



A review of UNHCR's
engagement with the
'Delivering as One' (DaO)
Initiative

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A Review of UNHCR's engagement with the 'Delivering as One' Initiative

Andy Featherstone, May 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction and Approach

The Delivering as One (DaO) Initiative

The DaO approach emerged from intergovernmental decision-making on the operational activities of the United Nations (UN) system for development. Since the first 8 pilots commenced in 2007, the number of countries delivering as one has increased to 44 with many others implementing parts of the approach. DaO consists of five pillars that bring the UN at country level together in a more systematic and structured way and include One Programme, a Common Budgetary Framework (and optional One Fund), One Leader, Communicating as One and Operating as One. In 2014, two years after the Initiative was independently evaluated, a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), comprising an integrated package of guidance to implement the five pillars were agreed and heralded the next generation of DaO.

UNHCR's engagement in DaO

UNHCR was engaged in the development of DaO and was initially involved in five of the pilot countries. In 2007 an informal stocktaking exercise was undertaken to document some of the key elements of UNHCR's early experiences, identify lessons and inform future engagement. Eight years on, UNHCR now works in at least 27 of the 44 DaO countries as well as many others that have partially adopted the approach.

Purpose of the review

The purpose of the review is to assess the extent to which factors internal to UNHCR or the DaO Initiative, including mandate, policies and business practices, influence the effectiveness of UNHCR's engagement with it. It is primarily for the purpose of learning and will identify whether there are any major gaps and challenges and make appropriate recommendations to address them.

Approach

The review adopted a mixed methodology consisting of a document and literature review (including existing reviews and evaluations); an analysis of UNHCR's participation in DaO; interviews with key stakeholders in UNHCR in Geneva and in the field and with the UN in New York and at country-level; an online survey for field-based UNHCR staff involved with the DaO Initiative; and an analysis of funding data through its online Contribution Details Reports and Funding Application documents since the inception of DaO. Figure i provides an overview of the evidence used to inform the review findings.

Figure i: Evidence used to inform the review findings

Method	
Key informant interviews including country-based staff	17 interviews with participants from UNHCR HQ, 2 with other UN agency HQ participants, 6 UNDG/DOCO participants, 22 Mozambique participants, 14 Montenegro participants, 5 BiH participants, 10 Tanzania participants, 19 Pakistan participants, 8 other UNHCR country-based participants 103 participants in total
Country case studies	Visits to Mozambique, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina. Expanded series of interviews with Tanzania 5 countries in total
Country telephone interviews	Telephone interviews with UNHCR staff from Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Liberia and Malawi 7 Countries in total

Online survey	Participation from Mozambique, Tanzania, Mali, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, Ethiopia and Montenegro 10 countries in total
Literature review	16 UNHCR policy documents, 58 UNHCR DaO-related documents, 91 DaO policy documents, 6 Independent Evaluation documents, 29 DaO lessons documents, 142 Country documents 342 documents in total

Findings

The One Programme/Joint Programmes

DaO has significant potential to support UNHCR in its normative role. It is in this context where UNHCR representation is often modest in size, its resources are limited and there is the greatest possibility for UNHCR to benefit from working with the UNCT through the One Programme in order to achieve policy change. In its operations, the One Programme offers an opportunity for UNHCR to mobilise the support of UN development agencies in protracted refugee situations and the pursuit of durable solutions and to influence the national development agenda in support of Persons of Concern (PoC). However, progress in advancing this agenda has been patchy and success is dependent on the existence of an enabling policy, political and institutional environment. While there is some good practice, it tends to be the exception. UNHCR's country planning framework, its programme-based approach and its results-based management RBM framework are all a poor fit with DaO systems (see figure ii) which puts UNHCR at a strategic disadvantage, particularly with other agencies that have sought to strengthen alignment with the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR)¹ and that have project-based planning processes.

Despite these limitations DaO does have the potential to strengthen operations in the future and there is more that UNHCR could do to promote an enabling environment; there is scope to strengthen the evidence base for successful partnerships and to develop the tools for success in the future; the adoption in the One Programme of a more robust rights-based approach that builds from the 'Human Rights Up Front' Initiative would also improve the potential for refugees, asylum seekers, stateless people and IDPs² to benefit from the same visibility and development assistance as nationals, which is currently rarely the case; and there is scope for UNHCR to adapt its systems or provide more rigorous guidance on how to translate them to meet the needs of the One Programme.

The Common Budgetary Framework/One Fund

From a contributions perspective, the added value of DaO is negligible to UNHCR³ and as the country-based One Funds have shrunk in size and donors have increased their earmarking of funds, the limited contributions that UNHCR has received in the past are likely to continue to diminish. In countries where a One Fund exists, UNHCR's bilateral contributions to its joint programmes exceed contributions that it has received from the One Fund.⁴

¹ The QCPR is the primary policy instrument of the General Assembly to define the way the UN development system operates to support programme countries in their development efforts.

² In saying this it is noteworthy there were no examples in the case studies of UNHCR IDP projects that had been included in the One Programme.

³ By February 2015 UNHCR had managed to mobilize \$USD20.2 million for projects in Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Papua New Guinea which is less than 3% of the total contributions to the One Fund and constitutes a very modest amount compared with pooled sources of UN humanitarian funds such as the CERF from which UNHCR received approximately \$USD321 million over the same period.

⁴ In Pakistan for example, between 2009 and 2012, contributions to the One Fund were estimated to be \$86.2m of which UNHCR received approximately 1.02% or \$0.88m in 2010. Over the same period, \$103.2m was raised bilaterally for the joint RAHA programme convened by UNHCR under the One Programme. This

Evidence from the case studies suggest that UNHCR's budgeting process can also serve as a disincentive particularly when it has not been possible to obtain agreement from headquarters for an increase in budget space for joint programme activities. Translation of UNHCR's budgeting system to comply with the needs of the CBF takes considerable time and is an inexact process (see figure ii). While some pragmatic solutions have been found, they lack internal consistency and would benefit from the provision of guidance from headquarters.

One Leader

While concerns about the effectiveness of the 'functional firewall' persist, there is evidence from the case studies that when the One Leader understands and is supportive of UNHCR's mandate, then s/he can play an important role in engaging in advocacy on behalf of its PoC. What is problematic is the lack of consistency in the way the Resident Coordinator (RC) chooses to engage with UNHCR across countries which can act as a significant barrier to effective ways of working. While UNHCR has not yet fully implemented the management and accountability framework of the UN Development and RC system,⁵ this will only partially resolve some of the more complex relational issues and there was consensus from almost all the review participants that the personality - of the RC, but also of UNCT members - accounted in part for the success or otherwise of the One Leader.

Communicating as One

Maintaining agencies' brand and visibility within joint communications has been one of the more challenging and sensitive aspects of DaO but where this is supported by a policy which seeks to bring agencies together rather than speak on their behalf, then UNHCR has found considerable added value, particularly in countries where it has limited resources. In most of the case study countries there was space within the DaO framework for UNHCR to speak out independently on issues related to its mandate which was welcomed although there were far fewer examples of where the RC and UNCT supported UNHCR on more sensitive refugee-related issues. Where this did happen, however, it was considered to be of significant benefit. As with the One Programme and One Leader, communications is another area that many UNHCR staff considered would benefit greatly from a more robust interpretation of DaO's rights-based approach (RBA).

Operating as One

The potential benefits of Operating as One make a compelling case for change and in theory efficiencies should be easily achieved. However, in practice, progress towards realising these have taken time and UNHCR's adoption of many of the components has been hampered by the difficulties in finding joint systems that do not require a duplication of effort to translate them to agency-specific procedures. That said, the development of Business Operating Strategies (BOS) have often taken a pragmatic approach towards selecting the systems that can offer the greatest benefit at the least cost and additional workload to agencies and while this means that some of the more significant issues are left untouched, at least it can offer some added value. While several of the case studies revealed the benefits of co-location which went far beyond cost savings, as they often provided the relational glue between agencies' staff which is so important for the success of DaO, it is evident that the benefits of Operating as One will be limited without significant harmonisation in procedures. The importance of headquarters level change for UNHCR to harvest the benefits (in terms of effectiveness and efficiency) of DaO cuts across many of the DaO pillars including the One Programme, CBF and Operating as One.

underlines the comparative importance of bilateral funding to UNHCR, even for joint programmes within a One Programme.

⁵ Developed by UNDG in 2008, the management and accountability framework outlines the overall concept of governance and accountability for leadership of the UN Development system

Figure ii: Programme approach and budgeting systems that dis-incentivise participation in DaO

DaO Pillar	UNHCR procedure	Description
One programme	Strategic planning cycle	UNHCR has not fully aligned its strategic planning with the QCPR and does not report to its governing body on its contribution towards the implementation of Resolution 67/226.
	Country planning framework	UNHCR does not require its country programme documents to demonstrate complete results chains down from the UNDAF. As a consequence there is a need for country teams to translate the annual Country Operational Plans to 3-5-year budgeted One Programme frameworks.
	Results-based management	UNHCR's planning and budgeting Results Based Management is built around PoC and divided into goals, rights groups, objectives and pre-designated outputs. Because the pre-designated outputs rarely cohere with those of the UNDAF there is a need to artificially disaggregate its objectives and outputs, to projects/activities used in the UNDAF.
	Joint programme procedures	Joint programme implementation is complex particularly where UNHCR is accountable for coordination, reporting and financial results. In these instances, the difference in agency systems and procedures can offer a weak platform for working together and led to considerable additional work as standards and approaches to programme planning and reporting have proved difficult to reconcile.
Common Budgetary Framework	Translating UNHCR's budget to the CBF	To track expenditure requires a duplicate spreadsheet to be maintained which can then be used for the purposes of reporting against the UNDAF. The CBF includes estimated agency contributions (disaggregated by core and non-core) and a funding gap. Three case study countries each used a different approach to estimate the gap.
	Programme vs. project budgeting	UNHCR has a programme-level budgeting process compared to the One Programme's project-level process. This has the potential to weaken UNHCR's advocacy within UNCT for allocation of funding from the One Fund or other pooled funding mechanisms as it is complex to demonstrate the existence of a gap for activities which have been prioritised.
	Incorporating joint programme funding into UNHCR's budget	When opportunities for joint programmes have arisen for activities that have not been prioritised under the Operating Level (OL) but have been included in the Operations Plan it should follow that the OL should be increased accordingly but this is frequently not the case. There were examples where other UN agencies with more accommodating financial procedures were urged to accept the funds on UNHCR's behalf. The lack of predictability of this process can serve as a disincentive for UNHCR's participation in joint programmes.
Operating as One	Procurement, Human Resources, transport, etc.	There were concerns that for some systems that had been harmonised (such as procurement), there was still a need to translate agreed procedures into agency-specific procedures for the purposes of obtaining authorisation.

Conclusion

The foundations of DaO, based on the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and inequality which requires a more coherent, harmonized and rights-based response are sound. While UNHCR has a humanitarian mandate, important aspects of its normative work and its operations, including its work in protracted refugee situations and finding durable solutions for its PoC, would doubtless benefit from the support of development agencies.

Despite the potential benefits of DaO to UNHCR it has had limited success in galvanizing collective programme and policy support through the Initiative. While some of this can be attributed to the

lack of consolidated internal guidance on how UNHCR should engage with the Initiative, it also is in part a reflection of the inconsistent way in which human rights has been considered. Despite this, there is a small but growing body of evidence which suggests that where UNHCR is part of the Common Country Assessment and its PoC are afforded the same level of prioritisation as others in the One Programme, then DaO offers an important platform to work in partnership with UNCT members and government to identify and deliver durable solutions and to address protection concerns.

While UNHCR has struggled to maximize the programmatic benefit of DaO, its engagement still requires significant time as the Initiative is process-heavy and UNHCR's programme approach and business systems are currently ill-adapted to fit with it. Many of these problems will ultimately only be reconciled by making headquarters-level changes although the provision of comprehensive guidance document on UNHCR's engagement with DaO would be of significant assistance in reducing some of the inefficiencies while at the same time increasing the consistency in how UNHCR seeks to translate between different systems.

Looking to the future, the emerging post-2015 agenda, the World Humanitarian Summit and reviews of the UN's peacekeeping operations are likely to lead to significant changes in the way the world seeks to address poverty and respond to crises and if UNHCR wants to play a role in these and ensure that the decisions made in these important global opportunities are in the best interests of its PoC then it needs to continue to strengthen its engagement with DaO.

Recommendations

Directed towards UNHCR at a strategic level, at headquarters-level and in the field, the recommendations outlined below will strengthen UNHCR's engagement with the DaO initiative in the future and increase the potential for it to contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations.

#	UNHCR's strategic engagement in the DaO Initiative
1	It is essential that UNHCR clarifies the relationship it has to the QCPR and any reporting obligations under it. If UNHCR is obliged to report against the QCPR it should take action to align its strategic plan with the Resolution.
#	Provision of Headquarters-level support and guidance
2	The 2008 UNHCR policy guidance document and memorandum are now dated and should be revised based on the findings of this review and in a way that is consistent with these recommendations. This should be partnered with an operational guidance note to support UNHCR's engagement in DaO at the country-level.
3	In light of the findings of this review and as the only one of the 12-larger UN agencies yet to do so, it is recommended that UNHCR initiates a headquarters exercise to address challenges and bottlenecks with DaO in line with the Headquarters plan of Action.
4	Guidance should be developed for UNHCR staff in DaO countries on how to most effectively and efficiently translate UNHCR's programme approach, RBM and budgeting procedures to meet the requirements of the One Programme. Guidance should also be prepared to guide field-level engagement in the different aspects of the BOS.
5	Headquarters should clarify which Department has overall responsibility for strategic engagement with DaO and articulate how this links to other parts of the agency that have links to DaO.
6	The lessons from successful solutions strategies should be used to support DaO countries in the following ways; (i) To create an evidence-based portfolio of good practice in developing solutions strategies in the context of the CCA and UNDAF; (ii) To develop at the global level of a set of advocacy messages that can be used to promote solutions at the country-level; (iii) To provide input to update the 2005 handbook (or to produce a lighter, operational guide) on Development Assistance to Refugees ;

	(iv) To provide guidance on seeking to use the yearly planning system in a multi-year multi-partner context.
7	At the global level, UNHCR should engage with UN development partners in order to design collaborative solutions strategies. Where the potential for global partnerships is identified, more detailed discussions should be held between headquarters' in order to highlight and reconcile differences between UN partners in mandate, programming approach, reporting and business practices.
8	UNHCR should strengthen the timeliness and predictability of the procedure for increasing budget space for activities above the OL. This would increase the likelihood of field teams accepting contributions for joint programmes and would maximize resource mobilisation from DaO.
9	A system of reciprocal performance appraisal between the RC and UNCT members has been implemented for several years and it is important that UNHCR updates its performance appraisal guidance for its Representatives to accommodate this system.

#	Field-based engagement in the DaO Initiative
10	UNHCR teams at a country level need to more systematically participate in the earliest stages of the CCA and UNDAF development to ensure that UNHCR's PoC are included in the framework and that it includes strategies for them to attain their right to assistance and protection in the long-term.
11	In DaO countries, UNHCR should advocate on the use the 'Human Rights Up Front' initiative to ensure that there is an enabling environment for the inclusion of its PoC within a rights-based One Programme. Where PoC are not afforded their rights to assistance and protection under national law and the One Programme fails to include them, UNHCR at a country-level should be more systematic in documenting this and escalating it to the Headquarters for action.
12	Where the One Leader or Communicating as One fails to respect UNHCR's independence then UNHCR should use the SOPs as a lens for documenting the areas of divergence and should systematically escalate these to Headquarters.
13	Staff members at all levels of UNHCR play an essential role in implementing DaO and it is important that their job descriptions, performance objectives and deliverables reflect their participation and that their appraisal includes delivery of DaO-related objectives.

Table of contents

Executive summary	ii
Table of contents	viii
Acknowledgements	ix
Acronyms	x
1. Objectives of the review	1
1.1 Scope of the review	1
1.2 Approach, methods and limitations	1
1.3 Report structure and content	4
2. Overview of the Delivering as One Initiative	4
2.1 The impetus for UN reform and the DaO Initiative	5
2.2 The rise and rise of DaO	8
2.3 The interrelationship between the DaO Initiative and humanitarian action	10
3. UNHCR's early engagement in the DaO Initiative	11
3.1 Lessons from UNHCR's engagement in the DaO pilots	11
3.2 Overview of UNHCR's policy guidance on the DaO Initiative	12
3.3 Headquarters-level engagement in the DaO Initiative	13
4. One Programme	14
4.1 The operational context	17
4.2 The humanitarian context	20
4.3 The application of a Rights-Based Approach	23
4.4 The relationship between the UN and the government	24
4.5 The need for guidance on UNHCR's future engagement in the One Programme	24
5. Joint programmes	25
5.1 The potential benefits of joint programmes	26
5.2 UNHCR's experience of joint programmes by pillar	27
5.3 Factors that influence the outcomes of UNHCR's engagement in joint programmes	28
5.4 Realising the potential of joint programmes in the future?	30
6. Planning and Results-Based Management	31
6.1 Strategic planning cycle	31
6.2 Country planning frameworks	32
6.3 Results-Based Management	33
6.4 UNDAF coordination and results architecture	34
6.5 Implications of the One Programme on workload	35
7. Common budgetary framework and 'One Fund'	36
7.1 Budgeting	36
7.2 The One Fund	39
7.3 Joint resource mobilization	41
8. One Leader	42
8.1 Management and accountability	42
8.2 The personality factor	46
8.3 The challenge of retaining institutional knowledge of DaO	46
9. Communicating as One	47

9.1 Communications	47
9.2 Advocacy	48
10. Operating as One	50
10.1 Strengthening the case for Operating as One	50
10.2 UNHCR's engagement at country-level	51
10.3 The headquarters plan of action	53
11. Core messages and lessons for UNHCR's engagement with the DaO Initiative	54
12. An assessment of UNHCR's engagement in the DaO Initiative against the ToC	57
12.1 The one programme/joint programmes	57
12.2 The CBF/One Fund	58
12.3 One Leader	59
12.4 Communicating as One	59
12.5 Operating as One	59
13. Conclusion and recommendations	60
13.1 Conclusion	60
13.2 Recommendations	61
Annexes	
Annex 1: Terms of reference	63
Annex 2: Review participants'	66
Annex 3: Review criteria and research questions	68
Annex 4: Sources of information	71
Annex 5: Supplementary table outlining UNHCRs participation in UNDAFs	75
Annex 6: Analysis of countries that have adopted a common UN planning framework (inc. DaO)	77

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Acronyms

AA	Administrative Agent
BOS	Business Operations Strategy
CBF	Common Budgetary Framework
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
COP	Country Operations Plan
DAR	Development Assistance for Refugees
DaO	Delivering as One
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DOCO	Development Operations Coordination Office
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRTF	Delivering Results Together Fund
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ExCom	Executive Committee
HACT	Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LTA	Long Term Agreement
MA	Managing Agent
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OL	Operating Level
OP	Operations Plan
PDES	Policy Development and Evaluation Section
PPG	Population Planning Group
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
RAHA	Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Programme
RBA	Rights-Based Approach
RBM	Results Based Management
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinators Office
SG	Secretary General
SSG	Solutions Steering Group
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
ToC	Theory of Change
TSI	Transitional Solutions Initiative
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMEER	UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

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1. Objectives of the review

This section outlines the purpose of the review and the research methods that were used and offers a theory of change (ToC) for how the DaO Initiative could strengthen UNHCR's work which will be used to support the analysis. The limitations of the research are described and an explanation is provided of how the report is organised.

1.1 Scope of the review

The purpose of the review is to assess the extent to which factors internal to UNHCR or the DaO Initiative, including mandate, policies and business practices, influence the effectiveness of UNHCR's engagement with it (including fund-raising). It is primarily for the purpose of learning and will identify whether there are any major gaps and challenges and make appropriate recommendations to address them. The specific objectives of the review are as follows;

- to assess the practical relevance of the DaO to UNHCR's strategic goal of finding durable solutions for refugees and other persons of concern and the effectiveness of UNHCR's engagement with the DaO initiative;
- to assess the possible practical long-term implications of the DaO initiative for UNHCR's mandate, policies and business practices. In this respect, the experience and perspective of other UN, primarily humanitarian agencies will be sought;
- to provide useful advice to UNHCR globally and to Representatives and managers in the field on the cost-benefit of engaging with the DaO initiative where it exists.

This review will not attempt to assess the effectiveness or impact of UNHCR's DaO-funded joint programmes *per se*, or of the DaO Initiative itself, but rather whether the respective policies and procedures mutually reinforce UNHCR's and DaO's strategic goals or otherwise (see annex 1 for a summary ToR).

1.2 Approach, methods and limitations

Approach

The review adopted a mixed methodology consisting of a document and literature review (including existing reviews and evaluations); an analysis of UNHCR's participation in DaO; interviews with key stakeholders in UNHCR in Geneva and in the field and with the UN in New York and at country-level (see annex 2 for a list of participants and annex 3 for a list of questions); an online survey for field-based UNHCR staff involved with the DaO Initiative; and an analysis of funding data through its online Contribution Details Reports and Funding Application documents since the inception of DaO.

Field trips to four DaO country operations with active UNHCR engagement were undertaken, which included interviews with key stakeholders, including key UNHCR officials and key actors in the UN Country Team (UNCT) to solicit their views on the UNHCR-DaO relationship. A further 10 countries contributed to the evaluation including an extended series of internal and external stakeholder interviews with the UN in Tanzania. A summary table of the methods used is given below.

Method	Description	Use in the review
Literature review	Sources of information were divided into six broad themes as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR documents: Documents pertaining to UNHCRs mandate, 	Sources of information are listed

	<p>policies and procedures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR and DaO: Policy and guidance for UNHCR’s engagement with the DaO initiative; reviews of UNHCR’s engagement with the DaO initiative and lessons learned. ▪ DaO policies, procedures and analysis: DaO policy and procedure documents including factsheets, guidance documents, relevant resolutions and policy reviews, standard operating procedures, budgetary guidance, transaction costs, monitoring reports ▪ Independent evaluation: Country pilot documents including the evaluations, the independent evaluation ▪ DaO lessons learned: UN agency reviews and lessons learned (ILO, UN Habitat), UN agency guidance (UNICEF) and literature from academic journals. ▪ Country documents: Documents on country-level participation in DaO 	<p>in annex 4. The number of documents against referred to for theme is as follows: 16: UNHCR policy 58 :UNHCR/DaO 91: DaO policies 6: Independent Eval. 29: DaO lessons 142: Country docs 342: TOTAL</p>
Informant Interviews	<p>Key informants for the review included the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Country-based staff: RC and RCO staff, UN agency staff, UNHCR staff in each of the 5 case study countries (including Tanzania) ▪ UNHCR headquarters staff: Senior staff from across different departments; ▪ Other UN Headquarters staff: Staff members with responsibility for/knowledge of DaO implementation; ▪ UNDG/DOCO staff: New York-based staff with responsibility for leading and supporting DaO implementation. 	<p>17: UNHCR HQ 2 : Other HQ 6 : UNDG/DOCO 22: Mozambique 14: Montenegro 5 : BiH 10: Tanzania 19: Pakistan 8 : Other countries 103: TOTAL</p>
Country case study visits	<p>Four case study countries were visited as part of the review to offer an opportunity to gather field experience from UNHCR and its partners and to strengthen the evidence base and to ensure credibility of the study. An extended set of telephone interviews were conducted with Tanzania to draw from the UN’s extensive experience of DaO implementation in the country.</p>	<p>Visits to Mozambique, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina. Expanded series of interviews with Tanzania</p>
Online survey	<p>An online survey targeted UNHCR country-based staff. The survey comprised a short questionnaire containing 10-questions. The feedback from the survey was directly incorporated into the review as a series of charts indicating the survey results and associated text boxes highlighting ‘<i>voices from the field.</i>’</p>	<p>Participation from the following countries: Mozambique, Tanzania, Mali, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Montenegro</p>

Theory of change

As DaO is targeted at the UNCT as a whole in a country rather than the individual UN entities and given that its focus to date has largely been on the UN Development System while UNHCR’s mandate is broadly humanitarian in nature, the ToC developed for the 2012 Independent Evaluation of DaO (reproduced in figure 4) is of limited relevance to the review. However, it does provide a template for a UNHCR-specific ToC which describes the potential contribution that DaO *could* offer the agency based on a review of the literature (particularly the 2007 stock take of UNHCR’s participation in the DaO) and views articulated by staff during the inception visit (see figure 1).


The ToC provides a simple logic chain of how the five ‘Ones’ could contribute to strengthening the application of UNHCR’s mandate both with sister agencies and national governments, strengthen resource mobilization in support of UNHCR’s PoC and how it could offer business efficiencies to the agency. On the left hand side of the diagram are the five ‘Ones’ which form the basis of the DaO,

each of which could provide a number of inputs that could be expected to deliver outputs⁶ which in turn will lead to outcomes. The outcomes could be expected to contribute to important changes in the way that the UNCT, donors and governments at a country-level relate to UNHCR's PoC which may be expected to significantly contribute to the ultimate objective of UNHCR at a national level.

While the diagram is by necessity a simplification of a set of complex inter-relationships, it does provide a common theoretical framework which can be used as a lens to understand the effect of DaO on UNHCR's mandate and business practices. DaO has the potential to make a positive contribution to the achievement of UNHCR's mandate and business practices in the following ways;

- Greater programme coherence for protracted refugee situations and durable solutions delivering more relevant services and support to PoC;
- Partnerships with development agencies which can better meet the long-term assistance requirements for PoC;
- Stronger & more unified voice within the UNCT government delivering better results for PoC;
- Greater resource mobilisation contributing to the full range of interventions required by PoC;
- Stronger, more strategic leadership providing greater support for UNHCR's mandate;
- More efficient and cost-effective provision of support and services for UNHCR operations.

