNHCR's internal decision-making processes and organizational systems have also affected its results. Systems for staff deployment and handover, partnership management and procurement have been sub-optimal, affecting the timeliness and efficiency of the Kasai response. When the organization decided in 2013–2014 to phase down the operation in Angola, UNHCR may not have carried out a thorough risk analysis, including an analysis of the regional context and of GoA's continued need for support. This later required UNHCR to re-establish itself and regain credibility with GoA when the *Kasai* crisis erupted. Risk analysis did not take into account the fact that UNHCR's rapid deployment capacity was limited. In addition, a lack of an institutional learning culture in the organization impedes proactive lesson-learning and sharing among staff and partners. This is partly to do with the reactive nature of operations, as well as a predominant focus on activities. The ongoing development of results frameworks will be a good opportunity to ensure results are embedded in an organizational culture that values reflection, learning, sharing, experimentation and innovation.

4.2. Conclusions on Strategic Positioning¹⁰⁷

Conclusion 4

UNHCR has positioned itself well within the UN system and in its relationship with GoA to lead on refugees and asylum issues in line with the CRRF, engaging with host communities and local authorities, especially on providing basic services to both the refugee population and host communities in Lóvua. In this capacity, it has coordinated effectively on refugee issues with other humanitarian organizations and has begun to roll out elements of nexus between development and humanitarian interventions in the country. Within the small UNCT, UNHCR plays a lead role on emergency preparedness and response, besides leading on its core mandate related to

¹⁰⁷ *Areas of Inquiry 2: How strategically has UNHCR been positioned within the country context, and what are the key factors driving strategic decision-making? To what extent do the strategy and country operation plan have coherence and/or alignment with the work of other humanitarian/development actors, private sector and civil society actors within the country? How well aligned is the existing UNHCR strategy and country operation plan with the current and/or evolving needs of the population and wider country context?*

refugees, asylum seekers and protection – there is no significant internally displaced caseload in Angola. UNHCR’s leadership on humanitarian issues in general, and on its core focus on refugees, asylum seekers and other PoC in particular, is recognized by all stakeholders. The operation is following UNHCR’s global strategic directions which emphasize an integrated approach to deliver protection, response, inclusive programming, empowerment of PoC and solutions. In furtherance of the globally agreed CRRF, UNHCR has initiated work on nexus as part of the long-term solution for protracted refugees, which will continue to be a key concern of the organization. A good start has been made with engagement with the MAFSAMU on social protection assistance for vulnerable refugees and partnership with the UNDP which could offer opportunities for engagement with donor agencies on nexus and resilience programming in future.

Conclusion 5:

UNHCR has adapted its tools and response to ensure it has remained flexible in the country context. It has been able to respond to events as they unfold, though UNHCR’s preparedness to anticipate and provide a response has been challenged by a fast-evolving crisis, as was evident in its early response to the Kasai crisis, as well as the recent spontaneous return of refugees to the DRC – both of which indicate that UNHCR has struggled to put in place contingency and scenario plans.

Conclusion 6:

On complex issues of registration and refugees’/asylum seekers’ rights, a lack of a consistent message and a joined-up approach involving multiple stakeholders (donors, partners, UN agencies) may have stymied UNHCR’s efforts, which require engaging at high levels of Government. UNHCR needs to recalibrate its relationship and messaging with GoA, to articulate as clearly as it can where it finds GoA’s stance on issues related to protection of refugees and asylum seekers can be brought in line with its international commitments and domestic laws. This may be an issue that goes beyond the country operation and will require examining how UNHCR works with governments in environments where refugee rights are challenged, and determine the kind of support a country operation may need to effectively champion causes on behalf of its core PoC, including advocacy through regional forums and multilateral bodies.

Conclusion 7:

Progress on addressing gender equality and disability issues has been limited, partly because of inadequate staff resources dedicated to these. This has impacted on the operation’s ability to respond to the most vulnerable PoCs. In line with best practices, attempts have been made to promote accountability to affected population, with mixed results, owing to lack of a coherent approach among partners. Progress on localization, which would help facilitate this, is hamstrung by the limited capacity of local NGOs and multiple restrictions imposed on them by national regulations.

5. Looking Forward: Summing up, Recommendations¹⁰⁸

5.1. Country Context

Angola has maintained political stability since the end of the 27-year civil war in 2002. A country aspiring to gain middle income status, since 2002 the nation has worked to repair and improve ravaged infrastructure and weakened political and social institutions. Endowed with extensive oil and gas resources, diamonds and rich agricultural land, a third of the population still live in poverty without adequate access to basic services. As a refugee-hosting country even during the nearly three decades of civil war (1975–2002), Angola has adopted the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as regional conventions like the ICGLR commitment to eradicate statelessness by 2024. The National Development Plan emphasizes the rights of refugees to documentation and integration, where necessary. The refugee population in Angola comes largely from the still-simmering conflict in DRC, with a small number from Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan and Somalia. As of November 2015–2016, there were an estimated 45,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the country.

Following the conflict in the Kasai region of DRC in 2017, GoA welcomed some 35,000 refugees crossing into its territory, who were then sheltered in the border province of Lunda Norte. Besides refugees, migrant workers have been attracted by mining activities along the country's border with DRC from various parts of Africa, including DRC, and this trend of mixed migration and irregular migration has increased in recent years. This has led GoA to start moving towards restrictive policies and measures that coalesce mixed migration issues with refugees and asylum seekers. This has seen the formulation of a new Refugee and Asylum Law, which provides for systematic detention-like reception centres for newly arriving asylum seekers, and withdraws the provision in the old law that gave asylum seekers the right to work. The conditions of existing refugees and asylum seekers have also been affected by the fact that GoA has put a halt to the process of receiving asylum requests, determining pending registration cases or updating documentation – so profoundly limiting the legal security and freedom of movement of PoC. Angola has not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. However, it has recently taken steps towards ratifying the ICGLR Convention on Statelessness.

In sum, Angola presents a complex scenario. In recent years, as concerns about illegal immigration, particularly in mining activities, have come to dominate GoA's thinking, UNHCR has found it increasingly difficult to support and facilitate GoA's leadership on issues of protection of refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with national and international laws and policies. UNHCR has had to rapidly re-establish itself almost from scratch as it was in a phase down mode at the time of the influx from the Kasai region. GoA has allowed UNHCR to take the lead in providing basic services for the Kasai refugees, and welcomed a number of activities undertaken by UNHCR and partners to train officials on various aspects of Refugee Law and protection.

