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Report on the Meeting of the Working Group of Government Representatives on the Question of Rescue of Asylum-Seekers at Sea held in Geneva, 5-7 July 1982
EC/SCP/21

International Protection (SCIP), 24 August 1982

Introduction

1. At its thirty-second session in October 1981, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme requested the High Commissioner to convene a Working Group comprising representatives of the maritime States and coastal States most concerned, potential countries of resettlement and representatives of international bodies competent in this field. The task of the Working Group was to study the various problems arising from the rescue, disembarkation and resettlement of asylum-seekers at sea, to elaborate principles and measures that would provide a solution and to submit a report on the matter to the Executive Committee at its thirty third session.

2. Pursuant to this request the High Commissioner convened a Working Group, which met at the Palais des Nations at Geneva from 5 to 7 July 1982. The Working Group had before it background documentation that had been prepared and compiled by the Office of UNHCR. These papers are available on request. A list of the participants is attached as Annex I.

3. In opening the meeting on behalf of the High Commissioner, the Deputy High Commissioner noted that the issues that the Working Group was asked to consider were difficult ones. On the one hand there was the fundamental humanitarian duty to rescue persons in distress, while on the other there was the need for ships' masters and owners to know that the persons rescued could be disembarked at the nearest convenient port of call and removed from their responsibility. Since inability to disembark could result in ships ignoring distress calls by asylum-seekers at sea, it was necessary to ensure that conditions were established to exclude any possible reason for failing to rescue. The problem of rescue at sea also posed difficulties for the flag States of rescuing ships, coastal States and resettlement States and it was hoped that the Working Group would address these various issues and work towards finding reasonable and mutually acceptable solutions. In conclusion he asked the Director of International Protection to assume the chairmanship of the meeting on behalf of the High Commissioner.

4. The Director of international Protection took the chair and welcomed the representatives present. He noted that the convening of the Working Group was timely in view of the. continuing flow of asylum-seekers in boats and indications that vessels were ignoring the distress calls of some of these boats. The problem of rescue at sea had already been considered by the Executive Committee, most recently at its thirty-second session in 1981. The Committee had placed on record that the rescue of asylum-seekers had been facilitated by prompt disembarkation at the next port of call, the provision of resettlement guarantees by flag States of rescuing ships and by the existence of a pool of resettlement guarantees under the DISERO scheme. Recent statistics indicated however that fewer ships were now picking up fewer people and that many asylum-seekers were drowning in unseaworthy boats. This situation was of serious concern to the Office and it was hoped that the international community would take all possible measures actively to encourage the rescue of asylum-seekers in boats. This would involve addressing the complex issue of the appropriate division of responsibilities in the context of international solidarity between coastal States, flag States and countries of resettlement. Solutions to these various problems were essential to ensure that the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers were fully respected. Finally, the Working Group was also asked to, examine the problem of stowaways, which, although not of the same magnitude as rescue at sea, merited consideration because of the similarity of issues involved.

Adoption of Agenda

5. The following Agenda was unanimously approved;.

(i) General Discussion.

(ii) Relevant international legal norms

(a) The importance of rescuing asylum-seekers at sea, the duty of the masters of vessels and the need to facilitate compliance with this general rule;

(b) The problems connected with the disembarkation of asylum seekers rescued with special reference to:

i. the role and interest of flag States, charterers and owners of vessels;

ii. the role and interest of States of ports of call and other coastal States.

(iii) Practical measures

Implementation of the principle of international solidarity and burden-sharing with special reference to:

(a) the provision of resettlement guarantees by the flag State or under the DISERO scheme;

(b) possible arrangements for widening participation in DISERO;

(c) resettlement priorities; granting of resettlement opportunities and arrangements for resettlement; difficult cases.

(iv) Problems connected with stowaway asylum-seekers.

(v) Adoption of the report.