Figure 1: Simplified ToC for the contribution that DaO *could* make to UNHCR and its PoC



While the ToC is helpful in simplifying complex realities, what limits its utility is the differential way in which DaO is implemented in countries, with different strategies being adopted for implementation of each of the 'Ones' in different countries⁷ and also the significant role that personal relationships both between individuals and members of the UNCT can have on the positive contribution made by DaO. As a consequence, a positive outcome in one country may not transpire

⁶ Outputs are not presented in the theory of change as they are too numerous to include and are also dependent on how DaO is being implemented which is variable – see the limitations below

⁷ Adapting DaO to the country context is an explicit requirement of the Initiative.

in another. It is also important to add that many of the outcomes outlined in the ToC could also be achieved through strategies other than the adoption of the DaO. However, since the issue under review is UNHCR's engagement with the Initiative, counterfactuals were not sought, but it is important to note that other strategies may have achieved the same or better outcomes for UNHCR.

Notwithstanding these limitations and those described below, the review will seek to test whether the potential benefits outlined in the ToC have been realised, and if not, what the effects (positive and negative) of the DaO has been on UNHCR's mandate, programme, funding and business practices. The review will focus on the outcome level.

Limitations

A number of limitations were encountered during the review; perhaps the most significant of these was the diversity in the way that DaO is implemented. While the lessons-learning nature of the study and the structuring of the questions on each of the 'Ones' made it easier to accommodate this diversity and permitted the identification of models which better-suited UNHCR's mandate and business practices, it made comparison between countries more complex and militated against generalised findings and conclusions.

The lack of baseline data on the situation prior to DaO implementation meant that it was difficult to make a judgement on the net benefit (or detriment) that the Initiative had on UNHCR. Similarly, the lack of a counterfactual to DaO countries where few or no elements of DaO had been rolled out made it impossible to study the relationships between UNHCR and other UNCT members and the host government in the absence of the framework provided by DaO.

These challenges were heightened by the lack of disaggregated data to quantify changes in the efficiency of business practices and it was only in a small number of cases that analysis had been applied to specific areas where cost savings had been achieved.

The review did not explore the opinions of host governments on UNHCR's participation in the DaO either because of their lack of engagement in the process at a sufficiently detailed level to be able to participate, or because representatives were not available at the time the review was being conducted.

1.3 Report structure and content

Section 1 of the report provides an overview of the purpose of the evaluation, describes the methods used, offers a theory of change and outlines the limitations of the process. Section 2 introduces the DaO Initiative and provides an overview of its roll-out from the initial pilot to the present day. It also offers some suggestions as to the future of the Initiative. Section 3 provides an overview of UNHCR's historical engagement in the Initiative and outlines Policy Guidance and lessons that have been learned. Sections 4 to 10 present the findings of the review by DaO Pillar. Section 11 provides a set of core messages and lessons for UNHCR on DaO. Section 12 assesses UNHCR's engagement in DaO against the ToC and section 13 concludes the review and offers recommendations for UNHCR's future participation in the Initiative.

2. Overview of the 'Delivering as One' Initiative

This section documents the rationale for reform in the UN and the development and roll-out of the DaO Initiative from the initial pilots to the current situation. It provides a description of the 5 DaO 'pillars' and makes some observations about the future of the Initiative.


2.1 The impetus for UN reform and the DaO Initiative

Since the late 1990s there have been many calls for reform of the UN however, there has been little clarity or consensus about what reform might mean in practice. This has changed over the last decade during which there has been growing agreement on the need to enhance the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN's operational activities in order to overcome many of the poor practices which include the following;

“Overlapping mandates - and mandate gaps; the costs and time associated with effective coordination; UN development system versus specific UN agency identity; horizontal versus vertical accountability; the drive for harmonization versus safeguarding individual agency business models; and funding behaviours among donors...constrain, and even undermine, coordination and greater coherence”⁸

During the World Summit of 2005, the need for UN reform was given new impetus and the Secretary-General (SG) established the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in 2006. In its report, entitled ‘*Delivering as one*’, focusing mainly on the area of development, the Panel presented a series of recommendations aimed at, among other issues, strengthening the work of the UN in partnership with host Governments and its focus on results (see figure 2 for a timeline of UN reform associated with the DaO Initiative).

Figure 2: UN reform and the Delivering as One Initiative timeline, 2006 – 2015



As the Initiative gained momentum, eight countries volunteered to pilot DaO which included Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam. The purpose of the pilots was to allow the UN system, in cooperation with host Governments and in support of national development goals, to develop approaches that would enhance coherence, efficiency and effectiveness at country level; reduce transaction costs for national partners; and test what works best in various country situations. The 5 pillars of DaO are described in figure 3 but it is important to note that it is not a ‘one size fits all’ model and so DaO has been configured and implemented differently in countries, depending on the context.

⁸ Looking to the future: Current and emerging strategic priorities – Remarks by John Hendra at the ECOSOC OAS, 24 February, 2014 available at <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/2/john-hendra-at-the-ecosoc-oas>

Figure 3: The pillars of Delivering as One⁹

One Leader: The RC who coordinates all UN development activities in a programme country was given more authority and resources. By assuming comprehensive strategic leadership, the RC acts as a link between national authorities, the UN and other partners. The commitment and incentives of the UNCT to work towards common results and accountability was later strengthened through implementation of the monitoring and accountability system and by defining UNCT Conduct and Working Arrangements.

One Programme: Under the leadership of the RC and based on the country's nationally-owned development strategy, a joint country programme or UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is defined which draws on the full range of UN expertise and enables UN organizations to better focus on activities according to their comparative advantages. Joint Work Plans aligned with the UNDAF were later added to strengthen the results-focus.

Common Budgetary Framework/One Fund: The CBF is a common financial framework for all UN development entities at country-level updated annually with transparent data on financial resources required, available, expected, and to be mobilised. Coordinated financial planning provides governments and partners with transparent information on all UN activities as well as on funding sources and gaps. A Joint Resource Mobilization strategy that is appropriate to the country context is frequently adopted. A One Fund may be established at country-level to provide funding for unfunded UNDAF outcomes.

Operating as One: In order to increase efficiency and to lower expenses for administration, business procedures and policies must be harmonised, simplified and unified. When relevant, premises and services should be shared between UN organizations. Since 2014, it has been recommended that these efficiencies are bought together to form a Business Operations Strategy (BOS).

Communicating as One: Communicating as One entails the development of a joint communications strategy for all UN agencies which is appropriate to the country context and is approved by the UNCT.

As part of the Independent Evaluation of the pilot phase of the Initiative mandated in the 2007 Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review Resolution and undertaken in 2010, seven of the eight pilot countries (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam) conducted a country-led evaluation. In the case of Pakistan, a stocktaking exercise took place with a report prepared in 2010 in consultation with the Government of Pakistan which involved all UN organizations.

The Independent Evaluation of the DaO initiative was published in 2012 and registered mixed results against the Organisation for Economic Cooperation in Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) criteria. As part of designing the evaluation methodology, the team constructed a ToC to illustrate how the pilots could be expected to strengthen the UN system at country level (see figure 4) which was used as a means of describing the success of the initiative.

Against the four pillars,¹⁰ the evaluation revealed that there was only '*moderate*' progress made against the One Programme, One Leader and One Budget strategies and performance was considered to be '*weak*' on One Office, while the two new '*One*' strategies that emerged, One Fund and One Voice were respectively scored '*moderate*' and '*strong*'. Progress towards the immediate outcomes was found to be '*little*' on '*reduced duplication*' and '*reduced fragmentation*' and


⁹ It is important to note that definitions for the 5 "Ones" have changed in the literature over the years - the core aspirations for each of the DaO pillars has been taken from a 2013 UN fact sheet which describes the first 4 pillars. A description for Communicating as One and updates to reflect changed made to the other pillars were taken from the 2014 UNDG SOPS document.

¹⁰ At the time the evaluation was undertaken, 'One Voice' or 'Communicating as One' pillar had not been formally adopted into the Initiative.

'moderate' on 'reduced competition for funds' and 'enhanced capacity for strategic approaches'. Intermediate outcomes were found to be 'strong' only on 'national ownership', but 'moderate' regarding 'better delivery of UN system support' and 'little' regarding 'reduced transaction costs'.¹¹

Overall, in terms of the OECD/DAC criteria the evaluation found that the DaO initiative scored 'strong' on relevance, 'moderate' on effectiveness, 'weak' on efficiency and 'moderate' on sustainability. In its concluding remarks, the evaluation outlined the challenges in planning and monitoring and evaluation linked to the One Programme and the importance of strengthening horizontal accountability as well as questioning the efficiencies achieved by Operating as One in the absence of 'more vigorous systemic changes' at headquarters level.¹²

Figure 4: A generic theory of change for DaO at country level¹³




Shortly after the evaluation, Member States reaffirmed their commitment to further improve the coherence of the UN Development System through the UN Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) in 2012 and requested that the process be further consolidated by drawing on the lessons of the Independent Evaluation to formulate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). In 2013 a set of SOPs were developed and were adopted by all UN Heads of Agencies in September 2014 (see figure 5 for an overview of the SOPs). Among other benefits, the SOPs are considered to have addressed some of the concerns highlighted in the evaluation regarding the lack of a results-focus and the limited benefits from Operating as One. A strengthened focus on UN coordination and impact underpin the 'second generation' of DaO.

¹¹ These findings were taken from *the Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One, Summary Report*, September 2012, New York: United Nations.

¹² *Ibid*, p29.

¹³ United Nations, (2012) *Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One, Main report*, p. 9.


Figure 5: Interrelationships between the pillars of UN support to a DaO country¹⁴



2.2 The rise and rise of DaO

By July 2014 the number of DaO countries had increased to 39 in number and by March 2015, 44 countries had signed up to the Initiative (see figure 6 for a timeline of DaO country adoption between 2007 and March 2015).

Figure 6: The number of new DaO countries and the cumulative total of DaO countries, 2007- March 2015




The adoption of DaO by the UN is triggered when the government makes a formal request to the UN RC. The RC informs the Regional Chair of the UNDG and discusses the request with the UNCT. An agreement is then made between the government and the UN which outlines the details of how DaO will be advanced. However, in addition to the eight pilot countries and subsequent ‘self-starters’ there are a large number of countries where there has not been a formal request received from the government but where the UN Mission is applying a number of the DaO approaches, particularly the UNDAF, as good practice. This increases the number of countries affected by the

¹⁴ Adapted from United Nations Development Group (2014) *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Adopting the “Delivering as One” Approach*, New York: United Nations, p.10.

Initiative quite considerably. While the data on which countries have adopted which of the pillars or processes is still being analysed by UN DOCO,¹⁵ analysis undertaken as part of this review from the list of 136 countries on the UNDG website suggests that as many as 125 of them have developed an UNDAF.¹⁶ It is also noteworthy that in the 2014 survey conducted by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) on the QCPR, 70% of 67 governments that answered the question expressed an interest in implementing some or all of the elements of DaO.¹⁷

In terms of Government approval of DaO, in a survey undertaken in preparation for the 2012 QCPR by DESA, DaO countries appeared to be more convinced about the value of the contribution that the UN has made to their country. Of those governments that responded positively, 73% considered that the introduction of DaO had made it easier to deal with the UN system while the remaining 27% said it was too early to determine this. Furthermore, governments also consider that the DaO Initiative helps achieve better results than if each UN agency had planned its support separately (see figure 7), which echoes the findings of the 2012 Independent Evaluation.

Figure 7: Government perceptions of UNDAF effectiveness, 2012 and 2014¹⁸



Also of importance in analysing the influence of DaO is the endorsement in February 2014 of the SOPs Plan of Action for Headquarters (HQ), which outlines a joint commitment to jointly address HQ-level bottlenecks to DaO implementation over a two-year period. The Plan of Action contains 55 actions that the UNDG in close collaboration with the High Level Committee on Management needs to implement. It is anticipated that this will act as an accelerant for the stepping up of coherence efforts in both DaO and non-DaO countries. While many of the actions are already being implemented, where there has been more difficulty in making progress has been in addressing issues that required the approval of UN governing bodies or issues that affect business models which differ considerably between different UN entities.

Looking to the future, the UNDG has identified the implementation of the SOPs and the need for being *'fit for purpose'* to support the implementation of the post-2015 agenda which has contributed to an increase in the momentum for coherence across the UN. With the SOPs having been completed, there has been a concerted effort by UNDG to support countries towards adoption and implementation as a key strategy to ensure that the UN Development system delivers relevant, coherent, efficient and effective support to countries.

¹⁵ A list of countries in which the UNCT has adopted one or more of the DaO pillars is currently being compiled by UN DOCO and is expected to be finalised by mid-2015.

¹⁶ <https://undg.org/home/country-teams/alphabetical-list-a-z/>

¹⁷ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) *QCPR Monitoring, Survey of programme countries*, 2014 report, December 2014. P.22.

¹⁸ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) *QCPR Monitoring, Survey of programme countries*, 2014 report, December 2014. P.18.

2.3 The interrelationship between the DaO Initiative and humanitarian action

The Independent Evaluation of the DaO shied away from an analysis of the inter-relationship between the DaO and humanitarian response/reform, stating that *'on the basis of work conducted by the Country-Led Evaluations, it has been concluded that the relationship of DaO with the humanitarian role of the UN was not a fundamental issue in the pilot countries.'* This is a curious conclusion given the 2009-2010 stocktaking report for the Pakistan DaO pilot noted the difficulties of balancing the needs of the development-focused DaO alongside a significant humanitarian programme as it *'became excessively challenging for the UN agency country heads to run two parallel programs on full strength with limited human and financial resources.'* In a follow-up audit in 2014 of DaO in Pakistan, the lack of coherence between the UN's humanitarian and development programming were raised as the two most critical recommendations in the report.¹⁹

In addition to promoting change in the way in which the UN delivers its development assistance, the post-2015 agenda has also prompted reflection on how to strengthen the nexus between development and humanitarian assistance and there is growing consensus that responding to these and other global challenges will require a shift away from fragmented projects to a greater emphasis on strengthening the catalytic and normative role of UN entities. The need for this type of coherence has been evident in the development of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)²⁰ which envisage partnership on a far more significant scale than has been achieved in the past *'including bridging the development, security and humanitarian divide'*.²¹

While existing UNDG policy documents make scant reference to coherence in crisis/post-crisis transition (apart from in instances where DaO is being implemented in the context of a UN Integrated Mission)²² there is growing acknowledgement of the urgency of addressing this policy gap. Crisis/Post-crisis transition is included as one of the current three strategic priorities for the UNDG with a focus on the provision of *'coherent support to sustainable recovery through enhanced coordination among operational activities for development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding efforts of the UN system, in accordance with agencies' respective mandates, and incorporation of needs and specificities of these countries in their development processes and programmes. This will include an emphasis on building resilience by developing systems and capacities to reduce risks and vulnerabilities.'*²³ To date, progress in this has been limited and it was considered by the UNDAF Programming Network to have suffered from a lack of attention in 2014, but is considered a priority for 2015.²⁴ It is also a part of the *'Fit for Purpose'* agenda which *'speaks of the need for transitions from relief to development to be managed better, taking place concurrently*

¹⁹ Audit report No. 1247, 20 June 2014, *Audit of DaO in Pakistan*, joint audit undertaken by the internal audit services of FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNIDO.

²⁰ The SDGs are a proposed set of targets relating to future international development. They are to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) once they expire at the end of 2015. The SDGs were first formally discussed at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 (Rio+20).

²¹ Jenkins B. and Akililu B. (2014) *Draft discussion paper on the longer-term positioning of the UN Development System in the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, 9 December 2014, New York. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf14/ecosoc_dialogue_discussion_paper.pdf

²² In these situations, the guidance recommends that the UNDAF should be linked to the Integrated Strategic Framework where this is possible (see UNDG (2014) SOPS for Countries Adopting the Delivering as One Approach, August 2014, p. 14).

²³ United Nations Development Group (2014 – updated) *UNDG Strategic Priorities for 2013-16*.

²⁴ United Nations Development Group (2014) *2013-14 Biennium Final Results and Impact Report for UNDG Working Groups*, the UNDG UNDAF Programming Network (UPN), p5.

*rather than consecutively or in siloes and it is now essential that UNDAFs are not blind to these important development issues.*²⁵

Also of relevance to the discussion of DaO and humanitarian action is the formulation of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response in 2014, (UNMEER). While the entity may be an outlier, it is worthy of note as it has offered a real time 'one UN' model comprised of 96 staff members from throughout the UN system. Reflecting on the challenges of the Ebola response, it has been suggested that *'in countries where operational delivery remains significant and is conducted in extremely difficult circumstances, exploring more integrated models should be considered. In a number of these countries, the case for more highly integrated approaches by the UN bringing together the political, developmental and human rights dimensions is compelling. The case of the response to Ebola points to the need for further reflection and real reform.'*²⁶

While it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the implications of the current initiatives to promote greater coherence between development and humanitarian assistance, it is clear that change is being promoted both internally and externally to the UN which places an ever greater imperative for UN humanitarian agencies to engage in the discussions in order to shape them.

3. UNHCR's early engagement in the DaO Initiative

This section provides an overview of UNHCR's engagement in the DaO to date including its 2007 stock taking exercise, subsequent policy guidance that was developed for UNHCR's participation in the Initiative and headquarters-level engagement. This overview sets the scene and provides a baseline for the findings of the review which follows in subsequent sections.

3.1 Lessons from UNHCR's engagement in the DaO pilots

In 2007 UNHCR undertook an informal stock taking exercise of its engagement in the DaO Initiative²⁷ and this exercise remains the only consolidated set of lessons that have been compiled to date. Since this time there has been far greater organisational engagement on humanitarian reform and Integrated Missions which are considered to be of far greater relevance to UNHCR's mandate. The findings of the stock taking exercise were guardedly positive about the potential impact of DaO on UNHCR, noting that in its *'benefits are most evident in situations such as Pakistan, Rwanda, and Tanzania, where joint programming is used as a vessel through which to secure heightened interaction in refugee-hosting areas with development partners and specialist agencies.'* A summary of the findings is provided in figure 8.

The stock taking exercise advocated for continued engagement with the initiative, *'particularly in the context of [refugee] return and reintegration, self-reliance and development activities for refugee-hosting and refugee-affected areas'* but warned that *'UNHCR maintains its mandate-related obligation to speak out and act independently on issues relating to international refugee protection'*.

²⁵ ECOSOC Operational Activities for Development Segment (2014) *Key messages emanating from deliberations*, 6 March 2014, p.3.

²⁶ Ibid, p7.

²⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2008) *UNHCR's engagement in the Delivering as One pilots: An informal stocktaking*, December 2007, PDES/2008/01, March 2008.

Figure 8: Headline findings from UNHCR's stocktaking exercise of its engagement in the DaO pilots

DaO Pillar	Summary of the findings of UNHCR's 2007 stocktaking exercise
One Leader and Communicating as One	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In 2007 there was a perception that human rights were not a shared priority among all UN agencies. ▪ A related concern was that the One Leader pillar had the potential to stymie UNHCR's ability to speak out independently on issues relating to refugee protection and similar anxieties were raised about the potential of One Voice and common communication strategies. ▪ More positively, where there was an RC committed to a rights-based approach, there was the potential for UNHCR to benefit from wider support across the UNCT.
Common Budgetary Framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNHCR's programme-based approach was considered to be ill-suited to the project-based approach of DaO and experience in the pilots required additional offline budgeting systems to be developed in order to systematise the management of Joint Programme funds. ▪ UNHCR's approach to budgeting presented risks to the agency when activities included in the Joint Programme were also part of the regular budget which risked displacing planned activities that were more central to UNHCR's mandate.
One Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Some concern was expressed about the potential for conflicts between UNHCR's mandate and the alignment of joint programming with national development priorities. Conversely, in Pakistan, the document noted some success in securing refugee inclusion within the One Programme as a cross-cutting theme which provided support from UN development partners such as UNDP. A lack of certainty was expressed in the stock taking exercise about whether all or some parts of UNHCR operations are relevant to DaO (e.g. pillar 3, covering reintegration and local integration activities). In Tanzania, the entire operation was incorporated as the UNDAP was considered to be the business plan of the UN in the country, however, this was not the case in every DaO country and in these situations UNHCR had to divide its programmes between those that were in the DaO and those that fell outside of it. ▪ On reporting of results, a lack of coherence was reported in how UNHCR measures results and the approach of the DaO and there was some concern expressed about the ambition for the latter to become the '<i>only planning instrument replacing agency specific plans</i>' apart from some of the specialized agencies. The necessity of two reporting systems (for DaO and for UNHCR) has implications for the efficiency of business processes.
Operating as One and business practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ While the 2007 stock take raised certain reservations about the potential benefits of common UN premises, there were expectations of efficiencies in other aspects of Operating as One albeit with the caveat that any harmonisation of procedures at country-level will likely require harmonisation also at headquarters level (of HR for legal reasons and of financial management and IT frameworks for reasons of compatibility). ▪ Engagement in the pilots and subsequently in more recent DaO-adopters has required significant additional work both to coordinate activities but also to manage the high transaction costs required to fit DaO processes into UNHCR's business practices.

3.2 Overview of UNHCR's policy Guidance on the DaO Initiative

Subsequent to the stock taking exercise, a Policy Guidance Memorandum²⁸ prepared in September 2008 called upon UNHCR Field Offices to adopt a supportive, collaborative and participatory approach to the initiative in countries where it is piloted. However it warned that since the initiative is primarily anchored in the development arena, it is important to highlight that "*any engagement of*

²⁸ UNHCR IOM No. 069/2008 FOM No. 071/2008, *Policy Guidance on UNHCRs engagement in the UN DaO Initiative and on humanitarian reform and UNHCRs refugee mandate; Update on UNHCRs work on humanitarian space*, 1 September 2014.

UNHCR in the initiative remains focused on those activities that the Office believes lend themselves to the different approaches followed in the planning and implementation of development assistance". Furthermore it added that "the potential bridges between the Delivering as One initiative, the humanitarian reform process and integrated missions require further examination". In outlining the importance of UNHCR's engagement in the initiative, the memorandum also highlighted three 'enabling pre-conditions' that were drawn from the Independent Evaluation and which were considered important for UNHCR's successful engagement;

'First and foremost, the Host Government must be keen, or be convinced to include the integration or reintegration needs of refugees in its longer term development plans. Second, the Resident Coordinator must have the vision and leadership skills as well as knowledge of UNHCR's goals in the country to engage the UNCT in support of including specific UNHCR activities in the country strategic document and processes. In this respect, it is incumbent upon the UNHCR Representative to keep the Resident Coordinator fully apprised of UNHCR's goals, whilst ensuring that UNHCR retains full autonomy to engage directly with the government on issues related to its refugee protection and solutions mandate. Third, the donor community present in the country must be informed, cohesive, supportive of collective results of the UNCT and ready to provide resources towards the resulting joint programmes.'

With the three caveats in mind and the second in particular, the Memorandum encourages UNHCR Representatives to analyse the pros and cons of DaO at a country-level on a case-by-case basis in order to inform a decision on UNHCR's engagement. This policy has important implications for UNHCR's participation in the Initiative which will be examined later in the review.

Other UNHCR policy guidance relating to the DaO Initiative includes the following:

- On 10th July 2013, UNHCR provided clarification to its staff of the cost-sharing agreement for the UN RC system which replaced the previous *ad hoc* system with an annual fee paid directly from headquarters.²⁹
- On 27th December 2013, following the revision of the HACT Framework in which UNHCR participated, it circulated policy guidance to outline and explain the decision to opt out of its implementation.³⁰ HACT was considered not to apply to UNHCR as a consequence of its business model which is based on the delivery of short-term humanitarian assistance and which requires frequent changes of diverse partnerships.
- On 1st September 2014, the UNHCR High Commissioner signed the DaO SOPs with the caveat that '*UNHCR's contribution towards the implementation of the SOPs is without prejudice to the responsibilities conferred on it by the General Assembly, including those outlined in the Statute of Office, and relevant legal instruments such as the international refugee and statelessness conventions*'.

3.3 Headquarters-level engagement in the DaO Initiative

While there are members of staff in UNHCR headquarters with significant experience of engagement with the DaO Initiative, it has tended either to be those who regularly engage with the UNDG (particularly the staff of the New York Liaison Office) or those that have encountered it during field missions. As a consequence, at a headquarters level, institutional knowledge of DaO is held by a small number of staff members spread across the agency with no single individual responsible for

²⁹ UNHCR IOM Nr. 049/2013, FOM No. 049/2013, *UNHCR's participation in the cost-sharing of the UN Resident Coordinator System*, 10 July 2013.

³⁰ Memorandum CM00/2013/0126/FSN/jo, *Revision of the UNDG Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT)*, 27 December 2013.

institutional knowledge and no single repository on UNHCR's intranet of documents, advice or support.³¹

The lack of headquarters engagement is alluded to in UNHCR's submission to the QCPR Monitoring Survey of Agency Headquarters undertaken in December 2014. In response to the question of whether the organisation has initiated a HQ-level exercise to identify and address challenges and bottlenecks with DaO, states that 12 agencies gave a positive response and UNHCR was the only 'larger' UN Agency that reported that it had not.³² Later in the same survey, in response to the question 'to what extent does your agency subscribe to the UNDG SOPs for DaO?' to which 11 agencies answered 'fully', of the 6 agencies that answered 'partially', UNHCR was the only 'larger' agency to do so.³³ In its response, UNHCR explained that most SOPs are relevant for it, 'but there are a few that due to the specific operational environment or the governing structure of UNHCR are not implementable or would decrease efficiency'. In particular, UNHCR emphasized that their contribution toward the implementation of the SOPs had to be 'without prejudice to the responsibilities conferred on it by the General Assembly, including those outlined in the Statute of the Office, and relevant legal instruments such as the international refugee and statelessness conventions'.