¹⁰⁸ *Areas of Inquiry 3: How can UNHCR build on results achieved to date, and further leverage UNHCR's strategic position and influence within the country and region, to optimize the potential impact of collective efforts towards protection and solutions for UNHCR PoC, and the communities that host them?*

The situation with the Kasai refugees is evolving fast. An improved security situation in the Kasai, as well as a generally hostile environment in Angola (arbitrary detention, Operação Transparência, lack of freedom of movement, employment opportunities or livelihoods), has led to the spontaneous return of nearly half the refugees in Lóvua settlement, even as UNHCR was preparing to provide assistance in the repatriation process.

5.2. Summing Up

The evaluation points to UNHCR's success in several areas in a challenging environment, namely: (i) the multi-sectoral response for the Kasai refugees which ensured no increase in mortality and morbidity; (ii) good partnership with local authorities and other humanitarian organizations for education and healthcare for refugees and host communities; (iii) enabling the GoA to adopt the ICGLR Convention on Statelessness (now in the process of being ratified); and (iv) positioning itself within the country context well with the GoA and humanitarian system to provide leadership on humanitarian issues and refugee/asylum issues in particular. Going forward, while continuing to build on its partnership with local authorities and host communities, UNHCR will need to continue providing services for the Kasai refugees and facilitate their voluntary repatriation. UNHCR will also need to reinforce efforts on RSD and protection issues related to protracted refugees, asylum seekers, mixed migrants and the stateless, supporting GoA in fulfilling its commitments as per the national law and regional/international commitments that have been made.

Protection remains a challenging issue in the country context and this explains why UNHCR's outcomes in this regard have been limited. Within its sphere of control, UNHCR has not been able to leverage its global leadership role on refugees and asylum seekers in its advocacy with GoA on issues of registration and protection, highlighting the need to examine how UNHCR works with governments in difficult environments. Lack of political commitment notwithstanding, on its capacity building interventions, the evaluation points to ad hoc interventions, without a clear long-term strategy or a theory of change. While humanitarian needs and crises constantly evolve and responders are required to be reactive, as UNHCR has been, a proactive scenario/contingency planning was missing in the operation.

At the micro level, on certain aspects of programme delivery, the evaluation points to need for attention to a number of quality issues, specifically with regard to: (i) Kasai: developing an appropriate strategy for water provisioning; (ii) SGBV, among urban refugees, in particular, and a focus on vulnerability, gender equality and disability; (iii) livelihoods programming (targeting and diversification); (iv) coherence in approach to accountability to affected populations by all partners; and (v) organizational systems related to staff deployment, handover, institutional learning and results-tracking.

5.3. Recommendations

1. Programme delivery for the Kasai refugees

- Country Office**
- 1.1 Review selection criteria for beneficiaries of livelihoods activities and ensure vulnerability is given prominence in this.
 - 1.2 Deal with the issues related to lack of progress in the development of durable water sources at the earliest opportunity. This may require ensuring the activities receive adequate and consistent technical guidance.
 - 1.3 For food provisioning, gradually move to a combination of cash transfer and in-kind food, in partnership with WFP. This will go towards addressing the refugees' complaints of lack of food diversity and may also contribute to diversifying livelihoods opportunities through development of local grocers and shops.
 - 1.4 Work with partners to develop a coherent and consistent approach to strengthening beneficiary participation and AAP among the refugee population.
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2. Addressing SGBV among urban refugees and gender equality across the programme

- Regional Bureau**
- 2.1 Ensure that at the regional level there is specialized expertise to support country operations in strengthening gender and vulnerability analysis across the programme in general, and on SGBV issues in particular.
- Country Office**
- 2.2 Working with JRS and MASFAMU, develop a mechanism for monitoring, reporting and follow up on SGBV cases among refugees and asylum seekers, especially in Luanda. In Lóvua, ensure all partners have a consistent approach to addressing and reporting on SGBV.
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3. Advocacy and engagement with GoA on crucial issues of protection, registration and documentation

- HQ and regional Bureau**
- 3.1 UNHCR needs to review how it supports and guides country operations in advocacy on complex issues where vital protection issues and standards of treatment of PoC go unaddressed for a long time, putting them at risk of arbitrary and unlawful actions.
- Country Office**
- 3.2 Drawing on GoA's commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, develop a multi-stakeholder approach involving the UN Resident Coordinator, UNCT, donor agencies, embassies and NGOs to engage with GoA on crucial protection issues, acting as a principled and persuasive advocate for the inclusion of refugees and stateless people in national development. The current work on nexus could be leveraged in this regard.
 - 3.3 Explore a multi-pronged approach to ongoing capacity development using secondment of expert staff and advisers working alongside the various departments, instead of solely relying on training and exposure visits.
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4. Follow up and implementation of ICGLR Convention on Statelessness

- Regional Bureau**
- 4.1 Engage with the ICGLR Secretariat to facilitate support to individual countries in the region to follow up on and report on progress on implementation of the Convention.
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Country Office	4.2 Working with the Ministry of Interior, develop and agree a process for identification of specific population groups that are already stateless, or are vulnerable to being thus rendered, and develop an action plan in this regard.
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5. Lessons from phasing down of Southern Africa offices in 2016–2017

HQ	5.1 Establish clear parameters for phasing down and closing an office, which ought to be based on more than budgetary reasons, and take into account the risks of probable humanitarian crises affecting PoC and local capacity.
HQ and regional Bureau	5.2 To supplement UNHCR's global roster, examine the feasibility of standby arrangements with other humanitarian agencies to ensure a core team of qualified senior managers/country representatives/technical experts, as necessary, who can be deployed at short notice in the event a country operation is unable to cope with a crisis situation.
	5.3 Given the instability in DRC, UNHCR needs to be prepared for a possible further influx of refugees any time. For this reason, emergency preparedness will remain an important component of the operation's focus in the coming years.

