

## PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS

### I. INTRODUCTION: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO A SHARED CHALLENGE

1. UNHCR gives a very high priority to developing effective responses to protracted refugee situations, which have been among the principal targets of several major UNHCR initiatives, such as Convention Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions. Protracted refugee situations have also been the main subject of two high-level meetings on African refugees, and have featured prominently in policy speeches delivered by the High Commissioner and senior UNHCR officials. UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit has carried out a series of case studies on such situations.

2. The Agenda for Protection, adopted in December 2002, directed UNHCR "to undertake a review of all protracted refugee situations, with a view to exploring with States and other partners the feasibility of comprehensive plans of action, bringing into play each of the available durable solutions, to be implemented in close consultation with countries of origin, host countries, resettlement countries and refugees themselves.<sup>1</sup>" The purpose of this paper is to update member States on UNHCR's strategy on this issue, outlining the nature and dimensions of the problem and illustrating the conceptual and practical approaches that have been adopted in a number of protracted refugee situations. Its findings and conclusions seek to achieve a synthesis of the extensive work already undertaken on the subject by the Office.

### II. DEFINITION: IN LIMBO

3. For the purposes of this review, a protracted refugee situation is one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.

4. Protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. They are not inevitable, but are rather the result of political action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution or violence that led to flight) and in the country of asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the countries of origin, and stagnate and become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment

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<sup>1</sup> Agenda for Protection (Goal 5, objective 1, action 1).

possibilities, and confinement to camps. The short-term nature of planning and funding modalities is a contributing factor.

### III. DIMENSIONS

5. Using a crude measure of refugee populations of 25,000 persons or more who have been in exile for five or more years in developing countries, and excluding Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of UNRWA, it is estimated that, at the end of 2003, there were 38 different protracted situations in the world, accounting for some 6.2 million refugees in total. The great majority of such situations were to be found in Africa (not including North Africa), which comprised 22 major protracted refugee situations including 2.3 million refugees. However, in terms of numbers, the majority of refugees in protracted situations were located in the region covering Central Asia, South West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (CASWANAME), where eight major protracted situations accounted for 2.7 million refugees. Asia (outside the CASWANAME region) comprised five major protracted refugee situations including 670,000 refugees, whereas the three major protracted situations in Europe accounted for 530,000 refugees (see Annex 1).

6. Owing to the many new refugee situations that emerged in the 1990s, and which still endure, the global number of 38 major protracted situations at the end of 2003 represented a substantial increase since 1993, when the total stood at 27, although the absolute number of refugees living in protracted situations has fallen since 1993 (from 7.9 to 6.2 million). Furthermore, in a context in which shorter-lived refugee crises have diminished substantially, the proportion of major protracted situations within the total number of refugee situations increased from 45 to 90 per cent in the same period. It is estimated that the average duration of major refugee situations, protracted or not, has increased: from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003.

7. However, it must be emphasized that the severity of a protracted refugee situation depends more on the condition of the refugees involved than on its duration. Therefore, the evolution of the overall problem cannot be judged from figures alone. The human reality of refugees in protracted situations varies widely, particularly with respect to their economic and social integration. In some cases, prospects for local integration are minimal, requiring the international community to continue to provide assistance on a daily basis; in others, refugees have become economically self-sufficient, largely because the host country has provided access to land or the labour market. Of the 6.2 million refugees in major protracted situations at the end of 2003, 73 per cent (4.5 million) had been provided with some form of assistance by UNHCR. By contrast, in only six of the 38 major protracted situations were refugees fully integrated economically, without requiring any external aid (see Annex 1).

### IV. CONSEQUENCES: WASTED LIVES, SQUANDERED RESOURCES, FUTURE PROBLEMS

8. The consequences of having so many human beings in a static state include wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security.

9. Before identifying some of these negative consequences, it must first be remembered that people become refugees in order to escape from an intolerable threat to their fundamental rights or security at home; protection is, by definition, a benefit that is not available to the refugee in his/her own country. However, in times of crisis, the granting of asylum to large numbers of *prima facie* refugees is often premised on their being confined to camps. Such measures, which are imperfect and not in conformity with the rights enshrined in the refugee instruments, represent compromises that balance emergency refugee needs and host State concerns.