From an engagement perspective, UNHCR has participated in each of the different stages of DaO since the initial pilots and has been involved in the majority of the key policy discussions, but for reasons concerned with its mandate and the nature of its operations and programming model, it has tended to be towards the periphery of the Initiative. In saying this, it is important to note that there have also been significant reforms of humanitarian response policy and practice which have occurred concurrently with the growth of DaO and which have understandably received far greater attention from UNHCR as they are more central to its mandate.

4. One Programme

This section presents the findings of the review on UNHCR's engagement in the One Programme including an overview and analysis of UNHCR's participation and factors that influence this which include the operational context; the humanitarian context; the application of a Rights-Based Approach (RBA) and; the relationship between the UN and the government

Of the 44 countries that had formally adopted the DaO Initiative by March 2015, UNHCR had a presence and operations in at least 27 of them.³⁴ While a lack of data makes it difficult to determine precisely in how many countries the UNCT has adopted one or more DaO pillars, a review of UNDG's country-level data³⁵ suggests that in excess of 120 countries currently have a common UN planning framework, and that UNHCR has a presence in over 80 of these (out of a total of 130 countries

³¹ An informative analysis of UNHCR's engagement in 2007-2010 UNDAFs is available on the Solutions Steering Group portal on the intranet; an explanation of the UNDG and QCPR are provided on the Inter-Agency Coordination intranet page, and; the relevant IOM/FOMs are available in the Policy and Guidance section. The DAR Handbook makes reference to potential links between the UNDAF and durable solutions but it is outdated.

³² 12 agencies answered 'yes' to this question, 5 answered 'no' and 5 skipped the question. Among those that answered affirmatively were the agencies that together account for about 85% of UN Operational activities.

³³ 11 agencies answered 'Fully' to this question, 6 said 'Partially', and 1 said 'Not at all'. 4 skipped the question. Among the larger agencies, only UNHCR said 'Partially' and none said 'No'.

³⁴ This figure may be open to different interpretation as for some DaO countries, the budget is held elsewhere and operations are managed from regional offices.

³⁵ See <https://undg.org/home/country-teams/>

where it has operations).³⁶ Furthermore, it is estimated that 80 countries will be going through a process of revising their UNDAFs between 2014 and 2016 which will be used as an opportunity to bring them in compliance with the SOPs. As a consequence it can be anticipated that in many countries where an UNDAF has existed but the SOPs have not been adopted, then it is likely that the opportunity will be taken to revise the framework in accordance with the new policy.

In all of the countries that participated in the review, UNHCR was part of the One Programme. The variation in UNHCR's participation is largely a consequence of the different ways in which DaO is being implemented in each of the countries rather than being a result of staff motivation or agency guidance. Figure 9 summarises the inclusion of UNHCR's PoC in the UNDAF from each of the case study countries and notes the UNDAF outcomes that UNHCR participates in and the pillar(s) of UNHCR's operations that is included in the framework.

Figure 9: Summary of UNHCR's participation in UNDAFs for each the case study countries³⁷

Characteristics	Description
Country	Mozambique
Planning f/w	UNDAF and UNDAF Action Plan, 2012-15
Reference to UNHCR PoC	UNHCR's operations cut across many of the UNDAF 'Areas' but specific reference is made to increased access to justice, human rights and protection and the management of migration flows in the 'Governance Area' outcome.
UNHCR participation	The UNDAF Action Matrix lists UNHCR's operations with its PoC (including refugees and IDPs) under the relevant 'Area' including its refugee-related activities (in outcome 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). UNHCR have prioritised a smaller number of the outcomes for their regular participation.
UNHCR pillars	Pillar 1 – refugee programme, pillar 2 – stateless programme
Budget	Budget - \$5.414m, 100% included in the UNDAF
Country	Montenegro
Planning f/w	Integrated UN Programme, Results and Budgetary Framework (2010-2015)
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Outcome 1.1 of the Social Exclusion Strategic Development Goal includes reference to the harmonisation of legal frameworks for displaced persons. The focus of Outcome 1.2 is on inclusive attitudes and practices towards vulnerable and excluded populations although it does not explicitly refer to UNHCR's PoC. Outcome 1.3 focuses on access to quality services and reference is not made to UNHCR's PoC. The Democratic Governance strategic development goal includes as indicators accession to/ratification of relevant international instruments (statelessness, state succession), harmonization of national legislation with the law on Asylum and the Law on Foreigners (outcome 2.1) and implementation of UNHCR's 10-point Plan of Action for Refugee Protection in Mixed Migration (outcome 2.2). The focus of outcome 2.3 is on increasing awareness of human rights under which UNHCR's programmes on free legal assistance to PoC, capacity building of the national asylum system and prevention off statelessness are listed.
UNHCR participation	UNHCR participates in the first 2 of 3 pillars; the social exclusion strategic development goal and the democratic governance strategic development goal.
UNHCR pillars	Pillar 1 – refugee programme, pillar 2 - stateless programme
Budget	Budget - \$4.621m, 100% included in the Integrated UN Programme
Country	Bosnia & Herzegovina
Planning f/w	One UN Programme 2015 – 2019
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Outcome 1 of the Rule of Law and Human Security focus area includes an indicator related to refugee status; outcome 3 of the, Social inclusion focus area has an explicit focus on Roma communities and on social protection systems for the vulnerable. Outcome 9 on protection

³⁶ UNHCR Global Appeal, 2014 - 2015

³⁷ A supplementary table is available in annex 5 which provides a breakdown for countries that participated in the review remotely which includes Kenya, Namibia, Malawi, Ethiopia, Botswana, Liberia and Zambia

	of the vulnerable has indicators relating to statelessness and displaced persons.
UNHCR participation	UNHCR is present in 3 out of 4 of the results groups which include; Focus area 1 - rule of law and human security; Focus area 3 - social exclusion (education, social protection, child protection, health), and; Focus area 4 - empowerment of women.
UNHCR pillars	Pillar 1 – refugee programme, pillar 2 – stateless programme, pillar 3 – reintegration projects
Budget	Budget - \$9.507m, 100% included in the One UN Programme
Country	Tanzania
Planning f/w	UNDAP ³⁸ 2011 – 2015
Reference to UNHCR PoC	The third UNDAF cluster has a focus on governance, emergency and disaster response and refugees and the UNDAF has a section on refugee response which prioritises care and maintenance, protection and durable solutions such as naturalisation and local integration.
UNHCR participation	UNHCR chairs the refugee programme working group and apart from cross-cutting issues (gender, human rights and culture) and much of its programme is in that cluster.
UNHCR pillars	Pillar 1 – refugee programme, pillar 2 – stateless programme
Budget	Budget - \$41.074, 100% included in the UNDAP
Country	Pakistan
Planning f/w	One UN Programme 2013 - 2017 and Programme Results Matrix
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Strategic Priority Area 3 (increased national resilience to disasters, crises and external shocks) includes supporting national capacity development on humanitarian principles and the provision of sustainable solutions for refugees (1.7 million registered). Strategic Priority Area 4, (strengthened governance and social cohesion seeks to improve access to social protection systems) includes birth registration and documentation for migrants and social services for Afghan refugees (with a focus on Afghan women and girls in Strategic Priority Area 5, gender equality and social justice). Strategic Priority Area 6, food and nutrition for vulnerable groups includes an indicator for calorie consumption for Afghan refugees.
UNHCR participation	In OP II, UNHCR is represented across 5 of the 6 Strategic Programme Areas albeit with a focus in 3 of them with the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas joint programme accounting for the a significant proportion of the programme. In the previous One Programme (OP I) RAHA came under a single outcome (disaster risk management) but refugees was also a cross-cutting theme.
UNHCR pillars	Pillar 3 – reintegration projects
Budget	Budget - \$137.135m, 80% included in the UNDAF (all non-IDP operations)

The online survey which was undertaken as part of the review provides an overview of which UNHCR programme/project pillars are included in the One Programme for each of the countries³⁹ and which of the pillars included joint programmes (see figure 10 - joint programmes are discussed in more detail in section 5).


It is difficult to make generalisations about UNHCR's participation in the One Programme because its operations and the ways in which DaO is being implemented varies from country-to-country, but it is possible to identify a number of internal and external factors that can have a significant effect on how UNHCR country teams engage in it; some of the factors are not exclusive to UNHCR but will apply equally to other UN agencies. The factors and their impact on UNHCR's participation are outlined and analysed below using examples from the country case studies. They include the following:

³⁸ The UNDAP integrates all activities of all UN agencies into one integrated results-based management framework, that is aligned with the national goals and priorities of the Tanzanian National Development Strategy frameworks.

³⁹ Mozambique, Tanzania, Mali, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Montenegro participated in the online survey.

- The operational context;
- The humanitarian context;
- The application of a RBA;
- The relationship between the UN and the government.

Figure 10: Incorporation of UNHCR's programme in the UNDAF by pillar and by joint programmes



4.1 The operational context

The context which has the greatest potential to benefit from the convening power of a One Programme to galvanise collective action is protracted refugee situations where UNHCR's role includes care and maintenance and the challenge of finding durable solutions (see figure 11).

Figure 11: UNHCR's development challenge? Finding durable solutions for protracted refugee situations

UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country⁴⁰ In its 2013 Global Trends report, UNHCR estimated that some 6.3 million refugees (54%) were in a protracted situation by the end of 2013. These refugees were living in 27 host countries, constituting an overall total of 33 protracted situations.⁴¹

While UNHCR defines itself first and foremost as a humanitarian agency, given its responsibilities in finding durable solutions for such a large (and growing) caseload from protracted refugee situations, there is compelling reason why the agency needs to strengthen its development capabilities and partnerships in order to offer the most appropriate support. Beyond programmatic responses, successful durable solutions, particularly local integration are often rooted in a combination of advocacy and engagement with national development planning. Again, this is not best served through a humanitarian lens but can only be achieved through a long-term strategy of engagement with the government.

For protracted refugee situations UNHCR's participation in the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UNDAF can offer an opportunity to influence the development of a national framework that affords refugees and other PoC the same rights as nationals. It can also be used to galvanise the collective support of UN Development agencies and government partners in seeking to develop more comprehensive, coordinated and cooperative responses and to move from a policy that promotes care and maintenance to one that seeks to build self-reliance and ultimately seeks to find durable solutions.

⁴⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2009) *Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations*, No. 109 (LXI), 8 December 2009.

⁴¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014) *Global Trends, 2013*.

UNHCR's 2008 Memorandum and the associated guidance note on engagement with the DaO Initiative stresses the importance of Representatives *'to be proactive in pressing upon host governments, RC and UNCTs to include refugee hosting areas in national development plans and strategies and promote the early engagement of development partners in supporting local integration and reintegration upon return as well as support to refugee-impacted areas'*⁴² and a suite of guidance material exists including advice on how to strengthen linkages between UNHCR and national development planning through UNHCR's participation in the CCA and the UNDAF.⁴³

While it is now dated, a 2004 UNDG Guidance Note on Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons (refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees') exists which provides guidance to UNCT's to clarify the development challenge presented by the integration of displaced persons and how programming should be incorporated into the UNDAF by *'harmonizing and simplifying the sometimes disparate interventions of humanitarian and development actors'*.⁴⁴ A good example of efforts to use the One Programme to garner broad-based support to develop and deliver durable solutions is the concept note for a joint response to a mixed caseload of Roma IDPs and refugees in Montenegro. Configured around the challenge of protection and empowerment, a comprehensive approach is proposed which recognises that the issues cannot be addressed successfully through single and sector-focused interventions and neither can it be resolved by development agencies acting alone. There were several other examples from the case study countries of UNHCR seeking to use the UNDAF as a means of strengthening development cooperation for durable solutions which include the following;

- In 2014, Tanzania granted citizenship to 162,000 Burundian refugees who had fled their country following violence in 1972. UN assistance for their integration was provided under the DaO framework. UNHCR has collaborated with the Ministry of Home Affairs to distribute naturalization certificates in 2014 and under the DaO framework and in collaboration with government and development partners is in the process of finalizing a local integration strategy.
- Pakistan is part of the regional solutions strategy for Afghan refugees and it seeks to work with a broad range of UN partners in the context of DaO (in addition to governments, donors and civil society groups) to support voluntary repatriation, sustainable reintegration and assistance to host communities.

Over the last two years, institutional support for durable solutions has been provided to a small number of countries by the Solutions Steering Group (SSG) an inter-divisional team at headquarters tasked with achieving holistic solutions strategies to protracted displacement and to prevent new situations from developing into protracted ones (see figure 12 for an example of the successful engagement of the SSG with UNHCR in Uganda).

A second context in which DaO has the potential to support UNHCR is in middle income countries where UNHCR is playing a normative role. Of the 44 countries that have formally adopted DaO, 27 of them are included in the World Bank's list of middle income countries⁴⁵ and UNHCR has operations in approximately 14 of them. It is in this context where UNHCR representation is often modest in size and may have limited resources and there is the potential for UNHCR to benefit from working with the UNCT through the One Programme in order to achieve policy change. In countries such as

⁴² UNHCR IOM Nr. 049/2013, FOM No. 049/2013, *UNHCR's participation in the cost-sharing of the UN Resident Coordinator System*, 10 July 2013, p.3.

⁴³ Both documents were written prior to DaO and while reference is made to the UNDAF, there would be benefit to updating them so that they are consistent with DaO and the SOPs.

⁴⁴ United Nations Development Group (2004) *UNDG Guidance Note on Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons (refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees)*, October 2004, p.6.

⁴⁵ See <http://micconference.org/mic/list-of-mics/>

Montenegro where UNHCR has a limited staff presence and works closely with its sister agencies, or Botswana where UNHCR has the potential to benefit from other UN agencies close links with their line ministries, the One Programme has the potential to support UNHCR advocacy on issues relating to its PoC (this issue is dealt with in more detail in section 8 and 9). However, in emphasizing this normative role, it is also important to note that there are a growing number of middle income countries where UNHCR plays an operational role such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Pakistan and Iraq and so the countries in which UNHCR plays a purely normative role are relatively few in number.

Figure 12: Strengthening support for durable solutions in the context of DaO – the case of Uganda⁴⁶

In 2014, the Government of Uganda placed refugees squarely inside the scope of the National Development Plan 2015/16-2019/20 and supplemented this with a specific strategy for refugee settlements known as the Settlement Transformative Agenda. At the same time, the UN Country Team (UNCT) has worked to place refugees within the UN Development Assistance Framework 2016-2020. With these two building blocks, UNHCR is developing a Protection and Solutions Strategy 2016-2020 to guide UNHCR's long-term planning for durable solutions in Uganda. Embedded within this Strategy is a UNCT framework of cooperation for refugee and host communities known as ReHoPE (Refugees and Host Population Empowerment). ReHoPE is expected to become a new UN Joint Program for 2016-2020.


It is clear that UNHCR alone cannot meet the needs of over 420,000 refugees in Uganda. So, in addition to increased emphasis on solutions from UNHCR's own resources, UNHCR will work with UNCT partners, District Local Governments and the Ugandan and international private sectors and emerging donors.

UNHCR in Uganda is convinced that the result of a refocused long-term programme, embedded in Government plans and supported by the UNCT and the development partners, will enable the vast majority of refugees in Uganda to attain a level of self-reliance that will reduce their dependency on assistance, and that a significant number of refugees will achieve durable solutions by 2020.

While there are specific situations where DaO can strengthen UNHCR's programmes, the online survey of UNHCR staff on the DaO Initiative that accompanied the review highlights the unease that some UNHCR staff feel about the extent to which DaO fits UNHCR's mandate; participants from ten DaO countries considered it had only limited complementarity with only 20% of respondents considering there were greater commonalities. The key issue here is that UNHCR's mandate is considered to be largely humanitarian in nature and as a consequence it is often assumed that only a small proportion of its operations fit within the One Programme. However, this interpretation is overly restrictive and in many cases such as in Tanzania, UNHCR's operations have been fully incorporated into the UNDAP. In this context there is far greater potential for UNHCR to use the One Programme as a tool to strengthen its operational and policy objectives than in countries where the UNDAF was blind to PoC. When asked if DaO had facilitated the involvement of development agencies in support of durable solutions strategies, the response was more positive, with 40% of respondents considering that it had done so (see figure 13).

⁴⁶ Protection and Solutions Strategy for refugees in Uganda, UNHCR summary document.

Figure 13: Survey responses to the question of complementarity between DaO and UNHCR's mandate



4.2 The humanitarian context

As discussed earlier in this report, the inter-relationship between UN humanitarian response and DaO lacks clarity and as a consequence a variety of different approaches have been adopted which appear to depend in large part on the country context (see figure 14).

Figure 14: The inter-relationship between humanitarian response and DaO

Country	Protracted/large-scale humanitarian response part of DaO	Response to man-made and natural disasters undertaken through the DaO framework?	Disaster risk reduction (DRR) & contingency planning part of DaO
Mozambique	UNHCR's refugee programme included in the One Programme. No other protracted crises	Response to natural disasters (e.g. floods in 2015) undertaken through the DaO framework	DRR mainstreamed in the One Programme. Inter-agency contingency plan regularly updated
Montenegro	n/a	Response to natural disasters (e.g. floods in 2014) undertaken through the DaO framework	DRR included in the One Programme. Inter-agency contingency plan regularly updated
Bosnia & Herzegovina	The post-Dayton support to Bosnia & Herzegovina is included in the One Programme	Response to natural disasters (e.g. floods in 2011 and 2014) undertaken through the DaO framework	DRR and contingency planning included in the UNDAF outcomes
Tanzania	UNHCR's refugee programme included in the One Programme. No other protracted crises	Response would be undertaken in the context of the DaO framework	DRR included as an outcome in the UNDAF.
Pakistan	UNHCR's refugee and host community solutions programme incorporated into the One Programme. Relief-focused IDP projects are outside of the common framework	Responses to man-made and natural disasters are undertaken through the HCT and clusters albeit with a link to DaO through the RC/HC	DRR and resilience included as an outcome in the OP II Programme.

Where a country suffers natural disasters but does not have a large-scale response ongoing and does not have a humanitarian architecture in place or a separate HC, then contingency planning and response to moderate crises may be incorporated into the One Programme and is often undertaken by the One UN. In Mozambique, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, floods responses were all undertaken within the DaO framework. In Mozambique, the RC convenes the clusters on an annual basis just prior to the cyclone season and will coordinate humanitarian response if it is necessary. In

Tanzania the humanitarian assistance programme which followed the deportation of Rwandan and Burundian Nationals in 2013 was incorporated into the activities of the One UN.

Where there is less harmonisation between the UNDAF and humanitarian response is in countries where there is an ongoing or protracted humanitarian response (such as in Ethiopia) or at times when humanitarian response can dwarf the provision of development assistance (such as in Pakistan). In Ethiopia, where UNHCR's annual budget is over \$200m, the percentage of its operations that are included in the UNDAF are negligible and the document makes no reference to the over 600,000 refugee caseload that exists. However there is a refugee task force that coordinates all refugee-related assistance and an HCT that oversees humanitarian action that is convened by the HC. While there is no reason why the two systems cannot co-exist (and many review participants emphasised the importance of maintaining the separate architectures), this is an issue that has been raised in successive audits of DaO in Pakistan:

'For transition countries like Pakistan, there are two competing coordination processes: development (DaO) and humanitarian (coordinated by OCHA). The RCO reported that, in 2009, the value of UN's humanitarian programmes in Pakistan was almost three times that of the development programmes; in 2010, it was over five times more; in 2011, the value of UN's humanitarian programmes still exceeded that of development programmes. In that environment, where agencies need to cater to a significant volume of funds outside of the DaO One Programme, the processes of UN coordination are resource intensive, all the more when they do not reconcile/integrate well with the humanitarian coordination processes.'⁴⁷

In its management response, UNDG/DOCO cogently articulated some of the practical and policy-related barriers to greater integration which include the necessity that principled and independent humanitarian action is kept distinct from the UN's development work that is longer-term in nature and guided by government priorities; that coordination structures have different membership and includes non-governmental organisations and members of the Red Cross Movement. The management response also highlighted the potential for a resilience agenda to strengthen potential harmonisation which highlights an area where there is far greater need for coherence and where progress is being made in the most recent One Programme (OP II, 2013-2017). The important potential role for a resilience agenda in the one programme was also highlighted by a review participant in Tanzania;

'We have just carried out a humanitarian assistance programme following the migrant deportations and subsequent migration crisis in north-west Tanzania, which was well incorporated into the One UN. It needs to be followed up by longer-term engagement and development assistance, which is likely the same for other emergency operations [and] there is a perceived need to overcome the divide between humanitarian work and development cooperation, and to incorporate short-term assistance in a longer-term UNDAF framework can help in this regard. Donors benefit because they are shown a more coherent and comprehensive picture of the problem to be addressed.'⁴⁸

The importance of ensuring principled humanitarian response and defending humanitarian space from politics or pragmatism underpin UNHCR's mandate and it will be important that future changes in the breadth of DaO do not undermine this in countries where there are complex humanitarian crises which require a significant response. However, at the same time it is also evident that the extent of humanitarian need and the finite financial resources that exist means that in countries that accept their responsibilities for the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance, a

⁴⁷ Audit report No. 1247, 20 June 2014, *Audit of DaO in Pakistan*, joint audit undertaken by the internal audit services of FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNIDO.

⁴⁸ Private communication with senior staff from a UN agency in Tanzania, 20/04/15.

coordinated response (particularly to natural disasters) within the DaO framework can offer timely, effective and efficient assistance to those that are in urgent need.

This suggests that the One Programme has the potential to offer significant added value in spanning the transition between relief and development through a focus on resilience. This is a third potential programming area of interest for UNHCR particularly in protracted refugee situations such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia all of which have relatively long-term refugee populations. Examples of efforts by UNHCR to use the One Programme as a means of strengthening long-term assistance to refugees include the following;

- In Mozambique, where UNHCR has limited resources and a small team, the UNDAF is considered to have the potential offer a framework with which to broaden support for refugees as well as supporting longer-term livelihoods needs of refugee communities. Discussions between UNHCR and a number of UN partners is ongoing;
- In Namibia, where UNHCR is phasing out its operations, the UNDAF was seen as a vehicle to responsibly hand over responsibility for refugee care, maintenance and protection to government partners, supported by UN agencies;
- In Malawi efforts have been ongoing over a number of years to galvanise coordinated UN action through DaO to support the long-term needs of a protracted refugee caseload. UNHCR's experience in trying to garner the support of sister agencies has been mixed and where there is a host government that is unsupportive of refugees or where the UNDAF fails to prioritise refugee needs, then the difficulties of securing support from UN development agencies have been particularly acute.

However, there is also a second group of countries that have had more recent refugee influxes but whose displacement has become protracted such as the countries neighbouring Syria; Lebanon and Jordan now have the highest per capita ratios of refugees worldwide, and they, like the other major host countries of Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt, have been the largest providers of both human and financial resources for the response. While it would be easy to consider these as humanitarian situations, after 5-years, there is an urgent need for the response to go beyond the limited scope of a purely humanitarian response which the foreword of UNHCR's Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, jointly signed by Helen Clark and António Guterres attests;

The task ahead goes well beyond the resources, expertise, capacities, and mandates of humanitarian organizations. Longer-term – and scaled-up – assistance by development actors, bilateral partners, international financial institutions and the private sector is being brought in to address the massive structural impact of the crisis. The response requires a new aid architecture... [the plan] brings together almost 200 humanitarian and development partners, including governments, United Nations agencies, and national and international NGOs. It is a unique and coordinated initiative aimed at bringing about a scaling-up of resilience and stabilisation-based development and humanitarian assistance to cope with the crises.⁴⁹

It is too early to determine the precise nature of UNDG's resilience agenda and how it will frame its engagement whether through a preventive Disaster Risk Management lens (which figure 14 shows is routinely part of One Programmes) or as a response to people suffering from long-term crisis and livelihoods collapse, but it will be important for UNHCR to engage in this aspect of the 'fit for purpose' agenda in order to shape it in a way that can potentially offer the support of development agencies in similar complex situations.

⁴⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014) Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-16 in response to the Syria crisis, Regional Strategic Overview, p.6.

4.3 The application of a Rights-Based Approach

UNHCR's stocktaking report outlined a key role for UNHCR to play in promoting human rights and refugee protection in the UNDAF, but also raised concern about the potential for the alignment of UNDAFs with national priorities may result from a shift away from a RBA. While it has been acknowledged that human rights has been overlooked in the past,⁵⁰ the second generation of DaO has sought to re-assert the importance of shared values, norms and standards of the UN system including strengthened accountability on cross-cutting issues such as human rights. This has been bolstered by explicitly linking DaO with the 'Human Rights Up Front Initiative'; launched by the SG in December 2013, the Initiative recommends six actions to more effectively secure human rights throughout all of the UN's engagements, the third of which is to ensure '*coherent strategies of action on the ground, leveraging the UN system's capacities to respond in a concerted manner,*' the delivery mechanism for which is One UN. The RBA language included in the SOPS and the Human Rights Up Front Initiative has provided the UN system with an important opportunity to strengthen the integration of rights in UN development activities.

What is more difficult, however, is to attribute specific changes that have occurred as a consequence of the focus of DaO on rights. If the baseline established by the Independent Evaluation was low, there is limited evidence from recent UNDAF evaluations of the case study countries that significant progress has been made;

- The 2014 UNDAF strategic reflection and mid-term evaluation for Mozambique failed to comment on progress against the human rights cross-cutting issue beyond a recommendation that the '*the UNCT should propose improved mechanisms/processes/accountability within the UNDAF architecture so that all cross cutting issues including culture and human rights are monitored.*'⁵¹
- The 2015 UNDAF evaluation for Montenegro reported that although the programming principles (Human Rights-Based Approach, gender equality, and environmental sustainability) have been considered in the UNDAF document and implementation, they could have been mainstreamed in a more systematic way as there is no clear evidence of mainstreaming the Human Rights-Based Approach in the Pillar Working Groups, Steering Committee, and human rights issues are mainly addressed at agency level.⁵²
- The focus of the 2014 Joint Audit of DaO in Pakistan undertaken by the audit services of six UN organisations focused its attention on the architecture rather than on the programme and human rights is not mentioned in the report.
- There is extensive reference to the application and promotion of human rights throughout the evaluation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNDAF including significant evidence of the human rights-based approach (human rights is mentioned 98 times in the document).