General Discussion (Item 1 of the Agenda)

6. The Representative of the Netherlands gave a historical summary of the events leading up to the present problems arising from the rescue of asylum-seekers at sea. He pointed out that when the phenomenon of asylum seekers leaving their homeland by boat first arose in South-East Asia they could normally be disembarked at the next port of call. Due to the growing number of asylum-seekers, however, some coastal States adopted a more restrictive attitude and either refused disembarkation or allowed it only after protracted negotiations or permitted it only upon receipt of resettlement guarantees. This development led to a certain reluctance on the part of ships' masters to rescue asylum seekers at sea, which in turn gave rise to concern on the part of the international community. As a result of this concern the matter was considered on several occasions by the Executive Committee and various practical measures were identified to meet the situation, viz: the provision of resettlement guarantees by flag States and the establishment of a scheme of disembarkation and resettlement offers (DISERO) to meet cases where resettlement in the flag State could not be envisaged. A clear obligation to rescue any person in distress at sea, including refugees, was imposed by various international instruments. This obligation rested in the first instance on ships' masters but coastal States were also tinder a duty to assist in rescue., when these international instruments were adopted, however, it was not envisaged that the persons rescued might not as in the case of asylum-seekers enjoy the diplomatic protection of their home country and could not be returned to their home country. As had been reaffirmed by the Executive Committee at its thirty-second session, asylum-seekers rescued at sea should nevertheless be disembarked at the next port of call. At the same time States that because of their geographical situation were faced with a large-scale influx should receive immediate assistance from other States in accordance with the principle of equitable burden-sharing. In the present context the application of this principle had been very successful and as a result hundreds of thousands of refugees had been granted asylum and resettled. This situation led his Government to suggest that coastal States should no longer regard resettlement guarantees as a precondition for disembarkation. The withdrawal of this requirement would facilitate compliance by ships masters with their duty to rescue. It would also put an end to the present disparity in resettlement opportunities between those asylum-seekers who reach the coastal States in their own boats and those who do so after having been rescued at sea by passing vessels. This disparity had no basis in international law which called for non-discrimination and was unacceptable from a humanitarian point of view. Finally, the withdrawal of guarantee requirements would also serve to ensure that the flow of refugees from coastal States to resettlement countries could take place in a more orderly fashion.

7. The Representative of Australia said it was not practicable, in the view of her Government, to seek to formulate detailed, legally binding principles on state responsibility for asylum-seekers rescued at sea, both because of the varying and unpredictable circumstances in which rescue situations could arise and the reluctance of States to bind themselves to any rigid rules. The existing applicable rules were not originally drafted to cover a situation of mass exodus and, in her view, the responsibility of States must be governed by the broad circumstances of each situation. There were, of course, broad principles that would apply across the board; principally that States must respect the fundamental well-being of the asylum-seeker and that they must ensure that he was not subjected to refoulement. There was also a paramount duty to rescue. The key principle in all cases was international solidarity. The response in each situation had to be worked out in the context of international solidarity and against the background of broad humanitarian principles; if it was to be effective, however, it would have to take practical account of the realities of each particular situation. Practical considerations demanded the improvement of practical arrangements. One such arrangement was the DISERO scheme, which Australia believed had in the main operated satisfactorily but could be improved. The Australian delegation would be making specific proposals in relation to this scheme at a later point.

Relevant International Legal Norms (Item 2 of the Agenda)

8. Introducing this item, Mr. S Bari, UNHCR Legal Adviser for South East Asia, enumerated the various international legal instruments that laid down a clear obligation to rescue at sea. in regard to disembarkation, however, the rules were not so clear cut. While rescue and disembarkation normally went together, problems had arisen in the case of asylum-seekers rescued at sea in South-East Asia due to the large number of persons involved and their lack of diplomatic protection. The matter should, however, be approached according to the principles relating to asylum and, in particular, the need recognized by the Executive Committee that in the case of large-scale influx, asylum-seekers should at least be granted asylum on a temporary basis. As regards flag States, their obligations beyond the duty to rescue were neither implicit nor explicit. Although they were under no obligation to grant durable asylum, they had nevertheless been willing to provide resettlement guarantees, which was felt to involve an undue burden by those countries having a large maritime trade. Finally, he stressed the importance of international solidarity and burden-sharing in resolving the various problems that arose.

9. In the ensuing discussion, the unqualified nature of the duty to rescue at sea was unanimously recognized. Some speakers recalled that this norm had been reiterated in the recently adopted Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 98). One speaker believed that the obligation to rescue was not sufficiently clearly defined and should be appropriately strengthened by, for example, placing a clearer responsibility on ships' owners in addition to the responsibility of ships' masters. There was agreement that ships' masters should not in any way be held liable for undertaking rescue. It was nevertheless considered that to seek to redefine the obligation would be inappropriate and one speaker pointed out that any uncertainties were corrected through effective implementation in national legislation. one representative remarked that the legal obligation was to render assistance to persons in distress, which did not necessarily require these persons to be taken on board in all cases. He further considered that the problem of refugees taking to sea in large numbers had created a new situation, which would not be resolved by imposing stricter obligations on ships' masters. A more effective approach might be to reduce the disincentive to rescue by facilitating disembarkation.

