

Annex 7: UNHCR INDEPENDENT COUNTRY STRATEGY EVALUATION: POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS

| Scenario | Status quo | Worst case | Best case |
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| Summary | <i>Stalled and contested transition causing continued insecurity and economic decline</i> | <i>Breakdown of transition process, high level conflict, instability and economic hardship</i> | <i>Progress in transitional governance institutions and peace, positive signalling</i> |
| VARIABLES/DYNAMICS | | | |
| Political | Contested transitional arrangements, continued discontent and popular protests. | Collapse of transition arrangements leads to high level instability. | National consensus on transitional process and handover to a civilian-led government reached. |
| UNHCR mandate | <i>GoS remains formally committed to the IGAD Solutions initiative on forced displacement, GCR etc. but scope for progress unclear; hiatus in key institutions due to personnel changes.</i> | <i>GoS commitment to international responsibilities diminishes; reform-oriented, competent GoS counterparts replaced</i> | <i>Government reenergizes efforts on GCR, NPPOC etc.; reform-minded officials re/appointed in key roles Sudan continues to play a constructive regional peace-making role in South Sudan through its chairmanship of IGAD.</i> |
| Peace | Stalled progress towards JPA implementation and fully inclusive peace; heightening intercommunal conflict. Transitional justice does not satisfy victims. | JPA collapse; renewal and spread of violent conflict by armed movements; narrow political settlement undermines prospects for peace | Inclusive peace processes, peace agreements implementation; transitional justice measures; |
| Security | Rising insecurity; crackdowns on protests; stalled security reforms; incidences of violations, GBV. Volatile operating environment for UN and I/NGOs; | Intensified insecurity, intercommunal conflict; rise in violent crime HR/IHL violations, CRSV. Operating environment drastically deteriorates | Improved security; JPA arrangements and security sector reforms implemented; Improvement in the operating environment. |
| Economic | Economic reforms stalled; economic stagnation; lack of finance, international investment; continued military control of key economic sectors. | Deepening economic crisis; end of macro-economic reforms; spiralling inflation rates; renewed sanctions worsen economic hardship. | Progress in macro-economic management; commitment to transparency, accountability, and civilian control of the economy. |
| Covid-19 | High volatility to new variants; limited capacity of basic state services; restrictions with moderate negative effect on service delivery/operations | Increase mortality/morbidity, healthcare breakdown; huge social and economic impact; lockdowns/restrictions impact service delivery | Vaccine rollout and uptake; healthcare strengthened; Covid restrictions lifted; basic service ministries reach/quality improved |
| Population movement | Limited return of Sudanese refugees including from Ethiopia and Chad. High likelihood of refugee influxes from Ethiopia; also potentially South Sudan; resettlement/ return limited; risk of internal displacement, migration. | Large refugee influxes (Ethiopia and/or S.Sudan); renewed displacement; outflows of Sudanese refugees; increase in youth migration. Increased trafficking of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Sudan. | Ethiopian refugee influxes diminish; 'go and see' visits from Sudan to Ethiopia increase; returns to/ from S.Sudan; reduction in internal displacement; voluntary return, resettlement; reduced outflows. |
| Sub-national: East | Risk of further influxes; tensions between HCs and refugees over resources; ongoing political tensions/protests; smuggling and trafficking | Increased ethnic fragmentation and political tensions; insecurity, smuggling, trafficking; humanitarian access decreases significantly | More inclusive political settlement, reduced intercommunal violence; improvements in security situation, livelihood, tackling of trafficking. |
| Sub-national: Darfur | Continuing intercommunal fighting; increasing fractures along ethnic lines; criminality and insecurity; constrained humanitarian access | JPA breakdown, full-scale conflict; access becomes extremely difficult; large-scale displacement; increase in trafficking. | JPA implementation, esp. security arrangements; inclusive peace process; progress on reconciliation, returns, livelihoods. Access improves. |
| Sub-national: Two Areas | Lack of peace, localised conflict; JPA transition arrangements in Blue Nile State threatened; situation in South Kordofan highly volatile; | GoS-SPLM fighting resumes in one or both areas, escalation of tribal conflicts; more internal displacement, accessibility increasingly difficult. | JPA implemented; SPLM-N Al-Hilu faction sticks to ceasefire, resumes negotiations; increased access to POCs with full GoS and SPLM-N cooperation. |

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| Regional | Border tensions, risk of spill-over of the Ethiopian conflict; some regional actors supporting military leaders; ongoing volatility in South Sudan | Spill over of neighbouring conflicts; border and/or water-related regional conflicts; some regional actors step up support for the military. | Border disputes solved, good relations maintained with all neighbouring countries; regional actors positively support transitional process |
| International community | Keen to support a civilian led democratic transition; development pledges and programming largely paused; focus on meeting rising humanitarian needs. | Limited engagement, condemnation due to HR violations; sanctions (individuals/ companies); high level of unmet humanitarian needs. | International community rallies support, eases conditions on cooperation; more foreign investment flows. |