Where the One Programme has applied a robust RBA, there is an enabling environment for UNHCR to more effectively deliver its mandate. Analysis undertaken of the One Programme documents from each of the country case studies gives a mixed picture; for Mozambique, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tanzania and Pakistan, social protection for PoC and vulnerable groups (which in most cases explicitly includes refugees in the text) is articulated in the documents. Of the other countries

⁵⁰ The Independent Evaluation summary report (p.11) lamented that, '*many results have been reported in annual reports and evaluations of projects and programmes implemented under the first-generation version of One Programme, in particular for cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, human rights and HIV/AIDS. However, it is extremely difficult to establish an evidence-based argument that these results are significantly different from those of earlier non -"Delivering as one" programmes.*'


⁵¹ Barnes, S. and Hill, E (2014) *UNDAF Strategic Reflection and Mid-term Review*, Mozambique, October 2014.

⁵² Privat, C. (2015) *Evaluation of the Integrated UN Programme/UNDAF in Montenegro (2012-2016)*, 19 March 2015, p.31.

that participated remotely in this study, UNDAFs from Liberia, Botswana and Malawi all make reference to refugee protection while the Kenya and Namibia documents make more general references to protection but do not explicitly refer to refugees. In Ethiopia, refugee protection is dealt with through the Refugee Task Force which comes under the humanitarian programme which is separate to the UNDAF. While UNHCR has played a lead role in seeking to achieve these outcomes, advocacy and communications have been important tools. The contribution made by the DaO pillars of One Leader and Communicating as One will be appraised in the relevant sections in the report.

The online survey recorded mixed responses about UNHCR staffs perceptions of the contribution that DaO had made to human rights and its interrelationship with UNHCR's protection mandate. While there was a muted response to the latter, there was more optimism about its potential role in integrating human rights into UN operational activities for development (figure 15).

Figure 15: Survey responses to the question of Dao's contribution to human rights and protection



Looking to the future, the prominence of human rights as one of UNDG's three strategic priorities for 2013-2016 should be welcome news for UNHCR. The assertion that *'the post-2015 development agenda provides a much needed opportunity to further integrate human rights into sustainable development and strengthen the linkages between the UN system's normative frameworks and its operational activities when supporting the implementation of the new development agenda'*⁵³ offers an important opportunity to go beyond existing commitment and to demonstrate that tough action is being taken in support of the UN's obligations.

4.4 The relationship between the UN and the host government

UNHCR works closely with host governments to protect and assist refugees and to find long-term solutions to their problems. But this also means that in countries where adequate protection and assistance is not provided, UNHCR may have more robust relationships and in these contexts there is the potential for this to conflict with approaches adopted by other members of the UN system. This is particularly evident in countries where the RBA has been de-prioritised or fails to go further than the text of an UNDAF.

In a refugee-hosting country in Sub-Saharan Africa, the UNHCR Representative lamented the difficult relationship that the government has with refugees and voiced concern that this had an impact on how UNHCR's operations were reflected in the One Programme and the relationship they had with other agencies in the UNCT. In several other countries that participated in the review, UNHCR staff

⁵³ United Nations Development Group (2014) *UNDG Strategic Priorities for 2013 – 2016*, Update December 2014, p.3.

commented that UNHCR's PoC were '*hidden*' in the UNDAF as refugees, asylum seekers or stateless persons were '*unpopular*' with the government. In several countries, there was a concern that budget lines for these activities had to be worded vaguely as the government would not be keen to see UN funding being used for non-nationals.

The situation is particularly problematic for UNHCR where the host government is either ambivalent or hostile to a specific group of PoC of which there were three examples in the review. While an UNDAF can be used as a tool to address this, this may not happen in practice in which case the One Programme has the potential to be an obstacle to UNHCR.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether UNHCR is best served by a One Programme which reflects refugee needs across all or most of the outcomes (such as in Mozambique) or where there is a single outcome which includes refugees. The former case offers UNHCR a platform to ensure that refugees are prioritised across the entirety of the UN's development programmes but it also requires significant participation in outcome groups which can be very time-consuming. A single refugee-related outcome, such as in Tanzania or Liberia, ensures that PoC have visibility and offers potential for coherent and focused support of like-minded agencies. Articulation of refugee needs in UNDAFs can also strengthen engagement of UN partners in advocating on key refugee-related issues.

4.5 The need for guidance on UNHCR's future engagement in the One Programme

Existing internal guidance on UNHCR's participation in the One Programme is prescriptive and is now outdated. It is premised on the assumption that the One Programme is implemented in a fairly rigid way and that there is an option to select the aspects of UNHCR's operations that are best suited to the One Programme. While the exercise of determining which activities best lend themselves to partnership and/or joint programmes is helpful, there are two reasons why UNHCR should seek to revise the guidance;

- In many DaO countries, UNHCR has no choice but to include all of its operations in the UNDAF as the One Programme is frequently the sum of all of the operations of the UN entities. The exception to this is when there is a large pre-existing humanitarian programme which is often (but not always) coordinated separately from DaO and is not included in the UNDAF.
- Given the important need to strengthen the understanding of the RC and UNCT colleagues of UNHCR's mandate and the breadth of its operations, there is little to be gained by self-censoring. While some of its activities may be considered sensitive from a government perspective, the UNCT can potentially play an important role in supporting UNHCR's advocacy on such issues and as a consequence, the strategic imperative should be to ensure that UNHCR's operations for its PoC are fully included in the UNDAF.

With the increase in the number of DaO countries, UNHCR needs to ensure that it consistently positions itself to maximize the potential benefit of the One Programme to its operations and in support of its advocacy on behalf of its PoC. While the implementation of DaO is specific to the country context, the SOPs will ensure a level of consistency in its application and can offer a foundation for UNHCR's policy guidance to be updated.


5. Joint programmes

This section provides a detailed analysis of UNHCR's participation in joint programmes by pillar; it identifies and examines factors that can influence the effectiveness of UNHCR's engagement and makes recommendations for how it can leverage the greatest benefit from joint programmes in the future.

5.1 Introduction to joint programmes

A joint programme builds on the complementarities of two or more UN agencies and is one of a number of implementation tools used within common UN programme planning frameworks.⁵⁴ Joint programmes can be managed through three fund management modalities, parallel,⁵⁶ pooled⁵⁷ and pass-through.⁵⁸ Joint programmes have been established every year over the past decade and the data collected for the Joint Programme Mechanism Review⁵⁹ shows a shift from parallel funds which dominated in 2004-2005, to pooled funds in 2004-2006, and pass-through funds since 2007 (see figure 16).

Figure 16: Number of joint programmes by modality and year, 2003-2011⁶⁰



Between 2003 and 2011, the Joint Programme Mechanism Review shows the total value of joint programmes grew from \$18m in 2003 to a peak in 2008 of \$617m before reducing to \$272m in 2011.⁶¹ At the time the review took place there were 19 DaO pilots and self-starter countries in which 93% of the joint programmes were undertaken through the pass-through modality. An analysis of the frequency of joint programme participation for the 41 participating UN organisations for 886 joint programmes undertaken up to mid-2012 (in both DaO and non-DaO countries) placed UNHCR as 10th most frequent participant (see figure 17).

⁵⁴ A definition and updated guidance on implementation arrangements for joint programmes is given in United Nations Development Group (2014) Guidance Note on Joint Programmes, August 2014.

⁵⁵ 'Joint programmes' are defined as those in which agencies jointly plan results and multiple activities to achieve them and then implement jointly. 'Joint programming' is different in that agencies jointly plan but implement activities individually.

⁵⁶ The parallel fund management modality is likely to be the most effective and efficient when donors want to earmark funds to a specific agency and when the interventions of participating UN organizations are aimed at common results, but with different national, sub-national and/or international partners. Under this modality, each organization manages its own activities within the common work plan and the related budget.

⁵⁷ A pooled fund management modality is likely to be the most effective and efficient when participating UN organisations using mostly their own core resources work for common results with a common partner or partners. Under this modality, participating UN organisations transfer pooled funds together to one UN agency selected to be the Managing Agent (MA).

⁵⁸ Pass-through fund management is currently the most commonly used methodology where a number of UN agencies develop a joint programme and agree to channel the funds through one UN organisation selected to act as Administrative Agent (AA) working with different national, and/or international partners.

⁵⁹ Downs, C. (2013) *Joint Programme Mechanism Review*, Consolidated Final Report, 4 February 2013, p.6.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Figure 17: Frequency of UN agency participation in joint programmes (JPs) to mid-2012⁶²

PUNO	UNDP	UNICEF	UNFPA	WHO	FAO	UNWOMEN	UNESCO	ILO	WFP	UNHCR
% of JPs	68	57	44	27	23	19	18	18	17	10

5.2 UNHCR's experience of joint programmes by pillar

One of the potential beneficial outcomes to UNHCR of the One Programme is the opportunity to strengthen the engagement of UN agencies in responding to the diverse needs of PoC, particularly those in protracted refugee situations (for both refugees and host populations) where UNHCR's approach may significantly benefit from the knowledge and support of UN Development partners. In a similar way, the delivery of durable solutions may also benefit from broad-based partnerships. DaO offers a platform to convene such groups and to devise and execute operational and policy-related responses to ameliorate protracted refugee situations. Examples of joint programmes in the case study countries across UNHCR's pillars are listed below (figure 18).

Figure 18: Joint programmes by UNHCR in the case study countries disaggregated by Pillar

Pillar 1: Refugee programme

While there are theoretical benefits to joint refugee programmes, UNHCR has had limited success in realising these benefits which have been relatively slow to come in Mozambique with negotiations for joint programmes still work in progress. UNHCR considers its participation in the UNDAF as a means of engaging UN partners to support PoC which includes a caseload of 15,000 refugees, most of the cases protracted in nature and while there has been some interest shown, such as a partnership between WFP and UNHCR to move to cash-based assistance for improving food security which would improve efficiency and offer greater self-reliance, this has not got beyond the planning stages. Similar efforts to promote self-reliance have been set back by a lack of funding and efforts to generate interest among UN development agencies (such as ILO, UNIDO and FAO) have had limited success.

UNHCR in Tanzania is facing a similar scenario with dwindling interest and funding for refugee care and maintenance which has meant that partner UN agencies have withdrawn leaving UNHCR to take on services that are outside of its core competencies (such as school rehabilitation). This presents a challenge to the hypothesis that in protracted refugee situations DaO offers a possibility of developing closer relationships with UN partners as it is these same situations where there is a flight of funding making it an extremely challenging environment in which to develop new partnerships. That said, in a similar way to Mozambique, UNHCR in Tanzania has identified potential partners in UNIDO and ILO to bring a more developmental approach to efforts to strengthen local integration.

In Southern Africa, mixed migration is particularly pervasive and in recognition of the challenges that have resulted from it in Mozambique the government requested the UN to provide technical and material assistance to address the issue. Efforts have been made to address it through joint action between UNHCR, IOM and UNICRI seeking to support the development of a national policy framework and standard operating procedures for border management in the context of mixed migration. The joint programme is seeking funding.

UNHCR in Montenegro submitted a joint programme under pillar 1/durable solutions rights group for Roma (both local and refugees). It was prepared under the Trust Fund for Human Security in partnership with UNDP which focused on addressing issues of documentation for domicile Roma. The proposed joint programme was rejected.

Pillar 2: Stateless programme

A joint programme on Civil Registration has been conducted in Mozambique between UNHCR, UNICEF and UNFPA in which the three agencies joined efforts to improve civil registration in the Province of Tete and identify problematic cases leading to statelessness, to develop systems for recording vital statistics as well as to strengthen advocacy to prevent Statelessness through having the Convention signed and revising the Nationality and Civil Registration Laws. While the project has struggled with inconsistent government attention, it did provide the foundation for an exciting project on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics, the Working Group for which comes under the One UN and includes UNHCR, WHO, UNFPA, UNDP and UNICEF.

Pillar 3: Integration projects

⁶² Downs C (2013) *Joint Programme Mechanism Review*, Consolidated Final Report, 4 February 2013, p.7.

A joint programme was launched under the Reintegration projects pillar from Tanzania in response to the decision by the Government of Tanzania to proceed with the naturalization of 1972 former Burundian refugees following the suspension of the local integration programme in 2011. UNHCR is currently working with UNDP under the DaO framework to design a comprehensive integration strategy by June 2015.

Launched in 2009, the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) programme is a joint undertaking between the Government of Pakistan and the UN within the DaO framework. It aims to promote regional stability and compensate for the social economic and environmental consequences by over 3 million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan over a 30-year period and sought to promote peaceful co-existence with local communities for the residual Afghan refugee population of 1.7 million. It was considered to be a shift from humanitarian to development assistance. RAHA was initially launched as a 5-year initiative between the Government of Pakistan, the One UN in Pakistan and was part of the DRM joint programme within the One Programme I and had a budget of \$140m. UNHCR worked alongside FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNIFEM, WFP and WHO. Between 2009 and 2014, the RAHA Initiative has carried out over 2,000 projects and benefited over 4 million people, 85% of them Pakistani host communities. The project is now part of the new One Programme II framework in Pakistan.

Pillar 4: IDP projects

The review found no examples of joint IDP programmes conducted under the DaO framework.

5.3 Factors that influence the outcomes of UNHCR's engagement in joint programmes

While the focus of the review on a small number of DaO countries underestimates the breadth of UNHCR's joint programmes, it is notable that they are so few in number and that they continue to present a benefit in theory rather than one that has been realised in practice. Based on a review of the examples found during the study, a number of factors can be identified that have an important influence on the success or otherwise of UNHCR's engagement in joint programmes. These include the following issues, each of which is examined below;

- Divergent programme approaches;
- The lack of coherence of agency systems and procedures
- UNHCR's hesitancy to take a more inclusive approach to activities associated with its mandate;
- Financial management issues (this issue is discussed in section 7.1 - budgeting).

Divergent programme approaches

In several of the case study countries there was concern raised about the different approaches of UN agencies that made partnering with them a complex and time-consuming task. Contrary to what many assume would be a relatively straightforward task of identifying common themes to galvanise joint UN action, negotiating joint programmes have been a challenge. Beneficiary selection and targeting, programme design, implementation and oversight, and monitoring and reporting often differ considerably between agencies, particularly between those with a humanitarian and those with a development mandate. On a number of occasions, trying to account for the divergence in programme approaches has caused considerable tension and three of the country case studies had experienced one or a more of these issues. The 2010 independent evaluation of UNHCR's response to the protracted refugee situation in Tanzania which was convened under DaO as a joint programme sums the problem up well:

'The strategy for Pillar 3 takes on a broad partnership approach and envisages the implementation to be in the hands of the Government and UN DaO with UNHCR playing a role in protection and monitoring. The reported inefficiencies and friction within the UN agencies is about different mandates and different cultures. In relation to the implementation of Pillar 3 of the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy, the issue at stake is the change

from a short-term humanitarian paradigm on the one hand to a longer-term development paradigm on the other.⁶³

The lack of coherence of agency systems and procedures

Where joint programmes did exist, programme staff spoke of a steep learning curve, particularly in instances where UNHCR is playing the role of Managing or Administrative Agent and is accountable for coordination, reporting and financial results. In these instances, the difference in agency systems and procedures can offer a weak platform for working together which has in the past led to tensions between UN partners and made for considerable additional work as standards and approaches to programme planning and reporting have proved difficult to reconcile. This is consistent with the findings of the Joint Programme Mechanism Review which found that *'the additional work burden is high in the limited number of cases in which the agency is the Administrative Agent for the joint programme and it involves a level of inter-agency liaison work'*. The review also highlighted the lack of harmonisation of agency systems, procedures and reporting requirements as one of the most frequently cited obstacles to success of joint programmes.⁶⁴

While it should come as no surprise that joint programmes have taken some time to blossom, it is notable that seven years after the DaO pilots were launched there continues to be unreconciled systems and legal compliance issues between UN partners. These sorts of challenges need to be addressed at the headquarters level and there is a compelling justification for UNHCR to ensure that it has contract templates which are considered fit for purpose for use for joint programmes in the future.

UNHCR's hesitancy to take a more inclusive approach to activities associated with its mandate

A very sensitive issue for UNHCR but an important one for its participation in DaO is its willingness to work with others on issues related to its mandate. UNHCR has a history of overcoming considerable financial, operational and political impediments over the years in order to fulfil its mission and as a consequence the agency has a strong 'esprit de corps'. While UNHCR understands the added value of pooling the knowledge and capacities that are offered by the UN system, at the same time it can be reticent to request assistance from others to meet its mandate. This is not specific to UNHCR and many other agencies expressed similar concerns about their particular specialism or mandate.

UNHCR's leadership and coordination of refugee operations is undisputed, but there does need to be a greater acceptance and understanding of the added value that others can offer to refugees and PoC in specific situations. Collecting evidence of successful partnership approaches under DaO and making these more easily available to others will go some way to shifting mindsets as will offering guidance and tools to ease the process of developing partnerships with other UN agencies. Some staff spoke of the change that is happening in how UNHCR engages with others both in its humanitarian response and in working with development partners and the importance that UNHCR embraced these changes as part of a strategy to ensure its continued relevance and effectiveness in the future.

Given the paucity of successful joint programmes, the evidence base is relatively weak, but information about UNHCR's joint work is also not being systematically collected. It will be important in the future for UNHCR to strengthen its understanding of how partnership can contribute to better outcomes for its PoC and that this information is proactively disseminated throughout the

⁶³ Nordic Consulting Group (2010) *Evaluation of the protracted refugee situation for Burundians in Tanzania*, October 2010. P56.

⁶⁴ The review lists similar findings from the 2006 Joint Programme Case Study Review, 2007 RC Synthesis Report on Strengthening Implementation, evaluations of individual joint programmes of MDG-F and Iraq Trust Fund.

organisation. That said, joint programmes should not be about working to the lowest common denominator and UNHCR should continue to have high standards, both for its own accountability needs but also for those it seeks to assist.

5.4 Realising the potential of joint programmes in the future

Under the circumstances, the 2014 stock take of Pakistan's One UN Programme is justified in concluding that...*'Perhaps the most important [lesson] is that Delivering as One requires effort, time and investment in joint programming and harmonized systems...Joint implementation of projects and pass-through financing are perhaps the two areas that need the major focus moving ahead.'*⁶⁵

While the country context is essential for ensuring the relevance of joint programmes, there is also much to be gained from identifying good practice examples. There are a growing number of agency-based or sector-based joint programming strategies that have sought to promote collective action or provide guidance to country-based staff. As this review has shown, there are aspects of UNHCR's mandate that can be achieved more effectively through joint action and it is on these issues that UNHCR could seek to update existing guidance material to reflect the potential offered by DaO, or could proactively seek to broker global agreements with other UN agencies. An example of an initiative that may provide lessons for UNHCR is the 2011 initiative taken by UNDP and IOM to mainstream migration into national development strategies in order to bring a level of coherence to country-based delivery of policy and practice on migration (see figure 19).

Figure 19: UNDP and IOM's joint initiative on mainstreaming migration into national development strategies

A handbook has been published which provides an overview of the issues, features examples of existing programmes and projects that link migration and development policy goals and includes practical tools. It has been operationalized through a 2-year pilot project which seeks to consolidate guidance at the global level and support integration of migration in national development strategies and UN planning instruments (UNDAF) at the country-level. Specific support posts within government and UNCTs have been funded and the strategy is underpinned by an action plan and resource mobilization strategy. Lessons learned will be analysed globally with a view to extending the pilot to other countries.

The Solutions Alliance, a partnership between UNHCR and development partners to find durable solutions to protracted displacement and refugee contexts that bridge the humanitarian-development divide offers an example of a joint initiative to promote joint action for durable solutions (see figure 20). It is now important that the Group starts to fill the evidence gap identified by the Solutions Alliance which notes that only a *'few studies of how planned, development-led strategies might mitigate negative impacts and promote positive developmental outcomes and their impacts.'*⁶⁶

As well as galvanizing collective action, there is also scope for UNHCR to revise some of its existing tools; given the significant investment that has gone into the development of the DAR Framework and Handbook, there would also be value in updating this to take into account DaO and the implementation of the SOPs. A relatively small investment would have the potential to significantly strengthen guidance to country-based UN staff.

⁶⁵ United Nations Pakistan (2014) *One UN Programme I* Final Report, p.73

⁶⁶ Zetter, R. (2014) *Reframing Displacement crises as development opportunities*, policy brief prepared for the Global Initiative on Solutions Copenhagen Roundtable, 2-3 April 2014.

Figure 20: Efforts to promote durable solutions through joint research, advocacy and operations⁶⁷

The Solutions Alliance seeks to promote and enable the transition for displaced people away from dependency towards increased self-reliance, resilience, and development. This will be pursued by:

- Supporting innovative solutions through concrete projects and programs in selected displacement situations.
- Helping shape the global policy agenda to recognise displacement as a development challenge as well as a humanitarian and protection issue.
- Ensuring that a diverse and growing group of partners form a vibrant network and seek to maximize the impact of their individual efforts.

The Solutions Alliance was launched in early April 2014 in Copenhagen to advance a partnership oriented approach for addressing protracted displacement situations and preventing new situations from becoming protracted. Jointly chaired by the Colombian and Danish governments, the International Rescue Committee, UNDP and UNHCR, the Solutions Alliance is intended as an inclusive forum and catalyst for mobilizing development and humanitarian actors to work together in finding solutions to displacement.

In the 65th Session of UNHCR's Executive Committee (ExCom) in October 2014, the UN SG outlined the challenge ahead and spoke of the potential that the Solutions Initiative had to mobilise joint action, '*Securing durable solutions and refugees is a joint responsibility and one that needs to be undertaken progressively. We have learned many lessons in the field. Now we must use what we have learned to bring together more actors to achieve common commitments.*' While UNHCR's experience in undertaking joint programmes under DaO can only answer this in part, its work with the Solutions Alliance offers an exciting opportunity to use and learn from collective action to strengthen durable solutions in the future.

6. Planning and Results-Based Management

This section examines the coherence of UNHCR's strategic and country planning tools and RBM framework with those commonly used for DaO. It seeks to identify complementarities between the two and analyses the costs in terms of staff time in translating between the two systems where they are incompatible.

6.1 Strategic planning cycle

The SG's QCPR monitoring report shows that 14 out of 22 UN entities have aligned their strategic plans with the QCPR which includes UNHCR albeit through two biennial programmes rather than a single quadrennial strategic plan (see figure 21 for an overview of agency alignment and figure 22 for a more detailed example of UNICEF). However, the 2014 Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report offers a less favourable analysis rating the alignment between the QCPR and UNHCR's strategic plan as inadequate. The divergent views that exist between the QCPR monitoring report and the MOPAN reflect a lack of clarity that exists about UNHCR's relationship to the QCPR and its obligations to it. The MOPAN assessment was based on a document review and found '*almost no mention*' of the QCPR in UNHCR's documents. Furthermore, interviews suggested that it has not aligned its strategic reflection with QCPR. UNHCR does not currently report to its governing body on the QCPR unlike UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP.

⁶⁷ *Solutions Alliance: Ending displacement together*, Brochure, February 2015. Available at <http://www.endingdisplacement.org/>

Figure 21: Alignment of UN Funds and programmes strategic planning cycles with the QPR cycle⁶⁸

Entity	Strategic planning document	# years	QCPR alignment	Annual QCPR reporting to governing body
UNDP	Strategic plan	4	Yes	Yes
UNFPA	Strategic plan	4	Yes	Yes
UNICEF	Medium-term strategic plan	4	Yes	Yes
WFP	Strategic plan	4	Yes	Yes
UNHCR	Biennial programme	2	Yes	No ⁶⁹
UN-Habitat	Strategic plan	6	In progress	No
UNRWA	Medium-term plan	6	No	No

Figure 22: Alignment of the draft UNICEF strategic plan, 2014-17 with the QCPR⁷⁰

UNICEF has explicitly included QCPR relevant indicators drawn from the UNDG QCPR Action Plan, for reporting in the Strategic Plan. Shared indicators contribution of programme/funds towards building national capacity; advancing south-south cooperation; strengthening gender through the use of gender markers, application of SOPs for DaO countries, use of common RBM tools and principles in programming; implementation of harmonized approaches to business practices and financial services, etc.; contribution to the RC system; critical mass of programmes. Tracking of core and non-core expenditure; and poverty reduction and equity.

6.2 Country planning frameworks

There are a growing number of agencies that have made progress in harmonising agency-specific country programme instruments and approval processes in alignment with the UNDAF and the Executive Boards of UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF have approved a modified format and procedures for country programme documents including a simplified one-step approval procedure for country programmes (such as in Pakistan where they have a single country planning framework which replicates the relevant One Programme outcomes, outputs and activities). Full alignment of UNDAF outcomes with agency-specific One Programme outcomes strengthens country-level coherence as well as reducing transaction costs and improving efficiency.

In the 2014 QCPR agency HQ survey, UNHCR was the only 'larger' agency that did not require its country programme documents (or equivalent) to demonstrate complete results chains down from the UNDAF. As a consequence there is a need for country teams to translate the annual Country Operational Plans (COP) to 3-5-year budgeted One Programme frameworks. While there are plans for UNHCR to trial longer-term planning frameworks of 3-5 years with an initial focus on 5 countries, because budget approval is dependent on annual contributions, annual budgets will still be required and there are no current plans to replicate results chains and so there will be no benefit in terms of workload; in fact workload may increase as there will be a need to ensure that the longer-term planning framework is regularly revised in line with annual budgets. However, the change will offer a greater level of harmonisation with the One Programme and given the increasing challenges

⁶⁸ United Nations, Economic and Social Council (2015) *Report of the Secretary General, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 67/226 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system*, Advanced unedited version, 13 January 2015, p.40.