6. Organizational systems and processes

HQ and regional Bureau	6.1 Ensure that, when new staff take over from outgoing staff, there is a proper and systematic handover process in place, especially in case of representatives and senior staff.
	6.2 When the new results framework is rolled out, UNHCR may like to review its reporting framework to ensure the annual reporting process is used by country operations to reflect on and share lessons, besides reporting on outputs and outcomes. ¹⁰⁹
Country Office	6.3 Given the short-term nature of contracts with partners for delivery of activities, streamline grant decision-making and funds disbursement timeline.
	6.4 Ensure that, when one partner takes over responsibility for particular programme from another partner, there is a managed transition and handover process.
	6.5 Establish a system of annual workshops for partners focusing on sharing of lessons learnt across the programme. This must not be combined with a planning and budgeting exercise, which needs to be kept separate.

¹⁰⁹ A good results framework is not simply a tool for reporting but also has the potential to bring about change in how operations are planned and delivered. Focus on changes in behaviour, for example, would be a desired outcome for training provided to SME and police officials, and this will begin by first identifying and mutually agreeing the behaviour/performance gaps, before identifying the knowledge /skills gap (to be addressed by training). This then would also provide a basis for dialogue with the authorities on an ongoing basis for follow-up after the training is delivered. An outcome-oriented results framework would enable staff and country teams to report/reflect on changes at different levels, namely: change in state (poor/hungry/less hungry, etc.); change in relationship and status (refugee with valid documents; children registered; women in community leadership); change in behaviour and practice (hygiene practices in refugee communities, SME's dealings with refugees and asylum-seekers); change in capacity (GoA policy, SME staff capacity).

Annexes

Annex 1: Angola Country Operation Evaluation ToR

1. Operational and Country Context

1. Despite the anticipated transition from a Low Income Country (LIC) to a Middle Income Country (MIC) in 2021 – and despite being the second largest oil producer in Africa, and the 4th largest diamond producer in the world – the Republic of Angola is still ranked 13th on the list of poorest countries.¹¹⁰ Angola faces multiple ongoing humanitarian crises: in particular the impacts of an economic downturn as a result of dropping oil prices in 2014-2015, droughts, persistent food insecurity,¹¹¹ irregular influx of refugees from the DRC, as well as internal displacements of populations.¹¹² Instability and potential for violence in the Kasai region of the DRC remains a matter of concern for humanitarian actors in the region. The escalating violence in the Kasai regions of the DRC in March/April 2017, triggered an influx of 32,000 refugees into Angola's Lunda Norte province. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) declared a system wide level-3 emergency in the Kasai, Tanganyika, and South Kivu regions of the DRC at the time. The onset of this humanitarian crisis occurred two years after UNHCR had decided to scale down its presence in Angola, Botswana, and Namibia.¹¹³ A real-time review conducted in September 2017 - concluded that UNHCR was insufficiently prepared to respond to the influx of refugees in Lunda Norte - due to various factors, including: the downscaling of the operation, the political sensitivity associated with advanced preparedness actions, and the fact that neither central nor local authorities considered it a priority to prepare for a refugee emergency.¹¹⁴ These factors hampered UNHCR's emergency response in all operational areas, including strategy, protection & assistance, coordination, procurement & supply, and durable solutions.
2. The L-3 emergency in DRC, forced UNHCR to dramatically adjust its operation in order to quickly mobilize staff, and scale up presence in northern Angola. UNHCR together with partners managed to step-up their response, transfer refugees from border areas to settlements, set up WASH activities and shelters, while undertaking registration and issuance of temporary documentation, as well as distribution of food and Core Relief Items (CRI).¹¹⁵ Although the violence in DRC subsided by mid-2017, continued instability in DRC has meant UNHCR's emergency preparedness remains a key focus of the operation in Angola. This includes the adaptation of a comprehensive protection strategy in responding to refugee needs in the capital and border regions, as well as building and maintaining partnerships with Government officials, enhanced border monitoring activities, and setting up of protection networks at the border where UNHCR currently has no partners or presence. Moreover, UNHCR Angola will continue to work on the stabilization of the refugee population in Lunda Norte, including further development of Lóvua refugee settlement, supporting voluntary relocation of urban-based refugees to

¹¹⁰ Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), 2002. *Briefing on Angola and DRC*. Online available at: <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/1833/>

¹¹¹ An estimated 1.42 million people are currently food insecure, with the most severe conditions experienced in the southern provinces of Cunene, Huila, and Namibe. Source: UNFPA, online available at: <https://www.unfpa.org/data/emergencies/angola-humanitarian-emergency>

¹¹² UNHCR data portal. Online available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ago>

¹¹³ Also see: UNHCR (June 2018). *Evaluation of UNHCR's country operations in Angola, Botswana and Namibia: assessment of phasing down UNHCR presence during the period 2012-2016*. Online, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/research/evalreports/5ba0cc844/evaluation-unhcrs-country-operations-angola-botswana-namibia.html>

¹¹⁴ UNHCR (September 2017). *UNHCR's emergency response in Angola: A real-time review*

¹¹⁵ UNHCR Country operation Plan 2019.

Lóvua, and setting up a strategy for addressing the needs of refugees that do not wish to relocate. UNHCR Angola will also focus on strengthening self-reliance of refugees through enhanced livelihood activities, as well as creating a favourable protection environment through improved access to education, health care, economic opportunities for PoCs.