10. In reference to the remarks made on the desirability of amending the nature of the obligations of ships' masters in respect of rescue, or rendering assistance to people at sea and of allowing ships' masters to disregard owners' instructions in some cases, the representative of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) stated that his headquarters had advised that no member State had so far made any such proposals for consideration by the organization. However, if the Working Group were to make any specific proposals in this regard, these would be brought to the attention of the appropriate intergovernmental bodies of IMO on a request from UNHCR accompanied by a statement of the aims to be achieved. The representative of the IMO also stated that in regard to the 1979 Convention on maritime Search and Rescue there were currently nine States parties and that the Convention would enter into force 12 months after 15 countries had become Contracting States.

11. As concerns the responsibility of coastal States to permit disembarkation, there was general agreement that the situation was less clear than the obligation to rescue. While persons rescued at sea were normally allowed to disembark, this was not specifically provided for in the relevant international instruments. Some speakers considered that an implicit obligation could be derived from existing international legal instruments and that this obligation was no different in the case of asylum-seekers. Other representatives believed that the responsibility of coastal States to allow disembarkation could not be derived from existing rules and that the matter had to be viewed in the wider context of international solidarity and burden-sharing. By permitting disembarkation, therefore, coastal States were assuming their part of the burden. This view was reiterated by one representative speaking for the four ASEAN member countries present at the meeting, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. These States believed that they had done more than other countries in sharing the burden of the refugee problem in South-East Asia. other speakers considered that there were certain accepted standards that could help to resolve the question of disembarkation in the case of rescued asylum-seekers. In this connection, some speakers drew attention to the conclusion adopted by the Executive Committee at its thirtieth session that persons in large-scale influx situations should at least receive asylum on a temporary basis. Attention was also drawn to the conclusion adopted by the Committee at its thirty-second session according to which persons rescued at sea should normally be disembarked at the next port of call. Recognition of these principles would in itself require coastal States to permit disembarkation of rescued asylum-seekers.

12. Some representatives expressed the view that primary responsibility for asylum-seekers rescued at sea lay with the flag State of the rescuing ship. one of these representatives indicated it was the policy of his Government to consider asylum-seekers rescued by its ships as qualifying for resettlement in his country. Another representative stated that his Government's policy was to provide guarantees of temporary refuge rather than permanent entry since it frequently happened that rescued asylum seekers wished to resettle elsewhere. Some representatives felt that to place a responsibility on the flag State, although relieving the burden of the coastal State, nevertheless resulted in a distortion of the principle of equitable burden-sharing. There was general agreement that flag States together with other States forming part of the international community had a responsibility to relieve the burden falling on countries of first asylum when confronted with situations of large-scale influx. One representative expressed the view that the responsibility of the flag State was to ensure that persons in distress at sea were rescued but that after disembarkation its responsibilities in regard to burden-sharing were no longer derived from the fact of its being the flag State but of its being part of the international community.

13. It was recognized that the central point at issue was to devise arrangements to facilitate disembarkation and resettlement, thereby ensuring that asylum-seekers in distress at sea could be rescued. in this connection, some speakers suggested that coastal States no longer make disembarkation subject to resettlement guarantees. The concerned coastal States represented at the meeting, however, indicated that it was unfortunately not possible for. them to dispense with this requirement.

Practical Measures (Item 3 of the Agenda)

14. Mr. K. Feldmann, Chief of the Resettlement Section (UNHCR) introduced this item by citing the figures of boat people rescued at sea since 1980. Although the general flow of asylum-seekers crossing the high seas in South East Asia continued, proportionately fewer of them were being rescued by a decreasing number of ships. He detailed the various stages of rescue and disembarkation and the difficulties connected with each of them. As regards disembarkation, these difficulties resulted in the main from delays caused by negotiations between port authorities and flag States for obtaining resettlement guarantees. The DISERO scheme was at present not fully utilized and currently some 600 places were still available. This indicated that fewer asylum-seekers were being rescued by ships of open registry.