⁶⁹ Reporting on action taken or planned is conducted within overall annual reporting, without specific reference to the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (ref: *Ibid*, p.39).

⁷⁰ UNICEF has published a matrix which shows how it has deliberately aligned its 2014-17 Plan and results framework with the QCPR guidelines. Available at http://www.unicef.org/strategicplan/files/UNICEF_Integration_of_QCPR_in_UNICEF_Strategic_Plan_2014-2017.pdf

experienced in resource mobilisation for protracted refugee situations, multi-year planning may also present considerable advantages by enabling a better dialogue with funding partners.

6.3 Results-based management

Prior to the introduction of the SOPs, the Independent Evaluation judged progress in strengthening the effectiveness of delivering development processes and results had only been 'moderate' and that '*...bolder measures may be required to put the United Nations on a more comprehensive track of reform.*'⁷¹ While the adoption of RBM and increasing familiarity of individual UN agencies with the approach had the potential to strengthen their participation in the interagency results framework of the UNDAF, there was also some concern about the risk that this presented due to the prioritisation of vertical accountability to headquarters over horizontal. This was acknowledged in a 2012 report on RBM in the UN:

*'The demand for performance information of individual agencies appears to be stronger than the demand for performance information on UNDAF. The results frameworks of individual agencies are therefore designed to, first and foremost, serve vertical accountability.'*⁷²

Partly in response to the criticism, some UN agencies have made progress in harmonising their planning and reporting processes. In an effort to implement a more robust, coherent approach, the new strategic plans for UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP and UN Women for the period 2014-2017 and General Programme of Work for WHO for the period 2014-2019 include clearer and more robust results frameworks with complete results chains and indicators. These include common indicators that have been developed to effectively implement the QCPR. Through the development of their strategic plans, the funds and programmes have directly responded to the request of the resolution 67/226 to improve the planning, measurement, monitoring and reporting on system-wide results.⁷³ 15 agencies, representing 85% of UN operational activities for development participate in the UNDG initiative to develop and use common RBM tools and principles. UNHCR participates only in part⁷⁴ and as a consequence there are significant differences in the two approaches (figure 23).

Figure 23: A comparison of RBM for the One Programme and for UNHCR

The One Programme defines outcomes to be achieved over three to five years. These outcomes are operationalised and translated into concrete, measurable and time-bound outputs and annual/biennial action plans. Baselines are identified alongside targets to be achieved in the project period with progress indicators identified for each which are monitored and reported on by Results Groups.

UNHCR has a planning and budgeting results-based management framework which is built around populations of concern (referred to as population planning groups or PPGs). It is divided into goals, rights groups, objectives, and outputs. The goals characterise different protection and solutions strategies or types of programme and the full range of UNHCR's protection and solutions objectives are organized under different Rights Groups. For every objective there is a series of pre-designated outputs (actions to achieve the desired objective).

⁷¹ *Independent Evaluation of Lessons Learned from Delivering as One: Final Summary Report* prepared for United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 12 June 2012.

⁷² Bester, A. (2012) *Results-based management in the United Nations Development System: Progress and challenges*. A report prepared for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, for the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review, Final Report, July 2012, p.23.

⁷³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) *Report of the Secretary General, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 67/226 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system*, Advanced unedited version, 5 February 2014, p.45.

⁷⁴ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) *QCPR Monitoring, Survey of Agency HQ, 2014 report*, December 2014, p.31.

As a consequence of differences between the two RBM frameworks, UNHCR must go through a process of translating its country-level objectives into outcomes, outputs and activities for the purposes of inclusion into the UNDAF. Given that the One Programme increasingly includes all aspects of UNHCR's country operations, this can be a significant task and represents a duplication of effort. It is also inherently inaccurate as the results included in the UNDAF often differ significantly from the way that UNHCR articulates them and as a consequence there is a need to artificially disaggregate outcomes and outputs to bring them into line with the One Programme framework. Interviews with programme staff suggested that the accuracy of the results depended in large part on who the task was assigned to and practice differed with it being considered a task for a junior staff member in some countries to a participatory process involving technical staff and programme staff jointly at the other. The difference in the timing of annual planning cycles further complicates this task although having to complete the UNHCR planning cycle in the months prior to the UNDAF cycle is of some consolation.

6.4 UNDAF coordination and results architecture

Each DaO country has Outcome or Results Groups (or something similar in constitution if not in name) which are mechanisms organised to contribute to specific UNDAF outcomes through coordinated and collaborative planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. They are defined at the planning stage and are aligned to the One Programme expressed in the UNDAF results matrix. Each Results Group is led by a designated Head of Agency or senior programme staff member who is a member of the UNCT and who is responsible and accountable for driving joint approaches for results as well as monitoring and reporting within a harmonised and coordinated framework. In some countries the Results groups had sub-groups tasked with the job of monitoring progress towards achieving the outcome. In one country with a decentralized governance system, there was also a results group convened in each of the Provinces.

For the majority of the case study countries, results groups were formed of a set of senior UN agency staff that share a broadly common interest and programming theme, but that were often responsible for very different outcomes, outputs and activities. As a consequence of the diverse participation in many of these groups, business tended to be driven by process rather than by programme substance as highlighted in the mid-term review of Mozambique UNDAF;

'Members of the DRGs [results groups] were very active initially, and are motivated by when engaged in joint programming and Joint Programmes, but find the time spent on process to increase transaction costs, rather than reduce them. These tasks have also become demotivating over the past year, and all DRGs (including sub-groups) voiced dissatisfaction to varying degrees... DRG's and their respective subgroups are predominantly driven by process in planning and monitoring. Most expressed that there is limited or no substantive or strategic discussion within the DRG or the UNDAF Outcome or sectoral sub-groups.'⁷⁵

The review recommended experimenting with sector results groups which are convened around outcomes where there is common interest. It is interesting that in Tanzania, which has a refugee working group under the UNDAF governance, emergency and disaster response cluster, agencies considered that a shared theme and commonality of purpose strengthened the interest and participation in the group compared with others.

While Mozambique and some of the other pilot countries appear to have a relatively heavy architecture, it is important to acknowledge that in some of the self-starter countries, such as


⁷⁵ Barnes, S. and Hill, E (2014) *UNDAF Strategic Reflection and Mid-term Review, Mozambique*, October 2014, p.53.

Montenegro the process was considered to be far less time-consuming as the number of groups are fewer and the transaction costs are far less.

6.5 Implications of the One Programme on workload

The online survey included a question on the perception of staff of the extent to which the different aspects of the DaO Initiative fitted with UNHCR's programme planning cycle and business practices. Of note is that only 10% of participants considered UNHCR joint programme planning and RBM to complement that of the DaO (figure 24).

Figure 24: The complementarity of UNHCR's programme planning cycle and business practices with DaO



While country-based staff considered the duplication of effort as inefficient, it is increasingly being seen as 'business as usual'. It is also only considered particularly arduous at specific points in the year at the commencement or completion of an UNDAF or when results are begin aggregated. At these peak times of activity, one of the case study countries estimated that it can account for up to 60% of a senior programme staff member's time. Outside of these peak periods, there are a number of maintenance tasks, the most prominent of which is participation in Results groups which differ from country-to-country in their frequency. Some of these directly support UNHCR's work and so although they contribute to the DaO-related estimate of effort, they also strengthen collective support for UNHCR's PoC and so were considered beneficial; other of the tasks were considered less beneficial but would have been required irrespective of whether a One Programme existed or not and so were considered necessary (e.g. coordination meetings for cross-cutting issues). However, there are a number of other processes that are a specific requirement of participating in the One Programme or DaO more broadly and it is these that can create frustration. The table below provides an overview of the survey responses on additional workload as a consequence of DaO (figure 25).

Figure 25: UNHCR staffs estimate of the additional workload (% per annum) required by DaO participation⁷⁶

Analysis	% additional workload per annum (estimate)
Range (highest and lowest %)	5% - 35%
Mean (average of all percentages given)	19.3%
Median (% at the mid-point of the range)	20%

In recognition of the added workload, in the early stages of the DaO pilot in Tanzania a P3 staff member was recruited into the team to support UNHCR's engagement and strategies for the DaO pilot⁷⁷ and there continues to be an Associate Officer post to support the process (NOB level).

⁷⁶ It should be noted that if DaO did not exist, some of the tasks attributed to DaO, such as coordination meetings would still be required and so the estimates may be over-stated.

It is noteworthy that when asked if the duplication of effort provided a sufficiently compelling reason to change UNHCR's approach or systems, there was very little support for this from country-based staff. This may be understandable at the level of the individual country, however when viewed at the level of the organisation, the additional workload that is required for a large proportion of UNHCR's operations to consistently monitor and report results through two different systems may provide a more compelling justification for modifying organisational procedures.

7. The Common Budgetary Framework and the One Fund

This section presents the findings of the review on UNHCR's engagement with the CBF and One Fund and analyses the inter-relationship between the CBF and UNHCR's budget approach and the contribution that the One Fund has made to UNHCR's operations.

7.1 Budgeting

The CBF enables UNCTs to present all planned and costed programme activities in one place and is considered to be an important tool for reporting to Governments and donors, promoting resources that are driven by programme needs. It also facilitates coherent resource mobilization by the RC and the UNCT for implementation of agreed costed results.

UNHCR's budget is developed around a Results Framework that differs from the One Programme which assigns budget figures, disaggregated by UN agency, to different pre-defined country based projects/activities. To translate UNHCR budgets to the CBF requires an artificial disaggregation of the objectives and outputs relevant to UNHCR, to projects/activities used in the UNDAF. To track expenditure requires a duplicate spreadsheet to be maintained which can then be used for the purposes of reporting against the UNDAF. This is fairly common among agencies as the QCPR monitoring report attests;

'...there remained a lack of synergy between the [CBF] tools and the programmatic and budget cycles of agencies. The terminology used was not the same and there was a concern that the data being provided were not always comparable. The Unit concluded that the issue could be addressed only at the CEB level and that resolving it would enhance the effectiveness of the framework as a tool for joint programming, resource mobilization and monitoring of the implementation of the United Nations Development Assistance Plan.'⁷⁸

While there was recognition, and some frustration about the duplication of effort that this represented, it was also considered to be part of the business and as such was accommodated by UNHCR staff, albeit with some difficulty when there was significant spikes in workload; at times when an annual report was being prepared or when a new UNDAF was being developed, the additional time required by finance and programme staff was considerable.

To address the duplication of effort would require that UNHCR shift to output-based budgeting and it is accepted that this would be possible using the current system '*in principle*'⁷⁹ albeit with considerable investment but the findings of the 2014 MOPAN suggest that '*producing expenditures*

⁷⁷ In 2009 the post was budgeted at a P3 level of \$176,857 with 20% support costs of \$35,371, with a total cost to UNHCR of \$212,228.

⁷⁸ United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council (2015) *Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the GA Resolution 67/226 on the QCPR*, 13 January 2015, p.27.

⁷⁹ The 2010 PDES publication, '*Measure for measure: a field-based snapshot of the implementation of results-based management in UNHCR*' confirms that this would be possible '*in principle*' but in practice detailed budgeting was undertaken at objective level.

*at the output level at the country level remains impossible as it currently requires too much data manipulation (i.e. data generated is unreliable).*⁸⁰ Until such time as UNHCR's resource planning software, Managing for Systems, Resources and People (MRSP) is able to accommodate this level of data manipulation, or the system is changed, there is little likelihood of addressing the issue of duplication for country-based staff. While the harmonisation of budgeting procedures would offer the potential for greater coherence, this could only fully be achieved if there was an associated change in UNHCR's planning framework so that the relevant One Programme outcomes could be migrated into UNHCR COP.

Finding the 'gap': Translating UNHCR's budget contributions to the CBF

UNHCR funds its programmes almost entirely through voluntary contributions and this is only allocated for implementation against countries and programmes at the end of the financial year (earmarked contributions are reported earlier) which can make it challenging for country-based finance staff to accurately complete of the CBF. The CBF includes (a) estimated agency contributions, disaggregated by core and non-core resources; (b) the Governments' contributions (in some cases); and (c) the funding gap. The review found that different countries adopted different approaches to filling out the CBF; in three countries, three different approaches were used to estimate the gap.

- Accepting that almost all of UNHCR's resources are contributions and are not confirmed until the end of the year, one approach that has been adopted is to consider the whole budget as the gap. This approach skews the CBF as it tends to over-state the gap.
- A second approach that has been used is to show a fixed percentage of the Operating Level (OL, i.e. budgets authorized for expenditure) as non-core resources in the CBF (based on OL approvals for prior years) and then show the remaining percentage as the funding gap. In one case, 80% of UNHCR's OL is included in non-core while the remaining 20% of the OL is reported as the gap.
- A third approach is to consider the OL as the non-core contributions and the difference between OL and the Operations Plan (OP, total required budget, rarely fully funded) as the gap. It has the advantage of being simple as it offers a direct fit with UNHCR's own approach and can be easily replicated.

It is important to state that country teams have sought to find pragmatic solutions to the dilemma of how to engage with the CBF, but given the large number of countries that participate in UNDAFs (in both DaO and non-DaO countries), there would be value in headquarters providing guidance that achieves a balance between the need to reflect the voluntary nature of UNHCR's global contributions with the requirement for the RC and UNCT at country-level to have clarity about the resource that have been mobilised for the UNDAF.

Linked to this issue, there is also a lack of clarity about how to present budgetary 'gaps' to the UNCT in order to bid for One Funding. UNHCR in Mozambique, which received a small contribution from the One Fund in 2008 and 2010 spoke of the practical difficulties of highlighting unfunded projects in the CBF given UNHCR's budgeting processes which funds at the programme level. This has the potential to weaken UNHCR's advocacy within UNCT for allocation of funding from the One Fund or other pooled funding mechanisms. The approach taken by the team in Pakistan which considers the OL as the non-core funds and above OL as the 'gap' may offer a solution to this but the different approaches that have been adopted suggest a need for Headquarters to provide guidance.

⁸⁰ Multilateral Organisation Performance Network (2014) *Technical Report, UNHCR, Volume 1: Results by micro-indicator and by country*, January 2015, p.27.


Incorporating joint programme funding into UNHCR's budgeting process

One of the more significant disincentives to engaging in (or certainly receiving funding from) joint programmes is internal to UNHCR and is related to its budgeting process.

Contributions that are received for planned priority activities generally contribute to the OL and given that the focus of the UNDAF is on supporting longer-term planned activities then it follows that this should usually contribute to the OL. However, it is when the situation deviates from the norm that UNHCR have encountered challenges in finding budget space to accommodate joint programme funding. This has occurred when opportunities for joint programmes have arisen for activities that have not been prioritised under the OL but have been included in the OP. It should follow that the OL should be increased accordingly but this is frequently not the case. In two of the case study countries, other UN agencies with more accommodating financial procedures were urged to accept the funds on UNHCR's behalf; for one country, the fact that the predictability of the process of requesting an OL increase is unclear was sufficient to deter them from pursuing the option. The complexities of this process can serve as a disincentive for UNHCR's participation in joint programmes. It also has implications for UNHCR's visibility for programming that is central to their mandate but for which funding is handed to other UN agencies. The results of the online survey about budgeting for joint programmes endorses the findings from the case studies (figure 26) and the challenges were summed up by a staff member from sub-Saharan Africa:

'UNHCR's programme-based approach is unsuitable to the project-based approach of DaO since it requires specific budgeting mechanisms to be developed in order to comply with the management of DaO's Joint Programme funds. It also presents risks to the UNHCR when activities included in the Joint Programme are also part of the regular budget which will risk displacing planned activities which may be more central to UNHCR's mandate.'⁸¹

Figure 26: Findings from the online survey about budgeting for joint programmes in DaO countries



⁸¹ Response received from the online survey question, 'What would you consider to be the 3 most important lessons that you have learnt from UNHCR's participation in the DaO Initiative that may be helpful for guiding UNHCR colleagues in the future.'

7.2 The One Fund

In addition to the traditional sources of core and non-core resources, three specific funding instruments have been used to support DaO which comprises the One Fund at country level, and the Expanded Funding Window for Achievement of the MDGs and the MDG-F at headquarters level. The modality for all three instruments is the multi-partner trust fund. The purpose of the One Fund is to maximize the effectiveness of the UN system delivery by pooling resources into a common fund to support a nation's strategic priorities, as outlined in the One Programme. In order to strengthen the coherence, efficiency and delivery at the country level, the One UN approach calls for multiyear, un-earmarked commitments contributed to the Fund.

To date, the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF) shows expenditure of \$702.99m for country-based One Funds between 2008 and 2014⁸² and \$680.48m was contributed to the Expanded Delivering as One Funding Window for the Achievement of the MDGs between 2009 and 2012.⁸³ More recently, in December 2013 the 'Delivering Results Together Fund' was established to support countries applying the DaO approach by providing programme resources to influence greater policy coherence which by April 2015 had received \$27m from 4 donors.⁸⁴ To put the contribution that One Funds makes to development into context, the UN estimated that in 2013, non-core funding modalities for UN development-related activities came to a total of \$11.6 billion of which 73% was classified as single-donor, programme and project specific funding and 8% was classified as pooled funding which included 1% for One UN funds.⁸⁵

While the DaO pilot countries received generous un-earmarked funding, donors have increasingly chosen to earmark their funding such that in 2014, 79% of the contributions to the One Fund were earmarked by sector or agency.⁸⁶ The 2012 Independent Evaluation of DaO lamented this trend and suggested that despite the progress made towards strengthening joint ways of working, individual agencies continued to be the primary unit of accountability for performance and management. This sentiment was echoed by participants in the review who suggested that the fact that donors have increased their earmarking of funds may imply that they too consider that the agencies remain pre-eminent. In analysis undertaken by the UN's Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on resource mobilization, Member States gave a number of reasons for earmarking contributions which included, *'the need for visibility and attribution; pressure from parliaments, media and taxpayers for greater accountability; the inability of some of the United Nations organisations to audit and report on core funding in a satisfactory manner; increased scrutiny by budgetary, audit and parliamentary authorities; and growing concern regarding value for money and the results-based management of organizations and their expenditures. Specifying funds makes it easier to ensure that funds are aligned with the donors' own priorities.'*⁸⁷

Expenditure for the One Fund peaked in 2010 at \$176m with 21 One Funds operating in 20 countries but the contributions have been in decline with an estimated reduction of 38% since then (figure 27). While concerns have been expressed in the past about the small donor base, the number of

⁸² MPTF/Funds and Joint Programmes/Delivering as One/2004 – 21/04/2015. Available at http://mptf.undp.org/portfolio/fund?fund_type=12

⁸³ UNHCR figures, February 2015.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.10.


⁸⁵ Muttukumaru, R. (2015) *The funding and related practices of the UN Development System*, ECOSOC dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN Development system in the context of the post-2015 development agenda, May 2015, p.9.

⁸⁶ Interview with UN DOCO, April 2015.

⁸⁷ United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (2014) *An Analysis of the Resource Mobilization Function within the United Nations System*, p.12.


donors appears to have increased albeit in the context of a downward funding trend; in 2014, the top 10 donors accounted for 78% of all contributions to the MPTF Office compared to 91% in 2011.⁸⁸

Figure 27: Contributions to country-based One Funds and the Expanded Funding DaO Window, 2006-15



From a total of \$702.99m for the country-based One Funds UNHCR’s calculations indicate that by February 2015 it had managed to mobilize \$USD20.2 million for projects in Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Papua New Guinea (see figure 28). This is only 2.87% of the total contributions to the One Fund and constitutes a very modest amount compared with pooled sources of UN humanitarian funds such as the CERF from which UNHCR received approximately \$USD321 million over the same period. This is hardly surprising given that UNHCR’s mandate is largely humanitarian in nature, but the review has also demonstrated that there are internal procedural barriers to the agency maximizing its potential contributions from the One Fund. There are also external impediments to UNHCR’s use of the Fund; in at least one of the case study countries where the government was not supportive of refugees, the requirement for it to endorse all One Fund allocations has meant that UNHCR was unlikely to be selected.

Figure 28: Analysis of UNHCR’s fundraising from the DaO initiative, 2008 – 2014



While from a resource mobilisation and agency convening perspective, the One Funds have been beneficial, some of those who participated in the review from pilot countries felt that they had also had a negative impact with some of the early joint programmes being considered ‘marriages of convenience’ more focused on accessing additional funding than seeking to leverage the benefits of

⁸⁸ ECOSOC Dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN development system in the context of the post-2015 development agenda, background note, Workshop 2 – funding, 4 May 2015, p.9.

collective action. In this respect the re-focusing of some of the One Programmes such as the OP II in Pakistan on joint programming has been considered to be a positive step although some did raise a concern about the limited opportunities to fill funding gaps which has meant that some programmes have struggled to gain adequate momentum. In Tanzania, the element of 'strategic gap-filling' was considered extremely important in providing funding to activities and agencies with insufficient resources for activities that were regarded as essential to achieving common outcomes. Tanzania is the country for which UNHCR has received the greatest contribution from the One Fund (see figure 28). However, for the first time since the pilot Initiative commenced, UNHCR has not received funding and its ability to fill gaps has been progressively eroded by the diminishing number of donors and level of contributions to the Fund, and by an increasing and corresponding trend among the donors to earmark their contributions. Analysis from Pakistan's 2014 joint UN audit of DaO offers an insight into the motivations of a specific donor to withdraw from the One Fund which may have broader relevance:

'Contributions to the Pakistan One Fund amounted to \$77.9 million between 2008 and 2012, with a decreasing trend specifically in 2012 with a total contribution of \$4.8 million, 77 percent lower compared to 2011. Significant part of the decrease in contributions to the One Fund is related to the Government of Norway ending its support...Norway decided to phase out its support to the initiative in July 2013, having contributed \$16.8 million between 2008 and 2011. Norway's decision was based on the view, developed through a mid-term review of the initiative...that there had been significant issues related to strategic leadership, as well as management and quality control factors that had not been adequately dealt with. These shortcomings resulted in delayed implementation, insufficient monitoring and quality control, low efficiency and effectiveness of investment and lack of accountable reporting.'⁸⁹

Donors did not participate in the review and so it is not possible to say whether this accounts for the broader decline in the One Funds and concomitant increase in earmarking although it is noteworthy that the 2014 QCPR Monitoring report stressed the importance of the One Fund to the success of DaO and made a plea to Member States that *'the financial support of donors and other stakeholders for 'One United Nations' funds must be maintained.'*⁹⁰

7.3 Resource Mobilisation

UNHCR's stocktaking review of the DaO Pilots raised a concern that donor contributions to the Joint Programme could have an impact on UNHCR's direct funding as donors may choose to channel their funding through the One Fund.⁹¹ There is no way to objectively evaluate this but feedback received during the country case study visits suggest that this is unlikely to have been the case, given that UNHCR receives the majority of its contributions from humanitarian funding sources which are often quite separate from DaO funding. With cumulative funding to country-based One Funds decreasing and with earmarking increasing, it is now less likely that UNHCR's global contributions will be adversely affected, although UNHCR will also be less likely to benefit from the One Fund.

An analysis of funding to Pakistan is instructive; between 2009 and 2012, contributions to the One Fund were estimated to be \$86.2m⁹² of which UNHCR received approximately 1.02% or \$0.88m in 2010. Over the same period, \$103.2m was raised bilaterally for the joint RAHA programme convened by UNHCR under the One Programme. This underlines the comparative importance of bilateral funding to UNHCR, even for joint programmes within a One Programme.

⁸⁹ Audit Report No. 1247, 20 June 2014: *Audit of DaO in Pakistan*, p.15.

⁹⁰ United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council (2015) *Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the GA Resolution 67/226 on the QCPR*, 13 January 2015, p.47.

⁹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2008) *UNHCR's engagement in the Delivering as One pilots: An informal stocktaking*, December 2007, PDES/2008/01, March 2008, p.4.

⁹² MPTF Gateway, accessed on 07/05/2015.

In order to increase contributions, many DaO countries have developed Joint Resource Mobilisation Strategies (including for Mozambique, Montenegro, Tanzania and Pakistan) and a guidance document was produced by UNDG in March 2014.⁹³ It was considered too complex to judge the inter-relationship between joint resource mobilisation and UNHCR's global contributions although the JIU analysis study documents some of the more fundamental challenges to joint resource mobilization from recent experiences from the DaO in Mozambique (figure 29).

Figure 29: The challenges of joint resource mobilization within the DaO framework in Mozambique⁹⁴

The individuals in the country team have the difficult task of satisfying dual expectations: the need to project performance to both the country team and their headquarters. Each agency in Mozambique sees itself as a part of the "One United Nations" initiative, but in headquarters, the units are very specifically agency units. For example, everyone in the country team agrees that the common budgetary framework is a useful tool, as it points out where the gaps in resources are. However, there is a lack of synergy between the tools and the programmatic and budget cycles of agencies. The terminology used is not the same; the concern is that the data populated in the common budgetary framework is not comparable (that is, what is core for one agency might not be for another, or one agency includes salaries of staff while another might not)...

...Although there is no real competition for resources, there is a sentiment that "small" agencies tend to get neglected by the "big" ones. Small country offices are challenged with not having enough resources to stretch themselves to be included in all activities. The "big" agencies pointed out the need for the "small" ones to focus on their strengths and partner with "big" agencies. In their view, focusing on many activities with few resources will yield no results.