3. After the end of the civil war in 2002, Angola had one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with an annual GDP growth of 11.1% between 2001 and 2010.¹¹⁶ Rapid economic growth attracted migrants from the region and immigration control gained importance on the political agenda in Angola. Mining activities along the country's northern border with DRC has garnered particular attention from the Government in the efforts to curb irregular migration into Angola. Dynamics related to mixed migration and irregular migration caused by perceived opportunities in diamond mining continue to play an important part in the Government's receptiveness towards registration and RSD. The reluctance to accept new migrants¹¹⁷ has been evident in the Government's decision to stop registration activities for urban refugees in 2013, and more generally, in the slow implementation of the 2015 Refugee and Asylum Law (10/15). Approximately 50% of the refugee population in Angola is urban-based - and the halt in new registrations and renewal of expired documents - has meant a considerable number of refugees are not able to access basic services or formal employment. A key focus area for UNHCR in 2019 is the development of an urban assistance and protection strategy for refugees affected by these challenges. Currently there is no system in place to receive asylum requests, to determine pending registration cases, or to update documentation. Refugees and asylum seekers are therefore left in a precarious situation, at risk of arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as forced returns.
4. One of the key challenges facing UNHCR's operation in Angola is the limited capacity of civil society organizations, as well as limitations in human and financial resources of the organization. This situation is further exacerbated by a presidential decree released in 2015, where the Public Prosecutor's Office was mandated to enforce strict monitoring and financing controls on national and international NGOs.¹¹⁸ This legislation stifled the efforts of civil society actors in Angola, and although there are numerous NGOs active on the ground, their capacity to deliver on humanitarian services varies considerably. Moreover, refugees and asylum seekers have limited access to health care, education and employment, particularly in urban contexts. In Lóvua refugee settlement, UNHCR has worked with partners in establishing basic services, however, limited capacity in the provision of assistance schemes for child protection, gender-based violence and access to education continue to be important focus points for UNHCR in Lunda Norte province, particularly in Lóvua refugee settlement which is officially recognized by the Government. Participatory assessments in 2017 highlighted the lack of legal security and freedom of movement, particularly where these concerned arbitrary arrests and confiscation of documentation by local authorities. The legal framework and administrative practices at the provincial level leave little space for local integration of refugees including economic and social integration. In an effort to create positive awareness and perceptions on refugees and asylum seekers; UNHCR aims to address gaps in access to legal and basic services with a strong focus on partnerships, as well as advocacy efforts aimed at Government and the media. Particularly in urban settings where protection partners

¹¹⁶ World Bank Group: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola>

¹¹⁷ Since the end of the civil war, the Angolan Government has actively pursued a policy of expelling undocumented migrants for 'national security' reasons. One article published in an independent newspaper Rede Angola in June 2015, authorities claimed that there are more than half a million people in the country illegally who are part of a "silent invasion". Available online at: <http://www.redeangola.info/mais-de-meio-milhao-de-imigrantes-ilegais-no-pais/>

¹¹⁸ Although the legislation was declared unconstitutional by the Angolan Courts in July 2017, citing that it did not go through the National Assembly, its effects have significantly stifled the ability of NGOs and civil society to operate effectively in the country.

have very limited outreach, UNHCR aims to promote systematic community-based approaches that consolidate referrals through refugee mobilizers and relevant Government stakeholders.

5. Partnerships and coordination have played a critical role in UNHCR's response in Angola as a result of limited staff and presence on the ground. UNHCR's main Government partners at the provincial and central levels are: The Ministry for Social Action, Women's Rights and Family (MASFAMU), The Ministry of Interiors' Service for Migration and Foreigners (SME), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX). UNHCR also actively engages with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice – notably on the prevention of statelessness - and the Ministry of Health. UNHCR also works closely with other UN agencies in Angola in order to include refugees and asylum seekers in their programmes. UNHCR's main partners are UNFPA for youth mobilization and SGBV prevention and response, WFP for food security, UNICEF for child protection, education and WASH, WHO for health-related activities, and UNAIDS for HIV prevention and response. Furthermore, UNHCR is fully engaged with UN processes, and participates in the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Protection Working Groups (PWG), as well as the development of the UN Partnership Framework Agreement (UNPAF 2015-2019), and the Common Country Assessment (CCA). The GoA, together with the UNCT is currently developing the next partnership framework agreement, which reflects more strategically on the UN systems contribution to the country's National Development Plan (NDP 2018-2022). The new UNPAF (2020-2022) will likely also be aligned with the ongoing UN reform and adoption of the Deliver as One (DoA) approach to the UNCT in Angola. UNHCR leads the emergency preparedness activities and continues to review the contingency plan for the DRC situation within the UNCT, while working closely with the Disaster Management Team to respond to possible emergencies. With regards to NGOs and civil society, UNHCR has six Project Partnership Agreements (PPAs) with: the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), World Vision International (WVI), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), MdM, and Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo (ADPP).¹¹⁹ These organizations have included activities aimed at the protection of refugees in their programme strategic objectives as a result of the PPAs. In 2019, UNHCR aims to further strengthen its partnerships, with the hope of identifying potential partnerships with national organizations as well.
6. Furthermore, Angola is a member of a number of regional efforts to promote economic integration, human rights, peace and security, while mitigating HIV/AIDS, natural and human-driven disasters, as well as statelessness. Angola is a member of the SADC, where Member States engage in legally binding protocols and a common agenda to achieve regional development, peace and security, and regional integration, Angola is also a member of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which sets out, through its Regional Programme of Action on Humanitarian and Social Issues, an action plan (2017-2019) to eradicate statelessness in the region. Through the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, Member States adopt a regional approach for the ratification and implementation of the UN Conventions on Statelessness, harmonize national laws and standards, and provide refugees and displaced persons with identification documents, enabling them to have access to basic services and exercise their rights.¹²⁰ In this regard, UNHCR in collaboration with the ICGLR, will assist Member States in the preparation for the adoption of the UN Convention on statelessness, and their domestication into national law. The evaluation should therefore also help inform UNHCR's advocacy and capacity building strategy to ensure regional commitments are upheld by the GoA.

¹¹⁹ The PPAs are all held with international organizations as a result of the limited capacity of national civil society organizations, particularly in the areas of protection of human rights.

¹²⁰ Action Plan of the ICGLR on the Eradication of Statelessness (2017-2019), online: <http://www.icglr.org/images/CCI/Action%20plan%20ICGLR%20statelessness.pdf>

2. Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

7. The main purpose of the country portfolio evaluation is to generate timely evidence to inform UNHCR's future operational planning and strategy in Angola. The evaluation will help inform decisions that strengthen partnerships and programme design in the pursuit of assistance, protection and solutions for UNHCR PoCs and the communities that host them. In addition to this, the evaluation will seek to analyse and assess the effectiveness of UNHCR's plans and activities in light of the specific country context, and evolving needs of the population, the Government, and its partners. In highlighting lessons learnt at the country operation level, recommendations from the evaluation should be practical, feasible, and forward looking in their orientation.
8. The primary audience for these evaluations is the UNHCR Country Office in Angola, and the ROSA. Other UNHCR Bureaux and Divisions, as well as UNHCR partners – including Government and humanitarian and development actors – will serve as a secondary audience.