10. If it is true that camps save lives in the emergency phase, it is also true that, as the years go by, they progressively waste these same lives. A refugee may be able to receive assistance, but is prevented from enjoying those rights – for example, to freedom of movement, employment, and in some cases, education – that would enable him or her to become a productive member of a society.

11. Protracted refugee situations also waste lives by perpetuating poverty. The World Bank notes three dimensions of poverty: lack of income and assets; voicelessness and powerlessness in the institutions of State and society; and vulnerability to adverse shocks, linked to an inability to cope with them. Very often, being a refugee involves all three dimensions, ensuring that refugees are not only without national protection, but also desperately poor. Poverty can lead refugees, as well as others, to resort to a gamut of negative survival tactics, such as child labour, the degradation of the environment or prostitution.

12. The prolongation of refugees' dependence on external assistance also squanders precious resources of host countries, donors and refugees. Spending on long-term situations is often characterized by what has been termed the 'plastic sheeting syndrome.' Limited funds and waning donor commitment lead to stop-gap solutions, such as the provision of plastic sheeting instead of more durable shelter materials. Spending on short-term fixes, however, yields only fictitious savings. Spending on care and maintenance (currently 40 per cent of UNHCR's 2004 budget), rather than on solutions, while often necessary, is a recurring expense, and not an investment in the future. It can only ensure that such situations are perpetuated, not solved.

13. A third consequence of protracted refugee situations is that they can serve as incubators for future problems. Festering crises can nurture instability and conflict. Large, disaffected and alienated populations relying on subsistence-level handouts are prime targets for recruitment into armed groups. And the frustration of being a refugee – of living in squalor and obscurity, and of feeling that injustice continues in one's homeland – can lead persons to commit dramatic actions that draw attention to a cause.

## V. SOME WAYS FORWARD: CAUSES, EFFECTS, TOOLS

14. Any strategy for dealing with protracted refugee situations must address them on two fronts, i.e. causes and effects. Moreover, such an approach must be underpinned by a notion of respect for refugees and their capacity to bring about change and be productive; and finally, it must acknowledge that resolving such situations may entail higher costs in the short term.

### Underlying causes

15. As the causes of persistent refugee situations are political, solutions must be sought in that arena. UNHCR is non-political, but this does not mean it should be politically unaware. Rather, it must understand the political forces and opportunities, while using its position as an impartial player to identify and exploit entry-points for solutions.

16. UNHCR can play a key supporting role in addressing the root causes of refugees by virtue of this position. It can and does achieve this at a number of different levels. It is most successful when it grasps the political significance of refugee presence and repatriation, and strategically inserts refugee issues into peace and other political agendas. Experience demonstrates that refugees do not simply wait for the completion of peace accords, but are themselves active in forging the very peace that will stabilize their return.

### Immediate effects on refugee well-being

17. In the absence of immediate durable solution prospects, there are a number of steps UNHCR may take to improve the lot of refugees and to prepare them for an eventual durable solution. Many of these steps are core, mandate functions for the Office, as they involve ensuring that refugees are able to enjoy basic human rights, including those specifically mentioned in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Refugee self-reliance is the key element in any strategy dealing with the effects of prolonged and stagnant exile. It is more dignified for the individual, is less costly, and is a positive factor for repatriation. Essential elements of a strategy include: (i) providing refugees with physical, legal and economic security; (ii) removing barriers to self-reliance; and (iii) creating opportunities.

18. The provision of security is about ensuring that refugees have the necessary physical and economic security to lead productive existences. Guaranteeing physical security is a core UNHCR concern, and involves ensuring *non-refoulement* and safe asylum. Legal security might include ensuring that refugees are provided with personal documentation. Economic security in a refugee context entails providing safety nets that prevent refugees from having to resort to negative coping mechanisms.

19. Often self-reliance is unattainable because of imposed barriers, such as legal obstacles and restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement, employment or access to land. UNHCR can play a role in identifying these barriers, but it is the responsibility of the host government to work towards lifting them.

20. The creation of opportunities involves promoting prospects for refugees to lift themselves out of poverty. This begins with building existing refugee capacities, and also includes - depending on the asylum context - loans, land, tools and income-generation projects.