8. One Leader

This section presents the findings of the review on UNHCR's engagement in the One Leader DaO pillar including its experience of working in the context of the Management and Accountability System. It raises the impact that leadership personality can have on UNHCR's engagement and examines the challenges of staff rotation on institutional knowledge of DaO.

8.1 Management and Accountability

Under the One Leader, the RC leads the UNCT and plays a role in coordinating UN operational activities and ensures coherence and alignment of UN activities for development at the country-level in support of national priorities. S/he also engages in advocacy on the core values, standards, principles and activities of the UN system. The challenges of successfully achieving the varied and complex demands of the role are considerable as the management response to the 2012 Independent Evaluation attests;

'Resident Coordinators must cope with the challenge of achieving overall coherence in programming of operational activity in an environment where entity participation is in large part voluntary, funding is not flexible and decision-making is consensus-driven. This increases the need for the Resident Coordinator to be a highly qualified leader with strong competencies as a consensus-builder to mobilize the United Nations Country Team around collective results.'⁹⁵


⁹³ United Nations Development Group (2014) *Advisory Note: Joint Resource Mobilisation*, Final Draft, UNDG Fiduciary oversight group, March 2014.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 26.

⁹⁵ United Nations Development Group (2012) *Management response to the Independent Evaluation of Lessons Learned from DaO*, 28 November 2012, p.11.

From a UN Agency perspective there was considerable anxiety expressed from review participants from across a number of UN agencies about the potential for conflict of interests to occur given the predominance of RCs from a single agency although there are signs that change is happening with the balance now beginning to shift (64% of RCs were from UNDP in 2012 – see figure 30).⁹⁶ While the 'function firewall for the RC system'⁹⁷ has gone some way to allaying these concerns, making progress against the recommendation made in the JIU's evaluation of the RC selection and appointment process to the GA through the QCPR to '*establish long-term targets to be achieved with regard to diversity among RCs in terms of North-South balance and organisation of origin*',⁹⁸ continues to be important.

Figure 30: Diversity in the agency background of Resident Coordinators, 2004 – August 2013⁹⁹



Efforts have also been made to strengthen mutual accountabilities between the RC and members of the UNCT¹⁰⁰ albeit with variable uptake by UN agencies. An important aspect of this has been the development of a system of reciprocal performance appraisal between the RC and UNCT members. Several agencies have already adopted this system and UNHCR is in the process of updating its performance appraisal guidance for its Representatives to reflect these changes which will improve its performance against the QCPR management and accountability requirements which the monitoring report considers are '*almost universal in terms of policies adopted by the agency headquarters*'¹⁰¹ which suggests that UNHCR is out of step with most other agencies (see figure 31).

Figure 31: Participation of UNHCR in the management and accountability system in 2014

Agency	No. of UNCTs of which agency is a member	Agency heads job description recognizes role of RC	Recognises reporting obligations to RC	UNCT results captured in member's own performance appraisal	RC asked to provide formal input to UNCT member's appraisal
UNHCR	78	No	Yes	No	No
No. of other agencies that comply (out of 14)	Average - 77	Yes – 12 No – 0	Yes – 12 No – 1	Yes – 12 No – 0	Yes – 11 No – 1

⁹⁶ Lindores, D. (2012) *Enhancing the functioning of the UN Resident Coordinator system, A report prepared for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in preparation for the 2012 QCPR*, p. 42

⁹⁷ The term is used to describe the removal of the RC from operational responsibilities for UNDP by transferring these responsibilities to a UNDP Country Director, or in the absence of one, to a Deputy UNDP Resident Representative.

⁹⁸ Posta, I. and Achamkulangare, G (2013) *Selection and appointment process for the United Nations Resident Coordinators, including preparation, training and support provided for their work*, Joint Inspection Unit, JIU/REP/2013/3, p.v.

⁹⁹ Ibid, Annex III, p.43.

¹⁰⁰ United National Development Group (2009) *Guidance Note on Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team Working Relations*, approved by the UNDG, 29 January 2009

¹⁰¹ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) *QCPR Monitoring, Survey of Agency HQ, 2014 report*, December 2014, p.20.

UNHCR's Memorandum on engagement in the DaO Initiative correctly emphasizes the lessons of the Independent Evaluation that the *'RC must have the vision and leadership skills as well as knowledge of UNHCR's goals in the country to engage the UNCT in support of including specific UNHCR activities in the country strategic document and processes.'* In the majority of cases, UNHCR has maintained cordial relations with the RC whose consensus-building capacities were considered fundamental to allowing DaO to maintain momentum, even at times when added value of some of its constituent parts were proving cumbersome. There were also examples, however of where relations between Representatives and the RC were less collegiate. While it is not possible for the review to fully comprehend the dynamics that may have contributed to this, one particular touch-paper is when the RC chooses to go beyond her/his 'coordination' function and seek to 'manage' particular aspects of DaO that were considered mandate-specific – be it communication, joint programmes or resource-mobilisation. In these instances, there was concern by agency staff that 'vertical' accountability lines could not be subordinated to 'horizontal' ones, an issue that was also raised in the Independent Evaluation of the DaO pilots where it was noted that *'the One Leader concept was not supported by any authority of the Resident Coordinator over organizations, which retained their own lines of authority and staff accountability.'*¹⁰² In offering a critique of the RC role, it is important to add that the challenges of the long-term success of the RC falls on all parties; if UNDP must continue to ensure the effectiveness of the 'firewall', so must other agencies work to respect the role of the RC which is not always the case. Also important in strengthening collective accountability is the importance of ensuring that UNCT members include DaO participation in their job descriptions; which is another area where performance appears to be patchy with the 2014 Pakistan audit noting that out of four heads of agencies whose job descriptions were reviewed, three did not include their contribution to the DaO Initiative.¹⁰³

A more frequently-cited concern was of passive or assertive resistance by RCs to UNHCR's mandate which has the potential to place the agency in confrontation with both the government and the UN mission when obligations to PoC are not being met. Several countries spoke of a reluctance to include refugees in the One Programme for fear of eliciting a hostile reaction from the government, or a reticence to engage with UNHCR's operations, particularly in countries where refugees and other PoC are not afforded their full rights. In one country, UNHCR had distanced itself from the RC because of concerns that politics had trumped rights. In these instances, the role of the One Leader can be in direct opposition to UNHCR and has serious implications for those in need of assistance. This is considered to be one of the key factors that continues to undermine relationships and may be resolved once a RBA has been incorporated into development programming, policy and action.

Conversely, in several countries, the RC was considered to be one of the most important and influential advocates in support of UNHCR's refugee protection mandate in a way that is consistent with UNHCR's policy guidance that stresses the importance of partnership with the RC as opposed to delegation of the mandate. In Kenya for example, the RC has been fundamental in supporting UNHCR in advocating for refugee rights in a very complex context – having reach into parts of Government that UNHCR may not have links with can be fundamental to ensuring that states respect their obligations to PoC. In Liberia, a DaO country operating in the context of an Integrated Mission, the openness and engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in supporting agency advocacy on issues related to their mandate has resulted in very positive relations and a high degree of satisfaction with DaO partly as a consequence. Figure 32 provides voices from

¹⁰² United Nations Development Groups (2012) *Independent Evaluation of Lessons Learned from Delivering as One: Final Summary Report* prepared for United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 12 June 2012, p.26.

¹⁰³ Audit report No. 1247, 20 June 2014, Audit of DaO in Pakistan, joint audit undertaken by the internal audit services of FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNIDO, p.5.

the case study countries and the online survey on the interrelationship between One Leader and UNHCR’s mandate.

Figure 32: Voices from the field on the effect One Leader on UNHCR’s mandate

‘Our messages have been said from more sources, thanks to the "One Leader". It gives them more weight.’

‘The One Leader (RC) enables better branding of the UN in the country. For UNHCR the additional benefit is that the RC has consulted UNHCR on the specific issues that our PoC have concerning their legal stay in the country and has raised that topic, among the others, in meetings with high Government officials.’


‘Our experience has been negative, as it has confused UNHCR’s brand’

‘The success of the DaO initiative depends on the persona of the leadership, which means it requires time to mature and be able to move on regardless of who is in the driving seat.’

‘Being part of the DaO initiative does not mean giving up on the agency's identity and key values - knowledge of other UN agencies can be valuable to you; - The agencies have more in common than they are aware of.’

There was also mixed feedback to the online survey question about the effect of the One Leader on UNHCR’s mandate and programme which highlights the variability that exists in practice (see figure 33). It is noteworthy that less than 10% of respondents felt that the One Leader had compromised UNHCR’s independent leadership of refugee protection (and over 50% felt that One Leader was supportive of it). The majority of review participants also felt that the One Leader had assisted in galvanizing the collective support of the UNCT for UNHCR’s mandate which is encouraging.

Figure 33: UNHCR perceptions of the effect of One Leader on its mandate and programme



The unease that some people feel about UNHCR ‘sharing’ its mandate with other UN agencies and the RC in particular is an important factor in the mixed feelings that exist within UNHCR about the participation of others in matters related to refugees. This is not peculiar to UNHCR but affects all agencies as articulated in ILO’s report on the challenges of DaO;

‘Related to the issue of mandate is that of “turf”: agencies are identified by their mandate and their area of work, this gives them identity notably vis-à-vis their executive boards and

their donors. This means, however, that agencies defend their particular area and theme, and do not necessarily welcome newcomers – other UN agencies - that join their topical area – as these may have a different position, or role, or attachment. It also means that each agency has a myopic —slice of the cake , which makes it difficult for each to be comprehensive, and to develop and present comprehensive policy positions.¹⁰⁴


There is no question about the importance of UNHCR maintaining strong relationships with the RC for reasons that go far beyond the implementation of DaO, but at the same time, the current guidance lacks clarity about how to decide on strategies to engage the RC in the context of DaO; the 2008 UNHCR Memorandum and Guidance on DaO is now dated particularly in view of the significant changes in RC/UNCT management and accountability that have occurred since its circulation. There may be value in UNHCR using the 'Human Rights Up Front' as a means of both informing how to engage with the UN Mission but also proactively as a lobbying tool when the high standards that it aspires to are not being met.

8.2 The personality factor

It is impossible to discuss the relationships between the RC and UNCT members without referring to the important role that different personalities play in making or breaking relationships. The inescapable conclusion of almost all of the participants of the review was that so much of the success or otherwise of DaO came down to personalities – of the RC and of members of the UNCT, and several examples were given of poor relationships that negatively affected DaO engagement which were completely transformed by a change in staffing; a previously hostile relationship could become the most supportive in a matter of days when the personalities changed. The frequency with which this was reported was striking as it suggests that recruitment processes for senior staff continue to produce extremely variable results.

8.3 The challenge of retaining institutional knowledge of DaO

Figure 34: the DaO workload/engagement challenge



Beyond personalities, the UN policy of rotating senior staff members also negatively impacts on DaO as it is a challenge to retain institutional knowledge of the Initiative. There was recognition among staff that familiarity with DaO plays an important part in managing the workload associated with it which tended to decrease (the blue line in figure 34) as understanding increased which allowed staff to engage at a more strategic level (the red line in figure 34).

This pattern presents a challenge to UNHCR where there is staff rotation, particularly when it affects senior staff and concern was raised about UNHCR's country-level approach to DaO changing significantly when new staff arrived which makes is particularly problematic given the longer-term horizons of DaO. To avoid personality-based engagement, there would be added value in scaling up organisational-level support for DaO either physically in Geneva or through the creation of agency-

specific induction resources to assist staff in familiarizing themselves with the initiative via a dedicated intranet page for example.

¹⁰⁴ Köhler G (2011) *The challenges of Delivering as One: Overcoming fragmentation and moving towards policy coherence*, Working paper no. 100, Policy Integration Department, International Labour Organisation Office, February 2011, p.15.

Some agencies have also made strategic investments at headquarters to engage staff in broader discussions about UN Coherence and change. UNICEF has a UN Coherence team at headquarters that provides guidance and support to field staff. There is also a newsletter providing updates to staff on DaO and UN reform initiatives and in 2010 UNICEF published 'A Handy Guide on UN Coherence'. A UNHCR briefing pack and common guidance material available in Geneva or via the intranet for staff joining DaO countries in addition to country-based briefings would go some way to minimising the loss of institutional knowledge and would also militate against the potential for engagement to be personality-led as appears to often be the case.

9. Communicating as One

This section presents and analyses UNHCR's participation in the Communicating as One DaO pillar and seeks to analyse its effect on UNHCR's communication and advocacy.

9.1 Communications

The DaO SOPs consider that Communicating as One as plays a key role in ensuring clear and consistent strategic positioning of the UN at the country-level, for developing common messages and policy positions and for supporting communication on UN comparative advantage in the country. In most of the country case studies there was a common communications strategy and the RCO often had a Communications Officer post to assist in coordination.

Maintaining agencies brand and visibility within joint communication has been one of the more challenging and sensitive aspects of DaO. Across the pilots, there was been a range of experiences – with some UNCTs agreeing on ways to maintain agencies visibility and other UNCTs convening under the 'One UN' brand. Agencies consider their visibility to be critical for a number of reasons, particularly for fundraising and beneficiary accountability reasons but also for security purposes. Because of UNHCR's unique mandate the symbol is extremely important both for the agency and PoC. In contexts where the UN has political, peacekeeping or peace enforcement and humanitarian objectives, the independence of UNHCR is particularly important. The concern raised in UNHCR's informal stock take is the potential for this to affect UNHCR's distinct identity and visibility linked to its protection mandate and during headquarters-based discussions this issue was frequently cited.

For most of the case study countries, the approach that has been adopted has been consistent with the DaO SOP on Communicating as One, that *'While it is important to establish agreed common UNCT positions, United Nations entities must continue to support mandate-specific strategies, policies, messages and products, using agencies' own brand identities, provided that mandate-specific messages are consistent with agreed common positions and complement joint UNCT and United Nations mission efforts.'*¹⁰⁵

As a consequence, Communicating as One has generally been considered to be of added value to UNHCR; in Mozambique, UNHCR does not have public information capacity and as a consequence has used RCO resources to support UNHCR's communication activities. There was a similar situation in Montenegro where UNHCR found the support of the RCO to be beneficial as it provided an additional means of communicating on key issues related to UNHCR's mandate; the current campaign on Statelessness had been hosted by the One UN website and on the occasion of the World Refugee day, the One UN participated in activities linked to its promotion in support of UNHCR. The Tanzania case study revealed similar findings and there was a general view from within UNHCR, other UN agencies and the RCO that an approach that allowed agencies to act

¹⁰⁵ United Nations Development Group (2014) *Guide to Communicating as One*, August 2014, p.4.

independently or in concert with the One UN on issues linked to their mandate. Conversely, one of the case study countries had chosen to celebrate World Refugee Day alone as they did not consider it appropriate for this to be done under the One UN. The material issue here is that decision-making for mandate-specific issues have been the responsibility of the relevant agency.


On brand visibility, while different approaches have been adopted in different DaO countries, the most frequently reported policy is that for joint communications, the One UN logo is used alongside the logos of relevant agencies and the review found no examples of the former being used in place of the latter. For mandate-specific issues, the use of a single agency logo is most frequently adopted. This approach is consistent with the DaO SOPs although there have been stricter interpretations used in the past which have led to greater concerns. It is important to add that this continues to be an extremely sensitive issue and it will be important to maintain an approach that favours 'all agencies communicating as One' over 'one communicating for all agencies'.

9.2 Advocacy

While the protection mandate for refugees has been specifically entrusted to the High Commissioner by the General Assembly and cannot be delegated, it can benefit from partnership and the One UN has the potential to support this. While the SOPs speak of a stronger focus on the UN adopting a RBA, there is also truth in the concern raised in an ILO-published study that '*the process of Delivering as One carries the risk of converging towards the lowest common denominator, the least imaginative approach, the most acquiescent policy or programme content... There is therefore, conceivably, a risk built into the well-intentioned drive for policy coherence, since it may lead to policy coherence, but on a minimalist, non-controversial, non-antagonistic level.*'¹⁰⁶ Experience in the case study countries was mixed, but in the majority of cases, the RC and the wider UN was considered to have been of assistance in amplifying UNHCR's voice on issues associated with its PoC, particularly where UNHCR lacked resources, did not have access to those the change-makers or where the situation required an unequivocal message.

The feedback to the online survey was balanced between DaO having a positive and negative impact on UNHCR's ability to advocate in support of its protection mandate although it is noteworthy that over 70% of respondents considered that One Voice had not negatively affected UNHCR's ability to speak out independently where this was required (see figure 35).

Figure 35: The contribution made by Communicating as One to advocacy related to UNHCR's mandate



¹⁰⁶ Köhler G (2011) *The challenges of Delivering as One: Overcoming fragmentation and moving towards policy coherence*, Working paper no. 100, Policy Integration Department, International Labour Organisation Office, February 2011, p.19.

The case studies and online survey offered several examples of instances when Communicating as One amplified the voice of UNHCR on issues of refugee protection in addition to raising some of the challenges (see figure 36).

Figure 36: Voices from the field on the effect of Communicating as One on UNHCR's mandate

'The UN Joint Communication Team, which UNHCR is part of, supported our efforts to raise issues related to our mandate with the general public but also with the host government.'

'There is potential although we do need to push to have the word "refugees" mentioned in what is produced by the joint communication group.'

'The One Voice Pillar of DaO has just been revitalized and so it is difficult to draw conclusion. However, it has helped to support the limited capacity we have for external communication as well as to increase other UN agencies' awareness of UNHCR's mandate.'

'The One UN in Montenegro came together to support UNHCR's global #ibelong campaign on the eradication of statelessness. With the assistance of different members of the UN Mission, it was possible to garner the support of the Minister of the Interior and the Head of the EU Delegation in the country to sign the digital petition. The website of the UN in Montenegro also has links to key UNHCR publications on issues of displacement, the Roma and stateless (available at <http://www.un.org.me/documents-and-publications>).'

As discussed earlier in this report, the imperative to find durable solutions also has the potential to significantly benefit from country-level advocacy support from the wider UN system. In several of the countries that participated in the review, an unsupportive political environment was cited as one of the biggest obstacles to achieving solutions. In a country in Southern Africa, UNHCR's relationship with its line ministry was considered to be a significant barrier to raising issues associated with durable solutions and UNHCR had worked with other agencies to engage with other line ministries that were more willing to engage. However, in many DaO countries successful joint advocacy will also require a significant shift in the engagement between members of the UNCT which will take time. This sets an important agenda for UNHCR to seek to strengthen collective advocacy which is consistent with the findings of the recently published Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluation;

'Building global, regional and national coalitions around the development of solutions strategies was identified in surveys and interviews as a major enabling factor for achieving results, and a majority of staff, partner and ExComm survey respondents (58, 63 and 57 per cent respectively) rated UNHCR as being very effective or effective in this regard. However, widespread feedback from the field identified instances where UNHCR was insufficiently proactive in building effective coalitions around solutions within particularly challenging political environments'¹⁰⁷

At the country-level, DaO has the potential to offer significant support to UNHCR's efforts but this will be difficult in contexts where the One Programme is silent on the needs of refugees for reasons of political expediency. Looking to the future, it is recommended that in protracted refugee situations UNHCR ensures that the issue of durable solutions is included in the UNDAF and that it seeks to build closer links with the One UN to support advocacy with government interlocutors.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Economic and Social Council (2015) *Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services*, E/AC.51/2015/5, p.15.

10. Operating as One


This section will present the findings of the review on UNHCR's engagement in the Operating as One pillar; it will provide a brief explanation of its different components and will discuss UNHCR's participation in them, their inter-relationships with UNHCR's business practices and the implications for UNHCR's efficiency.

10.1 Strengthening the case for operating as one

Operating as One is a business model that provides UNCTs with an outline for common operational support to the DaO by using existing agency operational capacities and consolidating service provision. The Business Operations Strategy (BOS) is the framework within which the different aspects of Operating as One are organised.

The concept of Operating as One has advanced relatively slowly and while the Independent Evaluation found evidence of gains from expanding common services and simplifying business practices in procurement, Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) and staff recruitment, harmonization of business practices in financial management and human resource management made very limited progress. An initial lack of cost-benefit data is slowly being addressed but while there is now a stronger evidence base for some of the changes that have resulted, a recent survey of operations management teams showed that UNCTs still do not systematically implement common services or base such implementation on sound business analysis and management practice (see figure 37). It also revealed that the country teams still do not coordinate the provision of most of the basic support services and that the majority of countries have not followed the minimum requirements of setting up common services for their effective management.¹⁰⁸

Figure 37: Common services based on existing inter-agency agreements¹⁰⁹



Despite the slow progress and gaps in evidence, there are a growing number of initiatives that are contributing to the momentum of Operating as One in addition to addressing some of the more problematic duplications of functions and administrative and transaction costs that will serve to increase the incentives for agencies to work together;

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) *QCPR Monitoring, Survey of Operations Management Teams, 2014 report*, December 2014, p.11.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council (2015) *Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 67/226 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations System*, report of the Secretary General, 13 January 2015, p53.

Country level progress:

- 2014, Strategy on common premises;
- 2014/15, Common support services at the country level.

Global level progress:

- 2014, Common definition of operating costs/standardized system of cost control;
- 2014/15, Report on progress towards harmonized regulations and rules;
- 2014/15, Intra-agency rationalization of business practices;
- 2015, Report on progress towards Interoperability of ERPs with view for full interoperability in 2016.

10.2 UNHCR's engagement at country-level

The case studies offered a variety of different approaches to Operating as One, the highlights from which are summarised in figure 38. While with the introduction of the BOS there has been a greater focus on establishing baselines and calculating cost and time savings, the evidence base for the achievement of efficiencies is still patchy; for example, the 2013-17 Tanzania BOS includes detailed baseline data and cost-saving targets and so has the potential to offer robust data, whereas the 2014 joint audit of Pakistan noted that *'there was inadequate documentation of comparative costs and tracking mechanisms to accurately monitor and measure post-DaO introduction cost savings on an itemized basis. This was due to the lack of systematic mechanism to capture transactions and after the harmonization of processes in all the agencies involved.'*¹¹⁰ While Pakistan will soon produce its own BOS, the two examples show the diversity that exists between different countries.

Figure 38: Summary of findings from the case study countries on Operating as One

Components	Summary of findings from the case studies
Common procurement	In Tanzania, there are some elements of common procurement undertaken by the Tanzanian One Procurement Team which has resulted in 58 common Long Term Agreements (LTA). While the BOS estimates that significant cost and time-savings have been achieved, but there continues to be some duplication of effort as different agencies have different thresholds and different policies and have to use back to their vertical accountability chain for authorization. Similar constraints were reported in Bosnia & Herzegovina although it is only a small number of services (flight bookings, office stationary and fuel) that have been targeted. In Montenegro, procurement has not been harmonised. In Pakistan the Procurement Working Group started in 2008 and succeeded in harmonizing several procurement initiatives and sharing of LTAs among agencies (including joint contracts for common security services, banking and travel services). However, the harmonisation of the procurement plan was not fully achieved, due to agency-specific policies and budget constraints.
Common logistics and transport	In Bosnia & Herzegovina there have been discussions about pooling vehicles and drivers but UNHCR has not opted into this. They do use the common pool in Banja Luka. Discussions were conducted in Montenegro to pool vehicles and drivers but agency legal requirements made this problematic. In Tanzania, there is a LTA for hire vehicles but each agency maintains its own fleet.
Common ICT	Some progress has been made in Mozambique on common ICT although UNHCR is not part of this and there is a similar situation in Montenegro. There are some sensitivities about data security for UNHCR given that it holds confidential data on issues relating to their PoC. In Tanzania, a common ICT system exists for UN agencies with 450 users in 11 locations in Dar es Salaam. In Pakistan, the Information and Communication Technology Working Group developed a common telephone directory for all UN agencies and a common radio room, centrally managed by UNDSS and cost-shared by all agencies country-wide.
Common HR	In Montenegro HR procedures have not been harmonized although UNDP maintains the

¹¹⁰ Audit report No. 1247, 20 June 2014, Audit of DaO in Pakistan, joint audit undertaken by the internal audit services of FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNIDO, p.19.

	service contract and so agencies work through them albeit with UNHCR needing to translate its procedures to fit with those of UNDP. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, the only are of common HR is a proposal to designate UNHCR's physician for all UN staff. The UN in Tanzania has two medical clinics, one in the capital and a second in Kigoma where UNHCR, IOM and WFP are present. A HR Working Group was established in Pakistan in 2009 which established the "one UN recruitment portal" where all UN agencies advertised their vacancies. While it continues to be used, there are some concerns about whether it is fit for purpose.
Common finance	UN finance systems were not harmonised in the case study countries although in Tanzania there is a One UN bank which has been agreed by all agencies.
Harmonized approach to cash transfers (HACT)	While HACT has received fairly broad uptake from across the UN, UNHCR considers that the full components of the Framework are not entirely applicable to it due to the specific nature of its operations and its business model. ¹¹¹
Common Premises	On common premises, the Zanzibar One UN Office continues to provide eight UN resident agencies with common services in the areas of procurement, security, cleaning, and telecoms. In Montenegro, UNHCR's calculations show that it has achieved cost-savings of \$88,000 pa since its relocation into the UN Eco House. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, after significant investment in calculating cost-benefits and added value, UNHCR took the decision not to move into UN House. In Mozambique, the UNHCR office is co-located with the RCO. The Common Premises Working Group had been working on UN common premises for the last six years but due to the current security situation in Pakistan, the fragmented location of UN agencies and the high rental cost in the compound, it has been difficult to shift to a common premise concept.