15. In the ensuing discussion one representative raised the question whether the disembarkation of rescued asylum-seekers should be limited to the next scheduled port of call. He drew attention to a recent case in which asylum-seekers had not been permitted to disembark at an intermediate port even though a resettlement guarantee was available. Another representative however expressed the view that the practice referred to was correct since otherwise rescuing ships might be encouraged to proceed to different ports where asylum-seekers could be more easily disembarked. The representative of the International Maritime organization (IMO) stated that the Legal Division of his organization was not aware of any formal multilateral agreement containing provisions to the effect that people rescued at sea should be disembarked at the "next scheduled port of call".

16. As to practical arrangements, some speakers mentioned the possibility of facilitating disembarkation by either devising new mechanisms or improving existing ones. one speaker raised the question whether rescued asylum-seekers without resettlement guarantees might not be disembarked at refugee processing centres pending arrangements for resettlement. Other representatives suggested that the period of stay permitted under a guarantee might be extended from three to, say, six months. The representative of the Philippines, speaking on behalf of the four ASEAN members present at the meeting, stated that rescued asylum-seekers could only be admitted to RPCs on the basis of definite resettlement guarantees and that the accumulation of a residual caseload was not acceptable.

17. Other speakers considered that, while present arrangements for disembarkation were working satisfactorily, the possibility of improving these arrangements, e.g. by extending the duration of stay on the basis of resettlement guarantees, could usefully be examined. They also believed that measures that might impede the smooth working of existing arrangements might give rise to further problems and should therefore be avoided. One representative considered that the problems that the DISERO scheme was designed to meet represented only a small element in a very much larger resettlement operation.

18. Some representatives considered that a solution to the problem could be found in the expansion of the DISERO scheme through wider participation by Governments and its application to broader categories of asylum-seekers. One representative proposed that the scheme might also be expanded to include not only resettlement offers but also a funding arrangement to meet the costs related to rescue, disembarkation and temporary admission. While the exact scope of the Fund would be a matter for discussion, contributions from it could also go towards meeting certain resettlement costs. DISERO would become DISERFO, i.e. Disembarkation, Resettlement and Funding offers. Some representatives expressed interest in this suggestion and at their request an informal working paper on the matter circulated. While recognizing the interest of this suggestion, one representative indicated that her delegation had certain difficulties in regard to its contents.

19. Other representatives supported the idea of supplementing present arrangements by a scheme whereby flag States would establish an annual upper limit of resettlement opportunities for asylum-seekers rescued at sea. An integral part of this scheme would be the establishment of a pool of unconditional resettlement offers that UNHCR could draw on when the ceiling of resettlement offers provided by flag States had been utilized. Such a scheme would permit the more orderly planning of resettlement movements while at the same time facilitating disembarkation by meeting the requirement of resettlement guarantees. It would not affect the DISERO scheme, which would continue to meet the specific objectives for which it was established.

20. At the close of its debate on the various problems related to the rescue of asylum seekers at sea, the Working Group retained the suggestions made below:

(i) The obligation to rescue asylum-seekers in distress on the high seas is fundamental and should be strictly observed and facilitated by ships' masters, ships' owners and concerned States. Ships' masters should not in any way be held liable for undertaking rescue;

(ii) In regard to a possible strengthening of the obligation to rescue at sea, UNHCR should maintain contact with IMO with a view to determining what further action should appropriately be taken to this end;

(iii) Compliance with the obligation to rescue should be facilitated by the removal as far as possible of all difficulties resulting from rescue, especially as regards costs and the disembarkation of rescued asylum-seekers;

(iv) In accordance with the conclusion on problems related to the rescue of asylum-seekers in distress at sea adopted by the Executive Committee at its thirty-second session and pursuant to established international practice, asylum-seekers rescued at sea Should normally be disembarked at the next port of call. Moreover, in cases of large-scale influx, asylum-seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted at least an a temporary basis. All States should assist in facilitating disembarkation by acting in accordance with the principles of international solidarity and equitable burden-sharing in granting resettlement opportunities;

(v) In line with the principles stated in the preceding paragraph, coastal States should be given appropriate guarantees that they will not be left with a residual caseload;