21. Evidence suggests that focusing on the condition of the refugee, and removing obstacles in the way of that person's productivity, are the most effective means of dealing with refugee situations, in the absence of a durable solution. For example, Liberian refugees who are free to cultivate land in Côte d'Ivoire, have turned swamps into rice-fields. In Pakistan, Afghan refugees made such a contribution in the carpet and transport sectors that their mass repatriation

impacted negatively on Peshawar's economy. And in Malawi in the 1980s, Mozambican refugee farmers sold surplus produce to locals, and bequeathed functioning farms upon their repatriation. In these and other such cases, the important factor was that the refugees were able to overcome barriers to self-reliance.

22. Admittedly, there are some situations in which self-reliance may not be possible, even in the absence of legal barriers. This might be the case, for example, when refugees find themselves in arid, poor and inhospitable areas, for example in Yemen or Algeria.

### Tools and approaches

23. UNHCR has been dealing with the causes and effects of protracted refugee situations for many years, using a combination of strategies. The various tools and approaches it has developed fall under the Agenda for Protection, an ambitious and practical programme adopted in 2002 to reinvigorate and improve protection for refugees worldwide. Of its six overarching goals for reinforcing refugee protection, two are of particular relevance to protracted refugee situations: sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to receive and protect refugees (goal 3); and redoubling the search for durable solutions (goal 5). Two of its more germane aspects are Convention Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions.

24. The Convention Plus initiative provides the tools to implement special agreements, including comprehensive plans of action (CPAs) that will bring together in a strategic manner a mix of durable solutions. These tools are intended to facilitate the targeting of development assistance for burden sharing and self-reliance; the strategic use of resettlement; and the allocation of responsibilities in the event of irregular secondary movements – which may indeed be a symptom of protracted hopelessness among long-standing refugee populations. In negotiating multilateral agreements with States, UNHCR has the opportunity to identify areas of mutual interest, and forge connections between refugee concerns and other initiatives. The development of comprehensive plans of action, modeled after those used in South-East Asia and Latin America in the 1980s, is one means of harnessing Convention Plus in order to unblock protracted situations.

25. A number of tools are already available, notably with regard to integrated programming and planning methodologies. The May 2003 Framework for Durable Solutions also works towards Agenda for Protection goals, and brings together three initiatives developed in recent years: DAR (Development Assistance for Refugees), the 4Rs (Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) and DLI (Development through Local Integration). DAR and DLI in particular emphasize refugee self-reliance.

26. Another initiative, the development of 52 quantifiable protection and assistance standards and indicators, will enable UNHCR to derive clear, diagnostic and comparable portraits of refugee situations. This will help to determine which level of assistance refugees are enjoying, and to identify gaps in meeting needs, including suitable solutions.

27. UNHCR has also been actively engaged in strengthening the capacity of host countries to provide protection to refugees, both as a follow-up to the Agenda for Protection and as a part of the Convention Plus initiative. In particular it is developing a Handbook on Strengthening

Protection Capacities in Host Countries (forthcoming in 2004). The Office has also received financial support from the European Union and from three co-funding States for a project that will analyze the gaps in the protection capacities of four African countries, and, in dialogue with the countries concerned, as well as others in the region and donors, will develop comprehensive strategies to bridge them.

## VI. PARTNERSHIP

28. The key to responding effectively to protracted refugee situations is partnership with all stakeholders to enable astute planning, build ownership and increase available resources. With refugees, partnership can entail taking a community-based approach; with host governments it can encompass joint problem analysis and the implementation of programmes that benefit both refugees and host populations; with development actors it requires persistence and advocacy to ensure that refugees and refugee-hosting areas figure on development agendas; and with the international community (governmental and non-governmental) it involves joining forces to ensure that responsibilities and burdens are shared.

29. For a partnership to be genuine and productive, UNHCR must be open to the ideas and objectives of others. This applies in both the political and development spheres, where it is incumbent upon UNHCR to grasp the 'big picture' in order to be able to effectively insert refugee concerns into these agendas. If UNHCR wants refugees to be considered in development plans, for example, it must 'learn development, speak development', even though it does not 'do development'. For this reason, UNHCR has, for example, assimilated the Millennium Development Goals into its programming and become a member of UNDG. UNHCR Representatives are under instruction to engage with United Nations country teams in the preparation of Common Country Assessments/United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks. Furthermore, over the past two years, UNHCR has forged strategic partnerships with ILO and FAO to help develop the productive capacities of refugees.