3. Evaluation Approach

9. Further details on the evaluation approach, deliverable timetables, consultant qualifications, and selection criteria are outlined in the generic ToR, to which this document is an Annex.

3.1 Scope

10. The evaluation scope – relating to population, timeframe and locations– is as follows:
 - Timeframe to be covered in the evaluation: the evaluation will gather evidence from the country operation over the course of the last three years (2016-2018), although, this timeline will be refined in consultation with the UNHCR Country Office.
 - Population location and details: Primary data collection will involve fieldwork in Luanda and Lunda Norte Province, including Lóvuá refugee settlement, and Dundo. The exact research locations will be determined during the inception phase.

3.2 Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs)

11. The generic ToR for the country operation evaluation lays out three key areas of inquiry outlined below. Specific sub-areas of inquiry for Angola have been detailed under each of the overarching generic ones. The analysis needed to answer them is likely to touch on other possible sub-areas and may be further refined or narrowed down during the evaluation inception phase.

Key Areas of Inquiry 1 (generic): What have been the results in the areas of assistance, protection, and solutions as achieved by the UNHCR country operation in the past 3-5 years? Under which conditions has UNHCR achieved these results, and what were the most important contextual and operational factors/decisions contributing to or impeding achievement of these results?

Sub-areas of Inquiry 1.1 (country specific): What are the key inhibiting/facilitating factors contributing to UNHCRs efforts in promoting assistance, protection, and durable solutions to persons of concern in Angola, and which key areas of the operation need to be strengthened in order to capitalise on results achieved in support of urban and rural refugee caseloads, and how can UNHCR improve its capacity to prepare/respond to emergencies?

Key Areas of Inquiry 2 (generic): How strategically has UNHCR been positioned within the country context, and what are the key factors driving strategic decision-making? To what extent do the strategy and country operation plan have coherence and/or alignment with the work of other humanitarian/development actors, private sector, and civil society actors within the country? How well aligned is the existing UNHCR strategy and country operation plan to the current and/or evolving needs of the population and wider country context?

Sub-areas of Inquiry 2.1 (country specific): How can UNHCR further advance its protection strategy within the UNCT, and which mechanisms or strategies should be adopted to prioritize the needs of refugees and asylum seekers among its partners?

Key Areas of Inquiry 3 (generic): How can UNHCR build on results achieved to date, and further leverage UNHCR's strategic position and influence within the country and region, to optimize the potential impact of collective efforts towards protection and solutions for UNHCR PoC, and the communities that host them?

Sub-areas of Inquiry 3.1 (country specific): What progress has UNHCR Angola made in achieving the strategic objectives set out in the ICGLR Action Plan for the eradication of statelessness (2017-2019), and what opportunities can UNHCR explore to further advance its efforts in this regard?

Sub-areas of Inquiry 3.2 (country specific): How can UNHCR advance its efforts to support the Government in the role out of the Refugee and Asylum Law in Angola, with particular emphasis on improved registration activities, and advocacy for the rights of refugees in the areas of access to services and employment, and how can UNHCR utilise this vehicle and/or other vehicles for increased funding for its protection activities?

Sub-areas of Inquiry 3.3 (country specific): How can UNHCR improve its strategy to assist urban refugees and asylum seekers, and what opportunities, partnerships, or mechanisms can be further explored to advance refugee outreach and local integration in this context?

3.3 Evaluation Timeline and Deliverables

12. The evaluation contract was finalised in April 2019, and was managed following the timeline tabled in the generic ToR. Exact dates for the inception workshop and possible scoping mission were refined in consultation with the Country Office during inception. Key evaluation deliverables are further summarized in bullet points below:

- Inception report;
- Data collection toolkit (including questionnaires, interview guides, focus group discussion guides, and data monitoring methods) and details on the analytical framework;
- Final evaluation report including recommendations (30-40 pages excluding annexes);
- Executive summary in both Portuguese and English.¹²¹

¹²¹ The evaluation ToR, final report with annexes, and formal management response will be made public and posted on the evaluation section of the UNHCR website. All other evaluation products (e.g. Inception Report) will be kept internal.

Annex 2: Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder(s)	Role/nature of stakeholders and interest in evaluation	Level of interest in evaluation
UNHCR headquarters	Directors and senior executives of UNHCR are one of the main stakeholders of the evaluation. They are responsible for accountability to the Board and donors, and have an interest in learning from the evaluation to inform decision-making and, strengthen programming.	Direct - High
UNHCR Regional Bureau, Southern Africa	As Head of the Regional Bureau, the Regional Director (currently Representative) line-manages the head of Representation /branch office, sets the budget for all offices in the region, and acts as a bridge between the senior directors and the Representation/branch office. The Regional specialists provide technical support to the country operations which is vital for quality assurance and backstopping. The Bureau thus has an immediate and high interest in the evaluation to inform its decision-making, quality assurance, learning, reporting and accountability to senior management at HQ.	Direct – Very High
Angola branch office	As the focus of the evaluation is on Angola, the branch office has a direct stake in the evaluation, as much as the Regional Bureau, in ensuring accountability and drawing lessons for programming.	Direct – Very High
UNHCR partners in Angola	As recipients of UNHCR grants, which for some is a substantial proportion of their overall funding in Angola, they are key stakeholders. Partners are: the JRS on child protection, SGBV and legal	Direct - Medium

	<p>assistance in Lunda Norte; WVI on camp management, logistics/ warehouse, food distribution); LWF on livelihoods; NCA on Water, Sanitation & Hygiene and Environment protection); Mdm on Mental healthcare and provision of primary health services; Mines Adversary Group (MAG) on mine risk education; ADPP Angola on primary education and the IOM.</p>	
<p>GoA</p>	<p>UNHCR has engaged with the Ministry for Family, Social Assistance and Women promotion (MASFAMU) on social assistance and livelihoods for refugees. The Service for Migration and Foreigners (SME) of the Ministry of Interior is responsible for all matters related to registration, status determination, and documentation of all migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in-country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX) works on extradition cases for refugees and migrants and also on coordination with foreign countries – pertinent now due to moves to establish a tripartite agreement with the Democratic Republic of Congo on the voluntary return of refugees from the DRC. There is also the National Council for Refugees (CNR) – but it is not currently active. Work and relationship with all these entities have a direct bearing on UNHCR’s operations. The evaluation may be an opportunity for these institutions to share perspectives and explore how UNHCR and GoA’s joint responsibility and response to PoC could be more sustainable.</p>	<p>Direct - Low</p>