(vi) The willingness demonstrated by a number of flag States in providing resettlement guarantees has permitted large-scale disembarkation and has thus encouraged the rescue of asylum-seekers on the high seas. Pending the possible relaxation of the requirement for resettlement guarantees or the adoption of alternative arrangements, it is desirable that the present practice be maintained subject to such improvements as can be introduced. Such improvements could, for example, comprise arrangements for the provision of resettlement guarantees with greater speed and/or providing for a longer period of stay on the basis of resettlement guarantees;

(vii) The scheme of disembarkation and resettlement offers (DISERO) has fulfilled a useful function in providing resettlement guarantees in cases where these could not appropriately be provided by flag States. Additional resettlement places should, however, be made available under the DISERO scheme as and when the need arises and further Governments should be invited and encouraged to participate;

(viii) Consideration could also be given to the possibility of expanding the DISERO scheme to include a funding arrangement (DISERFO);

(ix) Consideration could also be given to the possibility of replacing and/or complementing present arrangements for the provision of resettlement guarantees by a more comprehensive and general scheme comprising flag States and other countries including resettlement countries. under such a scheme, flag States would assume a responsibility to provide resettlement opportunities up to a specified limit to be determined by them in consultation with UNHCR. In order to ensure equitable burden-sharing, other States able to provide for resettlement opportunities would put at the disposal of UNHCR a number of unconditional resettlement places. Flag States could also participate in providing additional resettlement opportunities for the operation of such a comprehensive scheme. Such a scheme could also include funding arrangements. One of the aims of such a scheme would be to increase speed and effectiveness as compared with the present system. Another aim would be to obviate the necessity for explicit national resettlement guarantees required up to now in order to fulfil the disembarkation procedure, and thereby to facilitate the rescue of asylum-seekers at sea through the co-operation of all States.

21. The Working Group felt that the various suggestions made above should be the subject of a study as regards their feasibility and implications, to be carried out by UNHCR, which should submit a preliminary report on the matter to the Executive Committee at its thirty-third session.

Problems Connected with Stowaway Asylum-seekers (Item 4 of the Agenda)

22. In introducing this item, Mr. F.E. Krenz, Chief of the General Legal Section (UNHCR), described the difference between stowaway asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers rescued at sea, which lay mainly in the mode of embarkation. There was, however, a similarity in the problems related to their disembarkation. Although the number of such cases was small, the problems that they caused were proportionally greater and it would be useful to find some general consensus among States as to how to solve them. The International Convention on Stowaways of 1957, which, however, had not yet entered into force, specifically mentioned the situation of asylum-seekers. It was possible to consider stowaway asylum-seekers as being in the same situation as ordinary asylum seekers arriving at a land frontier. Certain States regarded the flag States as having a primary responsibility for stowaway asylum-seekers, but in the absence of a link with the flag State special consideration should be given to the intentions of the asylum-seeker.

23. In the ensuing discussion, a number of participants expressed the view that stowaway asylum-seekers should be treated essentially as ordinary asylum-seekers. In this connection, reference was made to paragraph h (iii) and (iv) of the Conclusions on Refugees without an asylum country (No. 15), adopted by the Executive Committee at its thirtieth session, which they believed could also be applied to stowaway asylum-seekers. Some representatives drew attention to the fortuitous character of the connection between the stowaway asylum seeker and the., flag State. One representative also drew attention to the fortuitous character of the connection between the stowaway and the country of the first port of call.

24. A number of participants stated that when stowaway asylum-seekers arrived in their respective countries, their asylum requests would be examined according to the established asylum procedures. Whether or not they would qualify for asylum was, however, a different question, to be determined according to the facts of each case. One representative considered that when a stowaway asylum-seeker arrived in a State that was party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and where asylum procedures existed, it would be difficult to deny him these facilities. Due to the nature of the problem, however, it was difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules.

25. Another participant explained that when a stowaway asylum-seeker was not considered to qualify for asylum or resettlement in his country, the flag State was regarded as having ultimate responsibility.

26. The view was expressed by one representative that each case should be considered on its own facts and that practical solutions rather than legal norms should be sought. She suggested that stowaway asylum seekers were the primary responsibility of UNHCR, which should pursue the most appropriate durable solution. She also considered that it would be useful to ascertain the actual practice of States both in regard to stowaway asylum-seekers and to rescue at sea, and made a suggestion, supported by another representative, that UNHCR compile a compendium on such practice.