## VII. RESPONDING TO PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS

30. While there are some common consequences and ways out of protracted refugee situations, each one is specific, and requires a customized approach. UNHCR is approaching the 38 different prolonged situations in various manners. The three cases described below provide a sense of the different strategies being used in different regions, but are far from a comprehensive listing. Other notable examples include: the Self-Reliance Strategy in Uganda; local integration for refugees in Armenia; the Zambia Initiative; and local integration for refugees in Serbia and Montenegro.

### Bhutanese refugees

31. Over 103,000 Bhutanese refugees have been residing in seven refugee camps in Nepal since 1989. The High Commissioner emphasized in September 2003 that resolving the stalemate on finding solutions for the Bhutanese in Nepal was a priority for UNHCR. He noted that the Office had not been able to participate in the joint Bhutanese-Nepalese process of verification of these persons, and had not been granted access by the Government of Bhutan to areas of potential return. He announced that UNHCR would gradually phase out its direct involvement in the camp by the end of 2005. In the process, it would promote self-reliance projects to facilitate

the integration of those who are willing to remain and support resettlement initiatives for vulnerable cases. Given that it is denied access in Bhutan, UNHCR has found it impossible to monitor the return process and would not promote returns, although it would assist in verifying that returns from Nepal are voluntary.

32. UNHCR's strategy in Nepal is thus to phase out assistance, while continuing to protect the refugee population. The phase-out strategy will emphasize the shift from relief to development and create means for self-reliance pending durable solutions. A preparatory plan of action envisages: re-registration and profiling of the refugee population; a socio-economic survey of refugee and host populations; and a rapid assessment of development potential, capacity and programmes in districts hosting refugees, for a smooth phase-in of developmental programmes and phase-out of UNHCR assistance. Targeted resettlement will also be considered as a solution for this situation.

#### Afghan refugees

33. Despite two of the largest repatriation movements in recent history in 1992 and 2002, as many as three million Afghans remain outside their country. Although UNHCR expects that many will return between now and the end of 2005 and is supporting their voluntary return, it is inevitable that some will remain in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. To address this challenge, UNHCR has launched an initiative, known as 'Afghanistan Plus', aimed at developing a broader policy framework within which displacement may be managed increasingly as a migration and poverty problem, rather than just a refugee situation.

34. The 'Afghanistan Plus' initiative is based on three primary considerations:

- the political advances that have been made in Afghanistan, and the country's increasingly normal relations with its neighbours and other States in the region, indicate that population movements that are primarily migratory and economic should be handled within the context of regular regional and bilateral relations;
- continued international engagement and support will be required to develop and underpin such a transition;
- there will be a refugee and protection dimension, albeit a modest one, to the Afghan displacement issue post-2005.

35. There are likely to be four main issues that need to be addressed: (i) overcoming the poverty that prevents many Afghans from returning home to conditions of sustainable reintegration and economic recovery; (ii) dealing with the absence of the rule of law; (iii) managing the flow of persons who are moving back and forward for economic and social reasons; and (iv) responding to the wishes of those Afghans with legitimate reasons for remaining in the asylum countries, and identifying those with genuine needs for continuing international protection. UNHCR is therefore consulting with the three Governments concerned, as well as major donors and partner agencies, regarding the way forward.

36. If, as UNHCR believes, the situation of Afghans in neighbouring countries could in future be approached primarily as a migration and development problem, it would need to be addressed by governments and technical cooperation agencies with appropriate competencies (notably ILO and IOM), expertise, and resources. The Office's own mandate and expertise would be of continuing relevance to only a portion of the residual population. UNHCR is, however, committed to ensuring that the process starts out on a solid and generally accepted footing and to pre-empt a situation where a significant number of Afghans find themselves with no clear status or options, or left in unacceptable conditions.

#### Somali refugees

37. The Somalia refugee situation has been chosen for a Convention Plus initiative because of its size and protracted nature, the limited scope of humanitarian and development assistance to Somali refugee programmes, the slow progress in peace negotiations and the lack of immediate prospects for voluntary repatriation to southern Somalia.