<p>Provincial and local authorities</p>	<p>UNHCR's PoC often require/access basic services provided by local authorities i.e. UNHCR often supports local infrastructure like health facilities, schools, etc., managed by local authorities so that they can provide services to both host communities and refugees. The evaluation may be an opportunity for them to share perspectives and explore how these responses could be made more sustainable.</p>	<p>Indirect - Medium</p>
<p>Other UN agencies</p>	<p>The Resident Coordinator office is responsible for overall coordination of UN activities in the country and also for high-level coordination with GoA on behalf of the UN system. UNHCR also has a few joint initiatives with various UN agencies: (a) a joint project with UNDP on capacity building on Refugee Law; (b) joint initiative with WFP on livelihoods; (c) partnership with UNFPA in refugee camps on reproductive health and with UNAIDS on HIV testing and prevention; (d) WHO, on epidemiology and monitoring of disease outbreaks.</p>	<p>Direct - Medium</p>
<p>Key donor agencies in Angola (Spain, US, Japan, China, France)</p>	<p>All these donors are known to have funded various actions related to refugees and migrants in the country, and some of them are currently funding UNHCR. Donors may be interested in learning from this evaluation on particular aspects of UNHCR's work with Government institutions and on durable solutions.</p>	<p>Indirect - Medium</p>
<p>Asylum seekers, refugees and other PoC (documented &</p>	<p>As the final users of services provided through UNHCR support, PoC in different regions of the</p>	<p>Indirect - Low</p>

undocumented) and host communities

country have a direct stake in UNHCR's approach and strategy, though for this evaluation, they may, at best, like to share their perspectives and experiences. Among this group, the Refugee Community in Angola (CRA) is also an important source of information on the recent developments in the country related to refugees and other PoC situations.

Annex 3: Evaluation matrix

Core evaluation questions/sub-questions	Judgement/performance criteria	Data sources	Data collection methods	Links to Area of Inquiry
<p>Area of Inquiry 1 - Results:</p> <p>What have been the results in the areas of assistance, protection, and solutions as achieved by the UNHCR country operation in the past 3-5 years? Under which conditions has UNHCR achieved these results, and what were the most important contextual and operational factors/decisions contributing to or impeding achievement of these results?</p>				
<p>EQ 1.1 To what extent has the UNHCR country operation in Angola achieved results for PoCs, including in the areas of protection, assistance, access to basic services and solutions?</p> <p>(Effectiveness)</p>	<p>Data shows improvement in wellbeing of PoCs through improved nutrition, healthcare, provision of basic needs, cash transfers, livelihoods, education and protection.</p>	<p>Refugee communities, asylum seekers, urban refugees, site observations, MASFAMU, progress reports, monitoring reports and BTORs.</p>	<p>Desk review, FGD/group discussions, transect walks in rural and urban settlements</p>	<p>1, 3.3</p>
<p>EQ 1.2 What contribution has UNHCR made in Angola towards building the capacity of Government institutions in discharging their respective mandates vis-à-vis protection of refugees, asylum seekers</p>	<p>Examples of direct contributions to policies, implementation capacity and systems within relevant Government institutions to strengthen protection regime for PoCs.</p>	<p>MASFAMU, Min. of Interior, Min. of External Affairs; UNDP; project documents.</p>	<p>KII, desk review</p>	<p>1.1, 3.2</p>

Core evaluation questions/sub-questions	Judgement/performance criteria	Data sources	Data collection methods	Links to Area of Inquiry
<p>and mixed migrant population, in accordance with international and national law/conventions (GCR, CRRF, Refugee convention and laws)? (Effectiveness)</p>				
<p>EQ 1.3 What progress has UNHCR made in achieving the strategic objectives set out in the ICGLR Action Plan for the eradication of statelessness? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to strengthen links to interventions of other actors? (Effectiveness)</p>	<p>Clearly articulated strategy and action plans exist with regard to UNHCR's proactive contribution on social protection mechanism, employment /livelihood opportunities for PoCs, durable solutions and eradication of statelessness.</p>	<p>Regional Bureau, Ministry of Interior, MASFAMU, Regional Refugee Coordinator, UNHCR Angola staff; UNHCR Angola and Regional strategy documents.</p>	<p>KII, desk review</p>	<p>3, 3.1, 2</p>
<p>EQ 1.4 What contextual and operational factors have contributed to or hindered achievement or</p>	<p>UNHCR's preparedness and response capacity; regional context; internal systems & processes;</p>	<p>UNHCR and partner staff; site observation; technical agencies (FAO, agriculture department,</p>	<p>KII, desk review and community interviews (host and PoCs)</p>	<p>1.1</p>

Core evaluation questions/sub-questions	Judgement/performance criteria	Data sources	Data collection methods	Links to Area of Inquiry
non-achievement of results for PoCs in Angola? (Effectiveness)	appropriateness of theories of change underpinning each major intervention aimed at PoC's wellbeing and protection.	health & education authorities; UNFPA); local authorities; SME/Min. of Interior; communities; project documents, BTORs/monitoring reports.		
<p>Area of Inquiry 2: Strategic Positioning</p> <p>How strategically has UNHCR been positioned within the county context, and what are the key factors driving strategic decision-making? To what extent do the strategy and country operation plan have coherence and/or alignment with the work of other humanitarian/development actors, private sector, and civil society actors within the country? How well aligned is the existing UNHCR strategy and country operation plan to the current and/or evolving needs of the population and wider country context?</p>				
EQ 2.1 To what extent has UNHCR's strategic and operational approach in Angola taken into account and responded to the changing/ evolving needs of PoCs and country context? (Relevance)	UNHCR and partners use joint and coordinated needs assessments; use strategies/ plans/methods for identifying and reaching most vulnerable PoCs; use of AGD-disaggregated data in needs assessment and planning. Evidence of regular and/or ad hoc context analysis for	Proposals, progress reports, needs assessment reports, partner reports and staff, urban refugees and rural. Donors, Government.	Desk review, KII, Community interviews	1,2