27. A number of representatives drew attention to the frequently complex character of cases of stowaway asylum-seekers, which made it necessary to seek solutions on a purely humanitarian basis. such solutions should appropriately be sought by UNHCR.

28. Two representatives suggested that where all resettlement options had been exhausted the flag State should be responsible for the residual problem.

29. At the close of the debate on the question of stowaway asylum-seekers, the Working Group suggested the following principles:

(i) Like other asylum-seekers, the stowaway asylum-seeker must be protected by the principle of non-refoulement against forcible return to his country of origin;

(ii) While it must be recognized that there are at present no positive international rules dealing specifically with stowaway asylum-seekers defining the respective responsibilities of the States involved, such asylum-seekers should be given the special consideration that their situation demands;

(iii) They should, whenever possible, be allowed to disembark at the next port of call and given the opportunity of having their asylum request examined under established national procedures;

(iv) If necessary, UNHCR should be requested to assist in finding a durable solution.

Working Group on the Rescue of Asylum Seekers at Sea (Geneva, 5-7 July 1982) List of Participants

Chairman: Mr. Michel MOUSSALLI, Director of International Protection

Representatives

AUSTRALIA

Miss Erika FELLER, First Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva

CANADA

Mr. M.J. MOLLOY, Counsellor, Permanent Mission, Geneva

DENMARK

Mr. M. BENDIX, Head of Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Miss S. JENSEN, Assistant Chief Constable, of Ministry for Supervision of Aliens

Mr. Arne Piel CHRISTENSEN, Secretary-General of Danish Refugee Council

FRANCE

Mme. M.S. WATINE, Chargé de Mission, Ministere des Relations Exterieurs

Miss S. CARTA, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva

GREECE

Mr. T. HALKIOPOULOS, Deputy Special Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. C. IVRAKIS, First Counsellor, Permanent Mission, Geneva

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

Mr. F. LAMBACH, First Counsellor, Permanent mission, Geneva

INDONESIA

Mr. Jono HATMODJO, Director General, Social and Cultural Relations and Foreign Information, Department of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Roeslan SOEROSO, Senior official, Department of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Witjaksana SOEGARDA, Official, Department of Foreign Affairs

Miss Djudju DJUBAEDAH, Attaché, Permanent Mission, Geneva

ITALY

Prof. G. KOJANEC, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

JAPAN

Mr. Takashi SAITO, Legal Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Kunio SHIMIZU, First Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva

MALAYSIA

Mr. Azman NAZIR, First Secretary, Permanent mission, Geneva

NETHERLANDS

Mr. M. Den HOND, Asylum Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mrs. Trienke KOK, Read, Refugee Section, Ministry of Social welfare

Mr. Hilbrand NAWIJN, Head of the Asylum Section, Ministry of Justice

Mr. Hans VAN DEN DOOL, First Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva

NIGERIA

Mr. Olufemi OWCAJE, Counsellor, Permanent Mission, Geneva

NORWAY

Mr. Ragnar ASKEEIM, Head of Division, Ministry of Justice

Mr. Vegard ELLEFSEN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PHILIPPINES

Mr. A. MANGUIAT, Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. C.V. ESPEJO, Attaché, Permanent Mission, Geneva

THAILAND

Mr. V. BHINYOYING, Counsellor, Permanent Mission, Geneva

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. J. SIDDLE, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth office

Mr. B.D. ADAMS, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva

UNITED STATES

Mr. R. PAIVA, Refugee and migration officer, Permanent Mission, Geneva

COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX ROUGE (CICR)

Mr. F. AMAR, Chef de la Division Agence Centrale de Recherches, Genève

Mr. C. WENGER, Membre de la Division Juridique, Geneva.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR MIGRATION (ICM)

Mr. D. HUNTER

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION (IMO)

Mr. F.D. MASSON, Director, Liaison Office, Geneva

UNHCR

Mr. M. MOUSSALLI, Director of International protection

Mr. I.C. JACKSON, Deputy Director

Mr. M. FARTASH, Deputy Director

Mr. K. FELDMANN, Chief, Resettlement Section

Mr. F.E. KRENZ, Chief, General Legal Section

Mr. S. BARI, Legal Adviser for South East Asia

Miss B.J. GRAINGER, Legal Officer

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