38. UNHCR is promoting voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees to north-west and north-east Somalia. In order for the returns to be sustainable, increased emphasis on reintegration and post-conflict recovery is essential. At the same time, massive voluntary repatriation to southern Somalia is not possible for the time being, although peace negotiations continue. As a consequence, there are some 400,000 Somali refugees, residing mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti (as well as hundreds of thousands more in Europe and further afield). Whilst working on improving their prospects for voluntary repatriation, there is a need to improve the standards of assistance and protection for this group, including the possibilities for self-reliance.

39. With a view to crafting a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Somali refugees, UNHCR has launched an exploratory project, the objectives of which are:

- to better understand the geo-political context in Somalia and the dynamics of the refugee situation and migratory patterns in major host countries;
- to identify appropriate durable solutions applicable to each Somali refugee sub-group and each host country. This would include playing a catalytic role in the Somali peace process;
- where durable solutions are not immediately available, to identify measures to enhance the quality of asylum in the current host country, including through better legal and physical protection, improved assistance and increased opportunities for refugee self-reliance; and
- to institute a regular dialogue amongst interested States, UNHCR, and relevant stakeholders, including the refugees themselves and NGO partners, in order to agree upon strategies and activities for a CPA for Somali Refugees.



## VIII. CONCLUSION

40. Protracted refugee situations are symptomatic of political failures, neglect and unequal distribution of resources. In line with its mandate to protect refugees and seek durable solutions to their plight, UNHCR is working vigorously to ensure that protracted refugee situations are not forgotten, and that they are responded to in a manner that respects individual refugees, accounts for the wider political and development climate, and enables refugees to enjoy the 1951 Convention rights that would facilitate their self-reliance pending a solution. But solutions to protracted situations will not be solved by humanitarianism alone. UNHCR counts on the support and political will of Member States to work together to astutely tackle the root causes of prolonged refugee situations, and to robustly and humanely respond to the immediate effects of such situations.

MAJOR PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS<sup>1</sup>

Region / Country of asylum	Origin	UNHCR assistance status		Total	Percentage Assisted
		Assisted	Not assisted		
Burundi	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	13,000	27,000	41,000	32%
Central African Rep.	Sudan	36,000	-	36,000	100%
Chad	Sudan	55,000	55,000	110,000	50%
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Angola	43,000	81,000	120,000	36%
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Sudan	11,000	34,000	45,000	24%
Rwanda	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	35,000	-	35,000	100%
United Rep. of Tanzania	Burundi	320,000	170,000	490,000	65%
United Rep. of Tanzania	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	150,000	-	150,000	100%
<b>Central Africa and Great Lakes</b>		<b>670,000</b>	<b>370,000</b>	<b>1,000,000</b>	<b>67%</b>
Djibouti	Somalia	25,000	-	25,000	100%
Ethiopia	Sudan	95,000	-	95,000	100%
Kenya	Somalia	150,000	-	150,000	100%
Kenya	Sudan	63,000	-	63,000	100%
Sudan	Eritrea	73,000	35,000	110,000	66%
Uganda	Sudan	180,000	20,000	200,000	90%
<b>East and Horn of Africa</b>		<b>620,000</b>	<b>55,000</b>	<b>670,000</b>	<b>93%</b>
Zambia	Angola	72,000	87,000	160,000	45%
Zambia	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	54,000	4,000	58,000	93%
<b>Southern Africa</b>		<b>130,000</b>	<b>91,000</b>	<b>220,000</b>	<b>59%</b>
Cameroon	Chad	-	39,000	39,000	0%
Côte d'Ivoire	Liberia	74,000	-	74,000	100%
Ghana	Liberia	42,000	-	42,000	100%
Guinea	Liberia	89,000	60,000	150,000	59%
Guinea	Sierra Leone	15,000	10,000	25,000	60%
<b>West Africa</b>		<b>220,000</b>	<b>110,000</b>	<b>330,000</b>	<b>67%</b>
<b>AFRICA</b>		<b>1,600,000</b>	<b>620,000</b>	<b>2,300,000</b>	<b>70%</b>
Algeria	Western Sahara	160,000	10,000	170,000	94%
Egypt	Occupied Palestinian Territory	-	70,000	70,000	0%
Iraq	Occupied Palestinian Territory	-	100,000	100,000	0%
Islamic Rep. of Iran	Afghanistan <sup>2</sup>	830,000	-	830,000	100%
Islamic Rep. of Iran	Iraq	150,000	-	150,000	100%
Pakistan	Afghanistan <sup>3</sup>	1,120,000	-	1,120,000	100%
Saudi Arabia	Occupied Palestinian Territory	-	240,000	240,000	0%
Yemen	Somalia	59,000	-	59,000	100%
<b>CASWANAME</b>		<b>2,300,000</b>	<b>420,000</b>	<b>2,700,000</b>	<b>85%</b>
China	Viet Nam	11,000	290,000	300,000	4%
India	China	-	92,000	92,000	0%
India	Sri Lanka	-	61,000	61,000	0%
Nepal	Bhutan	100,000	-	100,000	100%
Thailand	Myanmar	120,000	-	120,000	100%
<b>Asia and the Pacific</b>		<b>230,000</b>	<b>440,000</b>	<b>670,000</b>	<b>34%</b>
Armenia	Azerbaijan	50,000	190,000	240,000	21%
Serbia and Montenegro	Bosnia and Herzegovina	100,000	-	100,000	100%
Serbia and Montenegro	Croatia	190,000	-	190,000	100%
<b>Europe</b>		<b>340,000</b>	<b>190,000</b>	<b>530,000</b>	<b>64%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>4,500,000</b>	<b>1,700,000</b>	<b>6,200,000</b>	<b>73%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Refugee situations numbering 25,000 or more persons by the end of 2003 which have been in existence for 5 or more years. Industrialized countries are not included. Source: 2003 UNHCR Annual Statistical Report. Numbers rounded to two significant figures. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