Core evaluation questions/sub-questions	Judgement/performance criteria	Data sources	Data collection methods	Links to Area of Inquiry
	adaptive response; clarity of strategy with regard to changing context.			
EQ 2.2 To what extent has the UNHCR country operation achieved geographical coverage, and were its responses proportionate to the needs and UNHCR’s expected role in preparedness, response and durable solutions for PoCs? (Coverage)	Scale and scope of UNHCR interventions compare well to needs met by other organizations; lead agency role on policy advice, implementation support and Technical Assistance on core mandate.	Government (MASFAMU, Min. of Interior), partners and donors.	KII	2
EQ 2.4 To what extent has UNHCR in Angola facilitated a coherent strategy and approach amongst donors, Government and key humanitarian institutions in addressing gaps, access and promoting international good practice in its work with PoCs,	Evidence of practices on the ground and advocacy on AAP, cash-based interventions and promoting localization.	PoC communities, partner and UNHCR staff.	KII	2, 2.1, 3

Core evaluation questions/sub-questions	Judgement/performance criteria	Data sources	Data collection methods	Links to Area of Inquiry
<p>particularly with regard to: (a) strengthening accountability to and participation of communities, (b) GCR & CRRF, and (c) localization? (Coherence)</p>				
<p>EQ 2.5 To what extent has UNHCR in Angola attempted to leverage its influence within the country and region to strengthen collective efforts towards protection and duration solutions for UNHCR persons of concern, and the communities that host them? (Effectiveness)</p>	<p>High-level advocacy and policy inputs at national and regional levels on durable solutions and protection regimes, as well as addressing vulnerability in host communities.</p>	<p>Regional Bureau, Ministry of Interior, MASFAMU, Resident Coordinator, Regional Refugee Coordinator, UNHCR Angola staff.</p>	<p>KII</p>	<p>3.1, 3.3</p>

Core evaluation questions/sub-questions	Judgement/performance criteria	Data sources	Data collection methods	Links to Area of Inquiry
EQ 2.6 What evidence exists to show that lessons are fed back into programming in real-time to adapt interventions or ways of working to changing context? <i>(Relevance)</i>	Lessons from Real-Time Review, audit reports and monitoring visits taken on board.	Partner reports, Operation Plans, UNHCR senior managers/directors.	Desk review, KII	3

Area of Inquiry 3: Future directions

How can UNHCR build on results achieved to date, and further leverage UNHCR’s strategic position and influence within the country, to optimize the potential impact of collective efforts towards protection and solutions for UNHCR persons of concern, and the communities that host them?

Future directions will emerge from conclusions that arise from analysis of findings under Aol 1 and Aol 2 above.

Annex 4: Key Informants

Interviewees

Organization	Location	Title
UNHCR	Luanda	Sr. Protection Officer
UNHCR	Luanda	Project Control Officer
UNHCR	Pretoria	Regional Director
UNHCR	Dundo	Livelihoods Officer
WFP	Dundo	Project Coordinator
Department of Health, GoA	Dundo	Director of Health
UNHCR	DRC	Deputy Regional Representative (Protection)
UN	Luanda	Resident Coordinator
UNHCR	Luanda	Representative, Angola
UNHCR	Dundo	Associate Reporting Officer
WVI	Dundo	Emergency Response Manager
WVI	Dundo	Child Protection Manager
Médicos Del Mondo	Dundo	Head, Emergency Unit
Médicos Del Mondo	Dundo	Programme Manager
MASFAMU, GoA	Luanda	Special Adviser, Social Assistance
UNHCR	Dundo	Protection Officer
JRS	Dundo	Provincial Director
JRS	Dundo	Deputy Provincial Director
JRS	Dundo	Legal lead
UNDP	Luanda	Programme Manager, Crisis Prevention & Recovery
Chinese Embassy	Luanda	Consular Minister
UNHCR	Geneva	Senior Desk Officer, Regional Bureau for Africa
UNHCR	Geneva	Head, Emergency Capacity Development
UNHCR	Luanda	Supply Officer
UNHCR	Dundo	Head of Office (now left)
UNHCR	Dundo	Associate Programme Officer (now left)
UNHCR	Luanda	External Relations
UNHCR	Luanda	Data management
Lutheran World Federation	Dundo	Admin & Finance,
ADPP	Dundo	Team Leader
Provincial Education Department	Dundo	Director & RH Department manager

Organization	Location	Title
Provincial Education Department	Dundo	Education department Head
Norwegian Church Aid	Dundo	Head of Shelter, Energy & Environment
Norwegian Church Aid	Dundo	Head of WASH
Lóvua Administration	Lóvua	Administrator
UNHCR	Luanda	Protection Officer
LWF	Luanda	National Coordinator
WFP	Luanda	Business Support Assistant
UNHCR	Luanda	Protection Officer
SME	Luanda	Director of the Refugee Department, Migration Commissioner, Director for Asylum seekers
US Embassy	Luanda	Political/Economic Chief
US Embassy	Luanda	Political Officer
UNHCR staff	Geneva	Staff from Division of Financial and Administrative Management (DFAM), Results Based Management unit, Africa Bureau
UNHCR partners	Dundo	JRS, WFP, WVI, MdM staff
UNHCR staff	Luanda	Representative, Angola; Protection Officer; Associate Reporting Officer
UNHCR staff	Dundo	Protection Officer; Associate Reporting Officer
UNHCR staff	Luanda	Briefing meeting (group) in Luanda

Community interviews and group discussions

Gender	Group	Location	Description
3Male	Host community	Lóvua/Dundo	Host community assisted village
1M	Kasai refugee	Lóvua/Dundo	Refugee arriving 2017
1M	Kasai refugee	Lóvua/Dundo	Refugee arriving 2017
1M	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
1M	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
1M	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
1Female	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
6M, 1F	Lóvua school teachers	Lóvua settlement	Teachers working in UNHCR schools
1M	Kasai refugee	Lóvua/Dundo	Refugee arriving 2017
2M	Kasai refugee	Lóvua/Dundo	Refugees arriving 2017
1M	Kasai refugee	Lóvua	Refugee arriving 2017