It is very difficult to make specific recommendations on Operating as One as the costs and benefits vary significantly from one country to another. While there is certainly the potential for considerable cost savings to be made, and there is documentation which attests to these, interviews sometimes undermined the veracity of the evidence that was provided. Where good progress had been made on specific components of the BOS, it tended to be as a consequence of a highly capable and motivated staff member, but one of the concerns raised on several occasions is that staff turnover played an important role in hampering progress. The inertia of agency systems and procedures also diminish some of the potential efficiencies that might be achieved from Operating as One; cost savings in joint procurement for example have been offset by agencies having to translate joint procedures into agency-specific ones to meet the needs of vertical accountability and audit requirements. This finding echoes the 2014 survey of OMTs which attributes the different policies and procedures (84% of respondents) and different regulations and rules (72% of respondents) as the top two reasons preventing the UNCTs from further harmonizing business practices at the country-level. Of note is that lack of agency commitment (39% of respondents) and lack and support of guidance from agency headquarters (28% of respondents) were the 4th and 5th most frequently-cited blockages to progress.¹¹²

Co-location can be a particularly emotive issue; in many of the countries, there was a general reticence in UNHCR to co-locate with other UN agencies and in some countries this came as a relief to some UN agencies; UNHCR's mandate requires it to be accessible to its PoC and this requires additional expenditure (security staff and private interview rooms) and also has potential security implications. For this reason, it is often other UN agencies that have to shoulder an additional cost burden when sharing an office with UNHCR (as is the case in Montenegro). However, in the two case study countries where UNHCR was co-located with other UN agencies, there were considered to be significant benefits. In the only case study country where UNHCR shared a common premises with

¹¹¹ UNHCR Memorandum, cM00/2013/0126/FSN/jo, *Revision of the UNDG Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfer Framework*, 27 December 2013.

¹¹² United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council (2015) *Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the GA Resolution 67/226 on the QCPR*, 13 January 2015, p.54.

the majority of UN agencies, there was an intangible yet important relational benefit that was considered instrumental in maximizing the potential benefits of DaO. It should come as no surprise that greater proximity can also breed greater trust and understanding and interviews show that both of the co-located UNHCR country offices found much greater added value from the One UN and tended to be more comfortable with DaO, possibly as a consequence.

Despite the slow progress that has been made with some aspects of Operating as One, the responses to the online survey suggest that there is optimism from within UNHCR’s field staff that the potential changes will ultimately achieve efficiencies particularly in the areas of common procurement, logistics and premises (see figure 39). Comments made in the survey confirm that some efficiencies have been achieved but that the changes will need to be partnered by systems changes at headquarters level in order for the benefits to be maximised (figure 40).

Figure 39: UNHCR staff perceptions on the potential for efficiencies from Operating as One




Figure 40: Voices from the field on the potential of Operating as One to offer efficiencies to UNHCR

‘Operating as one at a country level will likely require operating as one at the HQ level for reasons of compatibility and operation control and supervision. This will be too ambitious, complicating more the minimum efficiency and effectiveness available.’

‘The DaO approach has strengthened the basic services and expanded other common services by consolidating the various resources, capacities and capabilities of UN Agencies in our country. Significant savings (administrative) in investments, operating costs and time has been identified as well as had gradual increase on the efficiencies and delivery of these services through joint initiatives in these common areas.’

‘The results have been mixed. Some, like common procurement have resulted in increased efficiency. Others, such as HR, have been a complete failure because of different rules and regulations in different UN agencies.’

‘DaO has a good potential to benefit UNHCR in areas like the Business Operations Strategy. However, it requires additional work by UNHCR staff that may not necessarily match the benefits for UNHCR considering our internal requirements and processes that are sometimes significantly different from those of other agencies.’

10.3 Action at headquarters

The Independent Evaluation highlighted the need for changes to occur in agency headquarters in order for efficiencies to be achieved through Operating as One and importantly, the Headquarters’ Plan of Action has initiated this process of review and revision. The discipline that the BOS brings to Operating as One is also worthy of mention as it does offer a tool to focus on the changes that can

be effected in the short-term while identifying targets to focus on in the future. In this way, change at the country-level is starting to happen and there is the potential for it to gain pace if it is partnered with change at headquarters-level.

While the review highlighted the significant frustration that exists at a country-level as a result of the duplication of effort that is sometimes required to serve both internal systems and those of DaO, the discontent was not targeted at DaO alone. There was also disappointment that it was not easier to get support from headquarters and some staff felt isolated in dealing with the complexities of DaO. Several senior staff members considered it was now urgent that UNHCR accept that change was inevitable and do more to accommodate it and support country-level operations in working with it. While country-level staff suggested that those based at headquarters were best placed to determine how change could happen and whether there was 'low hanging fruit' that could reduce some of the inefficiencies, the need for support and guidance from across a range of headquarters functions came out as a strong message from the interviews (see figure 41).

Figure 41: Voices from the field on support required on DaO from headquarters

'UNHCR should have clear guidelines/policies for the following areas: - Budget Management - Agency contribution mechanisms - Coordination and Roll Out – Training – Joint Programmes.'

'As the UNHCR staff member on the UN OMT team, clearer guidelines are needed in the following areas of common services: Common logistics and transport - to further harmonize rules and regulation governing the use of all UN office vehicles; Common ICT - as UNHCR has its own ICT standards and requirement for management of LAN system; Reporting lines - currently there is no clarity if the office reports, to a single entity or to different agency HQ.'

'We need a specific training for senior managers on DaO modus operandi and UNHCR strategies to navigate through it...Multi-year planning would also help.'

'Creation of dedicated positions/focal points within UNHCR for the DaO process.'

The 2014 QCPR monitoring report highlighted that out of 55 measures set out in the Plan of Action, 24 had been completed including the tools and materials for the One UN Programme and the One UN fund. The other 31 measures that remain are in process. In terms of agency engagement, UNFPA, UNDP, UNICEF and WFP have been among the most proactive agencies, having developed an action plan covering all QCPR mandates related to business practices for presentation to the respective Executive Boards in 2015.

11. Core messages and lessons from UNHCR's engagement with the DaO Initiative

This section distils a number of core lessons from the review and offers a framework for reflection on how to guide UNHCR's engagement in the DaO Initiative in the future.

1. Through the QCPR the Member States have set an agenda for UN reform which was reiterated in the October 2014 report of the General Assembly on UNHCR¹¹³ and endorsed by the High Commissioner when he signed the Standard Operating Procedures.

¹¹³ Paragraph 16 of the report 'encourages the Office of the High Commissioner to engage in and implement in full the objectives of the 'Delivering as One' Initiative, United Nations General Assembly (2014) Sixty-ninth session, Third Committee, Agenda Item 61, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

Lesson: UNHCR's participation in DaO is not negotiable and while at headquarters there continues to be some debate about it, it is essential that all staff recognise UNHCR's participation in the Initiative and that the agency seeks to understand and engage with it at all levels. The mismatch between headquarters and country-level engagement in DaO means that opportunities have been missed to maximize the benefits to UNHCR of its participation in the initiative.

2. The foundations of DaO, based on the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and inequality which requires a more coherent, harmonized and rights-based response are sound. While UNHCR has a humanitarian mandate, aspects of its operations, including its normative role and its protracted refugee programmes and durable solutions have the best fit with development policy and practice.

Lesson: Despite the challenges it can present to UNHCR as a humanitarian agency, reform is urgently needed in the global approach to poverty reduction. In its normative role outside of crises and in seeking to meet the huge challenge of finding solutions to protracted refugee situations, UNHCR and its PoC urgently requires the support of the development community. DaO presents UNHCR with a potential opportunity to address some of the more long-standing challenges of its mandate in an area where it lacks the capacity that it has for humanitarian response.

3. And while cost-benefit cannot be calculated in terms of contributions received by UNHCR from the One Fund, there is the potential for money to be saved by ensuring that durable solutions are a shared responsibility and are considered by governments and UN development agencies alongside other national development priorities.

Lesson: The contribution made by the One Fund to UNHCR's programmes has been extremely modest and the decline in the Fund and associated increase in earmarking means that this is unlikely to change but the potential benefits that DaO offers are not fund-related and if they are maximized could offer significant longer-term benefits to UNHCR's PoC.

4. Many UNHCR country-level staff feel that the One Programme is struggling to meet the human rights benchmarks that are set in the SOPs which provide the entry point UNHCR's mandate, its PoC and its operations. A rights-based development framework would provide an important platform for joint communication, advocacy and programmes on behalf of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and the stateless.

Lesson: UNHCR's PoC were often afforded a lesser status in the One Programme and referred to in vague terms. Similarly, where governments chose to ignore their obligations to refugees or to de-prioritise them, it has been difficult for UNHCR to galvanise collective UN support to advocate for change.

5. And there is a small but growing body of evidence which shows that where UNHCR does participate in the CCA and its PoC are afforded the same level of prioritisation as others in the One Programme, then DaO offers an important platform to work in partnership with UNCT members and government to identify and deliver durable solutions.

Lesson: Through its engagement in the Transitional Solutions Initiative and more recently, the Solutions Alliance, UNHCR is participating in partnerships that seeks to re-frame forced displacement from a humanitarian issue to one that requires a more holistic approach. This involves seeking to mainstream the response to displacement within the wider framework of local and national

development plans, programmes and budgets in affected countries. Given the linkages that the One Programme has to National Development Policy and the nature of UNHCR's partnership with UN Development agencies through the UNCT, DaO offers an important platform to strengthen partnership with government and UN development agencies in support of durable solutions. The review has highlighted a number of examples of where an enabling environment does exist and has resulted in programme and policy support for UNHCR's mandate.

6. While there is little overlap between DaO and humanitarian reform in countries which have either large or protracted crises, in countries where the humanitarian architecture has not been rolled out, or that are affected by natural disasters, response is very often delivered through the DaO framework and in these situations, UNHCR's knowledge and humanitarian competence potentially has much to offer.

Lesson: The assumption that there is no overlap between humanitarian response and DaO is incorrect and the review found that under certain circumstances, it played an important role in directing and coordinating humanitarian response. More important still, the gap between humanitarian response and development cooperation is likely to become more central to DaO in the future as efforts to develop a resilience framework gain pace in UNDG which will offer important entry points for UNHCR.

7. However, while there are some strategic benefits to UNHCR's participation in the DaO Initiative, engagement does require time as it is process-heavy and UNHCR's programme approach and business systems are currently ill-adapted to fit with those of DaO. Many of these problems will ultimately only be reconciled by making headquarters-level changes although the provision of comprehensive guidance document on UNHCR's engagement with DaO would be extremely beneficial.

Lesson: While the paucity of evidence available does not permit a calculation of the cost-benefit of DaO, the findings of the review strongly suggest that the additional work that results from having to translate UNHCR's programme design, monitoring and reporting systems and the duplication of its budgeting processes linked to the limited efficiencies that have been realised from Operating as One outweigh the benefits. However, there is little doubt that costs could be reduced in the long-term if UNHCR were to modify some of its systems as other agencies have started to do and the preparation of a comprehensive package of guidance materials would ensure that UNHCR staff engages in a consistent way and would also reduce the inefficiencies associated with the solutions that have been developed at the country-level.

8. And while it is the challenges associated with DaO implementation that tend to be heard most frequently, a growing number of UNHCR operations consider them to be the new ways of working.

Lesson: The review showed that country-based UNHCR staff found value in each of the different pillars of DaO in addition to frustrations. Moreover, many saw significant potential for the future – with the caveat that this to be realised required change in UNHCR.

9. Fundamentally it will be necessary for UNHCR to strengthen its engagement with DaO across all parts of its headquarters and it will be important that UNHCR provides greater clarity on how its systems can best accommodate those of DaO to build a foundation of familiarity and trust that is required for UNHCR to maximize the opportunities it offers (and minimise the inefficiencies).

Lesson: The review found that UNHCR at country-level has been participating in DaO to the extent that its resources and systems have permitted it to, that relevant programmes were included in the

One Programme but that there needed to be a change in the level of engagement and institutional support provided from headquarters. If DaO is to be of the greatest benefit to UNHCR it also needs to be valued by all parts of the agency and there is a need to create an institutional enabling environment for participation in the Initiative.

10. Looking to the future, the emerging post-2015 agenda, the World Humanitarian Summit and reviews of the UN's peacekeeping operations are likely to lead to significant changes in the way the world seeks to address poverty and respond to crises and if UNHCR wants to play a role in these and ensure that the decisions made in these important global opportunities are in the best interests of its PoC then it needs to continue to strengthen its engagement with DaO.

Lesson: Many people who participated in the review either considered DaO to be the new UN Development paradigm or felt that it was of sufficient strategic importance to warrant UNHCR's engagement irrespective of the costs. The key question for UNHCR is to decide whether it will engage because of the potential value of what DaO can offer in the long-term as a positive proactive choice, or whether its interest rests purely in occupying a seat at a potentially influential table. The utility of many of the recommendations contained in the section below will depend on which of these two paths is selected.

12. An assessment of UNHCR's engagement in the DaO Initiative against the ToC

This section assesses the outcomes of UNHCR's engagement with the DaO Initiative against the ToC presented in figure 1 and offers a performance rating based on the findings of the review for each of the 'Ones'. An indicative rating is also provided of the potential contribution that DaO could make in the future alongside changes that would be required for that rating to be achieved.

Conclusions related to each of the outcomes identified in the ToC are rated on the findings of the review based on the input from the four case studies, the telephone interviews and the literature review. For each of the outcomes, a rating is also given for the potential contribution that DaO could make towards its achievement and a list of changes that will be required to achieve the rating are provided. A four-point scale is used with the judgment made on the balance of positive and negative factors for each of the outcomes. The performance rating scale is presented in figure 42.

Figure 42: Performance rating scale

Performance rating	Characteristics
Strong	Several significant positive factors with minor negative factors, or some (less significant) positive factors but no negatives.
Moderate	Positive factors somewhat outweigh negative factors.
Poor	Negative factors somewhat outweigh positive factors.
Very Poor	Negative factors strongly outweigh positive factors.

12.1 The One Programme/Joint programmes

DaO has significant potential to support UNHCR in its normative role. It is in this context where UNHCR representation is often modest in size, its resources are limited and there is the greatest possibility for UNHCR to benefit from working with the UNCT through the One Programme in order to achieve policy change. In its operations, the One Programme offers an opportunity for UNHCR to mobilise the support of UN development agencies in protracted refugee situations and the pursuit of durable solutions and to influence the national development agenda in support of PoC. However,

progress in advancing this agenda has been patchy and success is dependent on the existence an enabling policy, political and institutional environment. While there is some good practice, it tends to be the exception. UNHCR's country planning framework, its programme-based approach and its RBM framework are all a poor fit with DaO systems which puts UNHCR at a strategic disadvantage, particularly with other agencies that have sought to strengthen alignment with the QCPR and that have project-based planning processes.

Despite these limitations DaO does have potential to strengthen operations in the future and there is more that UNHCR could do to promote an enabling environment; there is scope to strengthen the evidence base for successful partnerships and to develop the tools for success in the future; the adoption in the One Programme of a more robust rights based approach that builds from the 'Human Rights Up Front' Initiative would also improve the potential for refugees, asylum seekers, stateless people and IDPs to benefit from the same visibility and development assistance as nationals, which is currently rarely the case; and there is scope for UNHCR to adapt its systems or provide more rigorous guidance on how to adapt them to meet the needs of the One Programme.

Outcome 1: Greater programme coherence for protracted refugee situations and durable solutions delivering more relevant services and support to PoC Outcome 2: Partnerships with development agencies which can better meet the long-term assistance requirements for PoC	Review finding
To what extent has DaO delivered this outcome?	Poor
What potential exists for DaO to contribute in the future?	Moderate
What changes are needed in UNHCR or DaO to maximise the potential benefits from this outcome?	
A stronger human rights focus in DaO would afford PoC the same rights as nationals. UNHCR country teams must engage in the CCA and UNDAF development at the earliest opportunity and the Solutions Steering Group must continue its work on building the evidence base for inclusive approaches to durable solutions and develop tools that are relevant to DaO, particularly during CCA and UNDAF development.	

12.2 The CBF/One Fund

From a contributions perspective, the added value of DaO is negligible to UNHCR and as the country-based One Funds have shrunk in size and donors have increased their earmarking of funds, the limited contributions that UNHCR has received in the past are likely to continue to diminish. In countries where a One Fund exists, UNHCR's bilateral contributions to its joint programmes exceed contributions received from the One Fund.

Evidence from the case studies suggest that UNHCR's budgeting process can also serve as a disincentive particularly when it has not been possible to obtain agreement from headquarters for an increase in budget space for joint programme activities. Translation of UNHCR's budgeting system to comply with the needs of the CBF takes considerable time and is an inexact process. While some pragmatic solutions have been found, they lack internal consistency and would benefit from the provision of guidance from headquarters.

Outcome 3: Greater resource mobilisation contributing to the full range of interventions required by PoC	Review finding
To what extent has DaO delivered this outcome?	Very poor
What potential exists for DaO to contribute in the future?	Poor – Moderate
What changes are needed in UNHCR or DaO to maximise the potential benefits from this outcome?	
UNHCR must maximize its opportunities to develop joint programmes under the DaO framework and could clarify its financial procedures to provide greater predictability in accommodating additional funding. DaO needs to more routinely include and reflect the needs of PoC in the One Programme, but ultimately there will be a need for donors to address the downward trend of contributions to the One Fund and the upward trend of earmarking which to date has rarely favoured UNHCR's programmes.	

12.3 One Leader

While concerns about the effectiveness of the 'functional firewall' persist, there is evidence from the case studies that when the One Leader understands and is supportive of UNHCR's mandate, then s/he can play an important role in engaging in advocacy on behalf of its PoC. What is problematic is the lack of consistency in the way the RC chooses to engage with UNHCR across countries which can act as a significant barrier to effective ways of working. While UNHCR has not yet fully implemented the management and accountability framework of the UN Development and RC system,¹¹⁴ this will only go some way to resolving some of the more complex relational issues and there was consensus from almost all the participants in the review that the personality – of the RC, but also of UNCT members – accounted in part for the success or otherwise of the One Leader.

Outcome 4: Stronger, more strategic leadership providing greater support for UNHCR's mandate	Review finding
To what extent has DaO delivered this outcome?	Moderate
What potential exists for DaO to contribute in the future?	Moderate – Strong
What changes are needed in UNHCR or DaO to maximise the potential benefits from this outcome?	
A strong human rights framework underpinning DaO is absolutely essential but UNHCR needs to continue engaging with RCs both to ensure they understand UNHCR's mandate but also so that they are cognisant of the important role that DaO can play for UNHCR's PoC. UNHCR should implement the management and accountability framework and escalate instances where RBA is trumped by political expediency to headquarters.	

12.4 Communicating as One

Maintaining agencies' brand and visibility within joint communications has been one of the more challenging and sensitive aspects of DaO but where this is supported by a policy which seeks to bring agencies together rather than speak on their behalf, then UNHCR has found considerable added value, particularly in countries where it has limited resources. In most of the case study countries there was space within the DaO framework for UNHCR to speak out independently on issues related to its mandate which was welcomed although there were far fewer examples of where the RC and UNCT supported UNHCR on more sensitive refugee-related issues. Where this did happen, however, it was considered to be of significant benefit. As with the One Programme and One Leader, communications is another area that many UNHCR staff considered would benefit greatly from a more robust interpretation of DaO's RBA.

Outcome 5: Stronger & more unified voice within the UNCT/ government delivering better results for PoC	Review finding
To what extent has DaO delivered this outcome?	Poor
What potential exists for DaO to contribute in the future?	Moderate
What changes are needed in UNHCR or DaO to maximise the potential benefits from this outcome?	
UNHCR needs to shift its own understanding and that of sister agencies about it being solely a humanitarian agency and build a stronger case for its PoC as having equal rights to development as nationals. UNHCR should develop an internal and external communication and advocacy agenda to support this.	

12.5 Operating as One

The potential benefits of Operating as One make for a compelling case for change and in theory efficiencies should be easily achieved. However, in practice, progress towards realising these have taken time and UNHCR's adoption of many of the components has been hampered by the difficulties in finding joint systems that do not require a duplication of effort to translate them to agency-specific procedures. That said, BOS' have often taken a pragmatic approach towards selecting the

¹¹⁴ Developed by UNDG in 2008, the management and accountability framework outlines the overall concept of governance and accountability for leadership of the UN Development system.

systems that can offer the greatest benefit at the least cost and additional workload to agencies and while this means that some of the more significant issues are left untouched, at least it can offer some added value. While several of the case studies revealed the benefits of co-location which went far beyond cost savings, as they often provided the relational glue between agencies' staff which is so important for the success of DaO, it is evident that the benefits of Operating as One will be limited without significant harmonisation in procedures. The importance of headquarters level change for UNHCR to harvest the benefits (effectiveness and efficiency) of DaO cuts across many of the DaO pillars including the One Programme, CBF and Operating as One.

Outcome 6: More efficient and cost-effective provision of support and services for UNHCR operations	Review finding
To what extent has DaO delivered this outcome?	Poor
What potential exists for DaO to contribute in the future?	Moderate – Strong
What changes are needed in UNHCR or DaO to maximise the potential benefits from this outcome?	
There is still scope to strengthen the evidence base for operating as one in order to provide a more compelling case for change. UNHCR will need to make headquarters-level changes in order to significantly reduce the additional workload required to participate in DaO and continue to work with UN agencies as efforts are made to strengthen the harmonisation of systems.	

13. Conclusion and recommendations

This section presents a conclusion and outlines a set of recommendations to strengthen UNHCR's engagement with the DaO Initiative in the future.

13.1 Conclusion

In UNHCR's core humanitarian business of refugee protection and solutions, significant reforms were initiated by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator in 2005 and deepened with the launch of the Transformative Agenda in 2011. The changes made are imperfect but they have become the prevailing humanitarian paradigm for emergency response. While UNHCR has been supportive of the changes, it wasn't until 2013 that it adopted the refugee coordination model to more fully reflect the changed ways of working. DaO is less central to UNHCR's mandate but like humanitarian reform it is becoming the new UN development paradigm. Many of UNHCR's closest peers have sought to lobby from within and have engaged in the Initiative and have made changes to their business practices to better accommodate the changed ways of working.

Internally to UNHCR there is significant difference of opinion about the need for change and while this review has shown the inefficiencies associated with servicing the needs of two significantly different administrative and programmatic systems as well as maintaining both horizontal and vertical accountabilities it is not possible to estimate the costs associated with this either now or in the future. What is clear, however, is that it requires significant duplication of effort. It is also likely that with the post-2015 agenda coinciding with the second generation of DaO and the *'fit for purpose' agenda*, the momentum for change is also likely to increase.

While this review has highlighted significant inefficiencies with the status quo and has raised some concerns about UNHCR's participation in the DaO, it has also registered cautious optimism from UNHCR staff involved in the Initiative and even some impatience for change. But currently UNHCR is not maximizing the programmatic opportunities to benefit from DaO.

Failure to adapt to the new paradigm will serve only to marginalise UNHCR within UNDG and exacerbate the negative impact of the gap that already exists. By more proactively engaging with DaO and by seeking to understand and accommodate the need for change, UNHCR will stand a far

greater chance of being able to promote the interests of its PoC from within which will be particularly important as measures to strengthen the coherence between development and humanitarian response are crafted. It is in this sphere of operations (protracted refugee situations and durable solutions) that some of UNHCR's most significant challenges lie and while DaO has had only limited impact on them to date, the findings of the OIOS evaluation suggest the need for UNHCR to redouble its efforts to work in partnership to find solutions. Making change in this important area would be best achieved from a more visible position inside DaO than it would from the periphery or outside of the Initiative.

13.2 Recommendations

The recommendations below propose a number of changes to UNHCR's practices, processes, systems and communications that will strengthen its engagement in the DaO Initiative, increase the relevance of DaO to its mandate, reduce the inefficiencies associated with its implementation and increase its coherence with UNHCR's systems. They build on some pre-existing initiatives in UNHCR as well as proposing additional actions. The focus of the recommendations is on strengthening UNHCR's engagement with the DaO Initiative in order to build momentum towards compliance with the QCPR.

#	UNHCR's strategic engagement in the DaO Initiative
1	It is essential that UNHCR clarifies the relationship it has to the QCPR and any reporting obligations under it. If UNHCR is obliged to report against the QCPR it should take action to align its strategic plan with the Resolution.

#	Provision of Headquarters-level support and guidance
2	The 2008 UNHCR policy guidance document and memorandum are now dated and should be revised based on the findings of this review and in a way that is consistent with these recommendations. This should be partnered with an operational guidance note to support UNHCR's engagement in DaO at the country-level.
3	In light of the findings of this review and as the only one of the 12-larger UN agencies yet to do so, it is recommended that UNHCR initiates a headquarters exercise to address challenges and bottlenecks with DaO in line with the Headquarters plan of Action.
4	Guidance should be developed for UNHCR staff in DaO countries on how to most effectively and efficiently translate UNHCR's programme approach, RBM and budgeting procedures to meet the requirements of the One Programme. Guidance should also be prepared to guide field-level engagement in the different aspects of the BOS.
5	Headquarters should clarify which Department has overall responsibility for strategic engagement with DaO and articulate how this links to other parts of the agency that have links to DaO.
6	The lessons from successful solutions strategies should be used to support DaO countries in the following ways; (i) To create an evidence-based portfolio of good practice in developing solutions strategies in the context of the CCA and UNDAF; (ii) To develop at the global level of a set of advocacy messages that can be used to promote solutions at the country-level; (iii) To provide input to update the 2005 handbook (or to produce a lighter, operational guide) on Development Assistance to Refugees ; (iv) To provide guidance on seeking to use the yearly planning system in a multi-year multi-partner context.
7	At the global level, UNHCR should engage with UN development partners in order to design collaborative solutions strategies. Where the potential for global partnerships is identified, more detailed discussions should be held between headquarters' in order to highlight and reconcile differences between UN partners in mandate, programming approach, reporting and business practices.
8	UNHCR should strengthen the timeliness and predictability of the procedure for increasing budget space for activities above the OL. This would increase the likelihood of field teams accepting contributions for joint programmes and would maximize resource mobilisation from DaO.
9	A system of reciprocal performance appraisal between the RC and UNCT members has been

implemented for several years and it is important that UNHCR updates its performance appraisal guidance for its Representatives to accommodate this system.