<sup>2</sup> UNHCR estimate. This figure is currently being reviewed by UNHCR and is expected to be revised upwards in 2004.

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR estimate. This figure does not include Afghans in urban areas and is currently being reviewed by UNHCR.

Documentation of relevance to protracted refugee situations <sup>\*/</sup>

General documents

Agenda for Protection (A/AC.96/965/Add.1)

Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern  
(EC/53/SC/INF.3)

Convention Plus documentation ([www.unhcr.org/Convention-plus](http://www.unhcr.org/Convention-plus))

Addressing protracted refugee situations in Africa. Paper prepared for the Informal Consultations on New Approaches and Partnerships for Protection and Solutions in Africa. Geneva, 14 December 2001.

"Protracted refugee situations: Impact and challenges", speech delivered by the Assistant High Commissioner, Copenhagen, October 2002.

Evaluation studies undertaken by UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU)

2003

"Comment répondre aux situations de refuge prolongé: Le cas des réfugiés guatémaltèques au Mexique"

2002

"Review of CORD community services for Angolan refugees in Western Province, Zambia"

"Evaluation of the Dadaab firewood project, Kenya"

"Responding to protracted refugee situations: a case study of Liberian refugees in Ghana"

"Review of CORD community services for Congolese refugees in Kigoma region, Tanzania"

"Participatory poverty assessment of Nakivale and Oruchinga refugees camps in southern Uganda: livelihood characteristics, economic constraints and recommendations for change"

<sup>\*/</sup> Most of these documents are available on UNHCR's website [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org)

"Responding to protracted refugee situations: a case study of Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire"

2001

"A beneficiary-based evaluation of the UNHCR programme in Guinea"

"Ukwimi, Zambia: the history of a successful refugee settlement"

2000

"Minimum standards and essential needs in a protracted refugee situation: a review of the UNHCR programme in Kakuma, Kenya"

Other relevant papers

"A state of insecurity: the political economy of violence in Kenya's refugee camps", *African Affairs*, Vol. 99 (2000)

"Protracted refugee situations: some frequently asked questions", EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (2002)

"No solutions in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, No. 75, EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (2002)

"Refugee identities and relief in an African borderland: a study of northern Uganda and southern Sudan", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, No. 19, EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (2000)

"International refugee aid and social change in northern Mali", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, No. 22, EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (2000)

"Changing opportunities: refugees and host communities in western Tanzania", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, No. 11, EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (1999)

"Vital links in social security: Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps, Kenya", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, No. 38, EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (2001)

"The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, No. 45, EPAU/UNHCR, Geneva (2001)

"Camps and freedoms: Long-term refugee situations in Africa", *Forced Migration Review*, Oxford University Press (2003)