Gender	Group	Location	Description
1F	Host community	Dundo	Urban Host community
1F	Kasai Refugee	Dundo	Refugee arrived 2017
1F	DRC Refugee	Dundo	Refugee arrived 1997
1M	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Deputy chief of the village
1F	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
1M	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
1F	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
1M	Host community	Lóvua municipality	Host community
6M	Host community	Village nr Lóvua camp	Host community
7M	Host community	Village nr Lóvua camp	Host community
5M, 2F	Host community	Lóvua settlement	Teachers working in UNHCR schools
2M	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugee arriving 2017
3F, 3M	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees arriving between 1990s and 2011
1M	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugee arriving 2002
1F	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugee arriving 2017
2F	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugees arriving 2017
2F	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugees arriving 2017
2F, 1M	Host community	Dundo	Host community
8F, 10M	Host community	Lóvua	Host community
5F	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees from Bairro da Ajuda
3F, 1M	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees from Bairro da Ajuda
6F	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees from Bairro de Viana
8M	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees from Bairro de Viana
1F	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugee from DRC, 1995
2M	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugees arrived April 2017
1F	Kasai refugee	Dundo	Refugee arrived April 2017
3M 4F	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees arriving between 1990s and 2012
3M	Luanda urban refugees	Luanda	Refugees arriving between 2006 and 2011

Annex 5: Evaluation Team Itinerary

There were three parts to the visit:

1. Luanda July 22: Interviewed UNHCR HQ staff
2. Dundo July 23 – 8: Interviews with regional authorities; regional UNHCR staff; Implementing Partners; Kasai refugees, urban Dundo refugees and Host Communities. Also conducted a debrief with the UNHCR staff situated there.
3. Luanda July 30 – August 2: Interviews with national authorities; UNHCR HQ and other UN HQ staff; donors; urban refugees. Conducted a final debrief with UNHCR HQ staff.

Annex 6: Documents Reviewed

Doc. No	Author/title/Date
1.	African Development Bank. Angola Economic Outlook 2019, Macroeconomic performance (https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/angola/angola-economic-outlook)
2.	Birgitte Refslund Sørensen and Marc Vincent. Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced, 2001.
3.	Fedde Groot, Sarah Deardorff Miller. Evaluation of UNHCR's country operations in Angola, Botswana and Namibia: Assessment of phasing down UNHCR presence during the period 2012-2016, June 2018, Full Report.
4.	ICGLR Secretariat. Action Plan of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the Eradication of Statelessness, 2017-2019.
5.	Inge Amundsen, Cesaltina Abreu. Civil Society in Angola – Inroads, Space and Accountability. CMI Report, 2006.
6.	UNHCR & WFP. Joint UNHCR and WFP Livelihood and Economic Inclusion Strategy. Angola Operation in Lunda Norte, January 2019 - January 2024.
7.	MOPAN 2017-18 ASSESSMENTS, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), February 2019.
8.	Roger Zetter. Reframing Displacement Crisis as Development Opportunities, 2014.
9.	UNHCR & TANGO International. GLOBAL REPORT DECEMBER 2018 - Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches.
10.	UNHCR & UNDP. Joint project document – Strengthening local governance, social cohesion and resilience in refugee-hosting communities in Lunda Norte, February 2019.
11.	UNHCR Angola Funding Update, 2 April 2019.
12.	UNHCR Global Strategy, 2017-2021.
13.	UNHCR, 2018. The Democratic Republic of Congo Regional Refugee Response Plan January 2019-December 2020.
14.	UNHCR. The 10-Point Plan in Action. Solutions for Refugees (undated).
15.	UNHCR. Angola Operation UNHCR 2018-2019 Protection Strategy, January 2018.
16.	UNHCR. ANNEX: Angola Country Operation Evaluation, January 2019.
17.	UNHCR. Congolese Situation - Responding to the Needs of Displaced Congolese and Refugees, Annex – Angola, Supplementary Appeal, January - December 2018.
18.	UNHCR. Detailed Report of an audit of the operations in Angola for the UNHCR, IAD:OIOS-2018-00884, 30 May 2018.
19.	UNHCR. Detailed Report of an audit of the operations in Angola for the UNHCR, IAD:OIOS-2018-00884, 30 May 2018.
20.	UNHCR. Emergency Handbook, 4 th edition, version 2.7, July 2019.
21.	UNHCR. Final Narrative Report to the Government of Japan (Supplementary Budget of the GOJ FY 2017) - Interagency Response to Congolese refugee situation in Dundo, Lunda Norte, Access to Education, July 2019.
22.	UNHCR. Final Report Template - Support to shelter and education infrastructure for refugees from DRC in Angola, June 2019.
23.	UNHCR. Angola Operation UNHCR 2018-2019 Protection Strategy, January 2018.

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24. UNHCR. Global Trends Report on Forced Displacement, 2016.
 25. UNHCR. Country Operations Plan, Angola, 2016.
 26. UNHCR. Country Operations Plan, Angola, 2019.
 27. UNHCR. UNHCR's emergency response in Angola: A real-time review, September 2017.
 28. United Nations. A/73/12 (Part II). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - Part II, Global compact on refugees, 2018 http://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf
 29. World Bank Group. Forcibly Displaced: Towards a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts, 2017
 30. World Bank. Poverty & Equity Brief Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola April 2019 (https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_AGO.pdf)
 31. UNHCR Angola. Preparedness Action Plan – Minimum and Advance Preparedness Actions for Refugee Emergencies, 2019.
 32. UNHCR. Biometric registration update, as on 15 July, 2019.
 33. UNHCR. Country Operations Plan, Angola, 2018.
 34. UNHCR. Communication Manual – The role of communication in protecting refugees, Angola 2019.
 35. UNHCR. Work Sessions Report – The Role of the Media in Protecting Refugees, Angola 2019.
 36. Angola Government. National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, Angola 2018.
 37. UNHCR. Participatory Evaluation Report – Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstream (ADGM), Angola 2019.
 38. UNHCR. Global Trends Report on Forced Displacement, p28, 2016.
 39. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and migrants, June 2017, Working Paper 512.

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