#	Field-based engagement in the DaO Initiative
10	UNHCR teams at a country level need to more systematically participate in the earliest stages of the CCA and UNDAF development to ensure that UNHCR's PoC are included in the framework and that it includes strategies for them to attain their right to assistance and protection in the long-term.
11	In DaO countries, UNHCR should advocate on the use the 'Human Rights Up Front' initiative to ensure that there is an enabling environment for the inclusion of its PoC within a rights-based One Programme. Where PoC are not afforded their rights to assistance and protection under national law and the One Programme fails to include them, UNHCR at a country-level should be more systematic in documenting this and escalating it to the Headquarters for action.
12	Where the One Leader or Communicating as One fails to respect UNHCR's independence then UNHCR should use the SOPs as a lens for documenting the areas of divergence and should systematically escalate these to Headquarters.
13	Staff members at all levels of UNHCR play an essential role in implementing DaO and it is important that their job descriptions, performance objectives and deliverables reflect their participation and that their appraisal includes delivery of DaO-related objectives.

Annex 1: Summary Terms of reference

A REVIEW OF UNHCR'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DELIVERING AS ONE / ONE UN INITIATIVE (DaO)

1. Background

This section has been expanded in section 1 of the inception report.

2. Scope and objectives

This evaluative review will be more learning than accountability oriented. The first objective is to assess the practical relevance of DaO to UNHCR's strategic goal of finding durable solutions for refugees and other persons of concern and the effectiveness of UNHCR's engagement with the DaO initiative. The second objective is to assess the practical long-term implications of the DaO initiative for UNHCR's mandate, policies and business practices. In this respect, the experience and perspective of other UN primarily humanitarian agencies will be sought. The third objective is to provide useful advice to UNHCR globally and to Representatives and managers in the field on the cost-benefit of engaging with the DaO initiative where it exists.

The review will assess the extent to which factors internal to UNHCR or the DaO Initiative, including partnerships and policies, influence the effectiveness of UNHCR's engagement with the DaO initiative (including fund-raising), will identify whether there are any major gaps and challenges and make appropriate recommendations to address them.

This review will not attempt to assess the effectiveness or impact of UNHCR's DaO-funded Joint Programmes per se, or of the DaO initiative itself, but rather whether the respective policies and procedures mutually reinforce UNHCR's and DaO's strategic goals or otherwise.

3. Methodology

The review will adopt a mixed methodology consisting of a document and literature review (including existing reviews and evaluations); an analysis of UNHCR's participation in the UNDAF/One UN programmes; interviews with key stakeholders in UNHCR at HQs and in the field, the UN (particularly UNDG and peer organizations such as WFP and UNICEF); and a questionnaire for UNHCR staff involved with the DaO Initiative (at HQs and in the field) and an analysis of funding data through its online Contribution Details Reports and Funding Application documents since the inception of DaO.

Furthermore, two or three field trips to DaO country operations with active UNHCR engagement are envisaged, even if these will not be to assess DaO-funded Joint Programmes implemented by UNHCR, but rather to interview key stakeholders, including key UNHCR officials, key actors in the UN Country Team (particularly RCs) and governmental counterparts to solicit their views on the UNHCR-DaO relationship. For country operations which will not be covered by field trips, additional phone interviews will be considered.

The review will be undertaken by a qualified expert consultant selected by PDES in consultation with the stakeholders, who is familiar with these issues. S/he will work closely with a staff member from UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) who will be the evaluation manager. The review will be carried out in close consultation with the UNHCR Inter-Agency Service and Donors

Relations and Resource Mobilization Service within the Division of External Relations (DER) and the UNHCR New York Liaison Office.

4. Deliverables

It is envisaged that the consultancy will last approximately four months, including the preparatory phase (desk/literature review, interviews with key stakeholders in Geneva) which will lead to an inception report, including and adjustment of these TORs if necessary (1 month), the research phase (data analysis, interviews with key stakeholders, New York and the field, preparation and distribution and analysis of the questionnaire and 2-3 field trips; 2 months) and the drafting of the report which will contain recommendations mainly directed at UNHCR staff both at HQs and in the field who are directly engaged with the DaO Initiative (1 month). An interactive workshop to disseminate key findings and preliminary recommendations and to receive early feedback prior to the finalization of the report will also be held.

5. Detailed evaluation questions [Note: some of these questions will be re-formulated during the inception phase].

Relevance

1. How relevant was the DaO initiative to advance UNHCR's strategic goals to find durable solutions for refugees and other persons of concern and to involve development actors thereby bridging the gaps between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation?
2. What are the practical implications of the DaO for UNHCR's mandate and business practices?

Partnerships and coordination

3. With which partners does UNHCR collaborate most frequently in the implementation of DaO-funded Joint Programmes? How are roles, responsibilities divided and allocated amongst the partners?
4. Was UNHCR an active partner in UNDAF processes and in UNCT meetings? How successful has UNHCR been in participating in the joint planning in DaO countries, and what are some of the lessons learned?

Effectiveness

5. What are the main challenges faced by UNHCR in engaging with the DaO initiative and in implementing and reporting on DaO-funded Joint Programmes?
6. Was UNHCR's involvement with the DaO initiative effective in leveraging the intervention of development actors in support of durable solutions strategies?
7. Have there been benefits other than monetary stemming from participating in joint planning with DaO partners in terms of assistance and protection for Persons of Concern? Have these benefits been measurable?
8. Are there any discernible differences between UNHCR's effectiveness in leveraging funds and support from the DaO initiative for refugees as opposed to other persons of concern and, if so, why?

Efficiency

9. Have transaction costs, particularly in terms of staff-time, been reduced or increased as a result of UNHCR's engagement with the DaO initiative?
10. What is the best format for UNHCR Representations to participate in DaO meetings maximizing the use of staff time in terms of cost efficiency?
11. How does DaO funding interact with UNHCR's financial procedures for preparing and implementing projects?

Coherence

12. How well do the DaO mandate, criteria and implementation timelines fit UNHCR programmes?
13. Does UNHCR's new budget structure (introduced in 2009-10) help ensuring closer linkages with the DaO initiative and a clearer budgetary niche for the chosen activities?

Annex 2: Review participants

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 Patricia Schiavinato, Project Officer, IOM
 Matthias Naab, UNDP Representative (Convener of Governance DRG)

Rodrigo Cina, UNDP (Governance DRG Secretariat)
 Flornce Raes, UN Women Representative (Gender Joint Team Chair)
 Abdoulaye Balde, WFP Country Director
 Castro Camarada, FAO Country Director
 Igor Felice, ILO Country Director
 Jaime Henrique Comiche, UNIDO
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 Sanja Bojanic, Co-convenor of the Pillar WG on Democratic Governance
 Dusica Zikvovic, IOM Officer in Charge
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Gerry Daly, Policy Adviser – Programming, Business Operations and Joint Funding, UN DOCO

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Rebaone Mmerekhi, Protection Officer, UNHCR Botswana

Laura Lo Castro, Representative, UNHCR Zambia

Annex 3: Review criteria and research questions

The review questions outlined in the ToR were re-organised thematically during the inception phase to allow a more comprehensive investigation of how the different elements of the DaO initiative affect different aspects of UNHCR's policies programmes and business practices. This is also consistent with the approach adopted by the 2007 Informal stocktake.

Strategic fit of the DaO initiative with UNHCR's mandate

This criterion seeks to assess the extent to which the DaO initiative is relevant to UNHCR's mandate and how effective it has been in accommodating and advancing UNHCR's strategic goals. Given that the DaO initiative stemmed from a collective desire by Member States to strengthen the UN development system, there has been a perception from within UNHCR that DaO offers the potential to promote knowledge or and support for durable solutions for refugees and other persons of concern among UN development agencies. UNHCR's strategies of engaging and influencing the DaO agenda at country-level will be reviewed in the case study countries to identify lessons that UNHCR can apply elsewhere.

1. How well does the DaO initiative fit with UNHCR's refugee protection and durable solutions mandate and what practical implications does it have.
2. How relevant has the DaO initiative been in advancing UNHCR's strategic goals to find durable solutions for refugees and other persons of concern and how effective has it been in galvanising action from development actors thereby bridging the gaps between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation?
3. To what extent has the DaO initiative promoted other key aspects of UNHCR's mandate such as humanitarian assistance, statelessness and role for IDPs. How has humanitarian response been delivered under DaO?

UNHCR's involvement in and lessons from participating in One Programme in DaO countries

This criterion will assess UNHCR's engagement in the One Programme component; it will seek to distil lessons on the nature of UNHCR's involvement, its key partners and the main challenges that have been encountered in implementing DaO-funded programmes (relevance and effectiveness). It will seek to learn lessons from the participation of UNHCR and peer UN agencies and will offer guidance on how UNHCR can maximise the efficiency of its engagement in One Programme processes.

4. In what ways (and across which pillars) has UNHCR been participating in joint planning and programming in DaO countries? What proportion of UNHCR's programming is delivered through the One Programme?
5. With which partners does UNHCR collaborate most frequently in the implementation of DaO-funded Joint Programmes? How are roles, responsibilities divided and allocated amongst the partners?
6. How is the process organised (UNDAF/P, Results Groups, Monitoring and Reporting) and to what extent do systems of programme/budgeting cycles, results-based management (RBM) and monitoring and reporting fit with UNHCR's existing practices?
7. Given the division of UNHCR's programme between DaO and non-DaO, would there be efficiencies to be gained through a revision of UNHCR's RBM, programme/budget cycles, monitoring, reporting? Would this require approval from its Executive Committee?
8. How does UNHCR participate and what resource implications does this have (staff time in particular)? What is the most efficient way for UNHCR Representations to participate in the One Programme to maximize the use of staff time?
9. Have there been benefits (other than monetary) stemming from UNHCR's participation in joint planning with DaO partners in terms of assistance and protection for Persons of Concern? Have these benefits been measurable?
10. What have been the main successes and challenges in implementing DaO-funded Joint Programmes? What lessons can be learned/good practice can be identified from UNHCR's engagement with the One Programme pillar and the experience of other UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, other).

UNHCR's involvement in and lessons from the common budgetary framework/One Fund

This criterion will analyse UNHCR's use of the One Fund and seek to identify and explain trends that emerge (relevance and effectiveness). It will place the Fund in the context of UNHCR's broader contributions in order to explore what impact it has had on its direct funding. It will review the procedural requirements of the Common Budgetary Framework against UNHCR's financial procedures to understand what complementarities exist (efficiency and coherence).

11. To what extent has the One Fund responded across UNHCR's persons of concern? What trends exist and how can they be explained?
12. What effect (if any) have donor contributions to the joint programme had on UNHCR's direct funding?
13. Specifically, how does DaO funding interact with UNHCR's financial procedures for preparing and implementing projects and does UNHCR's new budget structure (introduced in 2009-10) help ensuring closer linkages with the DaO initiative and a clearer budgetary niche for the chosen activities?
14. What are the successes and challenges and what lessons can be learned/good practice can be identified from UNHCR's engagement with the 'One Fund/Common Budgetary Framework' and the experience of other UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, other).

UNHCR's involvement in and lessons from Communicating as One/One Leader

This criterion will assess the effectiveness and relevance of the Communicating as One/One Leader pillars of the DaO initiative to UNHCR's strategic priorities documenting the successes and challenges that have been experienced at country level. The review will seek to document the effect (positive or negative) that both of the pillars on the ability of UNHCR to meet its protection mandate.

15. To what extent has 'Communicating as One/One Leader' strengthened UNHCR's ability to raise issues related to its mandate (including human rights and protection) with the host government?
16. To what extent has 'Communicating as One/One Leader' galvanised the collective support of the UN Mission for UNHCR's mandate (including human rights and protection)?
17. Does the joint communication strategy include messages relating to UNHCR's mandate (including human rights and protection)?
18. How has UNHCR sought to balance its need for an independent identity and leadership in order to deliver its refugee protection mandate with the communication and leadership requirements of the DaO initiative?
19. What lessons can be learned/good practice can be identified from UNHCR's engagement with the 'Communicating as One/One Leader' pillars and the experience of other UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, other)?

UNHCR's involvement in and lessons from 'Operating as One' and the Operational fit of the DaO initiative with UNHCR's business practices

This criterion will review the operationalization by UNHCR of the different aspects of the 'Operating as One' pillar and will seek to assess their complementarity with UNHCR's own business practices (efficiency and coherence). It will seek to document the impact of UNHCR's participation in the Initiative on resources (both human and financial).

20. What aspects of 'Operating as One' has UNHCR adopted (common procurement, common logistics and transport, common ICT, common HR, common audit, common finance, harmonized approach to cash transfers, common premises)?
21. How well do these fit UNHCR business practices and what are the main challenges and practical implications of operationalising them?
22. Have transaction costs, particularly in terms of staff-time, been increased or decreased as a result of UNHCR's engagement with the DaO initiative?
23. What lessons can be learned/good practice can be identified from UNHCR's engagement with these shared business practices and the experience of other UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, other)?

Beyond UNHCR - perceptions of the impact of DaO on the UN Mission

In acknowledgement that the DaO Initiative was launched to benefit the UN Mission as a whole rather than individual agencies/funds, this criterion seeks to gauge opinion from UNHCR staff about whether DaO is having a broader, positive effect on the country UN Development System and how it might change in the future. It is anticipated that by taking into account the broader aims of the DaO Initiative, this cluster of questions may offer a degree of balance to the review. It also seeks to explore perceptions of how the DaO Initiative may change with global processes on the delivery of relief and development over the next 12-months.

24. To what extent do you consider that the DaO initiative is delivering greater impact and efficiencies for the UN Mission in your country?
25. How do you think the DaO likely to change in the future given the need for greater coherence articulated through the SDGs and the WHS?

Annex 4: Bibliography and documents referred to

Documents that were included in the footnotes of the review report are listed below. A summary table of the total number of documents referred to during the review is provided at the end of the annex.

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Category	Sub-category	No. of documents
Background to DaO	General	35
	2013 DESA QCPR survey	3
	2014 DESA QCPR survey	5
	2014 QCPR monitoring report	2
	DaO SOPS	22
	DaO and human rights	4
	Post-2015 agenda	20
	Sub-total	91
Countries	Bosnia & Herzegovina	13

	Montenegro	36
	Mozambique	23
	Other countries	24
	Pakistan	20
	Tanzania	26
	Sub-total	142
Independent evaluation	General	6
	Sub-total	6
Lessons from DaO	General	29
	Sub-total	29
UNHCR and DaO	UNHCR and HACT	3
	UNHCR and HQ Plan of Action	4
	UNHCR and RC	5
	UNHCR and One Fund	4
	UNHCR policy and UNDAF entry points	22
	UNHCR guidance on DaO	3
	General	17
	Sub-total	58
UNHCR policy	General	16
	Sub-total	16
	TOTAL	342

Annex 5: Supplementary table outlining UNHCRs participation in UNDAFs

This table provides a breakdown for countries that participated in the review remotely which includes Kenya, Namibia, Malawi, Ethiopia, Botswana and Liberia.

Country	Kenya
Planning f/w	UNDAF 2014 - 2018
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Outcome 1, transformational governance includes reference to the protection of human rights and promotion of national policy on human rights although no explicit reference is made to refugees. Outcome 4 which includes human security adopts a rights-base but makes no reference to refugees.
UNHCR participation	Of the 4 results groups, UNHCR participates in 2 including transformative governance, environmental sustainability, land management and human security
Budget	Approximately 15% of UNHCR's operations included in the UNDAF. Refugees are not included
Country	Namibia
Planning f/w	UN Partnership Framework, 2014 – 2018
Reference to UNHCR PoC	The focus of outcome 2 is on promotion and protection of human rights and outcome 4 speaks to compliance with Namibia's international treaties' accession/ratification/monitoring. Outcome 5 and 7 focus on health and education which potentially extends to refugees. The document makes no mention of refugees or other of UNHCR's persons of concern.
UNHCR participation	Of the 12 outcomes, due to capacity limitations, UNHCR has prioritised participation in the outcomes related to refugee service provision including outcome 5, education and outcome 7 health
Budget	UNHCR's refugee health and education programmes are included in the UNPAF. The UNHCR office will close in June 2015
Country	Malawi
Planning f/w	UNDAF Action Plan 2012 – 2016
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Output 1.4.4 under the sustainable and equitable economic growth and food security outcome explicitly refers to the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive national refugee policy and of a joint action plan for refugee needs. Output 2.5.2 under the protection outcome anticipates the enhancement of institutional capacity for delivering protective services across the country and output 2.5.3 anticipates the availability of case management and referral services.
UNHCR participation	Of the 4 outcomes, UNHCR focuses its attention on the first 2 but is also part of Outcome 3, the national response to HIV and AIDS
Budget	Budget - \$4.346, 100% included in the UNDAF
Country	Ethiopia
Planning f/w	UNDAF 2012 – 2015
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Ethiopia has a Refugee Task Force which is led by UNHCR and an HCT led by the HC in which UNHCR participates. UNHCR is a signatory to the UNDAF but no reference is made in the document to UNHCR across the pillars or in the results matrix and while the 145,000 refugees hosted by Ethiopia are referred to in the narrative under outcome 4 which deals with disaster risk and impact, they are not referred to in the results matrix.
UNHCR participation	UNHCR has limited involvement in Outcome 7, HIV/Aids and the environment as a cross-cutting issue.
Budget	Budget - \$206.88m, negligible % included in the UNDAF
Country	Botswana
Planning f/w	UN Programme Operational Plan 2010 - 2014, UNDAF Action Plan 2013 - 2014
Reference to	There is a specific outcome related to the strengthening of human rights institutions that

UNHCR PoC	respond to the rights of vulnerable groups including refugees (Outcome 1.2) of which UNHCR is part of. UNHCR also participates in the disaster management, risk reduction and response outcome (1.4). UNHCR is also listed under the Health/HIV Aids results
UNHCR participation	UNHCR participates in outcome 1 (governance and human rights) and outcome 3 (health and HIV/Aids)
Budget	Budget - \$5.046m
Country	Liberia
Planning f/w	One Programme, UNDAF 2013 – 2017
Reference to UNHCR PoC	UNHCR participates in Programme Pillar 1, Peace, Security and Rule of Law which includes an output (1.1.3) on enhanced protection of vulnerable groups which includes refugees and IDPs
UNHCR participation	UNHCR is involved in the peace and security pillar one which encapsulates all of its operations
Budget	Budget - \$35.326m, 100% included in the UNDAF
Country	Zambia
Planning f/w	UNDAF 2011 – 2015
Reference to UNHCR PoC	Refugees and migrants included in the term 'vulnerable groups' but not referred to specifically. Under UNDAF Outcome 3 reference is made to provision of basic services (outcome 3.1) and social protection systems that protect vulnerable groups and families from human rights abuses (outcome 3.3). No specific reference to refugee communities in Zambia. There are no indicators in the M&E framework that relate to UNHCRs PoC
UNHCR participation	UNHCR participates in the sustainable livelihoods outcome (outcome 2.1) and then in the provision of basic services (outcome 3.1) and protection (outcome 3.3) for refugees. UNHCR also participates in the disaster management outcome (outcome 4.1) and the climate change adaptation outcome (outcome 4.2). UNHCR is also engaged in the human rights and gender responsive policy outcome (outcome 5.1),
Budget	Budget - \$26.35m

Annex 6: Analysis of countries that have adopted a common UN planning framework (inc. DaO)

The table below uses a diverse range of information sources to build up a profile of countries that have adopted a common UN planning framework (including countries that have formally adopted the DaO Initiative) and to compare these countries with those where UNHCR has operations. The UNDG data is not consistently reported and may not be up to date but is the best information available on the adoption of common planning frameworks. Countries that have adopted the DaO Initiative are highlighted in red. The UNHCR country information is taken from the 2014-15 Global Appeal.

Country	LDC (2014) ¹¹⁵	MIC (up/low) ¹¹⁶	Common UN planning. F/W ¹¹⁷	DaO countries ¹¹⁸	UNHCR operation ¹¹⁹
Afghanistan	✓		✓		✓
Albania		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Algeria		Upper	✓		
Angola	✓	Upper	✓		✓
Argentina		Upper	✓		
Armenia		Lower	✓		✓
Azerbaijan		Upper	✓		✓
Bangladesh	✓		✓		✓
Barbados			✓		
Belarus		Upper			✓
Belize		Lower	✓		
Benin	✓		✓	✓	
Bhutan	✓	Lower	✓	✓	
Bolivia		Lower	✓		✓
Bosnia & Herzegovina		Upper	✓	✓	✓
Botswana		Upper	✓	✓	✓
Brazil		Upper	✓		✓
Burundi	✓		✓	✓	
Burkina Faso	✓		✓		✓
Cambodia	✓		✓		
Cameroon		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Cape Verde		Lower	✓	✓	
Central African Republic	✓		✓		✓
Chad	✓		✓	✓	✓
Chile		Upper	✓		✓
China		Upper	✓		✓
Colombia		Upper	✓		✓
Comoros	✓		✓	✓	

¹¹⁵ List of least developed countries taken from

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf

¹¹⁶ List of MICs based on World Bank classification according to per capita income (lower = \$1,026 - \$4,035 and upper = \$4,036 - \$12,475). Available at <http://micconference.org/mic/list-of-mics/>

¹¹⁷ List of countries with UN Development Assistance Frameworks approximated from the country pages of the UNDG website.

¹¹⁸ List of Delivering as One Countries taken from the March 2015 update. Available at https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Delivering-as-One-countries_March-20151.pdf

¹¹⁹ List of UNHCR operations taken from 2015 Global Appeal Update. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/ga15/index.xml>. While efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the information, the interpretation of the data may not be entirely accurate.

Costa Rica		Upper	✓		✓
Côte d'Ivoire		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Croatia					✓
Cuba		Upper	✓		
Dem Rep of Congo	✓		✓		✓
Djibouti	✓	Lower	✓		✓
Dominican Republic		Upper	✓		✓
East Timor	✓		✓		
Ecuador		Upper	✓		✓
Egypt		Lower	✓		
El Salvador		Lower	✓	✓	
Equatorial Guinea	✓		✓		
Eritrea	✓		✓		✓
Ethiopia	✓		✓	✓	✓
Gabon		Upper	✓	✓	
Gambia	✓		✓		
Georgia		Lower	✓		✓
Ghana		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Guatemala		Lower	✓		
Guinea	✓		✓	✓	✓
Guinea-Bissau	✓		✓		
Guyana		Lower	✓		
Haiti	✓		✓		✓
Honduras		Lower	✓		
India			✓		
Indonesia		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Iran		Upper	✓		✓
Iraq		Lower	✓		✓
Israel					✓
Jamaica		Upper	✓		✓
Jordan		Upper	✓		✓
Kazakhstan		Upper	✓		✓
Kenya			✓	✓	✓
Kiribati	✓	Lower	✓	✓	
Kosovo (as Per UNSCR 1244)			✓		✓
Kuwait					✓
Kyrgyzstan			✓	✓	✓
Lao PDR	✓	Lower	✓	✓	
Lebanon		Upper	✓		✓
Lesotho	✓	Lower	✓	✓	
Liberia	✓		✓	✓	✓
Libya		Upper			✓
Madagascar	✓		✓		
Malawi	✓		✓	✓	✓
Malaysia		Upper			✓
Maldives		Upper	✓	✓	
Mali	✓		✓	✓	✓
Mauritania	✓		✓		✓
Mauritius		Upper	✓		
Mexico		Upper	✓		✓

Moldova		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Mongolia		Lower	✓		
Montenegro		Upper	✓	✓	✓
Morocco		Lower	✓		✓
Mozambique	✓		✓	✓	✓
Myanmar	✓		✓		✓
Namibia		Upper	✓	✓	✓
Nepal	✓		✓		
Nicaragua		Lower	✓	✓	
Niger	✓		✓		✓
Nigeria		Lower	✓		
OPT			✓		
Pakistan		Lower	✓	✓	✓
Panama		Upper	✓		✓
Papua New Guinea		Lower	✓	✓	
Paraguay		Lower	✓		✓
Peru		Upper	✓		✓
Philippines		Lower	✓		✓
Republic of Congo		Lower	✓		✓
Republic of Korea					✓
Romania		Upper	✓		
Russian Federation		Upper			✓
Rwanda	✓		✓	✓	✓
Samoa		Lower	✓	✓	
Sao Tome and Principe	✓	Lower	✓		
Saudi Arabia					✓
Senegal	✓	Lower	✓		
Serbia		Upper	✓		✓
Seychelles		Upper	✓	✓	
Sierra Leone	✓		✓	✓	✓
Somalia	✓		✓		✓
South Africa		Upper	✓		
South Sudan, Republic of	✓	Lower	✓		✓
Sri Lanka		Lower	✓		
Sudan		Lower	✓		✓
Suriname		Upper	✓		✓
Swaziland		Lower	✓		
Syrian Arab Republic		Lower	✓		✓
Tajikistan			✓		✓
Tanzania, United Republic of	✓		✓	✓	✓
Thailand		Upper	✓		✓
Turkey					✓
United Arab Emirates					✓
FYRO Macedonia		Upper	✓		✓
Togo	✓		✓	✓	
Trinidad & Tobago			✓		✓
Tunisia		Upper	✓		✓
Turkey		Upper	✓		
Turkmenistan		Upper	✓		✓
Uganda	✓		✓	✓	✓

Ukraine		Lower	✓		✓
Uruguay		Upper	✓	✓	✓
Uzbekistan		Lower	✓		✓
Venezuela		Upper	✓	✓	✓
Vietnam		Lower	✓	✓	
Yemen	✓	Lower	✓		✓
Zambia	✓	Lower	✓	✓	✓
Zimbabwe			✓		✓